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7It is, without a doubt, impossible to have started this project, much less finished it, without the 
help and support from my parents, Augusto Millán and Eugenia Caceres de Millán. Early on, as 
a child, there was no doubt in my mind that we were a family of a scholars, creatives, and out of the 
box thinkers. We were also told that it was through learning and schooling that we could excel in life. 
This excelling was not about pursing wealth, although certainly that was also encouraged, but 
rather that the pursuit of intellectual curiosity was a natural exercise for our minds. My mother’s 
favorite saying was that if we didn’t use our minds, they would atrophy. Consequently, academia 
was a space in which I could continue to learn and grow. Ultimately, if I had not been raised with 
those values from my parents, I would have never undertaken this program and gleaned so much 
from the structure and the pace in which it was set. 
My curiosity took me to Europe to complete my Masters in Business Administration where I crossed 
paths with two people who became pivotal to bringing me into the program, this experience and 
the product that you, the reader, will see unfold in this book.
Hugo Letiche was a professor of mine at the Rotterdam School of Management and during his 
Business Ethics class, he planted a seed in the ground when he mentioned the PhD program he was 
also directing. While I did not take him up immediately on his offer – or his second one – to join the 
program, I was finally convinced when I read a chapter out of one of the thesis he was advising. It is 
Hugo Letiche’s brilliance, understanding of theory, and his relentless questioning that made me 
realize I had a much more interesting story in my hands that I originally thought I did.
Another professor that was critically instrumental to the success of this project has been Geoff 
Lightfoote. Geoff patiently sent me all the requests for journal articles and other research material 
whenever I would hit him up for sources; he patiently waited for me to unfold the real story I was 
trying to find in my data; and finally, when the story was out, he helped pull out of the story the 
really interesting bits. His knowledge and skepticism of the financial institutions that we have today 
helped me tell a more complete story of the financialization of the corporations listed in this book. 
I want to thank my friend and former classmate Robert Earhart, who has also been instrumental 
not only to convincing me to do the program, but to also help me navigate it despite my physical 
distance – and was also brought to me through my schooling at RSM. 
Another obvious acknowledgement also has to go to the company that I studied. Having 
employed me for almost a decade, I have been given the time to see the waves of change that it has 
undergone in that time. I cannot thank my manager enough for not even batting an eyelash when 
I mentioned that I wanted to pursue my doctorate and to write exclusively about the company. He 
gave me access to any resource that I could get (if it was available) and supported me without 
question my pursuit of the program. It is rare to find this kind of manager and I am grateful I ended 
up reporting to him. Consequently, I also want to thank all of my coworkers who gave me information, 
“It has been decided that all books are the work of a single author who is timeliness and 
anonymous.”
 Jorge Luis Borges, Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, Ficciones
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8who talked to me about my project, who gave me ideas, who allowed me to interview them 
throughout the course of this project. Without you, both in your friendship and your knowledge, 
much of this book could not have been written. It is their experiences that dot this entire thesis. 
Amongst my other family and friends, I also want to highlight someone who helped me 
throughout the writing process. Stephen Wagner was supportive from the start and helped me 
believe that I could give birth to this book. He worked as my reader, questioning not only my 
language, but also my ideas, helping me be a responsible writer to my readers, as Jorge Luis Borges 
would have insisted. 
I want to thank my sister Catalina Millán Cáceres, for her love and support and who always asked 
me how I was doing on my thesis. But more importantly, I want to thank her for my two nephews 
who proved to be good distractions and also good motivators to get back on track with the writing! 
There are others who also need a special mention because they were patient and understanding 
and heard too much of the inner workings of my mind and this project amongst other favors: Hector 
Vazquez for opening his home at a moments’ notice when I needed a couch to sleep on as well as 
Gregoire Galperine and his couch (and especially for his patience), Maria Letiche, Thomas Sivo, 
David Norton, Pauline Weiss, Bryan Bornhorst, Carolina Pincetic, Scott Tetzlaff and my wonderful 
girlfriends: Susan Molina, Angela Castaño, Fatima Arosemena, and Maruchy Perez (who gave me the 
gift of cycling to clear my head). 
I also have to thank the friends that I neglected during the pursuit of this program, those friends 
who still remained even after I crawled into seclusion to finish writing this project. They never 
questioned my desire to pursue this and started planning for the celebrations a year before this 
book was completed. I owe artwork, time, travel, and some semblance of a social life to them now 
that I am done. 
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“Reality is partial to symmetries and slight 
anachronisms”
Jorge Luis Borges, 
The South
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An Autoethnographic Story: Like Alice…
I wanted the offer and I pushed for it. I told them that I had another offer from 
another company—and it was true. But I really wanted to work for this company, not 
the other one. The Human Resources department eventually came back to me with an 
offer of employment. I guess I had impressed them, too, because the company could 
have easily declined the option and told me that I could go take the other position.
Yet here it was. And I said yes—after a little salary negotiation, of course. 
The excitement of the offer wore off quickly, though, when I suddenly realized 
that I knew very little about what I was getting myself into. I started to research the 
company a bit more and even emailed my interviewer and the HR contact for more 
information on the company and the position. However, all I was told was to fill out 
a form for a corporate credit card and to call the travel agency to book my trip from 
Miami to New York for my first day at headquarters. I asked again about maybe just 
getting an organizational chart of the company. That at least might help me understand 
where I fit into the larger group.
The answer was resoundingly, “No, we don’t have that.”
I asked again, thinking maybe HR had misunderstood. HR must have some 
kind of map as to how the organization is structured. Again, the answer was “no.” I then 
asked my new manager if it was possible to get one—surely if HR didn’t have one, the 
department would. My new manager promised that if anything was found, it would be 
sent to me. But again, nothing arrived. I was really confused at this point.
I dismissed the worry it created, though. I would start this new job in about 
a month and I would surely find the missing organizational chart then. Someone would 
have it— I just hadn’t found the right person yet. Surely a company of this size, history, 
and reputation had to have some kind of formal orientation program, a new hire 
booklet, or maybe even some classes on the business.
But it never came. 












Like Alice falling through the looking glass, I immediately recognized that this organization was 
unlike any other in which I had previously worked. The missing organizational chart—a document 
that would take another two years to finally materialize—was just the first of many situations that 
I would experience and anecdotes that I would retell to friends and family about my confusing, 
absurd, frustrating, and incongruous first year at my new company.
During my interview, more of which the reader will learn about later, I had sensed that there was 
something slightly “off” about this company. But I was unprepared for what I uncovered once I was 
actually working inside the organization. I did not know what questions to ask, and even if I had 
known, I am not sure I would have understood what the answers meant. While the search for the 
organizational chart confused me, later receiving the offer letter, filling out the application for the 
American Express corporate card, and planning the flight, hotel, and car service for my first day of 
work fit into a well formalized and documented process of any new employee in a management 
position. I was reassured by these structured events, despite the missing chart. The fact that neither 
my new manager nor the Human Resources department could provide something as simple as an 
organizational chart really was a minor detail, an anomaly (I assured myself ), something that I could 
sort out later when I found out where these documents were kept or who to ask about them. 
But even as I entered this new company and a new industry—advertising—and learned who 
belonged to my department, and the other myriad of staff that supported or drove our work, the 
organizational chart never materialized. In my head, however, I was filling in the pieces of the 
missing chart, slowly creating the lines that formed the relationships and the hierarchical structure 
of the organization. The highest positions were the easiest to understand; it was clear who the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the company were. But only one or 
two levels below, the lines began to blur. Again, I did not understand. Who was in charge? Why 
wasn’t that clear? Who was leading the organization? Or even my department?
In trying to understand those questions and seeing the blurred lines of authority, hierarchy, and 
processes, I understood the reluctance to create an “org chart” (as we called it). In fact, even creating 
the org chart would have been a formalization of power and control. The period during which 
I entered the organization had been marked with significant change and upheaval in the department, 
so trying to pin down even a rudimentary org chart seemed like a waste of time. However, that did 
not stop me from attempting to create one as the weeks passed by, especially because newcomers 
to the group were also asking for one. The problem, of course, was that I did not have all of the 
information necessary from all of the different groups in the organization, and I also was in no 
position to start asking how and where I could gather such information. In the midst of changes to 
the organization, pressures from outside shareholders, client losses, financial downturns, and more, 
the environment was too unstable and uncertain to actually produce a chart.
It was a year or so later that I finally received a draft version of that elusive organizational chart. 
After a year of restructuring and personnel changes at all levels of the group, management ultimately 
issued a “draft” chart in an attempt to begin to define the new departmental structure. However, 
once I actually saw the chart I realized—only a year into my new job— that I had ended up in an 
environment that was completely different from the one into which I was first hired. This intrigued 
me, and so the genesis of my research was born.
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Introducing the Researcher
The facts and mechanics of how I ended up in this organization can be answered as simply as 
saying that I identified the job opening, interviewed with the hiring manager, and was offered the 
position. But the more esoteric question is less about how I physically ended up there and more 
about how I stayed (and thrived) in the company despite my lack of understanding of how the 
organization could possibly function in the midst of the seeming chaos and turmoil.
I always wanted to work in advertising. I remember that during my senior year in college, Leo 
Burnett, a well-respected advertising agency, was recruiting freshly minted college students to be 
account managers in their offices around the United States. Somehow, I missed the recruiting stage 
of the process because I only found out later that some of my classmates had been hired for those 
roles. Despite missing out on this opportunity, I kept it in the back of my mind, even as I entered 
other industries. It was finally in my late twenties that I had another chance to join the advertising 
industry, after having worked in financial services, publishing, manufacturing, travel, and consulting. 
In ironic juxtaposition to the seeming disorganization I found when I joined the company, my 
interest and love of advertising stemmed from my family upbringing and the desire to be financially 
stable in a broader discipline that is not necessarily known for its financial security: art. I liked the 
advertising industry because it married into a single career the disparate essences of my parents—
my artistic, painter mother and my structured, businessman father. Even more ironically, my entry 
into the advertising world ultimately had nothing to do with anything remotely artistic; I have never 
worked for an ad agency as a “Creative,” nor have I involved myself in advertising account 
management, although that might have been a strong option had I been recruited into the 
advertising world right after college or after obtaining my MBA. Instead, I took a more circuitous 
route into the industry; I came in through the technology side of the business—a side that has 
become increasingly more important as new media take over the industry—and I came in through 
a conglomerate holding company that owned and controlled an incredible number of advertising 
agencies around the world. 
However, the dissonance between what I knew about working in an organization (in any 
industry) and my Odyssey-like chase of the organizational chart left me with more questions than 
answers. The need to understand the logical processes behind the behavior of the people in my 
group was, for me, almost primal in nature. This was where my academic and career worlds crashed 
into each other, head on.
After spending two years attempting to create or find a stable organizational chart (and 
understand where I fell within that chart), I realized that the career path I had experienced in other 
companies did not exist here. I became even more intrigued (and occasionally frustrated). I was 
ambitious, and so I wanted to see what options I had in terms of growing in my career and on what 
paths. Numerous drafts and attempts to pin down the structure and chart my rise through that 
structure though were a waste of my time. That chart—like the organization itself—neither revealed 
itself to me nor gave me an answer to my queries. 
Yet the chase is something that I enjoyed because of the challenge it presented. I had changed 
both positions and industries in my search for an environment that not only found my skills useful, 
but that also kept me interested and engaged. The challenge that this company presented is 












explored throughout the chapters in this book, particularly in my autoethnographic essays.
Ultimately, the need for the challenge—and the genesis for the research—was part of a larger 
desire to be intellectually engaged and to solve both the problems I encountered in my daily work 
and the mystery that was the industry and the organization. I had grown up in an environment in 
which I was challenged by my parents and the schools I attended to expand my perceptions and 
understanding of my life experiences. Finding a company that could offer me a similar challenge 
was all I was looking for. 
Introducing the Company
As of this writing, I continue to work in the advertising industry and for the same company. The 
conglomerate I work for is one of the largest advertising and media companies in the world. It has 
thousands of employees, with revenues in the billions of dollars.
In Chapter Four I will delve deeper into the advertising industry and its history. But for now, as 
an introduction to the company, allow me to contextualize the industry and the company:
As one of the largest media and advertising conglomerates in the world, my company is involved 
in various areas within the advertising industry. Traditional creative advertising is the most common 
and well-known area of the industry, as it is the branch that brings commercials and print ads to our 
televisions and glossy magazines. With television and magazine advertising there is a lesser known 
industry of media buyers, separate agencies whose sole purpose is to understand demographics for 
different media (e.g., television ads, print ads, and internet) and sell the actual media slots to clients; 
that is, specific times and places into which advertising can be inserted to reach a target audience. 
A relative newcomer to this sector is the digital or interactive agency, which specializes in online 
sales and product placement on websites, and more recently, a focus on the creation of new 
technologies such as downloadable applications that are promoted by an advertiser and sold to the 
consumer. 
One business area in the world of advertising that is often forgotten, but is critical to 
understanding the industry is the role of holding companies. These conglomerates are just as 
dominating today as they have been for the past thirty years. Historically, advertising agencies 
merge with each other in order to grow or remain financially stable, but they had not created 
conglomerate-level corporations to handle different areas of business or streams of revenue. This 
changed in the 1970s, and the industry took a different turn and saw its first publically traded 
conglomerate. This conglomeration of the industry is further explored in Chapter Four along with 
the impact it had on global advertising. 
Turning to my own experience in my company, I was first hired by a holding company into its 
Program Management office, a new department that had been created to help formalize and 
implement a series of best practices into the organization. The goal of the department was to create 
processes and procedures, where none had existed before, and to apply these processes across all 
the corporate departments. The program management office spanned not only the technology 
departments, but also crossed over into the other areas that were servicing the corporate 
departments and agencies in the group. These corporate departments included Real Estate and 
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Audit. My responsibilities in the department were to be focused on the technology projects, 
specifically within Latin America. Other members of my department were focused solely on 
applications or infrastructure projects, but at a global level, and with no specific regional focus. 
The holding company itself is large, with thousands of employees and revenue in the billions of 
dollars. The company is structured with agency brands that are comprised of hundreds of offices, 
located all over the globe. These offices reported regionally, then globally to the agency brand. The 
agency brand then reported to the holding company. The agency brands compete with each other 
in their local markets, as well as globally, despite working for the same conglomerate. Traditionally, 
at the time I had joined the company in the mid-2000s, the agencies were not accustomed to 
working together. However, throughout the last decade, this has changed as the industry changed 
its perspective on collaboration among advertising agency brands. 
The creation of the program management office was relatively new; it had only been in existence 
nine months or so when I joined the group. Until that point, the department had managed to 
centralize the documentation of projects under one system that was accessible globally. The 
powers-that-be had also given the program management office the authority of approving capital 
expenditures that belonged not only to the conglomerate, but also to the advertising agencies in 
the group. This scenario was aligned with the best practices as dictated by the Project Management 
Institute. These best practices indicate that moving an organization to a more mature model of 
strategically managing projects can be effective and efficient—“An organization can consider its 
investments to ensure that together they address strategic business objectives and project 
interdependencies” (Project Management Institute, Inc., 2008). Whoever had given the program 
management office this power was also driving to make the organization more project-centric. 
I later learned that this was a series of steps that had been taken in the years prior in an effort to 
bring the technology departments into the conglomerate, but which had brought about some 
significant power plays. 
The program management office did not last long. When I came on board, the organization was 
in a state of flux (a state which I later learned was almost a permanent one), as upper management 
had recently changed. This brought about a series of further restructurings, including the elimination 
of my department, as a new management tried to implement new structures and projects, to make 
their mark on the organization. It is also important to note, especially in the descriptions of the 
organization, that the level at which I joined the company was solidly middle management. 
Although I was joining a specific group (Project Management Office) the technical aspects of project 
management (and technology, subsequently) were left to other employees who were considered 
subject-matter-experts or lower level employees who had to perform the work. As middle 
management, my coworkers and I were responsible for helping implement the strategy (setting the 
strategy was done at a much higher level) and we were rarely asked to do hands on technical work, 
although many of us could still remember how to do it (or still did it, but as a hobby or out of 
necessity). 
The company as a whole was undergoing a sea of change, and these changes were deceptive to 
a newcomer like me. I had made the (ultimately mistaken) assumption that the perceived turmoil in 
the department and in the company was solely due to the changes in management. However, it 
became clear as the years went on, that this was not the case. This evolution of understanding the 
rationale behind the seeming chaos, further fed into the genesis of this research.












Like any newcomer to an industry and company, there is fundamental knowledge and 
understanding that you learn after a period of time and experience. Part of my initial confusion in 
the company was probably based on my lack of that basic foundation. But once I started reading the 
trade papers in the kitchenette of my office (I had the luck to have a desk at a Public Relations 
agency who collected all types of newspapers and magazines, including industry ones as part of 
their daily operations) I filled in some of the gaps. I was able to begin to grasp that some of the chaos 
was due to the type of industry we were in – tight deadlines on the part of the agency – versus the 
actual strategy that my department was trying to implement. I also realized that we, as a department 
and as a group, seemed to know so little about the industry. I knew some of my colleagues came 
from the agencies, so I hoped they had a sense of the business. But many others were newcomers 
like me, having worked in telecommunications, finance, and manufacturing before making it here.
I began to realize that my technology department was overhauling the way that technology had 
been managed and prioritized (or lack thereof ) in the agencies and at the holding company. A few 
years prior to being hired, another Chief Information Officer (CIO) at the company had begun, after 
working with some external consultants to analyze the state of technology internally, and to 
centralize some of the technology operations in the company. Because the conglomerate had been 
acquiring all kinds of advertising agencies and advertising networks for already two decades, the 
levels of technology across the different agencies were varied and a lot of effort was duplicated. The 
pressure to reduce costs, to equal the amazing shareholder returns that company had once had, was 
strong and reducing bloated overhead was the goal of the centralization. At the time, certain 
technologists in the agencies were identified for their good reputation and significant achievements 
within the agencies and slowly they were being interviewed and offered positions at the holding 
company level. They were introduced to the centralization efforts, and began to operate as a group 
with informal approvals to proceed. 
The lack of mandate in the technology area was partly responsible for the turmoil and chaos 
that I found myself in. Initially, this seemed almost like willful mismanagement. I did not understand 
why something that could have eased all of our work would not get done. The company, at the time, 
was in no position to send down a mandate if they could not prove that it would actually benefit the 
bottom line of the agencies. The goal was always to focus on the business of advertising, not 
necessarily on centralization efforts. In reality, I later found out that it was also about appeasing the 
company’s shareholders, in addition to (instead of?) the business of advertising. But this also applied 
to many of the other corporate groups. As corporate departments, we were both at a “higher” level 
than the agencies, but with an inferiority complex, because we did not interact with clients or bring 
in our own business. The result was a lot of people agreed that it was a good effort to pursue, but we 
had very little upper management focus or commitment. 
In 2005, about six months before I was hired, upper management started looking more closely 
at the centralization efforts because centralization and efficiency had become part of the strategy 
for the company. No longer was it enough to make a good effort try on behalf of the agencies. The 
holding company technology department had to be part of a fiscally conservative, efficiency 
producing, and post-Sarbanes Oxley controlling environment. Suddenly, the three departments of 
technology, procurement, and compliance, became critical departments for the holding company. 
Staffing for these was ramped up. 
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I was hired in one of those sprees, as were many of my coworkers, in 2006. Many of them came 
from the agencies, as former agency technologists they now became “holding company” engineers, 
operators, and managers, specializing in specific areas, rather than generalists as many had been 
before. There were specific departments for each of the services that were offered centrally to the 
agencies – i.e. services for email, networks, help desks, datacenters, corporate applications, project 
management – with the objective of providing the best of class to the agencies, and doing it at 
a large enough scale that it was affordable. The creation of these services also created a very chaotic 
environment, as new technology was being brought in to agencies that in many cases were ten 
years behind in their technology development. All this activity sorted out those who ended up 
working on the services that were being offered, those who became lower-, middle-, and upper-
management. Surprisingly, many of the new “outside” hires were for positions in middle- and upper-
management. 
Since my middle-management role was primarily to implement the strategy was that was set by 
upper-management, some of my first experiences related to discussing with (selling) the agencies 
the benefits that these services would have, long term, for them. We were asking them to increase 
their investment as well as increase their level of technology. Despite the fact that this was the era 
of the post-Dot-com crash, the agencies still did not see the value in technology in their day to day 
business. So, their client needs always came before any investment in technology. Invariably, an 
agency (locally), would find themselves with a client that needed a certain level of quality technology 
to give them the business, and we would be asked to implement projects, from one day to the next. 
This also produced chaos as the holding company never rebuffed the agencies’ clients’ needs. 
All of these changes were happening at once. There was resistance to new implementations of 
projects to improve technology, to creation of new departments and groups in the centralized 
Technology department, and to shifting levels of management adding more and more chaos. 
Because all of this was happening at once, it seem logical to assume that eventually that the level of 
commotion would die down, as positions were sorted out, projects were finished, and some kind of 
structure was determined. I genuinely thought the the new CIO and his seemingly old-fashioned 
approach to technology would create some of kind of structure, order, and process. However, 
I would be proven wrong. This is not to say that the CIO did not try – he assigned his managers 
carefully and required them to follow and old style information technology organizational chart 
(which kept changing), but even that did not prove to be structured enough to match the changes 
that the organization insisted on bringing into the group. Part of it was due to the needs of the 
holding company that changed as upper management implemented the strategic plan that they 
promised Wall Street and the shareholders. The overall plan was the same at a very high level – 
increase value and share price for shareholders – but the execution was subject to changes in the 
stock market, competitor activity, global economic impacts, and retention and acquisition of clients 
and their marketing budgets. All of these affected the overall financial statements of the company, 
which the internal departments were subjected to various mandates to appease shareholders and 
analysts.
Sometimes, the turmoil was internally created within our own department. I remember the day 
that the CIO announced in a meeting with his upper management, and some of their direct reports, 
that he wanted to get twenty thousand users on the new email system the company was 
implementing. The prior year, the department had managed to get one thousand users -- at most. 
The new number seemed to be arbitrarily chosen, possibly as a means to test the management in 












the room. Eyebrows were raised, but no objections were voiced. Later, the managers and engineers 
involved in that project all objected to the number. The CIO was giving them less than eight months 
to finish a project that was more than just “adding” twenty thousand mailboxes! He was also asking 
that the agencies that fell within those twenty thousand mailboxes invest in infrastructure, in order 
to connect globally with the holding company. This was a tremendous effort, due to the technical 
details, the widespread impact on existing infrastructure, and the risk of failure combined with the 
wrath of the agencies that would be left without their lifeblood of email. It was nerve-wrecking to 
hear my coworkers claim it was impossible to do the project and to see that nothing happened for 
approximately three months, seemingly as though the group was frozen in fear of the enormity of 
the project. I suspect that a lot of those three months were spent in the private meetings with the 
CIO and his direct reports, trying to convince him it was not possible to meet the deadlines.
 As part of the project management office, I had been hired to oversee all the technology 
projects in my region. Being part of the project management office meant that I was supposed to 
track, oversee, and document all the projects, as well as create best practices and implement them 
in the region. It was a significant step forward in my career and I had a natural knack for project 
management. However, from the first day of this new job, I found myself in an environment where 
not only was there no tracking, there were no documented projects, no standards or best practices 
for what we were doing. I started off in the first few weeks of this new position completely lost – the 
organizational chart was a minor annoyance at that point – and frustrated at the lack of information 
available to do my work. Under my own initiative, I started writing out documents that formalized 
some kind of process or procedure that the department would share worldwide. Despite my efforts, 
and assurances from my department management that the work that I did in that area was great, 
the documents were stored on a server somewhere, never to be seen or used again.
The documentation and tracking of projects was really a wasted effort with all the changes and 
turmoil in the organization. Subsequently, in the second half of my first year and into the second 
year, I was assigned to work on the email project that the CIO had mandated down. However, our 
region had not received the money or the approval to proceed, so we stayed put for a few months 
as we watched it unfold elsewhere. However, my regional technology department was anxious to 
be part of this project and we set off to do what the other regions were doing – to start the process 
of convincing the agencies that this was the right project to do because our holding company was 
centralizing the technology. I attempted to use all the best practices and processes I had learned at 
the Project Management Institute and documented who was responsible for each task, developed 
the milestone events, the communication plan, and I had even set up a risk register for the project. 
Everyone who worked on the project was told that I was leading the project and that I had to be 
kept informed of the status, through emails and the weekly calls I set up. Yet, despite all the attempts 
to manage and control, I found out, on one of the status calls when someone did not show up that 
they had taken a trip to another country to help set up the email project there. No email was ever 
sent, permission was never requested, and I had no idea that the country needed additional help 
and had requested this person to come. It was more than just lack of communication or a breakdown 
in the levels of authority. It was part of the culture in the agency – something (project, campaign, 
etc.) needed to be completed (for the client) at all costs, therefore, everyone is “authorized” to 
proceed, at all costs. 
Part of the tumult in the company stemmed from the multiple projects that were always in 
progress. It was impossible to be focused on one project – even if you avoided trying to join another 
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one, you would be recruited to work on a second and third project. It was not possible (and possibly, 
not affordable) to have everyone focused on one thing. I realized later that this was part of the 
character of the industry. There were always multiple projects going on, some starting as others 
finishing. Advertising agencies always have an eye out for when clients are reaching the end of 
a campaign, in order to get more business for their product or for a new one or planning for the new 
version of the same campaign or sending the client to other departments in the agency. There were 
departments in the agency that were exclusively focused on the flow of work among the different 
departments, with the goal to manage the amount of work each area was getting, and estimate the 
amount it time it would take to complete what was promised. Many of these departments had 
project managers that took up this work as well, but traditionally the traffic department just 
managed the flow.
The email consolidation was just one of the major projects being undertaken globally. The 
overall goal of the company was to centralize as much as possible under the guise that this would 
bring cost savings at the holding company level. The aggregate level in this strategy was critical, as 
many of the agencies had been managed disparately and thus they could decide and manage their 
own level of technology investments. This was a vestige of the slew of acquisitions and lack of 
integration among the different agencies. Although many of these agencies wore the same name, 
under the surface, their origins were different and no work to integrate them into one system had 
ever been accomplished. At the time, I did not realize that part of the work was to reinforce that 
these local agencies (contained in their own bubbles) were part of a regional structure that was part 
of a global group, which was part of a holding company listed on a stock exchange somewhere. The 
concept of this behemoth of an organization that ran not only a global operation, but multiple lines 
of business, was almost inconceivable. There was a tension between what we were trying to do at 
a global, holding company level, and what the local agencies wanted to do. I faced their resistance 
regularly which made the work I was trying to do that much harder. We no longer had to only 
consider actual project implementation and the management of those resources, but we were also 
being asked to convince the agencies to agree to projects, since it affected their bottom line. 
Because there was a huge distance (literally and figuratively) between what was decided at a global 
level at headquarters, versus what was heard locally, the resistance did not abate. 
The other component that dominated much of the chaos in those early years was Audit, later to 
be called Compliance. The Dot-com bust had brought about in the United States a series of corporate 
failures that leading to measures such as the Sabarnes-Oxley Act, and other countries followed suit 
with similar rules and regulations. All of these laws required a series of efforts to improve the 
documentation and transparency of financial statements, internal processes, and what was generally 
referred to as “control” – an auditable and consistent procedure for external parties to review 
economic behavior. For a conglomerate of this size, the effort was considerable and the requirements 
were strict. These rules went counter to the way that the holding company had been operating for 
many years and completely counter to the way that the agencies had historically functioned. This 
was compounded by geographic distance, because the agencies in countries that did not have 
similar laws had little concept of the enormity or importance of these, to the regions or countries 
that did. Because the technology departments usually managed and controlled many of the 
systems, our work included creating the controls, testing them, and ensuring that they were 
followed. 












My first two or so years in the organization were focused on such technology projects and audit 
processes. Again, the initial job description had not included running projects directly or any of the 
audit and compliance components. My position had invariably shifted into something different and 
new, without a change in my title or salary (or whether or not this was a higher, lower, or lateral 
move in the hierarchy). As the economic climate started to change, most of us in the organization 
feared for the end of our position or of the company itself. I learned informally that the advertising 
industry was a barometer for the economy. And as the global economy continued to meltdown, 
analysts and others looked at the different sectors in the economy as tea leaves for telling the future 
of could possibly be coming. That year the company battened down the hatches waiting for the 
worst to pass and to see how badly we were affected. I spent the time trying to read the tea leaves 
myself, analyzing bits and pieces of information with my coworkers, trying to figure out if we would 
be laid off, or we would survive. I started to educate myself on the industry, a task I had not taken 
seriously until then. It was also during this period of time, that our company’s stock price fell 
drastically and then rose again. The company was focused on those numbers and on the reports 
sent to analysts and shareholders. Coworkers fretted over their company stock as it continued to 
descend. When the dust started to settle, there was a shift in the company, as it started to focus on 
other markets, where the economy had not been battered so severely – in other words, they started 
to look at my region. 
My role in the company shifted with the recession in the United States. My predecessor had 
moved into a new position within the company, albeit with some concerns about his job security. 
He had come to the conclusion, however, that he did not have job security with the position he left. 
It was given to me, informally. The project management office had been dismantled (more on this in 
later chapters) and with the continual shifts in the organization, I was now facing new challenges in 
running the region (without any formal recognition of the new role, new title, or increased salary, of 
course). With new attention on our work (and profit margins) I began to focus on a strategy for the 
region based on the fundamentals of the conglomerate technology department. On one hand, I knew 
that the global attention was limited, until larger regions recuperated economically, and I wanted to 
show that my region was as successful as any other. On the other hand, some of my coworkers, at 
the regional level, had left to other areas (in and outside the company), so I had a lot of work dropped 
in my lap. Focusing on the basics of centralization and standardization was a good solid foundation 
that I could cling to. But every step of the projects was met with responses of why it had to be 
slightly different or take longer. A lot of the responses were centered on meeting profit margins (we 
had to show the shareholders that the company was doing well, despite the recession). It became 
abundantly clear that there were three areas that my department had to balance – the need to meet 
shareholder expectations, internal strategy, and the business itself. Sadly, it seemed as though the 
three were never aligned with each other. I spent a lot of my time understanding the strategy of the 
agency against the possibility of implementing these projects and the context of these two with the 
larger picture of the demands of a publically traded company. This deepened my understanding of 
the business and our general pressures, but it did not make the strategy any easier to implement.
A year or two after this period, my career in the company started to shift again. I was asked to work 
at one of the advertising agency networks in addition to the work that I did for the holding company. 
Having feared for my job during the recession, I had no qualms in accepting the second position – I expected 
that the work would be an interesting turn to what I was already doing, I was also hoping it meant 
more job security. Although all the regions had started to stabilize and clients were spending money 
on advertising, we still feared the bottom would give way and we would be back in a free-fall. 
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This foray into the advertising agency sealed my love for the industry. I had worked with the 
conglomerate on projects that were focused on cost savings and efficiencies, on stretching 
resources, and finding ways to get everyone standardized and on the same templates. It was hard 
work because it was difficult to get everyone to agree on the principles and it was not rewarding 
work – no Financial Director or CEO would ever email our department to thank us for the work. Quite 
aside from the lack of financial or emotional rewards, the work itself was somewhat removed from 
agency operations. By working inside an advertising agency, I saw the humdrum of what builds the 
overall network of agencies working for the conglomerate. I saw the advertising that we produced 
and the awards that my agency was winning. Through minor things, like approval of budgets, 
I learned the technology needs of an advertising agency. I began to understand how the technology 
helped (or not) the agency and how some of the expectations of the conglomerate seemed so 
removed from the reality of the day to day. This continues to be my experience, as I am still working 
for the agency and for the conglomerate. I am still trying to manage the two worlds that I find myself 
in.
These experiences, along with that of my coworkers, are further detailed in the remainder of this 
book. The organization’s shifting and changing aspects are so constant that it is almost predictable 
in its changing nature. I still meet newcomers who enter the organization and find it completely 
baffling, and I later confirm that they have no previous advertising experience. The newcomers that 
look like veterans usually came from other conglomerates in the industry. 
The Research; A Road Map through Liquidity
The oft-forgotten dimension of the advertising industry—the holding company and its 
influence—also lacks theoretical literature and research. The industry knows that the holding 
companies run everything within the advertising industry, but everyone seems to focuses on the 
front office, on the advertising agency and the product it makes or the clients it has. But there are 
hundreds or even thousands of people that do the back office and corporate functions (such as 
technology, compliance, procurement, and others) and they are part of the bigger organization. 
These employees are quickly forgotten, their contributions a mere comment on a PowerPoint 
presentation to shareholders that identify a corporate group. Rarely do the heads of these corporate 
groups receive any recognition (external or internal) for the work that has been done, any cost 
savings that have been accomplished or recognition for the improvements throughout the 
company. A quick search on Google Books or Google Scholar reveals very few publically searchable 
academic papers or books that focus on the advertising holding company. However a search on 
advertising produces an incredible number of books, articles, and websites dedicated to the act of 
advertising. Academic and investigative work tends to focus on the creative aspects of advertising—
questioning or critiquing the influence of advertising on a specific demographic, trends in the 
industry, niche advertising markets, types and effectiveness of research, and more recently, on the 
impact of digital advertising on the industry. There is little information on the holding company or 
its employees. To me, the experience of working within a holding company and the dynamics within 
the industry was not only of interest, but also worthy of academic pursuit. It is these employees that 
inhabit the world of the corporation (beholden to shareholders and financial analysts) and the 
world of the advertising (beholden to clients, award shows, creativity eccentricities). 
This research is my attempt to share my autoethnographic experiences and those of several 












other individuals in my organization that work in the back offices of an advertising holding company. 
The people who participated in my research are mostly at the management level or are individuals 
who interact heavily with middle management. The Technology, Compliance, and Procurement 
departments of the holding company are interlocked because of the nature of their work and the 
similarity in the overall mandate to centralize as much as possible in each of the areas. Thus all three 
departments have been included in the research via the experiences and stories of certain individuals 
in each area. Additionally, the research also includes several individuals’ experiences in the 
advertising agency (as well as my own). Similar to the holding company, the agencies also have 
technology departments, which are identified as such in the research. 
As is common in most technology-centric departments, and especially in middle to upper 
management, the gender breakdown is heavily skewed to the male side. Today, at the middle 
management level, there are only two women out of eight staff members, including myself. Until 
a few years ago, the CIO did not have any female executive managers reporting directly to him. 
Within this male-centric environment, my colleagues are in the 35 to 55-year-old range, well 
educated, with college degrees at minimum, and various types of masters level degrees (including 
masters of business administration, masters in computer science, and such). Some of the staff in the 
Technology department had entered the company around the same period that I had. For the most 
part, our tenures are similar in terms of years in both the industry and the company. Other technology 
staff members had worked in the industry for well over a decade or longer. 
Additionally, advertising agency upper management is also incorporated in my research. My 
extended network included access to top level technology directors and the CIO. I also had access 
to the agency CFOs, CEOs, and managing directors in my day-to-day activities as an employee 
within the company. While the latter management affected both my research and my daily work, it 
was the technology directors and CIOs (who were primarily in the technology departments of the 
agencies) who participated in my research. The members of this group also had college careers and 
had been part of the industry for decades, whether at this holding company or others. The gender 
breakdown was similar to that of the holding company’s middle management in the technology 
department. 
In Compliance and Procurement, the gender breakdowns were similar to that of the Technology 
department’s breakdown during the period of the research. This has since shifted in the past year, 
with certain positions in upper and middle management filled with women in Compliance. 
Procurement continues to have mostly male managers, however. Additionally, the employees in 
these departments were also similarly well educated.
All of these groups had a critical role in the organization, as they were in a position to push 
initiatives, roll out corporate or agency projects, help determine strategy, and address the problems 
and issues in daily operations. The levels of success or failure in the three departments were affected 
by the macroeconomic climate, as much as internal politics, and the talent of the staff. 
The data contained in this research is as accurate as I have been able to capture in the highly 
fluid environment in which I work. It is important to note that, as both researcher and participant, 
the limits of my data are based on my perspective and ability to interpret the information I collect. 
Furthermore, based on the request of both the company and those who became part of my data set, 
I have attempted to conceal the identities of the agencies in the organization and the employees 
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who shared their stories with me. In order to ensure open communication and full disclosure, I have 
agreed to change names and protect identities to the best of my abilities without affecting or 
compromising the information that comprises the data in this research. I realize that the research is 
not possible without theory. 
Data comes alive when it is interpreted, evaluated and commented upon. During my journey 
through the advertising holding company’s back office, the themes of chaos, (dis)order, and 
indeterminacy looked very strong. Zymunt Bauman is the sociologist of liquidity – i.e. of the sort of 
change I believed I was confronted with. Gerald Davis and David Harvey analyze the sort of 
financialization that seemed to drive my world. Thus throughout the chapters of this book I will use 
my autoethnographic experiences in an attempt to apply the theories of Zygmunt Bauman, Gerald 
Davis, and David Harvey, plus the language that these theorists engender in their work, to my 
industry, my organization, and my experiences . This approach was undertaken in order to better 
understand my organization and the actions taken by those within it, to adapt successfully to the 
environment of change. These theorists have given the data a framework of understanding that 
allows me to contextualize events and situations in a manner that both brings the data together and 
also attempts to explain to the reader the information contained in the book. The data in my research 
tests the theories presented in the framework chapters by examining whether the real-life examples 
do indeed fit within the theories discussed or whether there are deviations. Thus, the authors’ 
theories, tools, and language form a structure with which I analyze the data within the context of the 
company and the industry, and larger themes in society. And the descriptions of these experiences 
form a structure that substantiates or challenges the theories. 
While the seeds of this research were sown upon entering my organization, the research truly 
began to grow when I discovered Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity. Upon coming to 
better understand Bauman’s theory and his language of liquid modernity, certain decisions, 
activities, and other puzzling situations within my company and its industry seemed to fall into 
place. Therefore, the structure of this book will mirror my pathway of enlightenment. What I wanted 
to understand, through this research, was whether the theory of modern liquidity applied to this 
industry? If so, how was this liquidity being expressed on the holding company level? More 
specifically, how were the employees in these corporate departments handling the liquidity of the 
organization? Lastly, was the liquidity purely based on the type of industry or were the financial 
markets affecting the liquidity of the company as well? While Bauman had used very descriptive 
language and examples from other sociologists and philosophers to develop the theory of liquidity 
modernity, I was curious to understand how the theory meshed with a specific example in 
a multinational advertising holding company.
Ultimately, my research is intended to understand the extent of liquidity in my organization and 
in my industry; and of course, to actually see what liquid modernity looks like in an concrete 
corporate environment. Thus, the goal is to find in how far that Bauman’s theories can be applied to 
the ethnography found in this book. The resulting effects of applying the theory show that there are 
variations found in how Bauman had predicted the theory, versus the actual practical effects of the 
liquidity in the organization. Primarily, the largest difference in the theory versus the results of 
research, show that the threat of frailty of human bonds – a common theme in Bauman’s theory of 
liquid modernity – leads to very different results than what was predicted. Holding company 
employees in this research find themselves grasping on to the relationships created with each other 
as the one constant in the changing and evolving environment produced by the industry and the 












financialization of the industry. Ultimately, there is a strong social quality to the work that permits 
the social bonds to be strong and unexpectedly to provide stability. 
In Chapter Two, I will discuss the theory of liquid modernity in more detail and explain Bauman’s 
background, so the reader can understand how he arrived at some of the theoretical conclusions he 
reached. Chapter Two is critical as a starting point because Bauman’s theory set in motion a deeper 
understanding of the overall macro-level forces that were affecting the industry, my organization, 
and my personal experiences within it. Upon viewing the organization with this new-found 
understanding, my experiences looked very differently. By the end of this book the reader should 
understand why some of what I had originally labeled as “mismanagement” was not a lack of 
knowledge or experience on behalf of my management, but rather a set of processes that make 
sense under the social construct of Bauman’s liquid modernity, but which at first I did not understand.
The data is presented as a set of sketches and stories, told in an autoethnographic manner. This 
autoethnographic methodology allows for a deeper insight into the organization from my 
perspective. It also allows the reader to experience my initial thoughts and impressions during my 
attempt to make better sense of the environment I was in. 
With the theoretical underpinnings and methodology of my research in place, Chapter Three 
will introduce the first series of autoethnographic stories, to demonstrate how the theory of liquid 
modernity may apply to my organization. But my interpretation of liquid modernity is also structured 
so it can be applied to any company. Just as Bauman’s theory takes into account a variety of different 
disciplines, the goal of Chapter Three is to demonstrate to the reader how the theory of liquid 
modernity can be applied to any corporation, not just a holding company in the advertising industry. 
The autoethnography will show that the theory and language of liquid modernity can be applied to 
any organization, regardless of the industry or specific company.
In Chapter Four, the origins of the advertising industry are further explained and explored in 
order to contextualize the industry within the theory of liquid modernity. From the perspective of 
liquid modernity, the advertising industry has played a role in the modernization of society. This has 
created an industry unlike others; this is an industry that has a set of different processes than those 
seen in traditional manufacturing companies. Through my analysis of the advertising industry, and 
the companies that compose it, the reader will understand how liquidity permeates this world.
The next set of autoethnographic stories, in Chapter Five, will build upon the greater 
understanding of liquidity in the advertising industry, in order to demonstrate the liquidity 
I encountered as a participant. I had the benefit of working within both an advertising agency and 
a holding company, which provided me with two different perspectives almost simultaneously. This 
series of autoethnographic stories will show how the liquidity of the advertising industry is perceived 
through the agency perspective. 
Now firmly entrenched in liquidity, Chapter Six takes the reader on a different route. My previous 
professional experience and educational background in finance had taught me to “follow the 
money” when it comes to understanding a company’s behavior. I learned early on that corporate 
finance drives most, if not all of the decisions that are taken by a company; failing to heed corporate 
finance means financial ruin, especially for a publically traded corporation. Therefore, this chapter 
attempts to explain the impact of the financial community on the holding companies that dominate 
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the advertising industry today. As the importance of the financial markets in corporate decisions 
and society has changed in the last 30 years, the effects of these changes have created an additional 
level of liquidity in the organization. Using the theories of Bauman, Davis, and Harvey, plus insights 
from Karen Ho, this chapter will explain the sources of liquidity and reflect on their anticipated 
impact on the industry.
Just as I have used autoethnography to challenge the theoretical underpinnings of liquid 
modernity in the abstract and as applied to my organization, in Chapter Seven another set of 
autoethnographic stories are presented that relate to the financialization of the industry and the 
corporation. These vignettes will give the reader an understanding of the impact of bank and 
shareholder financial decisions on my organization and on the daily experiences of my own decision-
making and that of those around me.
Throughout this research, each autoethnographic story I present is analyzed immediately 
thereafter in order to explain the impact of liquid modernity on my experiences and to test whether 
the theories of liquid modernity are substantiated in the practice of an organization and the 
decisions being made within it. Furthermore, the vignettes will give the reader a taste for the 
experiences I’ve had during my tenure with the company.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I discuss how liquid modernity in an actual corporate environment 
appears somewhat different than in the theory as Bauman defines it. In fact, the definition of liquid 
modernity remains limited by the solidity of that definition. The autoethnographic sketches will 
show that the relationships that are created are much more solid than what Bauman believes 
relationships can be in a liquid modern environment. Invariably, the answer of the question on the 
elusive organizational chart will be laid to rest. Furthermore, this chapter will include a discussion on 
the constantly evolving advertising industry and some of the recent developments in the year since 
the research ended. Lastly, two autoethnographic vignettes will be included; one vignette will close 
a story already presented and the second one will be my own reflection on my experience through 
this research and my company. The liquidity of the industry means that it is constantly changing and 
evolving in response to the pressures from financialization and clients. Ultimately, is liquidity liquid? 
Or is experienced liquidity not really liquid at all?
The Books That Could Have Been
At the onset of any research project into a particular field of study, there are multiple paths that 
such research can take. Invariably, with a rich data set, the question arises as to which of those paths 
I could have taken. First and foremost, it was important for me to answer the question that haunted 
me from the very start of my career at the holding company– the question of the chaos and turmoil 
in the organization. Jorge Luis Borges said “it is generally understood that a modern-day book may 
honorably be based upon an older one, especially since […] no man likes owing anything to his 
contemporaries” (Borges, 1998) but in this case, I will acknowledge there are contemporary books 
that have both influenced the work herein but are not the books I chose to (re)write. 
Because I work for a corporation (an entity known for power relationships) a study on the power-
knowledge correlation within the advertising holding company could have been a book on its own. 
Along with Zygmunt Bauman’s definition of modernity, the rise of the individual and the power (or 












lack thereof ) from Michel Foucault’s theories, may say that I was identifying with my own exploitation 
in the industrial corporation. The liquidity in the organization and the industry may have shown that 
the people in this system (I) can work harder and harder for the interests of financialization. This 
subsequent book on power relations within the organization may present a study of the psycho-
social perversity of capitalism and how it liquefies all critique. Given my starting point, however, I did 
not observe the concept of “follow the power” within the data that I was collecting. Intuitively, 
Foucault’s theories in power and knowledge did not seem to bring clarity or understanding to the 
chaos I was documenting. The chaos might have been a strategy to maintain power and control in 
the corporation, but the symbols of power were being removed or never existed in this organization. 
The Panopticon did not work in the structure of this company nor of the industry as will be explored 
later in Chapters Two and Four. 
Because I work in a corporate technology department, this book also could have been easily an 
ethnographic study similar to the work by Gideon Kunda, who studied a company he calls High-
Tech Corporation. However, in contrast to my own experience, Kunda is an outsider to the 
organization; while he does participate in the research, he is never fully part of the company. The 
research I conducted for this book on the holding company departments is not only an ethnography 
of the employees within these departments, but of my own experience as a worker in the 
organization. This internal perspective is different, because as a worker in this organization, I was 
directly affected by the decisions and actions made by my company and coworkers. The insider 
position is critical to understanding some of the subtleties that an outsider cannot accurately 
capture; therefore, I could not have followed Kunda’s path.
Because I was a part of the organization that was studied in this research, I had to consider an 
alternative perspective. Karen Ho’s ethnography on Wall Street bankers is based on the point of view 
of an actual employee within the organization. However, my own research does not lead me to write 
a book on the critique of financial capitalism, as Ho does through her lens, using Peter Drucker and 
Pierre Bourdieu. While parts of her message are important and are later used in this book, the bulk 
of this research is not a means to criticize the financialization of the advertising industry exclusively.
Lastly, this book could have followed a path underpinned by critical marketing that is focused 
on the advertising product. Nevertheless, since the research was conducted on the experiences of 
holding company’s back office departments – where no production of advertising product takes 
place – had I examined the advertising product, the data set would have been empty. Additionally, 
there is already extensive work, from Erving Goffman and others critiquing the advertising product. 
This path has been well studied. 
The chapters that follow will set up the foundation for why this book had to be written following 
my own particular path. Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity allows me to examine the 
advertising holding company through the lens of liquidity to determine if liquidity accurately 
predicts the behavior of the holding company. Historically, we will understand how these advertising 
companies produced their organizations and whether liquidity is inherent in the structure and basis 
of advertising. The research data will show how liquidity is experienced in the company and any 
peculiar effects arise from an organization of this type. Lastly, with the financialization of these 
companies, a different type of liquidity will be explored. 
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Historical truth, for Menard, is not “what happened”;  
it is what we believe happened.
Jorge Luis Borges 
“Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”
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Theoretical Grounding – Zygmunt Bauman and Modernity
In the coming chapters I will use Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s ideas to give context to 
the story of the advertising industry, the influence of Wall Street on that industry, and on the 
autoethnographic snapshots of my experience inside an advertising holding company. Professor 
emeritus from Leeds University in the United Kingdom, Bauman has reached academic stardom 
through his theories on his concept of liquid modernity. Though not previously used in analyzing 
the advertising sector or the organizations within it, the works of Bauman are apropos, for Bauman’s 
originality lies “in his ability to make connections which have not previously been articulated” 
(Blackshaw, 2004, p. 12). This section will attempt to give the reader an understanding of the history 
and work that Bauman has undertaken and the basis for the terms and ideas that will be used later 
in this work. 
Zygmunt Bauman is a sociologist in the purest definition of discipline: one who studies social 
problems. However, rather than subscribing to one school of thought exclusively, Bauman has 
borrowed from many areas, including other disciplines beyond the realm of sociology. Bauman is 
noted for his extensive and eclectic influences. As a consequence, Bauman admits that he has not 
been part of the “inner circles” of academia; “I was never any good in the art of exegesis, in ‘sticking 
to the letter’ of hallowed texts, and it barred me from ever being admitted to any school or caucus” 
(Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 23). This notion of staying away from the cliques of specific schools of 
thought stemmed from his academic training in Warsaw, Poland. 
Studying sociology was not Bauman’s first choice. In fact, Bauman admits that had his family not 
left Poland at the start of the Second World War, he may not have studied sociology at all. In 1939, 
Bauman’s parents fled to the Soviet Union with their children to escape the poverty and anti-
Semitism that the family faced in their hometown of Poznan, as well as the invasion by the German 
Nazi Army. Bauman was only 14 at the time. Once in the Soviet Union, Bauman became an avid 
Communist Party member, and at the age of 18 he joined the Polish First Army so he could fight the 
Nazis. He was wounded in battle and won the Military Cross of Valor in 1945. In his army career, he 
proved to be an adept soldier and quickly rose through the ranks. 
It is important to note here that although Bauman and his family had faced anti-Semitism in 
Poland (which led him to join the Polish army so he could fight the Nazis), Bauman felt more Polish 
than Jewish. He believed in the promise that communism was making “this fairest of social systems, 
which would guarantee full equality between human beings regardless of language, race or creed” 
(Smith, 1999, p. 39). Bauman did not identify to others as Jewish, having resisted as a child his 
grandparents’ attempts to promote his religious character. Rather, he self-identified as Polish. 
Bauman had turned to the First Army because he had been denied access to the universities in 
the USSR, as he was a “Westerner.” Once back in Poland, he continued in the Army and as a member 
of the Polish Communist Party. He also started attending the University of Warsaw. It was there that 
he met his wife, Janina, in 1949. During his time in the army he quickly reached the rank of Major, 
and would have continued on a career in the Polish Army had he not been dishonorably discharged 
in 1953. Bauman was told he was removed from his post because his father had started to speak to 
the Israeli Embassy regarding emigration to Israel. This justification, however, turned out to be part 
of a larger anti-Semitic purge within the Polish Army. Bauman’s disillusionment with the Army and 
the Communist Party was born during this incident.



















Bauman returned back to academia to complete his degree in 1954, pursuing a Master’s degree 
in Philosophy, the only degree that was available to him that also aligned with his interests. Bauman 
had joined the University of Warsaw when the Stalinization of the country had limited the access to 
some of the academic disciplines that had previously been available (Smith, 1999). It was only later, 
after social science academics were able to return back to their old posts, that he started to focus on 
sociology. 
His early sociological thoughts were influenced by the importance of society during the 
Communist period in Poland. Sociology was presented as a way to tell the truth about society, so 
people looked toward sociologists for the “truth” that the government was not providing (Bauman 
& Tester, 2001). As a consequence, the Philosophy and Sociology departments at the University of 
Warsaw became intertwined and provided a unique situation where a dialogue existed between 
both disciplines. At the university, not only were Marxist and positivist theories taught, but also 
“scientistic and humanistic sociologies, evolutionist and structuralist approaches, ‘naturalist’ and 
‘culturalist’ vision of social reality, statistical and hermeneutic strategies” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 
20); each was explored and considered as appropriate in the context of sociological thought 
(Bauman & Tester, 2001)1. Bauman’s teachers instilled in him the idea that sociology did not need to 
resemble a science like physics, in which methodologies or theories proven incorrect needed to be 
relegated to the past. Sociology was allowed to question and doubt its ideas. It was this commentary 
and dialogue that Bauman credits to his belief that sociology “has no other—and cannot have any 
other—sense (and no other utility either) than of an ongoing commentary on human ‘lived 
experience’” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 20).
This period was important for Bauman’s development of his ideas and interpretations, which 
later emerged as a combination of Marxism (which became the leading norm of Polish government 
and society) and sociology. It further shaped Bauman’s preoccupation not only with the role of 
sociology in society, but with the forces that drive society. He became the first editor of a journal for 
sociology, one of two major journals at the university at the time. Bauman also became the Chair of 
General Sociology at the university during the mid-1960s. However, after a series of works, including 
one that criticized the effects of communism in Polish society and analyzed of the behavior in the 
Polish Communist Party, his books and articles were regularly censored (Bauman & Tester, 2001). 
By 1967, another wave of anti-Semitism rolled through Poland, forcing Bauman to resign from 
the Communist Party in January 1968. It was only three months later that he was dismissed from his 
Chair at the university. Following the incident Bauman and his family immigrated to Israel.
After arriving in Israel, Bauman found solace in a number of significant theorists that affected his 
ideas and thought processes. With his new-found disillusionment with the Communist Party—
seeing that men were fallible and could not, or would not, believe in “fairness”—he had to turn to 
someone other than Karl Marx to answer the problems that he perceived were unfolding in Poland 
and in the Communist Party. Bauman indicates that he learned significant frameworks and concepts 
from Marx; however, it was the “ossified form of the ‘official’ vulgate version of Marxism” that 
disenchanted Bauman (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 26). 
1 C. Wright Mills, Bauman quotes, said about Warsaw at the time: “How lucky you are and happy you must be – 
the leader of the country responding to philosophical tracts! No one at the top pays any attention to what I’m 
doing” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 28).
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Bauman found Antonio Gramsci, who became a great influence in his beliefs. Through Gramsci, 
Bauman was able to conceive of an ethical way through the altered Marxism that was being 
implemented in the Eastern Bloc. Bauman affirms that Gramsci showed him that people were 
“possessed of the ability and power to make the world for themselves” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 9). 
But this is not to say that Bauman sees sociology through any specific political platform; rather, he 
sees sociology as a means of finding the “dignity of humanity.”
The Baumans did not stay in Israel long, although Bauman had been offered a position at Tel 
Aviv University (Bunting, 2003). Instead, looking to turn to a country that was not embroiled in 
nationalism, the Baumans chose to settle in the United Kingdom, at Leeds University, where he had 
been offered a post. Prior to this move Bauman had spent some time at the London School of 
Economics, so he did have some experience in the academic world in the United Kingdom. At Leeds 
he worked on a series of books that would begin the process of showing how Marxism and 
emancipatory sociology could work together. Bauman was already a prolific writer in Poland and 
would continue this trend at Leeds. 
While at Leeds, Bauman focused on understanding the agents of social change: the state, the 
people, and the intellectuals. His goal at the time was to find a way of creating a better society, either 
through a better economic, governmental, or academic system. In the 1970s, he explored these 
three areas through four of his books: Culture As Praxis (1973), Socialism: The Active Utopia (1976), 
Towards a Critical Sociology (1976), and Hermeneutics and Social Science (1978)—texts that explore 
the change in society from the feudal system to the focus on “scientific rationality” and the “challenge 
faced by men and women in the present epoch is how to construct a new intellectual and 
sociopolitical order that can replace the positivistic monolith favored by capitalist and communist 
regimes alike” (Smith, 1999, p. 95).
Sociologist Dennis Smith infers that Bauman’s biographical information creates the basic 
foundations of his later social thought. The effects of his disillusionment with Marxism led Bauman 
to deconstruct why it failed, not only for his own set of beliefs, but also why it failed the rest of 
society. Smith argues that Bauman needed to understand why it failed in order to develop a new 
theory. It was through this deconstruction process that Bauman was attempting to create a new 
Marxist model that borrowed from Habermas and Gramsci. Bauman headed toward sociological 
hermeneutics rather than positivism or existentialism (Smith, 1999) in his attempt to find a solution 
to the failed Marxism. As the 1980s approached, Bauman began to focus less on the individual and 
more on the “social systems: state socialism in the East … and capitalism in the West” (Smith, 1999, 
p. 54).
This focus led Bauman to develop an idea of a social order that included both socialism and 
capitalism; Bauman called this order “modernity” (Smith, 1999). Bauman’s analyses of the two 
political and economic systems led him to show that each took from the other. He further “argued 
the whole of industrial society had become subject to a thorough and all-pervasive discipline which 
left no group untouched, including the controllers and administrators of capital” (Smith, 2010, p. 3). 
It was now that Bauman started to notice the hold that capitalism had gained on society, in which 
the state was not as strong as it had been. In his book Legislators and Interpreters (1987), Bauman 
suggests that it is now the time for intellectuals to participate in the translation “between sub-
cultures and traditions, explaining them to each other” (Smith, 2010, p. 3). Smith also identifies that 
Bauman believed that society needed to emancipate from “the positivistic monolith favoured by 



















capitalist and communist regimes alike” (Smith, 1999, p. 95). By the late 1980s, Bauman had given up 
the idea that a Marxist society could exist and that capitalism had won. However, according to 
Bauman, capitalism had created individualism in its wake (Smith, 1999). He continued to explore 
these areas in Freedom (1988) and Modernity and the Holocaust (1989); however, at this point, 
Bauman was already heading away from socialism and Marxism as answers to the issues that he saw 
plaguing society. The fall of the state-run communist apparati in the former Eastern Bloc only served 
to seal this belief.
Bauman’s last book of the 1980s, Modernity and the Holocaust, was a book that would not have 
been written if it had not been for Janina Bauman’s own memoirs, Winter in the Morning (1986), an 
account of her time during the Nazi invasion of Poland. Bauman admits that he had never considered 
the larger implications that the Holocaust had for society. He believed it had been a tragedy, but 
that it was an event that was separate from society. “My image of the Holocaust was like a picture on 
the wall: neatly framed, to set the painting apart from the wallpaper and emphasize how different it 
was from the rest of the furnishings” (Bauman, 1989, p. vii). Janina’s influence led Bauman to try to 
understand the greater implications of the Holocaust. Bauman no longer believed it was a separate 
tragedy that had befallen the Jews, but rather that modernity had created the powerful instruments, 
beliefs, and processes that made the Holocaust possible. Bauman wanted to propose one central 
message with this book:
They are all arguments in favour of assimilating the lessons of the Holocaust in the 
mainstream of our theory of modernity and of the civilizing process and its effects … The 
factors that came together in that encounter were, and are still, ubiquitous and ‘normal.’ 
(Bauman, 1989, p. xiv) 
The book became one of Bauman’s turning points in his understanding and definition of the 
term “modernity.” Rather than looking at “modernity” as simply the definition of a period of time that 
describes post-agrarian, post-feudal society, Bauman began to realize that modernity was 
a reiterative process that society had accepted by leaving behind the feudal and agrarian régimes of 
the past. This reiterative process not only affected the changes in society, the economy, the body 
politic, and power, but it also deeply affected the individual and his or her moral and ethical self. For 
Bauman, a tragedy like the Holocaust was possible because the processes that created modern 
society removed or prevented any ethical and moral claims in the small decisions of day-to-day life. 
Because these decisions were small, the sum total of the larger picture—in the case of the Holocaust, 
the systematic oppression, discrimination, and eventual massacre of millions—was not easily 
recognized by society. 
Modernity and the Holocaust garnered a lot of attention for Bauman due to its controversial 
nature. Rather than outright blaming Germany for the atrocities of the Holocaust, Bauman tried to 
show that an event like the Holocaust was possible in any country, not just Germany. It was the 
apparatus of processes, scientific thinking, and the push for perfection that made the Holocaust 
possible; Bauman argued that such factors are present in all modern countries.
The definition of modernity became clearer for Bauman: 
[M]odernity is, so to speak, the time of ‘new beginnings’ and of forever new ‘new 
beginnings’, of dismantling old structures and building new ones from scratch … I believe 
that what set the modern era apart from other times was the obsession with designing and 
pursuing projects, the tendency to subordinate the present – each successive present – to 
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the project yet to be fulfilled. (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 72) 
Bauman expands the definition of modernity in the context of society as a whole:
[T]he longing for human-made order lubricated the wheels of the three ‘society-
targeted’ modern pursuits … that the desire to manipulate probabilities and to make 
human affairs regular and amenable to planning and control was high up in the mind of 
the principal advocates and actors of industrialism, democracy, and incredibly, capitalism. 
(Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 78) 
As these definitions became clearer for Bauman, the break from classical Marxism was complete. 
For Bauman, Marxism itself was part of and based on the processes of modernity, classifying social 
class and the behaviors that Bauman was now seeing falling apart; Marxism could not help identify 
a way out of modernity to improve the human condition.
In the 1990s, Bauman started to explore modernity at different levels, “[firstly] how modernity 
‘works’ (in other words, the mechanisms that have kept it in existence); secondly, the human cost of 
modernity; and thirdly, the social processes that are undermining the mechanisms which have 
underpinned modernity in the past” (Smith, 1999, p. 37). This last analysis took Bauman into 
postmodernity.
Bauman had started using three different contexts: the postmodern perspective, the postmodern 
habitat, and the process of postmodernity (Smith, 1999). Throughout his work in the 1990s, Bauman 
attempts to delve deeper into these three areas. The postmodern perspective is the “sense of the 
ambivalence of existence;” the postmodern habitat is the “cultural and sociopolitical arena” in which 
the postmodern perspective became dominant; and the process of postmodernity is a many layered 
process of how “structural transformations are altering the way capitalism articulates with national 
states” and how that creates “conditions that allow the postmodern habitat to develop” and the 
effects it has on the individual level (Smith, 1999, p. 155). 
He wrote a number of books defining and analyzing these concepts, including Intimations of 
Postmodernity (1991) and Postmodern Ethics (1993). However, his distinction of postmodernity 
became blurred with the other uses of postmodernity, which is why Bauman started to shift away 
from that definition and the usage of the word (Bauman & Tester, 2001). Bauman also admits that he 
realized that the word increasingly implied that there had been movement from modernity to a new 
era of postmodernity, but he felt uncomfortable with this distinction. To move beyond modernity 
would imply that there was something else; but he was not convinced that society had actually 
moved beyond the “modernity” period. Additionally, Bauman claims that as others held multiple 
definitions of postmodernity, the discourse around postmodernity became hollow. 
Because he was no longer comfortable with the word “postmodernity,” and because he felt the 
definition of postmodernity implied being beyond modernity (a phase that he was not certain 
society had yet crossed), Bauman started to use the term liquid modernity to define what he was 
seeing around him. Liquid modernity is the “continuous (melting, disembedding) and discontinuous 
(no solidification of the melted, no re-embedding) alike” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 92). 




















In the year 2000 Bauman published Liquid Modernity, the first of a series of books that developed 
a theory of “liquid modernity” in society, politics, government, and in regards to the individual. The 
work addresses Bauman’s definition of modernity and the subsequent processes of solid modernity 
and liquid modernity. In this work, Bauman brings together an array of theorists and connects their 
ideas and theories together to create a strong narrative about the unfolding of the modern era. 
As Bauman’s theory describes, modernity came to exist after society shifted the focus on the 
existing paradigm of agrarian society because “[it] found it much too stagnant for its taste and much 
too resistant to shift and mould for its ambitions” (Bauman, 2000, p. 3). In defining modernity in this 
manner, the focus is on the process of modernity, rather than specific economic or political aspects 
that arose during the period. 
Prior to the development of the industrial society, the primary economic structure was based on 
land ownership and an agrarian economy, with pockets of merchants and trade. This society was 
class-centric, meaning that communication and mobility were limited among and between the 
classes. The shift from this agrarian society to an industrial society was based on society’s desire to 
remove itself from the stagnant agrarian social order (Bauman, 2000, p. 3). This move toward 
a modern society, dubbed “modernity” by Bauman, represented the shift in the perception of 
landownership as the main influencer and determiner of wealth and class; capital now took on 
a perceived preeminent role. “[M]oney power was confined to the margins … [and] it moved to the 
centre of life … claimed authority and social respect” (Bauman, 1989, p. 46). Modernity “meant first 
and foremost shedding the ‘irrelevant’ obligations standing in the way of rational calculation of 
effects … [and] liberating business enterprise from the shackles of the family-household duties” 
(Bauman 2000, p. 4). Bauman argues that this separation of perceived wealth and class away from 
the homestead and into the manufacturing society also shifted the ethics of how businesses were 
managed. Rather than focusing on family-owned interests, business now centered itself on a “cash 
nexus” and created the concept of an economy independent of other factors in society. Bauman 
argues that this shift made the “economy” the super-structure of social life and created a new order 
that was based only on those economic definitions, rather than political, moral, and ethical 
structures. 
At the time, this movement away from landownership to capital as the primary economic 
determinant of wealth was seen as liberating for society; the system would give rise to the 
emancipation of man from feudal shackles, giving him control over his (economic) destiny. This belief 
also led to the rise of the perception that the primary purpose of society was “constructing a new 
and better order to replace the old and defective one” (Bauman, 2000, p. 5). Modernity, therefore, 
had the effect of applying one philosophy to everything that it encountered. Everything “now had 
to be manufactured, built up, rationally argued, technologically designed, administered, monitored 
and managed” (Bauman, 1989, p. 57). Structured environments, most notably in the factories (which 
were becoming the main source of income), were based on modernity’s attempt to rationalize all of 
the activities it oversaw. Solid modernity was the terminology applied by Bauman to define these 
activities that brought order and progress to society. 
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Bauman sums up his definition of modernity and the attitudes of society during this time to be 
a:
belief that there is an end to the road along which we proceed, an attainable telos of 
historical change, a state of perfection to be reached tomorrow, next year or next 
millennium, some sort of good society, just society and conflict-free society in all or some 
of its many postulated aspects: of steady equilibrium between supply and demand and 
satisfaction of all needs; of perfect order, in which everything is allocated to its right place, 
nothing out of places persists and no place is in doubt; of human affairs becoming totally 
transparent thanks to knowing everything needing to be known; of complete mastery 
over the future – so complete that it puts paid to all contingency, contention, ambivalence 
and unanticipated consequences of human undertakings. (Bauman, 2000, p. 29)
As the industrial revolution took over society, the masses that had previously been tied to the 
land now had the opportunity to work in factories. This resulted in an increase in the average 
worker’s economic power. Technology allowed previously impossible tasks to be standardized and 
simplified, allowing the factory worker to be able to do work that previously only a craftsman could 
have done. This shift in moving capital (money) to the workers increased their standard of living. The 
typical example of modernity’s main player is the Fordist factory, “which reduced human activities 
to simple, routine, and by and large predesigned moves meant to be followed obediently and 
mechanically without engaging mental faculties, and holding all spontaneity and individual 
initiative off limits” (Bauman 2000, p. 25). Technology permitted factories to increase their output to 
meet rising demand of goods as increasing salaries more than met the masses’ basic needs for food 
and shelter. This additional wealth allowed the workers to purchase more goods from the factories 
producing them. Blackshaw summarizes the concept of the era: “The idea of modernity … refers to 
the emergence of new faith in the processes of scientific knowledge and technological advance 
which marks the beginning of modernity’s separation from traditional society” (Blackshaw, 2004, p. 
37).
In this new society, factory owners and managers now became the most powerful class, 
replacing the landowners who had dominated before. The selling of goods and owning of capital 
became the primary source of economic and social power. Wealth was no longer determined by the 
land you owned, but rather by how much money you had in the bank. As a result, a new power 
structure was created between the owners of factories and the workers in those factories. Bauman 
uses Michel Foucault’s definition of the “Panopticon,” the “arch-metaphor of modern power,” 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 9) in demonstrating this modernity. A Panopticon was a design for an institution, 
such as a prison, promulgated by the 18th century English sociologist Jeremy Bentham, in which all 
of the inmates could be observed from a central point without the inmates knowing they were 
being watched. For Foucault, the Panopticon was the metaphor for the hierarchical structure that 
created a set of watchers, the ones who would observe and impose control over those being 
watched. In a solid modern factory, the managers acted as the watchers of the factory floor, which 
created “a model of mutual engagement and confrontation between the two sides of the power 
relationship. The managers’ strategies of guarding their own volatility and routinizing the flow of 
time of their subordinates merged into one” (Bauman, 2000, p. 10). These manufacturing companies 
created a relationship between the management and the worker, a détente in this power relationship 
that mutually benefited both sides of the power equation, even if both sides performed their roles 
out of self-interest. In other words, the factory set up this hierarchal structure so that, for a set 
amount of time, the workers would produce the goods the company needed to sell and, in exchange, 



















the workers would be compensated for their labor. Management would be there to ensure that the 
work being performed was adequate and that the workers were actually producing during that 
time. This uneasy relationship created obligations to the workers in terms of wellbeing and financial 
stability, because not only did the factory owners need those goods produced, but they also, 
ironically, needed those same workers to be able to purchase the goods that were being produced. 
The freedom of business enterprise (or capital) created and generated a series of beliefs and 
rules that were not tied to any social relations. This led to the drive for “rationality” as the determining 
factor for the foundation of modernity. It created a “new order, defined primarily in economic terms” 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 4). This economic rationality, as it was applied to every aspect of society, led to the 
belief that this would be a better framework and that it would create more solid structures than the 
ones that had existed before. Processes in society that were established in order to reinforce the 
order essentially created a cycle that “re-educated and converted to its ways the rest of social life; 
that order came to dominate the totality of human life because whatever else might have happened 
in that life has been rendered irrelevant and ineffective” (Bauman, 2000, p. 4).
The resulting effects were then to create a society that had very structured roles and relationships. 
Capital held the power in society: Without money, you had no power. Factories created the ability 
for members of society to access that money by becoming factory workers. The salaries that workers 
received in these factories then allowed them to purchase goods, increasing the overall standard of 
living of the worker and increasing economic activity.
Bauman goes on to define two different phases in modernity, the first being that of solid 
modernity, in which modernity was “to replace the inherited set of deficient and defective solids 
with another set, which was much improved and preferably perfect, and for that reason no longer 
alterable” (Bauman, 2000, p. 3). Solid modernity meant to create something perfect and everlasting 
(because of its perfection), thus making “the world predictable and therefore manageable” (Bauman, 
2000, p. 3). The structured factory setting was the most solid example of this type of modernity. The 
second phase of modernity, defined by Bauman as liquid modernity, was one in which “private 
consumption replaces work as the backbone of the reward system in a sociality which is 
underpatterned, rather than patterned, disorganized rather than ordered” (Blackshaw, 2005, p. 33).
Bauman uses the metaphor of fluidity to describe the continual process of modernity on existing 
solids. Liquids and fluids lack the ability to hold their shape. Conversely, a solid can hold its shape 
through time and space. “Solids have clear spatial dimensions but neutralize the impact, and thus 
downgrade the significance of time … [while] fluids do not keep any shape for long and constantly 
ready (and prone) to change it; and so for them it is the flow of time that counts, more than the 
space they happen to occupy” (Bauman, 2000, p. 2). In keeping with this metaphor, Bauman argues 
that liquids maintain their shape against solids, while solids are affected by liquids as they change. 
Thus, with this metaphor in mind, liquid modernity is the reshaping and re-embedding of the solids 
that it comes in contact with. Consequently, liquid modernity is the result of the process of recreating 
new solids. However, because liquids cannot retain their shape for long without much effort, they 
are bound to change again the moment that the energy and attention used to keep them in one 
shape is shifted elsewhere. 
In solid modernity, society has codes and rules that must be followed. However, in liquid 
modernity, these structures are either constantly changing or are too numerous, and thus “liquidizing 
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powers have moved from the ‘system’ to ‘society,’ from ‘politics’ to ‘life-policies’ – or have descended 
from the ‘macro’ to the ‘micro’ level of social cohabitation” (Bauman, 2000, p. 7). These changes have 
created a burden on the individual, who now has to navigate the constantly shifting environment. 
It has also changed the structure of power (capital). Rather than staying tied to factory power, capital 
can now be more fluid and thus can be found outside the factory, unlimited by borders or fences. 
Liquid modernity is born from the factors that made solid modernity possible, so the two are 
invariably tied to one another. Bauman did not want to create a dichotomy between the two 
concepts; rather he was focusing on the extent to which both could describe the forces and factors 
that have shifted and changed society, consequently bringing modernity into existence. 
Bauman explains, “The present-day situation emerged out of the radical melting of fetters and 
manacles rightly or wrongly suspected of limiting the individual freedom to choose and act” 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 5). However, he also warns that the melting of these solids has affected “the bonds 
which interlock individual choices in collective projects and actions – the patterns of communication 
and coordination between individually conducted life policies on the one hand and political actions 
… on the other” (Bauman, 2000, p. 6), and that we are now in “an individualized, privatized version 
of modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the responsibility of failure falling primarily 
on the individual’s shoulders” (Bauman, 2000, p. 8).
The drive to create modernity and liquefy (improve) the older solids was also the drive to break 
the bonds of “traditional loyalties, customary rights and obligations which bound hands and feet, 
hindered moves and cramped enterprise” (Bauman, 2000, p. 3). The “melting of solids” becomes, 
then, a “permanent feature of modernity,” having created a cycle of taking any solid structures (old 
or new) and making them liquid again. This cycle of liquidity took on the great structures in society 
that determined our economies and the roles of institutions, transforming the landholding agrarian 
society into an industrial one, and thus breaking the traditional roles of power and wealth. The next 
to be affected were the roles within society, including group identities, the role of government, and 
borders. Consequently, the ensuing layer left to be affected was the “individual” layer, whereby 
without these previous structures standing to determine the fate and future of a member in society, 
the individual was left on his or her own, without guidance or reference, to navigate liquid modernity. 
For the individual bearing the additional responsibility of not having solid structures to guide 
the way, power relations have also changed. Rather than having the solid modern structures of 
power and authority that existed as remnants from the old regimes, the “prime technique of power 
is now escape, slippage, elision and avoidance, the effective rejection of any territorial confinement 
with its corollaries of order-building, order-maintenance and the responsibility for the consequences 
of it all as well as of the necessity to bear their costs” (Bauman, 2000, p. 11). Bauman notes that this 
creates a sense of anxiety, and so a new set of coping strategies have been developed to handle the 
fluidity of liquid modernity. The disintegration of human bonds, Bauman argues, is not only 
a condition of this liquid modernity, but also a new technique of power, as “global powers are bent 
on dismantling such networks for the sake of their continuous and growing fluidity” (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 14), which is the source of strength. 
Since he began defining and speaking on liquid modernity, Bauman has continued to produce 
an extensive number of texts that treat different aspects of society through the lens of liquid 
modernity. In the last 12 years, he has published at least 15 books related to the subject. Liquid 
Modernity (2000) describes this current period of modernity, while subsequent works, including 



















Liquid Life (2005), Liquid Fear (2006), Liquid Times (2006), and others using the “liquid” title, delve 
deeper into the five basic concepts of the human condition that Bauman covers in Liquid Modernity. 
More recently, Bauman has been exploring the “consumer,” the denizen of the liquid modern society, 
in works such as Consuming Life (2007) and Does Ethics Have A Chance in a World of Consumers? 
(2009). In 2011, Bauman also published works on culture and social inequalities.
Through these analyses, Bauman attempts to reshape the concepts of modernity and provide 
an alternative to classical Marxism. However, he stops short of creating a grand narrative or claiming 
one absolute truth. His original influences at the University of Warsaw prevent him from stepping 
into that position, knowing that absolute truths cannot stand the test of liquid modernity (Blackshaw, 
2004). Thus, what Bauman does best is “paint for us a total picture of a broken totality … a fragmented 
world.” However, Bauman is not a relativist either; he believes the answer to the questions and 
anxiety that the liquid modern world creates are addressed through a “vigorous agora, conscious of 
its task and earnest about it, seems to be the key to the whole issue” (Bauman & Tester, 2001, p. 62).
In developing his theories of modernity, Bauman admits to having been influenced by 
a significant number of thinkers. Bauman himself has identified a veritable panoply of influencing 
writers and academicians, including Richard Sennet, Richard Rorty, Anthony Giddens, Claus Offe, 
Pierre Bourdieu, Ulrich Beck, Claude Levi-Strauss, Loïc Wacquant, Michel Maffesoli, Odo Marquard, 
Nils Christie, Henning Bech, Alberto Melucci, Mary Douglas, Michel Croizer, and Cornelius Castoriadis, 
in addition to Marx and Gramsci. Bauman also indicates that he has been leaning toward Lévinas to 
help him identify a more practical way of solving the dilemma he created (Bauman & Tester, 2001). 
Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, along with Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard, are 
also frequent references used by Bauman (Smith, 1999). 
In the next chapters, through autoethnography and analysis, I will further work with what 
Bauman has defined as liquid modernity to show how business organizations in general, and the 
advertising industry in particular, inherently exemplify the concepts of liquid modernity to show 
that, while Bauman’s theory of liquidity as an ontological state or evolutionary inevitability is 
inaccurate, Bauman was correct insofar as liquid modernity could not exist without postmodernity 
and that the language of liquidity can be useful to those in a liquid environment to help them 
identify, rationalize, and react to their liquid world.
Bauman’s Practice of Sociology
In this research I will be using Bauman’s theories of liquid modernity to analyze the organizational 
structure and development of the advertising industry, the effects of financialization upon the 
industry, and the autoethnographic exploration of my resulting experiences. However, performing 
this analysis will require an adaptation and extension of Bauman’s traditional theories into areas in 
which his work has yet to be applied.
Sociologist Tony Blackshaw argues, “Bauman’s aim is to reconcile sociology with the way the 
already existing reality actually is” (Blackshaw, 2005, p. 19). However, Bauman does not follow 
standard empirical practices and does not succumb to empirical sociology—having to explain why 
he chose one way over another (Blackshaw, 2004, p. 19). As such, Blackshaw interprets Bauman’s 
methodology in such a way that “there is nothing to be gained from imposing rigid theoretical 
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frameworks or interpretations on patterns of behavior where none exist” (Blackshaw, 2004, p. 19). 
Part of Bauman’s break from classical Marxism came from his interest in individuals and the personal 
relations they experienced (Blackshaw, 2004). Additionally, Bauman does not offer a specific 
methodology to address liquid modernity or to guide sociologists in understanding liquid 
modernity; rather, he suggests “an orientation to inquiry with strong moral and political 
undercurrents” (Blackshaw, 2004, p. 53). As a consequence, with no rules to create or formulate 
a framework, sociology, then, has to pursue new ways of understanding the world. 
Blackshaw also suggests that Bauman’s practice of sociology has to include other elements that 
are not currently part of classic sociological empirical methodologies. For example, Bauman uses 
literature in his writing—the works of authors Milan Kundera and Jorge Luis Borges appear 
frequently—because he is convinced of the importance of literature in framing social orders. In 
Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman (2001), when asked what book from a key thinker he would 
take with him a deserted island, Bauman rejected classic thinkers such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, 
and Simmel, and chose Jorge Luis Borges’ The Garden of Forking Paths (1941) (Bauman & Tester, 
2001). This suggests that Bauman’s “methodology” (if we can reserve the problematic notion of 
naming what he refuses to own) is a combination of viewing what is in the “real” world and creating 
a dialogue about the liquid modern society in which we inhabit. We can perform the application of 
this methodology through alternative methods that go beyond the standard empirical formulations 
that currently exist in social science research.
Because I will be applying Bauman’s theories and explanations to the current organization that 
I inhabit in an attempt to analyze unfolding trends in the advertising industry both at the macro and 
micro levels, I am faced with using alternative approaches to traditional methods in my own research 
methodology. I focus on autoethnography as my methodology to provide the broadest possible 
tools for the dialogue that Bauman insists we need today more than ever.
Ethnography and Autoethnography
Ethnography is understood as a collection of methods that fall under one approach or process: 
“[A] research process based on field work using a variety of (mainly qualitative) research techniques 
but including engagement in the lives of those being studied over an extended period of time” 
(Davies, 1999, p. 5). The “ethno” describes people or culture and the “graphy” denotes the written 
aspect of the process. A study or written account of a people or culture is thus considered 
ethnography.
The methods by which information is collected for ethnography are varied; participant 
observation, interviews (either informal or structured), shadowing, and other methods of 
information gathering are part of the process. Specifically for a corporate setting such as the holding 
company under review, emails, memoranda, industry newspapers, and observation and participation 
were the largest sources of data. 
Using ethnographic methods to create corporate ethnographies is not new. Robert Jackall 
published an analysis of the values and morals in a specific corporation in 1988, and in 2009 Karen 
Ho developed a critical account of investment bankers’ identities and the impact on their external 
practices and society at large. More recently, Robert Earhart published his doctoral research Partiality 



















of Responsibility: Ethics in  Sustainability  Consulting (2011) using autoethnography as one of the 
methodologies, as well as Loes Houweling in her doctoral research, Let’s Dance (2011).
Robert Jackall’s Moral Mazes (1988) is an interpretive sociological account of managers in 
a holding company he called “Covenant,” with subsidiaries named “Weft” and “Alchemy, Inc.” He also 
researched a public relations company associated with Covenant, which he named “Images, Inc.” 
Jackall chose to keep the company names as well as his inside sources anonymous, which enabled 
him to access extended amounts of data in the company. 
For his research methodology, Jackall used extensive interviews and participant and 
non-participant observation to gather information from managers and workers at different levels of 
the organization. He was given unprecedented access to the corporation. For example, he was 
allowed to personally interview very high-level managers, often for hours at a time. Jackall was also 
able to return frequently to conduct repeated interviews of the same subject if it was necessary. 
Jackall also interviewed line workers at subsidiary companies, United States government officials in 
Washington, D.C., and U.S. Congressional lobbyists for the organization. His access included entry 
into management meetings, informal conversations, and social events. In terms of corporate 
documentation, Jackall was given access to internal organizational actions, company literature, and 
memoranda on specific issues or concerns. The research spanned a period of four or five years, 
giving Jackall access to a critical period during which a new CEO was brought into Covenant and an 
economic turnaround of the company was in process. Jackall used external and publicly available 
sources of information to contextualize the companies, their managers, and their decision-making.
As an ethnography, Moral Mazes depicts the world of corporate managers. It examines the social 
context within the corporate world, focusing on the ethics and morals that are displayed in such 
organizations. The companies under analysis are solid modern companies; for example, Alchemy 
manufactures chemicals, and Weft is in the textile industry. Covenant manages these two companies 
and other additional subsidiaries, some of which are briefly mentioned when Jackall explores the 
decision-making practices at the holding company level. Throughout his research, Jackall finds that 
there is a very bureaucratic process, which is common in solid modern companies. Jackall writes:
First, occupational groups emerging from the segmented structure of bureaucratic 
work, each with different expertise and emphasis constantly … nor do competitiveness 
and conflict result only from the broad segmentation of functions. Sustained work in 
a product or service area not only shapes crucial social affiliations but also symbolic 
identifications, say, with a particular product or services … [Second] … for line managers, 
independent staff represent either the intrusion of an unwelcome “rules and procedures 
mentality” into situations where line managers feel that they have to be alert to the 
exigencies of the market, or alternatively, as power threats to vested interests backed by 
some authority. (Jackall, 1988, p. 36)
Jackall finds that there are also uncertainties in this corporate environment, stemming from 
focus on “hitting your numbers” and “results-oriented management.” He describes the relationships 
and alliances that must be created with management in order to help executives navigate corporate 
politics. Additionally, he covers the tension between Covenant and its subsidiaries, exploring what 
the different managers at the three organizations were saying about the decisions being taken by 
the holding company. 
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Some of the themes that Jackall addresses are similar to those I found in my research. The holding 
company in Jackall’s work was much like the holding company in my study: Like mine, the company 
discussed in his work was in a period of crisis, where changes at the top levels of the organization 
were affecting both the direction and the focus of the company. Yet while Jackall focused on 
corporate politics and the dissonance that the managers face, especially in light of the moral and 
ethical decisions they have to undertake, the focus of my own research allowed me to understand 
the impact of liquidity on the structure of the advertising industry and my organization as well as on 
the financialization of the company, which exacerbated the inherent industry liquidity of my 
organization. 
Karen Ho’s ethnography addresses the financial liquidity in the financial industry that became so 
evident during my own research. Liquidated: An Ethnography on Wall Street (2009) analyzes the role 
of “Wall Street” in the context of corporate America, how this affects and shapes the stock market, 
and the people that affect and facilitate the stock market. Ho’s ethnography tries to address whether 
or not there is a relationship in the actions of the individual (at the micro level) and the investment 
bank (at the meso level) that, in turn, affects the American economy as a whole (at the macro level). 
Additionally, Ho tries to understand whether the values and ideologies that are created internally 
for the investment bankers are consciously created or whether they’re accidental. 
Ho’s methodology was similar to Jackall, whereby she used interviews, participant observation, 
and other similar fieldwork processes. However, she had the chance to participate in a more 
embedded way; she was hired by Bankers Trust New York, an investment bank, and was able to 
experience first-hand the hiring processes, training, and culture of the firm. Her employment further 
allowed her to develop relationships with her coworkers, which gave her access to their value 
systems as well as their personal concerns about working in that environment. Ho, however, did not 
focus on only one company; rather, she tried to address a phenomenon she discovered by cross-
analyzing the behaviors of different investment banks outside of Bankers Trust. Through her 
personal connections as well as through alliances in her own organization, she was able to 
participate in events and meetings at different organizations, and was given access to different 
levels of her organization, which allowed her to thoroughly investigate some of the themes she was 
finding in her own experience at Bankers Trust. 
Contrary to Jackall, Ho chose to reveal her sources whenever possible. She ironically pointed out 
that the liquidity of the investment banking industry meant that by the time her ethnography was 
published, the banks would have merged so often, their names would be meaningless to a current 
audience. She explains, 
It is also instructive to note that providing pseudonyms for Wall Street financial 
institutions is practically a futile exercise given the prevalent cultural norms of the financial 
market where corporate names statuses, and identities constantly shift over time. For 
example, in 1997, Dean Witter Discover, a retail brokerage, merged with prestigious 
investment bank Morgan Stanley to form Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Discover. (Ho, 2009, 
p.32)
However, she did keep some of her “informants” anonymous because of her personal 
relationships with them, although she tried to use actual names whenever possible.



















Ho’s immersion in the world of investment banking enabled her to define liquidity in her 
experience to be an extrapolation of what investment bankers were doing to corporate America: 
from financial instruments that extracted the liquid cash out of the company, to the experience that 
investment bankers feel as they are forced to remain liquid themselves. Ho describes what she 
found:
It is investment bankers’ experience as employees (which in turn reshapes the market 
models they learn and proclaim) that instills a specific disciplinary model of employee 
liquidity, insecurity, and workplace relations; motivates them to export this model to the 
rest of U.S. business; as well as renders their own model superior. (Ho, 2009, p. 224)
This concept of liquidity, alternative to Bauman’s definition, was not too different—it just focused 
on the financialization of a specific area during a specific period of time. It also resonated with my 
own experiences at my holding company. I will use Ho’s work extensively in Chapter Six, as her 
findings and understandings of the stock market directly speak to some of the issues raised by the 
financialization of the advertising industry and faced by my company. 
Furthermore, her work mirrors much of my own research and experience. At my company, I had 
to be an employee first and foremost, and as I developed relationships with my coworkers and 
superiors, I had to also be cognizant of the information that came from those conversations. I did 
disclose to my coworkers and management alike that I was undertaking a doctoral program in 
business administration focusing on organizational behavior and that our company would be the 
subject of my study. As a fieldworker, I took note of my experiences and impressions, through notes 
or emails to friends and colleagues about my feelings. These notes and impressions have been 
incorporated into the accounts conveyed in this research. Interviews and remembrances of certain 
events also took place in more formal environments, in which coworkers were told directly that the 
accounts and experiences would be part of my research project. These stories and feelings were 
later incorporated into my autoethnographic accounts, which are shared throughout this book. 
Much of the information and data appearing in chapters four and six are publicly disclosed. The 
advertising industry has a number of significant trade papers, journals, and publications that focus 
on the actions and accounts of the agencies and the holding companies. Articles found in Advertising 
Week and Advertising Age (long-standing industry press) and data from other sources, such as the 
“4As” (American Association of Advertising Agencies) have also been included. Traditional sources 
of information, such as newspapers and magazines, have also made their way into my data 
collection. This information is important because these publications often publish information that 
is not available through internal resources. 
One of my frustrations is that the information that was available inside my company was very 
limited. The irony that my company is an advertising and marketing company, focused on 
communication on behalf of the advertiser, was not lost, and oftentimes this was a joke within the 
department or department. More often than not, despite working in a department with the word 
“information” in it, we would have to read about mergers or acquisitions through sources external to 
the company. 
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New Ethnography2
According to Charlotte Aull Davis, “There is a close relationship between reflexivity and 
objectivity, although the two are not identical” (Davis, 1999, p. 4). She argues that the researcher 
seeks to find ways to view the world as separate from him or herself because he or she understands 
the research object as the “other.” However, there is a relational impact between the researcher and 
the others. This leads to the question of whether the researcher affects the participant of the study 
just by being present in the observations. Davis argues that this subjectivity is even present in more 
quantitative research methods in which the researcher attempts to remove any personal aspects 
that might affect the objects of study.
Given this argument, because I was an active participant in the very company that was the 
subject of my research, it seems that my presence and any decisions I made involving my job 
functions automatically became part of the object of study, and thus my own separation as a neutral 
observer was not possible. Davis calls this form of ethnography “reflexive ethnography,” but there 
are other names that have been used, including the term I prefer to use, “autoethnography.”
Autoethnography is a relatively new approach that has been employed to address the 
researcher’s experiences in the field. In contrast to ethnography, which tries to depict a more broad-
based experience of the group in study, the “auto” portion of autoethnography focuses specifically 
on the researcher. As an emerging, new methodology, a variety of different fields and disciplines are 
beginning to use it, including sociology and organizational management studies. 
Carolyn Ellis and Arthur Bochner are two American academics who have pioneered the use of 
(and promoted the value of ) autoethnography. Ellis describes the method:
The interpretative, narrative, autoethnographic project has the following distinguishing 
features: 
The author usually writes in the first person, making herself or himself the object 
of research. The narrative text focuses on generalization within a single case 
extended over time. The text is presented as a story, replete with narrator, 
characterization, and plot line, akin to forms of writing associated with the novel or 
biography. The story often discloses hidden details of private life and highlights 
emotional experience. The ebb and flow of relationship experience is depicted in an 
episodic form that dramatizes the motion of connected lives across the curve of 
time. A reflexive connection exists between the lives of participants and researchers 
that must be explored. And the relationships between writers and readers of the 
texts is [sic] one of involvement and participation. (Ellis, 2004, p. 30) 
As Ellis explains, the role of the ethnographer in autoethnography is to use the similar tools and 
techniques that are found in ethnography, but adding some distinguishing characteristics:
 – the ethnographer/author as part of the object of research;
 – narrative text drive by the story;
 – emotional experiences and details of the researcher’s private life as part of the text;
 – dramatized relationship experience; and
 – reflexive tone in identifying the connection between research and participants.
2 This heading uses H. Lloyd Goodall’s portion of the title of his book on writing autoethnography Writing the 
New Ethnography (2000), published by Altamira Press



















Arthur Bochner warns that, too often, the researcher unnecessarily takes him or herself out of his 
or her work under the misguided belief that the personal voice is unprofessional. He claims, however, 
“It is rare, indeed, to find a productive scholar whose work is unconnected to his or her personal 
history” (Bochner, 1997, p. 433). Bochner argues that academics need to consider methods outside 
of the orthodox options that have been available in order to find “different goals, different styles of 
research and writing, different ways of bring academic and the personal into a conversation with 
each other” (Bochner, 1997, p. 433). This open dialogue proposed by Bochner reflects Bauman’s 
approach to sociology, also keeping in line with Ellis:
In our work (e.g., Ellis & Bochner, 1996) we try to produce texts that show how people 
breach canonical conventions and expectations; how they cope with exceptional, difficult, 
and transformative crisis; how they invent new ways of speaking when old ways fail them; 
and how they turn calamities into gifts (Bochner, 1997, p. 434).
However, the way that Ellis and Bochner propose to write autoethnography weighs tremendously 
on the emotional through crisis aspect—they require autoethnography to have an emotional 
transformation. While the study of my company included multiple management changes and the 
financial crisis of 2008, Bochner and Ellis are proposing that the crisis be of a personal nature. 
Bochner and Ellis have both written very descriptive accounts of their personal lives for articles or 
books, including Ellis’ Final Negotiations (1995) and The Ethnographic I (2004). The goals of these 
narratives are to evoke the reader into resonance with the written work as a means of opening 
a dialogue.
However, there are some concerns that this approach can cause the reader (as well as the 
researcher) to focus solely on the personal crisis or the personal story. The method can be a challenge 
as “autoethnography, and indeed all forms of ethnography, presents a unique challenge because 
the subject the writer attempts to represent is always in motion on various levels” (Rambo, Fall 2007, 
p. 540). This was true as well for the research that I conducted at my company. Just when the 
quantum of change at the organizational level seemed to have reduced to the point of relative 
stability and the direction of the organization seemed certain, an external force would thrust the 
organization into upheaval once again, whether it was the impact of a financial calamity like the 
mortgage default crisis of 2008 or the uncertainty of winning the pitch with a major client. The work 
that is produced in this study is an attempt to represent various moving parts of the industry, my 
company, and my work unit within that company, into a narrative that the reader can follow. There 
is always the opportunity to review and repaint the picture of the organization; however, the 
problem is that, “It is impossible to render a true, accurate, or real representation of a subject from 
a flat, synchronic perspective” (Rambo, Fall 2007, p. 540). In the context of this book I can all but hope 
that I have provided an open for dialogue about the issues that are raised therein. 
A criticism to this approach of ethnography is that it can become “unnecessarily restricted,” as 
Paul Atkinson states in his review of the work of Norman Denzin, Ellis, Bochner, and others.Atkinson, 
a British sociologist, is concerned with the uniformity of the performances and the writing styles of 
the American autoethnographers, who display little textual experimentation. Davis also warns that 
autoethnography “can lead to a form of self-absorption … that effectively denies the possibility of 
social research” (Davis, 1999, p. 6). In my own research and analysis I attempted to find a middle 
ground that both encompassed the understanding that there is value to the researcher being part 
of the study of research, as well as providing information and analysis. 
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For guidance, as I performed my research I kept in mind Bauman’s thoughts that “sociologists 
who study postmodernity should accept the cognitive and moral uncertainties that postmodernity 
brings, but they should not abandon ‘Enlightenment dream of the meeting of rational minds’” 
(Smith, 1999, p. 166). My goal in this book is to have created a dialogue that touches upon the 
inherent liquidity of the advertising industry, the additional liquidity that financialization imposed 
upon it, and the effects that these multiple layers of liquidity can have on an organization and its 
members. 
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Introduction
Bauman created the theory of “liquid modernity” to describe our modern day era and how we 
reached this point in society. His detailed descriptions and connecting theories present a strong 
metaphor for describing how different areas of society operate and the subsequent consequences 
of such processes. This metaphor plus the theory help contextualize some of the experiences that 
unfolded during my research into my organization. Thus, in using the metaphor of modern liquidity 
in the analysis of these experiences, the exploration of liquidity in an organization requires us to 
remember that the “… the prime concern of sociology made to the measure of liquid modernity 
needs to be the promotion of autonomy and freedom; such sociology must therefore put individual 
self-awareness, understanding and responsibility at its focus” (Bauman 2000, p. 213).
It seems, then, that if “liquid modernity” is affecting society, then it can permeate all business 
organizations to a degree. Bauman’s theories reflect what is happening in these organizations, such 
as when he comments that “today’s business organization has an element of disorganization 
deliberately built into it: the less solid and the more fluid it is, the better” (Bauman, 2000, p. 154). Yet 
liquidity is not just a metaphor at which we can remark when observing the functioning of an 
industry or the organizational behavior of a company. Rather, the tangible effects of this “liquid 
modernity” are observed and perceived by owners, managers, and employees throughout 
corporations on a daily basis, even though these individuals may not fully realize that their careers 
and daily lives can be described in this context. In trying to gain an understanding of the presence 
and impact of liquidity upon corporations, it is important to recognize that this liquidity is not 
merely theoretical: It appears in the manner in which the staff of a company interacts with each 
other and in their perceptions of their work.
Through autoethnographic sketches and subsequent analyses of these sketches through 
Bauman’s definition of liquidity, I will convey my experiences in a liquid environment. As a reminder 
to the reader, the organization I belong to is the technology department of an advertising holding 
company. Consequently, my interactions are with members of this department, as well as various 
other corporate departments that work closely with technology. Additionally, my interactions will 
bring me in contact with other technology staff that worked for the advertising agencies under the 
holding company. I would also often interact with other key management at these agencies, as the 
technology department had a number of efforts to centralize technology services. My role initially 
was in the Program Management Office, but later shifts as the organization goes through various 
restructuring efforts. The organization seems chaotic from a distance, but as the analysis after the 
autoethnographic sketches will show, the theory of liquid modernity can be applied to this 
environment to show that the chaos is liquidity expressed. This chapter’s sketches are selected 
because they epitomize the definition of liquidity and are not exclusive to a holding company in the 
advertising industry. The stories highlight the primary characteristics of liquidity and how they can 
appear in a corporation.
In this chapter’s following sections, as well as Chapter Five – Liquid Advertising and Chapter Seven 
– Liquid Financialization, short autoethnographic sketches of the experiences of working and 
interacting within a liquid organization will be explored. These autoethnographic essays capture 
moments in time and specific instances that highlight the liquidity of the organization. An analysis 
of how these sketches can be considered “liquid” follows in order to connect the assumptions and 
descriptions that Bauman defines and the autoethnographic story. 



























“Really?!” I thought to myself. I had heard that Addy would be in New York, 
effectively meaning that my boss would be supervising me from 3,000 miles away. She 
promised to visit me once in a while, and that I would get to go to New York to visit her. 
Otherwise, I was on my own.
My first day at work required me to head to the airport in Miami and get on 
a plane. I landed at LaGuardia three hours later, whereupon a black town car waited to 
whisk me into the city. When I arrived on Madison Avenue I was taken to Addy’s office, 
where she had a laptop and a Blackberry waiting for me. I spent the rest of the week in 
training and meeting others. Then it was back to Miami, on my own, with only two 
other coworkers, none of who were part of my department or reported to Addy. I was 
told to work, but received no directions on exactly what I was supposed to do.
But the whole process had been like that from the start. My initial interview 
was a quick, 10-minute conversation on the telephone with the head of the department. 
That was probably the most “normal” part of the process. The company probably just 
wanted to make sure I was a rational being before proceeding to the actual interview. 
I was then told that Addy, the hiring manager, would be coming down from New York 
to take part in the formal interview. That was my first inkling that she wouldn’t be in the 
Florida office all of the time. 
Already, this was a little out of the ordinary, but I was happier to handle it like 
this. The other companies for which I had worked had Human Resources departments 
that would conduct interviews—short or long—not only to review the information on 
your résumé, but also to tell you more about the company and the position to see if 
there was a “fit.” 
Not here.
In my first interview with Addy, she could barely contain herself and was 
speaking to me as though the job had been already offered to me. Frank, a coworker of 
Addy’s who also participated in the interview, seemed to know more about formal 
interviews and tried to ask some standard interview questions, but he was just happy to 
learn that I spoke foreign languages. We then briefly reminisced about a city in which 
we had both lived overseas. They were so enthused about my background, experience, 
and personality that they seemed disingenuous when they ended the hour-long 
meeting with a more formal, “We’ll be interviewing other candidates and let you know 
of the outcome.”
I could see immediately that the job was mine. But I had to pause: They only 
gave me vague descriptions of what I would be doing. I got the sense that they didn’t 
know for sure, either. I did know this position was newly created, so maybe no one really 
knew what the job entailed.
After my initial trip to New York I came back to review emails on which I had 
been copied—emails that dealt with a diverse set of subjects that made little sense to 
me. I also received and accepted meeting invitations for telephone conferences with 
people I didn’t know, about subjects that were not given in the invitation. I had learned 
…Because none of them could go at it alone and both sides knew that their continuous survival 
depended on finding solutions which they would consider acceptable.”
 Zygmunt Bauman Liquid Modernity, 2000, p 148
Autoethnographic Sketch - Indirect Direct Supervision
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that a big executive meeting was going to happen in two short weeks and that Frank 
was busy preparing for it. He had no time for me, and so I spent my first two weeks 
reading old materials I had found as well as whatever other company flotsam floated 
my way in the hopes that something would be pertinent to my experience. 
In this first vignette of my initial interview and first day with my organization, the description of 
the interview process at the company was similar to other experiences I had interviewing with other 
companies. However, the key difference was the vague description of the role that was being offered 
to me. The interviewers, both in the initial phone call and later in person, seemed to be indifferent 
to any prior experience I may have had in the industry. This fact only became a key issue later, when 
I was thrust into an organization and consequently left to figure out my role on my own without any 
understanding of the company or industry. Effectively, I was thrust into a dark room with a blindfold 
on and asked to make my way around. 
A key element to understanding the theory of liquidity is the concept that there is no one 
direction toward that which we seem to be heading. Liquidity does not have “solid” modernity’s 
drive of “progress” in one specific direction—“It can rule without burdening itself with chores of 
administration, management, welfare concerns…” (Bauman, 2000, p. 13). It was not until 
I encountered the metaphor of liquidity and the basics of the theory that I began to understand the 
differences between this particular interview and other job interviews. 
Addy, I learned later, had only been working at the holding company for a few months when she 
interviewed me. As a newcomer herself, Addy only had vague ideas of what roles we were supposed 
to have in the organization. She had also come from outside the industry. The idea that we were 
there to start something new, something that had not existed before—order, structure, policies, 
and procedures—was apparent in the conversation and in the presentations we created to espouse 
these ideas, but in practice none of that meshed into one solid process that was followed by 
everyone. In fact, Addy and I spent many of our conversations discussing the organization’s lack of 
structure and how the advertising agencies under the holding company failed to follow the path set 
forth by the holding company itself. Our little department of ten people scattered around New York, 
London, Hong Kong, and now Miami was tasked with organizing processes and procedures around 
the structure of all of the technology projects in the regions and throughout the world. We had 
control over how capital expenditures were allocated based on the projects, and we were also 
supposed to ensure this was documented in our databases. Conceptually, the control over capital 
expenditures was meant to force the agencies to approve any projects they wanted to pursue 
centrally, thus forcing them into this structured environment of procedures and project management. 
However, here, theory and practice were never in alignment.
The interview process had left me with the feeling that the main problems in the company were 
lack of structure, inefficiencies in organization, and missing processes and procedures. Getting the 
company to meet the goals of progress and profitability was paramount because we all believed 
that we could make a difference and make this company better than it was before. But the ideas and 
concepts behind the “progress” within the organization stemmed from a new crop of employees 
walking into a liquid organization—Addy, our Department Director, our Technology Director, and 
even the CIO were all relatively new and had all come from outside of the advertising industry. The 
company had chosen to hire these new leaders and foot soldiers of the technology division from the 
outside—from financial services, consumer goods, and other companies—all industries in which 



























efficiency, organization, structure, processes, and procedures were the norm.
The liquidity in the organization was ubiquitous, however; it surrounded us, permeating 
everything we did. Despite our attempts to focus on creating processes and procedures, despite our 
vision of our goals and the concrete milestones we set for our projects, we nevertheless fell 
effortlessly into the liquidity that the organization displayed. 
Without realizing it, even my first day of work—flying from Miami to New York—was an example 
of the liquid nature of the organization, as “nowadays, capital travels light – with cabin luggage only, 
which includes no more than a briefcase, a cellular telephone and a portable computer” (Bauman, 
2000, p. 58). Bauman’s keen observation of the nature of a liquid “modern” being was the perfect 
descriptor to my first day at headquarters. After being dropped off by the limousine at the hotel, I walked 
over to the company offices on Madison Avenue only to be handed a Blackberry and laptop; I was 
also told to figure out how to be a part of this department. Both Addy, and later, Frank, were insistent 
that much of my work would entail traveling around—whether to New York or to the different 
countries of Latin America. Liquidity in this organization was both the ability to be global (traveling 
around the world) and the ability to work out of a hotel room if necessary. The work itself that I was 
supposed to undertake was never described, other than that I should be trying to get the agencies 
to comply with the new policies and procedures that were not yet created—again, another aspect 
of the liquidity metaphor. 
Reflecting back upon those days, I can see now that the “liquidity” of the organization was much 
stronger than the “solid” modernity that any of us who came from more structured companies could 
hope to impose on the company. I did see pockets in which coworkers tried to impose solid, rigid 
structures, but those constructs would later fall apart without constant tending from those 
coworkers. The environment was “liquid” and so it perpetuated more liquidity in its processes and 
interactions. 
The initial interview process and my initial days in the company presented me with bits and 
pieces of the inherent liquidity in this industry and in this company, through the vague job 
descriptions, the long-distance manager, and other aspects, but I had failed to identify or understand 
what these omens portended. I spent the first few months in the company writing up processes and 
procedures that would never be followed and agonizing over the lack of “common sense” and 
“organization” that the agencies and their staff were exhibiting. I had brought into my new 
organization my naïve idea that the company only needed improvements in their processes and 
procedures, and that if we just had a little more structure, things would run better. 
However, the lack of direct supervision—my manager being in New York—was the biggest 
indicator of the liquid organization. The panopticon of management was unnecessary, because 
I was, as most people are, “dominated and ‘remotely controlled’; but they are dominated and 
controlled in a new way” (Bauman, 2000, p. 155). Having a cell phone, laptop, and always being 
connected to the Internet guaranteed that if Addy ever needed me, I was available. But she trusted 
that I could find a way to swim in the organization on my own.
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Autoethnographic Sketch - A “Virtual” Failure
In my first six months at the company I learned that Frank had a created 
a “virtual” Technology department in the Latin America region. The Technology 
department members worked for the agencies in these countries and they were 
promised that the holding company would come into the region to create legal 
corporate entities that would then “hire” them. By moving over into this new entity, they 
would be paid by the holding company and would report directly to the holding 
company and to Frank, rather than the advertising agencies themselves. The agencies 
from which these virtual department members would be drawn from would pay the 
holding company for their costs in exchange for a better and more comprehensive set 
of Technology services.
The logic was simple, and it sounded to everyone like a good idea.
But in practice, the “virtual” department was far more of a “theoretical” 
department. It was a good idea, but the implementation of the idea proved to be much 
more difficult.
Frank left the region 18 months later after the idea was proposed, without 
having creating a single entity there. The Technology staff were still part of the 
advertising agencies, but because Frank had announced these “virtual” departments 
and, consequently, promised the introduction of the holding company within each 
country, these technology staff members were no longer integrated with their host 
agencies. The management at the agencies—whom had also accepted the virtual 
concept—kept the Technology departments on the outside looking in since they were 
no longer part of the agency. These Technology departments were left in a strange, 
liminal space, where they neither had the identity of the corporate holding structure 
nor were they integrated into the agency. The promise of the virtual Technology 
department never came to fruition.
After Frank moved to greener pastures in New York City, I was left to handle 
the fallout from this virtual debacle—alone. The agencies did not want these staff 
members, and they, in turn, felt betrayed by Frank’s departure because of the broken 
promises. But I had no direct authority over these departments and no resources to 
mend the fences and heal the wounds that remained. There was little that I could do in 
the region, except to commiserate; because like these virtual Technology departments, 
I was also left hanging upon Frank’s departure. My department had also disbanded in 
the wake of the reorganizations that had unfolded in the last two years. I no longer 
reported to Addy. Instead of progress, the region and I drifted together for a couple of 
years. 
The lack of direction and structure to the overall goals of the company were apparent when 
I entered. It was no surprise to learn that Frank’s work in the region, as Regional Director of 
Technology Services, was constantly changing and never stable. His personal goal was to try to 
impose some structure to this department, which was supposed to be providing technology 
services to the agencies. With each of his efforts, however, he was perceived as someone who was 
fighting against a tide. 
He did not hide his impatience with the lack of organization and structure within the department. 
Frank’s handling of his own staff exposed his inability to contend with liquidity in his management 
style. He was authoritarian and hopelessly insisted that we had to create structure and order where, 
seemingly, none existed. In preparing presentations for the executive meeting, which was held only 



























weeks after I had started with the company, Frank insisted on doctoring facts as to the state of the 
staff and departments under his management in order to show “progress.” 
The most curious feature of Frank’s management was the “structure” he had concocted for the 
region. As the Regional Director under the holding company’s technology department, he only had 
one direct report, Mark, who was also in Miami. However, the rest of the staff in the region—the 
same managers and employees who would later stand up to give presentations about the Latin 
America Global Technology Services in the region—were not employees of the holding company. 
These were advertising agency staff who had been coerced and cajoled into becoming part of the 
“virtual” holding company Technology department under the promises and threats that the holding 
company would create legal, structured, formal entities under which the staff would operate. 
This entity structure was the carrot and the stick that Frank held over the region. Some of the 
staff wanted to believe that becoming part of the holding company would mean opportunities for 
career growth. Others feared that if they did not join or participate in the virtual Technology 
department, they would be left behind once the entities were created. However, the holding 
company had not moved forward to create entities in the region, so, fundamentally, all these staff 
members were simply agency employees. 
Despite Frank’s drive to create order and structure through threats and promises, he was also 
(unknowingly) one of the most liquid employees in the organization. He created smoke and mirrors 
with these promises and threats of an imminent holding company structure for the Technology 
staff. The staff “reported” to him despite not having to do so, projects were started to deploy 
technology across the region as a group, and people even recognized Frank as having authority and 
power in the region. But, in reality, he created nothing and did not really have the authority for much 
of what he was proposing.
In the executive meeting that we all later attended, Frank presented the Latin America Global 
Technology Services as though they existed; these services sounded formal, seemed structured, and 
appeared to provide actual services. Only later, upon being directly questioned, did Frank admit that 
nothing existed in actuality. The fact that the region as a whole—Technology staff, advertising 
agency management, and even holding company management—believed that Frank’s structure 
was a reality was an accomplishment in and of itself. His belief in making this a reality was strong 
enough to drive the region in a specific direction. Until Frank left, “work has drifted from the universe 
of order-building and future-control to the realm of a game” (Bauman, 2000, p. 138). With his 
departure, we realized that the work that Frank had undertaken in the region had only one goal in 
mind—his own advancement. Consequently, we were all left with the detritus of his vision and the 
actual structure in the region—that was, no structure at all, no “Latin America Global Technology 
Services,” and some very angry staff members and agency management who felt betrayed in the 
wake of that realization. 
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Addy… Laura… John… Addy (again)… John (once more)… The names no 
longer made any sense, and it didn’t matter. The job description wasn’t written, the 
titles were fleeting and ephemeral, mine, theirs. Most days I had neither goals nor 
directions.
I started to acquire titles and work. It didn’t matter what department I worked 
for, as long as I was working. I feared being unemployed. I also wanted more from my 
job, but there was nowhere to go.
Work friends floated horizontally from one position to another. Maybe they 
made more money. Maybe they just changed their day-to-day activities. But I hadn’t 
seen a promotion in a long time. 
The titles didn’t matter. I saw LinkedIn profiles with lofty sounding descriptions 
and impressive amounts of work, but I knew what they had really done. That public 
face didn’t matter. Their coworkers and managers were on LinkedIn, too. I’m sure that 
everyone saw each other’s profiles and tried their best to one-up each other.
How do you describe what you do in this company, anyway?
In Bauman’s theory, in “solid modernity” the relationship between labor and capital was clear. It 
required mutual engagement (Bauman, 2000, p. 146) because labor (employees) was in direct 
contact with capital (managers). Because the relationship was direct and labor needed management 
in order to work and produce, the relationship was balanced in the push-pull of both parties’ 
May 2006 Reorganization
•	 New Unit Name: Program Office
•	 New Supervisor: Addy
July 2007 Reorganization
•	 New Unit Name: End-User Services
•	 New Supervisor: Laura
•	 Work on new (unknown) projects
November 2007 Reorganization
•	 New Unit Name: Technology Services
•	 New Supervisor: John
•	 Work on Information Security
November 2008 Reorganization
•	 New Supervisor: Addy
•	 New Additional Title: Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Coordinator
•	 Work on Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance
June 2009 Reorganization
•	 New Unit Name: Corp-IT Services
•	 New Supervisor: John
January 2010 Reorganization
•	 (Nothing changed)
Autoethnographic Sketch - Meet the new boss. The same as the old boss.



























interests. Labor needed capital and managers needed employees—“None of them could go at it 
alone and both sides knew that their continuous survival depended on finding solutions which they 
would consider acceptable” (Bauman, 2000, p. 147). This mutual dependency gave each side stability 
and safety in the structure they had created. 
Liquid modernity, however, changed this stability and the solid roles that labor and capital had 
formerly held. In the past, solid modernity offered a routine: a structure to which labor could cling 
to, even if it did not like it. Now, capital is loosening the structure of the routine and is demanding 
flexibility. Bauman cites Richard Sennet’s proposition that “to imagine a life of momentary impulses, 
of short-term action, devoid of sustainable routines, a life without habits, is to imagine indeed 
a mindless existence” (Bauman, 2000, p. 21). Effectively, capital has ceased in its attempt to control 
labor and, therefore, individuals are “emancipated” from being tied to a particular structure or 
company. Consequently, Bauman tells us that there are “no more great leaders to tell you what to do 
and to release you from the responsibility for the consequences of your doings” (Bauman, 2000, p. 
30).
During my first five years at the holding company, my managers changed constantly, 
disappearing and sometimes reappearing in a strange series of reorganizations. While I remained in 
the region, the department to which Addy and I belonged to was disbanded. Each of us in the 
department was untethered from each other; I no longer reported to Addy and Addy no longer 
reported to Paul, our director. She was assigned to work within another department, but alone, with 
no direct reports. Paul had been promoted to another position in another area of the Technology 
group. I was handed off to a different department in another area of the Technology department. 
Had the organizational movement ended with this disbandment, I would have argued that this was 
a standard reorganization, which companies tend to have whenever there is a management change.
However, less than three months after this reorganization, my new manager, Laura, realized she 
was losing power within her department and was facing uncertainty about her own future in the 
organization. She had applied to several positions outside of the company—outside of the 
industry—and had been offered a position at a pharmaceutical corporation. She took the job, and 
so the wheel of change began to spin anew. Rather than replacing Laura, her manager, John, 
decided to keep her direct reports under his supervision, effectively eliminating an entire level of 
middle management. This organizational structure lasted approximately one year before John 
moved me to yet another subgroup within his department to report to Addy, who had found her 
way into John’s group. Just as quickly as the layer of middle management disappeared, it reappeared 
again. 
During this time, my role in Latin America remained the same; I had no change in title and no 
official (or unofficial) promotions. Yet reporting to Addy once again turned out to be another 
temporary measure. Seven months later, John had reorganized his department again and I began to 
report directly him (again).
Through this period of transition I collected additional work responsibilities, not because it was 
given to me, but because I sought them out. Part of the decision to seek more work was a defense 
mechanism to prove myself “worthy” of keeping my position in the company. With all of the changes 
in both senior management and the composition of the departments, my coworkers and I believed 
that we could be asked to leave at any moment.
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It was also during this period of transition that many of my teammates and coworkers joined me 
on LinkedIn, a business social networking website. They requested to “connect” with me (i.e., build 
their social networks) and also requested my recommendations on how best to use the networking 
website. Through reading the curriculae vitae of my colleagues posted on LinkedIn, I learned how 
my coworkers translated the liquidity of the organization into more solid-sounding achievements. 
Many people who had switched departments gave themselves de facto promotions in the process—
upgrading their self-reported responsibilities and scope of employment—even though I suspected 
that neither their title nor their salary had changed. I firmly believed this to be true because I, too, 
had participated in these transitions and neither my title nor my salary had changed. Reading their 
résumés, I came to envy their “ability” to recast themselves and to use these multiple reorganizations 
as a springboard to launch their lofty sounding accomplishments.
These colleagues understood the nature of the liquidity in which they found themselves. 
Bauman explains that the “free agent” who has been emancipated has to be able to create his or her 
own identity with what is at hand, despite the contradictions: the “self-made identities which must 
be solid enough to be acknowledged as such [i.e., LinkedIn résumés] and yet flexible enough not to 
bar freedom of future movements [i.e., potential new positions within the company or outside it] in 
the constantly changing, volatile circumstances” (Bauman, 2000, p. 50). By creating “solid” identities 
in LinkedIn, my coworkers were showing their liquid modern abilities to recognize the uncertainty 
in our organization and use the changing circumstances to their advantage.
These reorganizations, however, were par for the course in a liquid environment. Bauman’s 
analysis of Nigel Thrift’s essay “The Rise of Soft Capitalism” summarizes the ideas behind the “soft” 
capitalism that embody the same characteristics of liquid modernity in the concept of work: 
They [elite] are concerned with looser forms of organization which could be put 
together, dismantled and reassembled at short notice or without notice: it is such a fluid 
form of assembly which fits their view of the surround world as ‘multiple, complex, and fast 
moving, and therefore “ambiguous”, “fuzzy” and “plastic”’, ‘uncertain, paradoxical, even 
chaotic’. Today’s business organization has an element of disorganization deliberately built 
into it: the less solid and the more fluid it is, the better. (Bauman, 2000, p. 154)
While I did not unabashedly promote myself on LinkedIn like many others did during that 
period, I also did not demur from utilizing my own methods for dealing with the liquidity of my 
organization. My own actions during that period of transition strode a very fine line: I provided my 
ever-changing chorus of managers with a “solid ” description of myself and my job responsibilities 
that could be placed in the ever-changing organizational chart or displayed to senior management 
in the occasional PowerPoint presentation, while always ensuring that this description was 
sufficiently nebulous (and worth-while sounding) such that I would not be limited to a specific role 
that could be cut from the organization in the off-hand chance that one of those senior managers 
decided the role was no longer necessary. I also consistently took on additional work—whether it 
was covering compliance topics or getting involved in an agency’s technology strategy—both as 
a means of expanding my own skills and knowledge, but also to demonstrate that I had the flexibility 
to adapt to ever changing circumstances. Lastly, I worked to ensure that my relationships with my 
coworkers at the various agencies and at the holding company were strong; I had to rely on these 
relationships to navigate these turbulent waters of liquidity because I was unsure of the relative 
value of my contribution to the overall organization.



























Autoethnographic Sketch - The Limits of Hard Work
Once the employment of labour has become short-term and pre-carious, having been stripped 
of firm (let alone guaranteed) prospects and therefore made episodic, when virtually all rules 
concerning the game of promotions and dis-missals have been scrapped or tend to be altered 
well before the game is over, there is little chance for mutual loyalty and commitment to sprout 
and take root.
 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, 2000, p. 148
I warned Bruce. I had worked for Addy before. She knew how to get into the 
right circles and worm her way into positions. It didn’t matter that she didn’t have the 
experience or the skills needed in that position. She knew how to create the persona 
that upper management wanted to see in an executive. Bruce, on the other hand, knew 
how to work hard. With this promotion I told him he needed to place himself in the role 
of the executive and manager, not in the role of the “grunt.” 
Bruce, however, had other ideas. He believed his hard work would pay off and 
that his reputation was stellar. He had survived many reorganizations and had been 
promoted throughout his time at the agencies. Seemingly, his hard work had paid off. 
But I saw that there was a line that was drawn between middle management and 
executive management, a line that I myself had been trying to cross. I knew that a good 
reputation and hard work got you only close enough to see the line in the first place; it 
took a different set of skills to actually cross over. 
Addy had come close to that line, but even she had a hard time crossing. 
While she stayed in Technology, she had failed to ascend to the role of executive 
management, mostly because everyone around her saw the games she played and her 
insistence on collecting the accoutrements around “executive” management that she 
did not yet deserve. 
Defining who or what actions “deserved” these rewards was difficult for all of 
us. Many of us had been labeled as “high performers” and supposedly given 
opportunities to pull the company into a better point, but even that was unclear. The 
company was flat, so the levels of management were few. All of us in Technology had 
the same frustration—there was nowhere to go, no more rungs in the ladder, just the 
line between executive management and middle management, taunting us. 
Bruce was offered a position in a different department. He would leave 
Technology for a new group, the Compliance department, which had more rungs in its 
ladder than people—they filled many of their spaces with consultants and contractors, 
finding it hard to procure the specialty staff they needed. Bruce was not trained either, 
but he had shown that he wanted to learn and was willing to do that lower-level work. 
He worked in that department for a few years before his world was ultimately turned 
upside down.
Addy ended up in the same Compliance department a few years later because 
some of her friends in Technology could not bear to see her get laid off during one of the 
many reorganizations we suffered through. Some members of the Technology 
department’s upper management had negotiated a position for her with the head of 
Compliance, and so they offered Addy a role in one of the lowest rungs of the group’s 
ladder. Addy took it; I suspected that she, too, knew it was her only chance of staying in 
the company. To turn this bad luck around, Addy walked in as though she was brought 
into the department to turn it around and fix the problems within it. While Bruce had 
managed to win over the executive management in the Compliance department, Addy 
created enemies instead as soon as she joined.
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But the fates were on her side when the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) was 
fired and a new CCO was hired in his place. The new CCO came from the outside the 
industry and had no preconceived notions of anyone’s reputation. Addy took this 
opportunity to present herself as savior and organizer of the CCO’s department, and the 
new CCO had no qualms about giving Addy the breadth to do it. Addy, with her 
corporate gamesmanship, knew how to present the situation to the CCO. 
I warned Bruce of Addy’s abilities and implored him to take her on before she 
ended up being his manager. Bruce demurred, and in the end, it took less than a year; 
Addy, in her role to make life easier for the new CCO, had managed to take on so many 
of the Compliance group’s individual departments under her, that Bruce was now 
reporting to her. Because Bruce had a Director title, it was inevitable that Addy would 
need a better title than that. She is now the Senior Director to three separate 
departments and the clear favorite in the CCO’s group. 
When Bruce heard the news, he couldn’t believe it. Quite frankly, I was 
surprised at his naïveté. He had insisted it would be impossible for Addy to become his 
boss because she lacked experience and knowledge in the Compliance area. I told him 
that it didn’t matter. Addy’s forte was not getting work done, but the persona she 
created. She had created an avatar of a senior director of the Compliance group, and 
thus the perceptions had become the reality. I reminded him that I had suggested he do 
the same, especially as the old guard was changing above him. But he refused to believe 
that smoke and mirrors would be offset by Midwestern hard work and professional 
ethics. 
I didn’t say it to him then, but I wondered what made him think—especially 
after 20 years in this industry and in the agencies—that hard work was ever rewarded 
so easily? Hard work ensured that you stayed in your position and wouldn’t be laid off 
in the next round of reorganizations. Instead it was the networking and marketing of 
your role that led you to the next level. 
Bruce spent the next three months in a daze, unable to fully grasp that he was 
now reporting to Addy. Eventually, as it happened to all of us, he grew accustomed to 
the change and adapted to this new reality.
I perceive Bruce’s story in the organization to be yet another example of how liquidity creates 
uncertainty, in this case, about Bruce’s future prospects in the company. But Bruce’s experience also 
demonstrates that not all of the groups in the holding company experience the same levels of 
liquidity: Some groups are more solid than others. 
The Compliance department at the holding company exemplifies the interplay between solidity 
and liquidity in its structure. While the department itself has a relatively solid hierarchy composed of 
very structured titles (from the Chief Compliance Officer down to his or her vice-presidents and one 
or two directors), the remainder of the organization is actually comprised almost exclusively of 
consultants from some of the major auditing firms in the United States. Despite the high labor costs 
of these consultants, the holding company was comfortable paying the larger expense due to the 
necessity of the organization to be compliant with the government regulations that govern public 
companies of this size. This dependence on a flexible workforce was necessary, and “the advent of 
work on short-term contract, rolling contracts or no contracts, positions with no in-built security but 
with the ‘until further notice’ clause” were quintessential indicators of a liquid organization (Bauman, 
2000, p. 147). 



























Bruce’s promotion to his position in the Compliance department came during a period of 
strategic change in the company. Having spent hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars on 
this “flexible” workforce of consultants, auditors, and other external labor, the holding company 
seemed to have reached its limits (or perhaps, more cynically, come to its senses) in terms of its labor 
costs in this area. Upon his ascension to the position, Bruce and I discussed that it was about time 
the company created some permanent, non-consultant positions in the lower levels of the 
Compliance department: The company needed a more stable workforce to follow through on 
compliance issues and to respond to an increase in regulations. Moreover, we were seeing our 
advertising clients requesting greater regulation of our work processes in order for the clients to 
meet their own internal risk management policies and procedures. Perhaps it was inevitable that 
the tide in that group was changing from the flexible, flat organization it had been for so many years 
into something more solid with (perhaps) more accountability. 
Bruce was happier when he was first promoted into his position of Director in the Compliance 
department. This was the most senior title he had received in all his years of work with the company. 
Furthermore, given the relatively flat organizational structure of Bruce’s former groups, along with 
a structure that changed regularly, it was by no means guaranteed that Bruce would ever find 
himself in a higher position. This was an opportunity for Bruce: Finding that the department was 
restructuring itself into something more solid gave him hope that the structure would “routinize” 
the work he was being tasked to do. Bauman quotes Richard Sennett in that solid modernity can 
create routinization of work that can protect a worker through collective bargaining power, even 
while it can demean that same worker by simplifying the work to its lowest common functions. Solid 
modernity gave the work a “relative stability” in the sense that those who “buy labour and people 
who sell it are closely and inseparably intertwined for a long time to come. … And therefore working 
out a bearable mode of cohabitation is as much ‘in everybody’s interest’ as is the negotiations of 
rules…” (Bauman, 2000, p. 146). The Compliance department, in particular, had to be more solid 
than it had been in the past; the very existence of the work group depended on the regulations the 
company followed. Consequently, the need to make the Compliance organization stronger and 
more structured gave the department itself very solid characteristics. However, the department still 
remained within the confines of a highly liquid holding company and, as such, the Compliance 
department did not escape the impact of the liquidity that surrounded it. 
Initially, Bruce saw the overall liquidity of the organization affecting his day-to-day work, as 
people who ran the agencies refused (politely) to participate in many of his compliance projects. 
Regulation was neither desired nor easily accepted by the agencies. The holding company had to 
insist, cajole and, finally, mandate the agencies’ acceptance of the broader regulatory processes and 
procedures that were deemed non-negotiable by senior management. But for Bruce, that still left 
a number of projects in which he had to convince the agencies to join in. Working all the while with 
very few resources but determined not to be marginalized by the agencies, Bruce insisted on doing 
much of the work himself and focused on making an impact in his new department. He received 
praise for his hard work and his work ethic, but in the end he was left doing the work on his own, 
with no budget, and only “volunteers” from other departments instead of an assigned staff. 
After a year or so in the position, Bruce had developed good relationships with his coworkers 
and was enjoying the structure that the Compliance department was attempting to create. The 
Compliance organization had delved deeply into client contracts, helping the agencies to reach the 
next level of the “pitch” process, the process in which the advertising agencies competed for a new 
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client. The other groups in Compliance that handled audits were also working to solidify their goals, 
with the financial audit group hiring more full-time auditors, rather than depending on consultants 
or external auditors. The Compliance technology department was still using outside consultants, 
but the general consensus was that internal employees would soon replace these individuals as 
well. Bruce, in particular, had one more thing for which to be thankful: his new department was 
growing and he had not had to endure a single reorganization in the time he worked with them. 
In contrast to Compliance, my Technology department was going through its third or fourth 
reorganization in the same number of years. I was now watching my former manager, Addy, struggle 
with her position in this liquid environment. While I had initially admired her ability to ingratiate 
herself with upper management, I had also seen the negative side of this strategy: Addy had used 
other people’s work and claimed it as her own, and many people at middle and senior levels had not 
forgiven her for taking the work of those who were held in high esteem. She had lost much of her 
political capital because of this practice, and many of us stopped sharing work and information with 
her, fearing she would take it and claim it as her own. I had seen it happen with my own work at a meeting 
I attended. I reacted immediately and interrupted “her” presentation to clarify that it had been my 
idea and subsequently went on to explain the work. She correctly gave me credit as soon as 
I finished, but the damage was done. I knew I could not trust her. Bauman explains, “In a liquid 
modern society, individual achievements cannot be solidified into lasting possessions because, in 
no time, assets turn into liabilities and abilities into disabilities” (Bauman, 2005, p. 1). Addy’s abilities 
to network with upper management and speak in very proprietary ways about other people’s work 
were no longer working for her. 
While Addy still believed that she was in control of her own destiny—she would often give 
herself bigger titles than those assigned to her and tracked by Human Resources—the reality was 
that her reputation was falling in the eyes of her coworkers and management. Addy continued to 
feign the semblance of a higher role by insisting on having people report to her and by trying to find 
a bigger office she could move into. She pursued the traditional trappings of a corporate executive’s 
power: staff reporting to her, the bigger office, and titles. However, to the rest of us, these trappings 
looked contrived, fake, and completely out of place in this company. 
The final straw for Addy was when she ran afoul of the wrong executive at the holding company. 
She had been offered a position to work alongside a senior executive to help organize and add 
structure to his meetings with the agencies. She was also going to participate at these meetings in 
which the technology strategy for the organization was being determined. Rather than being 
appreciative of the opportunity to work with this senior executive, her behavior seemed to say that 
she believed the senior executive should consider himself lucky that she had agreed to work with 
him; after all, she was obviously destined for a much higher position. She failed to realize that the 
position was a test to see if she should merit a more senior position. When her attitude finally grated 
on this senior executive enough, he sent her back to her manager in shame. As a result, she was 
supposed to be laid off in one of the reorganizations because this senior executive could not see her 
value to the organization, at least in his department. However, those who were involved in the 
decision to lay her off (her direct managers) could not do it, knowing that the termination would be 
purely based on an executive’s whim. And while she was loath to perform any tasking that she 
considered beneath her (which were most), she did have good customer relationship skills, and 
those were sorely lacking at the holding company. Therefore, rather than lay her off, they found 
another solution to the problem that was Addy.



























Addy was demoted to a manager position in which she would not actually manage any 
subordinates. This was done with the agreement that if she did well in that capacity, she could move 
over to the Compliance department. Addy knew this was a demotion, but also recognized that she 
was lucky to not be getting fired in this tight labor market and that her salary was not being lowered. 
She put on a brave face. When she reported for her new assignment, she promoted her “demotion” 
to the outside world as a horizontal move that would enable her to climb a new ladder. Bauman 
identifies one of the characteristics of the liquid modern individual as having the ability to create 
a new identity, constantly. Freely-choosing liquid moderns can pick and choose how their lives will 
be spent: “It is up to the individual to find out what she or he is capable of doing, to stretch that 
capacity to the utmost, and to pick the ends to which that capacity could be applied best” (Bauman, 
2000, p. 62). Addy’s self-initiated turnaround of her situation was possible because of the liquid 
organization. After all, in this type of environment, “few defeats are final, few if any mishaps 
irreversible” (Bauman, 2000, p. 62). However, Bauman also argues that this liquidity becomes 
problematic for the individual as it creates a constant state of “unfinishedness, incompleteness and 
underdetermination [that] is full of risk and anxiety” (Bauman, 2000, p. 62). In Addy’s case, the 
uncertainty of her position also gave her an opportunity she otherwise wouldn’t have had. Rather 
than feeling completely defeated, she tried again to turn the situation in her favor.
Watching this unfold, I questioned whether Addy was capable of working in this type of 
organization. In the time that I had known her, she was always seeking that next higher rung on the 
corporate ladder, even though the organization was relatively flat. Initially, I had assumed I did not 
know how many ladders were available and that she had some inside knowledge that I did not 
possess, especially with me being so far away from the company headquarters in New York. I also 
theorized that it was possible she had a better understanding than I of what she was after. 
However, as the years passed, I saw that she struggled to accept the changing environment and 
make it her own. While others in the organization had essentially given up trying to predict where 
the next reorganization would land them, I saw Addy struggling to position herself in a more solid 
fashion: She sought out specific opportunities that may or may not have been “right” or “good” for 
her, rather than just accepting the vague promise of something better in the future. I  began to 
wonder if she was not better off in a more solid organization. She enjoyed the structure that the 
corporate ladder (with more rungs than ours) held. She liked seeing her own progress and writing 
down her accomplishments (or those of others that she claimed as her own). Addy wanted to see 
“progress” in her career and was unsatisfied when she was told that she was not ready for the next 
step or that she did not have the right experience or the right connections. Even her networking 
efforts seemed false and contrived, as if she was only interesting in finding out how your position 
could help her attain her next rung. 
Addy struggled because the liquidity of the organization prevented any certainty or predictability 
in regards to where her next promotion would come from. At best, you would hear about job 
openings or career progression opportunities through underground channels, and then these 
openings would be filled or be seized by someone almost immediately. There was no clear career 
path for any of our positions. Bauman explains that today’s liquid modernity is based on a “powerful 
individualizing force” that prevents “the idea of ‘common interests’” and that contemporary fears do 
not have one “common cause” that can be pointed to. Thus, the lack of commitment by capital 
(corporation) has essentially become a temporary relationship. The short-term nature of this work, 
especially in the United States and specifically in the advertising industry, has created an environment 
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in which “virtually all rules concerning the game of promotions and dismissals have been scrapped 
or tend to be altered well before the game is over” (Bauman, 2000, p. 148). Neither Addy, nor I, nor 
even Bruce, had any clear idea of how any of these promotions or firings would play out.
Addy was lucky in that her past relationships had enabled her to keep her position long enough 
to allow a new opportunity to evolve, namely the option of moving over to a new corporate group, 
such as the Compliance department. In her frenzy of self-promotion, however, she overreached 
again. Before she had even officially transitioned over to the Compliance department, she had 
started to present herself to outsiders as the manager of the technology auditors, thereby surprising 
the actual technology auditors, who had no idea this change was afoot. The existing CCO heard 
about her attempts to “take over” the auditing department through the account manager of the 
external auditing firm and questioned who she was. He had never met her and had certainly not 
hired her to take over this area. Addy’s attempt to turn her demotion into a promotion had backfired 
again because she misread (or chose to selectively read) the situation. Consequently, the CCO sent 
out the message that Addy would not receive this role, ever. The declaration of this intent was loud 
enough that it reached my ears through the corporate grapevine. I wondered if she even realized 
her mistake, let alone its gravity or implications. 
Again, Bauman is correct in his identification that in liquid organizations the rules governing 
promotions and dismissals are constantly changing, with no clear precedent. Addy seemed to have 
the skills to succeed in a different type of organization—a more solid one. However, her attempts to 
promote herself and find her way into better positions seemed to be resulting more frequently in 
demotions and lost opportunities. 
Addy seemed to have luck on her side, however. She also had a liquid modern skill that she used 
to her advantage: “People who move and act faster, who come nearest to the momentariness of 
movement, are now the people who rule” (Bauman, 2000, p. 119). Bauman describes that the 
uncertainty of the environment forces only those who can also move at lightning speed to rule over 
those that are tied down to their things. Capital (power) is light and constantly changing. 
Within months of her demotion by the CCO, he himself was asked to leave by the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) of the holding company. With this change, Addy was given a second chance in the 
Compliance department. Addy began to spend time with the new CCO, explaining how the holding 
company worked. The new CCO had not worked in advertising before and Addy was happy to share 
her insights on how the company functioned and how she could help him successfully accomplish 
his many tasks. The new CCO either did not hear or chose not to believe the rumors and took Addy’s 
seemingly generous offers of assistance at face value. Internally, Bruce and I discussed whether or 
not she was being tested so that her firing could be legitimate later on, as she had no experience 
with any risk subject, much less following government regulations, compliance of any kind, or 
auditing. Ultimately, she convinced the new CCO that she could be responsible for the technology 
department under Internal Audit. She would hire new full-time employees to work for the holding 
company and effectively cut the cost of the consultants and external auditors. This was proposed as 
a “win” for the new CCO, who had to make his own mark on the organization, and a “win” for Addy, 
who would get to keep her job, and even secure a new title in the process.
With these changes in the Compliance department, Bruce was now feeling the effects of the first 
reorganization in his department. The former CCO had been very friendly with Bruce and Bruce’s 



























manager, which granted him the privilege of being informed about the strategy in the organization, 
and, consequently, Bruce’s job was protected because of that close relationship. With the former 
CCO gone, however, Bruce’s manager knew his own days were numbered. This fear permeated 
down to Bruce, who wondered if the changes at these higher levels would impact his own position. 
He was yearning for the days back on the technology department, where a reorganization only 
meant a change in the structure of the department, not an actual job loss. While Bruce worried 
about his position and the future of his manager, Addy’s power and influence grew stronger. She 
recruited an employee from another corporate department to report to her. This sly move required 
her to receive the new title of Director. She also started to hire more auditors for the organization. 
She began to dominate the conversations at the virtual corporate water cooler because she was 
now throwing her new title and the trappings of such (travel, expensive hotels, and her expense 
account) back at the rest of us in an effort to ensure that we understood she had risen from the ashes 
of near extinction like a corporate phoenix. Again, “the style of the dominant tends to become the 
dominant style,” and Addy wanted to make sure we knew she was heading to the executive level 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 154). 
Having worked with her and for her over many years, I knew she had the gamesmanship to rise 
high in the organization if she was able to learn from her past mistakes. When it seemed that she 
had—or that the new CCO was more forgiving of her mistakes than the former CCO—I warned 
Bruce that Addy would soon become his manager unless he was ready to make his own strategic 
move. Bruce respected my opinion and advice, but in this instance he decided that it was 
preposterous that Addy, with such little experience in compliance and auditing, would succeed, 
much less ever become his manager. 
Bruce, of course, was still under the belief that his hard work and his title—if he survived the first 
year of the new CCO with his position intact—would prevent Addy from becoming his manager. 
However, Bruce did not understand that “liquid modern life is lived on a battlefield … All liquid 
modern victories are, let me repeat, temporary. The security they offer won’t outlast the current 
balance of power, which is expected to be as short-lived as all balances: just as momentary snapshots 
of things on the move are known to be” (Bauman, 2006, p. 49). Addy’s own experience of rises and 
falls in the holding company mirrored Bauman’s description of liquid modern wins and losses. Bruce 
would depend neither on his past experience, nor on Addy’s past mistakes, as a predicting 
mechanism for what the new CCO might decide to do. Bruce, having worked for so long in the 
company, should have understood that people in our organization rise to the top not only because 
of their ability or experience in a particular area, but also because of the relationships they create. If 
Addy and the new CCO became close, it was inevitable that Addy would convince the new CCO to 
give her more power. Having worked with Addy for so long, what I also understood was that while 
some of her actions had left a terrible taste in a lot of our mouths, she was not foolish. She was 
intelligent and smart and had ambition. Addy would not go down without a fight, and she would 
continue to seek more power and influence as long as it was there for her taking. 
It was less than a year later that the CCO put Bruce under Addy’s management. Addy logically 
had to be a higher level than her own direct report, and so she received a higher title than Bruce’s 
Director title. Her new title became “Senior Director.” She now had three departments and dozens of 
employees reporting to her, including Bruce.
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Conclusion
When I first joined the corporation I had no context in which to understand my environment, my 
surroundings, or my new coworkers. I was thrown into the deep-end of the pool and asked to swim. 
I was given very little understanding of my role in the organization and, ultimately, my main 
performance objectives. 
But as I grew to understand the holding company and my department, I realized that the issue 
was much larger than a lack of information and understanding. What became very obvious was that 
there was no clear definition of anyone’s role or position. Moreover, the fluid nature of the 
organization was further compounded by the myriad managerial changes when I first joined the 
company.
As conveyed in the sketch, Indirect Direct Supervision, it is abundantly clear that this technology 
department and this company function in an entirely different manner from that which I had 
otherwise experienced in my career. To my unfamiliar eye, this company was chaotic, unstable, and 
without discipline, structure, or process. However, it was through Frank’s experience in Latin 
America, as partially described in the sketch A ”Virtual” Failure, that I began to get the inkling that 
not all was randomly chaotic and without structure. I saw the force of nature that was Frank and how 
he was able to create what looked like order and progress in a very “virtual” (and thus, liquid) 
department. Watching him struggle trying to make his vision a reality, and how all of his effort never 
actually paid off, made me begin to question the forces within the company that kept him from 
progressing.
It began to dawn on me that the structure we wanted to apply and create perhaps was more 
illusory than real. Most of the “structure” that had existed up until then was smoke and mirrors, and 
if the structure failed it was not because of a lack of talent or devious intent. I was so unfamiliar with 
this situation that I was willing to accept that eventually, between my management, department 
members, and the overall department, we would find a way to bring order and process into the 
company. I felt strongly that I had been brought into the organization because I was not afraid of the 
challenge and that I held within my skill set the tools to bring about that order.
I also started to wonder about the return on investment from the hard work that was being 
applied to create these structures. On one hand I was seeing Frank struggle to create the Technology 
department in the Latin America region; he had put a lot of effort into trying to show what a great 
idea it was and how it was needed. The question that he posed to upper management was, “It’s all 
here. How do we formalize this?” Ultimately, however, the answer never came back with a clear 
process on how to do it. Despite this “failure” of turning his vision into a reality, Frank was promoted 
and left the region for a much better position within the Technology department. His failure turned 
out to be his success.
It was also no surprise, then, to learn that even someone who had been at the top of her game, 
like Addy, could also quickly fall from favor. As discussed in the sketch The Limits of Hard Work, my 
coworker Bruce had worked long and steadily in the organization, attempting to create a clear 
upward path in his career track. His patience and hard work had resulted in a specific role, but he 
was unable to move beyond that point. Bruce’s hard work did not automatically translate into 
keeping and maintaining the status quo, much less a promotion within the structure. And, equally 



























so, it did not mean that anything was guaranteed for Addy’s career track either. Thus, when Addy 
found herself faltering, it shouldn’t have been a surprise to see her rise again thereafter in another 
department.
All of these machinations of people moving ahead or staying the same seemed incongruous to 
me. But what I was learning in the company was that hierarchies, titles, and even the actual day-to-
day activities we performed across the department mattered very little. Thus, in the sketch Meet the 
New Boss, the Same as the Old Boss, the sense that I had within the organization was that, despite the 
whirlwind of activity and changes, everything and yet nothing changed. We spent many years with 
multiple announcements of our new organization, our new manager, and our new department. But, 
in the end, the actual work my coworkers and I were performing did not change drastically. Yes, we 
may have adapted to the management style of one over the other, but the only place where anyone 
could see any changes to our roles and positions was on the social networking site LinkedIn.
It was in the midst of this swirling fluid of corporate change, uncertainty, and even perceived 
chaos, that I was introduced to the concept of “liquidity.” The theory of liquid modernity by Bauman 
gave me a language in which to define all of these seemingly vague notions of what was supposed 
to happen in the organization. Initially, I thought the lack of structure I encountered was based on 
my own lack of knowledge. However, in reality, I was merely encountering the liquidity of the 
organization and the industry.
While I wondered if the lack of the organizational chart was simply an anomaly that would 
eventually get resolved (as I discussed in Indirect Direct Supervision), when I finally entered the 
holding company, every experience during that initial month was epitome of what Bauman 
describes as “liquid modernity.” From the lack of definition of the job role to the lack of processes 
within the organization to the expectation that the new employee will work it all out on her own, all 
of these events and assumptions were apt examples of the liquid modern environment that Bauman 
postulates. 
The liquidity in the organization affected us all—management or not—and because the 
environment was so fluid and changing, as Bauman describes, what you’d accomplish in a day 
wouldn’t necessarily matter the next. As described in The Limits of Hard Work, this rise and fall that 
Addy experienced confirms that the liquidity of the environment was not only applicable to the 
Technology department, but it was also evidenced in an entirely different department of the holding 
company, Audit, a department that is arguably the most “structured” and “process driven” of any of 
the corporate departments because of the nature of its compliance activity.
Moreover, the constant change in management beautifully embodies Bauman’s description of 
management in a liquid modern environment. Thus, when my coworkers and I would move 
departments or departments (as I chronicled in Meet the New Boss), it was simply a reflection of the 
liquidity in the organization. The lack of clearly defined roles or responsibilities, as I chronicled in 
Indirect Direct Supervision was also another indicator of the liquidity in this environment. The 
metaphor of liquidity can help those in such an environment understand the seeming lack of 
direction and conflicting messages. Bauman has created a theory that can explain organizational 
decisions and employees’ attempts to navigate in those waters. As a descriptor, this theory is 
applicable across industries. Indeed, various organizations can identify their own levels of liquidity 
based on how solid or fluid their structures, processes, and hierarchies may be. 
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Companies and organizations do not function in a vacuum; the impact of a business—sales, 
products, and clients—is critical to determining not only the culture and direction of the corporation, 
but also how its employees perceive their experiences within it. Consequently, Addy, Bruce, Frank, 
and the rest of the people within the corporate departments of this holding company were 
functioning within a specific industry with a specific set of clients and demands. 
The previous sketches shared insight into an organization that had created a very liquid 
environment for their employees; however, the creation of the liquidity in the organization had 
deeper roots in the advertising industry. The next chapter will describe the modern day origins of 
the advertising industry and its relationship to modernity and its forces. This is where the liquidity 
that is incorporated in the organization may be rooted. 
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“It’s gray and messy right now,” he says. “I find that 
chaos and lack of definition liberating.    
I think any really good creative person would.”
David Lubars, 
BBDO Chairman, 2010
Veronica Millan_2.indd   65 2/13/14   7:12 PM
66
American advertising began long before there was even a United States of America. As early as 
1704, the first recorded advertisement was placed in an American newspaper (Advertising Age 
Timeline, 2013). Noted American statesman Benjamin Franklin’s General Magazine became the first 
publication to print advertisements in the early 1800s; a short while later, the Pennsylvania Packet 
and Daily Advertiser was the first successful daily newspaper in the United States. By the mid-1800s, 
a series of advertising agencies were created, including the structure of the advertising agency’s 
commission as the standard form of compensation. Long standing agencies, such as J. Walter 
Thompson and the origins of Foote, Cone & Belding—two of the most well-known American 
advertising agencies—were born, along with retailers and consumer goods manufacturers. 
These  retailers and companies became more comfortable with using advertising as a means to 
attract their customers. By the turn of the 20th century, the first professional groups for the industry 
were created. The growth of the advertising industry in the United Sates was linked directly to the 
growth in manufacturing. As the consumer goods industry improved their production processes, 
the need to sell those goods to the general public became imperative. Both the Center for History 
and New Media and the America Social History Project indicate that advertising revenues grew 
fifteen-fold in just forty years, from about $200 million in 1880 to almost $3 billion by 1920 (History 
Matters, 2013). The increase of media outlets enabled advertisers to reach the masses. Significant 
numbers of active agencies today were founded during this period. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) for the United States, however, did not keep track of the increasing size of the industry until 
1939. At that point, over 1,600 established advertising agencies were in business, and less than 10 
years later, that number had doubled. By the early 1960s, the industry had grown to 4,500 agencies, 
and continued growing at this rapid pace until the early 1990s, when it reached its peak at almost 
14,000 agencies. After that, during the early 2000s, the number of advertising agencies declined to 
only 13,866, reaching its next peak of 14,355 in 2007 before the financial crisis struck. The numbers 
have since stabilized, with 13,706 agencies in business as of the most recent BLS statistics for 2009.













Figure 1: Number of Advertising Agencies 1930 - 2007
This exponential growth was tempered with numerous mergers, which many of these firms 
underwent. Whether to save a struggling agency or to grow a successful one, mergers between 
agencies began early on in the industry’s history.
The advertising agency was structured around the founder of the firm. These founders usually 
had the skills to attract clients or the creative ideas to sell to clients, which allowed them to become 
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independent operators. The increasing workload would allow the founders to add staff to their firm, 
but the main drivers of business were left to the founder and partners of the advertising agency. 
Many founders of American agencies started their careers by writing ad copy in individual 
newspapers or magazines. Having found success with those experiences, they left the newspaper or 
magazine business in order to start creating the ads that would be placed by their former employers 
and across other media. Others got their start by initially working inside the companies that needed 
an internal advertising department, which they then left to build their own agencies. Agencies took 
on the names of their founders because of their reputations for creating the best writing or artwork 
for a client, which would bring them additional clients. As the agencies merged together, so did the 
names of the key partners as a means of identifying the talent available. 
For example, in 1911 Harrison McCann had been working with the Rockefeller Trust as the 
advertising manager, when it was dismantled into 37 different oil companies. McCann was asked to 
continue working on providing advertising services for the subsequent affiliates. McCann set up his 
own agency and, with the Standard Oil affiliates as one of his main clients, his agency was 
immediately successful from the start (Tungate, 2007). After the Great Depression, however, McCann 
merged with another agency that was owned by Albert Erickson, who had also struck out on his 
own after having worked for a department store. Erickson had made some strategic investments 
that McCann was interested in pursuing, including an investment in the company that invented 
Technicolor (Tungate, 2007). This partnership created the firm of McCann-Erickson in 1930. Despite 
the Great Depression of 1929 – 1938, McCann-Erickson was very successful and, by 1945, the 
company had revenues of $40 million. They also expanded internationally during this time, opening 
offices in Brazil, Argentina, and many other European countries.
The growth of the advertising industry, combined with the growth of the industry’s 
manufacturing clients, created an opportunity for the agencies to expand exponentially. As these 
manufacturers created new products to sell, the agencies promoted these product lines to a newly-
affluent, post-World War II U.S. economy. While agencies grew in size, revenue, and profitability, the 
desire to acquire other agencies with attractive client lists grew as well. The resulting effect was 
a series of mergers and consolidations during mid-20th century. 
As the industry matured and the agencies grew, common internal organizational structures 
were developed that continue to be used today. The driver of any agency is its “Creative” team—the 
employees who do creative work for the client. This function includes copywriters, who create the 
words in an advertisement, and art directors, who create the pictures or images that sell the product. 
These two groups develop the advertisements that will be later presented to the client. Equally 
important, the account management teams (or client services, as they are sometimes known) are 
responsible for attracting clients and managing the relationship between the client and the agency. 
Other functions in the agency include the traffic team—project managers who ensure that the work 
being produced meets the client’s deadlines—and the media buying department, which purchases 
space for a client’s ads in television, radio, newspapers or magazines, and nowadays, in the online 
world and on mobile devices. New departments born from the advent of the Internet include digital 
advertising, which focuses on developing websites, games, and applications for mobile devices that 
support the client’s campaign. In some cases, agencies will focus only on media buying and will 
have a sister agency that focuses only on the creative ad. There can also be a separate sister agency 
that focuses on the digital online world. In other organizational models, all of these functions are 
integrated under one agency.













Despite the positive developments brought about by many of these mergers and acquisitions, 
the downside was the resulting clash of clients. As the agencies merged, a common situation 
emerged where the new hybrid agency would find itself with two opposing clients. Depending on 
the size, reputation, and relationship with the clients, the partners of the agency would determine 
which clients stayed and which were “resigned.” Alternatively, if this decision was not made quickly 
or handled well with the favored client, those clients could walk away from the agency, thus making 
the decision for them. 
The result of these mergers and acquisitions, therefore, was a constant shift of clients and 
agencies. Recognizing this fluid environment, advertisers became conditioned to look for the 
agency that best fit their needs, while agencies learned to change and adapt to attract new clients 
and/or keep their existing ones. 
Modernity and the Liquefaction of the Advertising Industry
Now that we have reviewed how the advertising industry gathered momentum at the turn of 
the 20th century, it is important also to note the overall macroeconomic changes that were affecting 
society at the time and how capitalism and the Industrial Revolution affected many aspects of 
society beyond just the increased production of goods. 
As described in Chapter Two, Zygmunt Bauman formed a theory and metaphor on the 
development of the Industrial Revolution and the creation of “modernity.” This precipitated the 
movement from an agrarian society to that which Bauman describes as solid modernity. The 
increasing wealth of society now required manufacturing companies to do more than just meet the 
basic needs of the masses. In order to differentiate themselves from their competitors, manufacturing 
companies needed a way to increase sales so they could sustain production. However, the 
production of “sales” is not possible on the factory floor. The act of selling was less structured and 
had to occur outside of the factory. Door-to-door salesmen could only sell so much; so as production 
levels increased, large scale selling became necessary. Thus, advertising agencies were called upon 
to help with the task.
Although advertising grew as a function of the increasing number of factories, the actual 
production of advertising did not take the path of the manufacturing companies. The Industrial 
Revolution needed technology to increase production and, subsequently, systemize it. Conversely, 
the advertising product was much different. When early advertisements were just a notice in the 
paper, the production was methodological and precise. Copywriters at newspapers and magazines 
could formulate those ads and place them appropriately. However, because manufacturers needed 
to increase sales and stand out amongst other wares that were being sold, the production of the 
advertisement had to change. Manufacturing companies started to use branding—another form of 
advertising—as a way of distinguishing themselves from other products (Tungate, 2008, p. 13). 
This is not to say that advertising agencies did not benefit from the solid modern technologies 
that had helped the manufacturing companies. In fact, many of the same solid modern benefits that 
facilitated the growth of factories also helped the advertising industry. Increased schooling in 
Britain and the United States helped increase literacy rates over the course of the industrial 
revolution (West,  1978). The result was more educated and literate masses that could read 
Veronica Millan_2.indd   69 2/13/14   7:12 PM
70
newspapers and, consequently, advertisements. The same industrial revolution that had helped 
manufacturing companies use technology to increase their output was now allowing newspapers 
and magazines to be produced at a much lower cost, increasing circulation, and thus the number of 
eyes on each advertisement.
Although they thrived together, the advertising industry and the agencies themselves did not 
develop in the same manner as the solid modern manufacturing companies. Rather than reducing 
advertising to the more “solid” structures by “routinizing” the activities behind the creation of the 
ads, the industry depended on the creativity and relationship management of their main production 
line—the workers themselves. Despite attempts to take a more scientific approach to advertising—
many big agencies tried to accomplish this through market research and direct marketing—most 
attempts have fallen flat given that it is the creative, qualitative side of advertising that matters 
most. 
The structure of the advertising agency removes the panopticon that exists in a factory and 
instead places the responsibility of production on the shoulders of the workers who fall into 
advertising industry’s version of a “production line.” Each creative worker is assigned a client’s 
product with the task of selling or rebranding it. The account management workers are tasked with 
understanding the business problem the client is trying to solve (increase sales, improve reputation, 
etc.). The role of the planning department is to first understand the demographics involved in 
solving that problem and then to prescribe the best course of action. The structure of the agency, 
therefore, is less hierarchical and becomes significantly flatter without multiple management levels. 
The incentive for the production worker in an agency is less about rising to the top of the hierarchy 
and more about having the freedom to create interesting work. The effect is that workers are given 
freedom to find inspiration and solve these problems creatively, all while being given fewer 
restrictions on time, structure, and environment. The only exception to this paradigm is the deadline 
for the work that was promised to the client.
As described above, the structure of the advertising agency is not like that of a manufacturing 
company; this places the agency outside the definition of a solid modern structure. As will be 
demonstrated below, the advertising industry and its structure are more similar to liquid modernity 
in many aspects.
Liquid modernity brings to the forefront the idea that there are fewer structures of authority, 
since the Panopticon is no longer in place. Therefore, unlike in solid modernity, where a leader 
lorded over all, a leader now has no real place in liquid modernity. By and large, the role of the leader 
has been replaced by the consultant or counselor: an individual who is functionally knowledgeable, 
but is not a leader. Bauman explains, “leaders demand and expect discipline, counselors may at best 
count on the willingness to listen and pay heed … another crucial difference between leaders and 
counselors is that the first acts as a two-way translators between individual good and the ‘good for 
all’… counselors … are wary of ever stepping beyond the closed area of the private” (Bauman, 2000, 
65). 
This usurpation of leaders by counselors is evidenced in two different ways in the advertising 
industry. First, to continue using the McCann agency example, Harrison McCann used his name to 
create his agency, but even after his death in 1962, the agency continued to the McCann name 
despite his role being replaced by a team of managers. The McCann example is not unique in the 













advertising industry; it has been replicated by virtually all of the larger and older agencies.
Secondly, advertising companies set themselves up to be the liquid modern counselors of solid 
manufacturing companies. While the manufacturer knows its product, that company must now 
consult with advertising agencies in order to create and execute an ad campaign for it. In this sense, 
the agencies have positioned themselves in the unique role of ‘knower of the consumer mind,’ 
shaping the perceptions of consumers and best positioning products (theoretically) to optimize 
sales; yet agencies, because they are not leaders, take very little responsibility over the actual results 
of an advertising campaign. For example, when sales do not increase after an ad placement, the 
advertising agency will likely suggest to the client that the product was out of fashion or poorly 
made, and so it was those product characteristics that affected the lack of sales, rather than the 
overall effectiveness of the ad campaign. 
In a liquid modern world, Bauman argues that
 business organization is increasingly seen as a never-conclusive, ongoing attempt ‘to 
form an island of superior adaptability’ in a world perceived as ‘multiple, complex, and fast 
moving and therefore as “ambiguous,”’ “fuzzy” or “plastic,”’ militates against durable 
structures, and notably against structures with a built-in life-expectation commensurable 
with the customary length of a working life (Bauman, 2000, p.117). 
Precisely in this way, advertising agencies were required to be adaptable to their clients’ requests 
and were required to have the ability to produce creatively and quickly. 
Indeed, liquid modernity began to permeate all structural functions of the ad agency, just as 
Bauman would have predicted3. As background, agency profitability is based on the billings 
received from clients minus agency overhead costs. The overhead costs are the operating expenses 
that are usually categorized as “back office”: administrative overhead, including finance and human 
resources, and non-profitable departments, such as a research. Business theory tells us that, 
depending on the size of the agency, there is a minimum amount of billings that will cover these 
expenses. Yet as agencies evolved with liquid modern characteristics, they realized that additional 
revenue does not necessarily require additional overhead (like their solid modern counterparts that 
needed additional factories, equipment and inventory), resulting in more profits for the agencies. 
Agencies also recognized that the larger their size, the lower their overhead costs were on a per-
employee basis. This economic realization drove many of the agencies’ growth spurts during the 
mid-20th century. Additionally, in terms of staffing practices, agencies began to understand that 
adding a new client to an existing roster of clients meant they could hire additional workers to cover 
the clients’ work, or if another account had been recently lost, those staff could now migrate to work 
on the new one. 
In the solid modern company there exists an “invisible chain riveting the workers to their working 
places and arresting their mobility” (Bauman, 2000, p. 58). However, in the liquid modern company, 
this is far from true. In 1966, the overall turnover rate in the advertising industry was 35%, significantly 
higher than other industries. In 2011, the industry had improved this rate to 30%, but, at the time, it 
was still higher than other industries (Advertising Age, 1-B). The factory job in the early 20th century 
almost guaranteed that if you started with that factory, you could easily retire your career at that 
3 Zygmunt Bauman developed the theory of liquid modernity post-creation of the advertising industry. Therefore, 
it is speculative whether or not he could have predicted how advertising unfolded in the early 20th century.
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factory many years later due to the relationship created between labor and capital through mutual 
dependency and unions. However, advertising was never structured in that way. Similar to the liquid 
world that Bauman describes, Daniel Cohen, as interpreted in Liquid Modernity, says that a worker in 
a liquid society “has no idea where it is going to end.”
In the same way that liquid modern characteristics permeate an agency’s back office functions, 
it is even more infused in an agency’s creative side. Advertising is complex and ambiguous; 
identifying the key aspects of what actually compels a consumer to purchase a specific item is 
difficult to quantify, despite various books, degrees, and professional assurances that there is a very 
specific way to do so. Advertising campaigns are built to last only a limited time, again, playing into 
the temporal nature of liquid modernity where that fluidity changes over time.
When a client commissions an ad, in general, it is only meant to be used for a finite amount of 
time, usually weeks or months. Only a very small number of campaigns have lasted years or decades; 
and even if the overall message is the same, adjustments and adaptations have likely been made to 
it over time. One campaign that fits this limited category is Absolut Vodka’s campaign that launched 
in 1993: “Absolut ___________” (with different names, locations, products, etc.). This campaign 
remained unchanged for the following 14 years—a situation essentially unheard of in the ad 
industry. The Ad Council also boasts some of the longest running advertising campaigns, the longest 
being the Smokey Bear’s “Wildfire Prevention” ads, which began running in 1944 and continue to the 
present day. 
Fundamentally, the difference between solid and liquid modernity lies in the product that is 
being created in the liquid advertising industry. Contrary to the stereotypical Ford factory of 
automobiles to which Bauman frequently refers, advertising offers a soft product, a creative idea, 
and a service to solid modern companies. This “liquid” product has no structure: the idea for an 
advertisement and its execution is where the real value of the industry can be found. This model 
lacks the time and space that is found in traditional solid modernity. A solid modern company is 
focused on acquiring material for their product and then creating the product to be sold, all of 
which take a specific amount of time and space (in a warehouse, in a box, etc.). An idea for a campaign 
can be created in five minutes by a single copywriter, or over six months by a team of Creatives who 
have been working around the clock. The time around the creation of the idea is only structured 
insofar as the solid modern company may require an ad to be ready for the launch of a new product 
or a specific event tied to the product. Therefore, the solid modern company imposes the structure, 
not the liquid advertising agency. 
In a liquid society, Bauman even goes so far as to question whether the “the term ‘career’ is 
legitimate. Bauman clarifies why that term cannot be used in liquid modernity: “‘Career brings to 
mind a set trajectory, no unlike the American universities’ ‘tenure tracks’, with a sequence of stages 
marked in advance and accompanied by moderately clear conditions of entry and rules of admission.” 
A solid modern society has a very specific structure that a worker can follow and can have a “career 
track” that lays the next steps the worker can take to proceed ahead to the next rung on the 
“corporate ladder.” However, the concept of career advancement is much looser in a liquid company. 
Bauman concludes that “under such conditions the idea of a ‘career’ seems nebulous and out of 
place” (Bauman, 2000, p. 117).
A liquid modern career is “short-term and precarious, having been stripped of firm (let alone 













guaranteed) prospects and therefore made episodic” (Bauman, 2000, p. 148). This theory aligns 
quite perfectly with careers in advertising, which tend to be on the short-term side and depend 
entirely on the ability of the agency to keep clients and retain their most talented employees. 
However, the aforementioned high turnover rate indicates that many agencies fail at, or are unable 
to retain their top talent. A recent survey of talent in 2011, summarized by Advertising Age, indicates 
that the industry is woefully lacking in employee training, motivation, and retention measures. The 
survey showed that while most agency employees plan to stay in the industry (66% indicated 
long-term plans to stay at least five years), the majority indicated that they did not feel loyalty to the 
agency that hired them, and 70% indicated they would consider other job offers. Employee retention 
is seen as a problem in the industry; as Andrew Bennett is quoted in saying; “we are a people-focused 
industry but we don’t embrace that with our employees” (Morrison, 2011). 
Bennett’s cry to action to the advertising industry is indicative of the importance of the staff in 
the agencies. Without the staff to create the advertisements, manage the client relationships, sell 
media, or, nowadays, create the digital content, the agency does not exist. This concept also aligns 
perfectly with Bauman’s definition of a liquid company. Advertising is a liquid industry, where “the 
main sources of profits – the big profits in particular, and so also of tomorrow’s capital – tend to be 
on a constantly growing scale the ideas rather than material objects” (original emphasis, Bauman, 
2000, p. 151). He continues:
Ideas are produced only once, and then keep on bringing in wealth depending on the 
number of people attracted as buyers/clients/consumers – not on the number of people 
hired and engaged in replicating the prototype. When it comes to making the ideas 
profitable, the objects of the competition are the consumers, not the producers. 
Advertising is singularly focused on understanding how the consumer thinks, reacts, and buys. 
The focus isn’t so much on the creation of the product itself—although agencies may collaborate 
with the client in this area—but rather on attracting consumers to that particular product.
The idea of the consumer being essential to the advertising industry is also critical to the 
definition of liquid modernity. Bauman identifies the members of liquid modernity “[as] men and 
women who possess and are possessed by consumer culture” (Blackshaw, 2005, p. 113). These 
consumers “are running after pleasurable … sensations … But they are also trying to find an escape 
of from the agony called insecurity” (Bauman, 2001, p. 81). Advertising has built up this liquid 
modern consumer and has, subsequently, used their insecurity to sell products. However, advertising 
also has created clutter and noise for the consumer. Because of the increasing amount of companies 
in the market, advertising has created “an age of persuasion, where people’s wants, wishes, whims, 
pleas, brands, offers, enticements, truths, petitions, and propaganda swirl in a ceaseless, growing 
multimedia firestorm of sales messages” (O’Reilly and Tennant 2009, p. xiii), and so agencies must 
fight to reach the consumer. 
Advertising takes the sales message and strives to create “genuinely funny stories, intelligent 
characters, fantastic writing, and irresistible moments,” which leaves the consumer with positive 
feelings for the products being sold, allowing them to hone in on that specific product, rather than 
another that has a less appealing ad (O’Reilly and Tennant, 2009, p. 44). In this vein, advertisements 
also have to seduce the consumer; “appealing content … drives great advertising [and] borrows 
from the same appeal that drives TV, film, theatre, music and yes, publishing” (O’Reilly and Tennant, 
2009, p. 45). Thus, “consumer culture is compelling in a profound way because it works ingeniously 
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through strategies of entertainment, with comprehensive engagement not required” (Blackshaw, 
2005, p. 117). In this manner, advertising creates a liquid modernity that is focused on the 
consumption of goods, rather than on the production of those goods. 
We can therefore conclude that modernity, with its focus on capital and changing society, gave 
rise to solid modernity, which permitted manufacturing companies to grow and dominate the 
economic landscape. However, these same forces also gave rise to liquid modernity, in which 
advertising agencies helped shape the members of society from producers to consumers. 
The advertising industry thus not only helped shaped some of the characteristics that are found in 
liquid modernity, but it also fell into liquid modern patterns ahead of other solid manufacturing 
companies. 
The First Advertising Holding Company
Through the middle of the 20th century, advertising agencies kept growing through their 
acquisitions and mergers. However, one problem that arose as a result of these business combinations 
was the loss of clients as the agencies merged. As previously discussed, if the newly merged agency 
found itself with two clients with competing products in the same market, one of the clients would 
either leave on their own accord or the merged agency would have to decide which account to 
resign. This problem required a solution, because many in the advertising industry saw the loss of 
these clients as a loss of revenues and business opportunities.
As will be discussed below, one agency, McCann-Erickson, decided to tackle this problem 
through innovation. 
Marion Harper, Jr. had joined McCann-Erickson in 1939 as an “office boy,” a position that was 
actually an executive trainee role. Once in the agency, Harper was trained and groomed in all of the 
agency’s departments. Soon, he found a permanent position in the agency’s research department; 
this was the start of his meteoric rise to president of the agency. By 1946, he had succeeded Harrison 
McCann, who became Chairman of the Board. McCann-Erickson was, at the time, the fourth largest 
American agency, trailing behind J. Walter Thompson, which had revenues of over $70 million, 
Young & Rubicam, and N.W. Ayer (Cummings, 1984). By the 1950s, Harper had started to ferment the 
idea of a holding company so that McCann-Erickson could keep competing clients through 
separately operating companies.
Harper wanted to model his advertising agency after the General Motors Company (Wright, 
1967). General Motors had been created in 1908 by legendary carmaker William C. Durant. 
Structuring General Motors as a holding company allowed Durant to acquire and manage many 
different, and potentially competing, lines of automobiles under the same roof. Durant began by 
acquiring the Buick line-up of cars; later the company acquired Oldsmobile. Throughout the 
following decades, General Motors continued to acquire other car companies under its name, but 
kept them each as separate, independently operating subsidiaries. Rather than cannibalizing its 
own sales, the different companies under General Motors were able to target different segments of 
the consumer market with good success. Harper wanted to do the same for McCann-Erickson.
A holding company is a legal corporate entity that holds controlling interest in other companies 













(DePamphilis, 2012). Traditionally, holding companies enable the transfer of assets with lower tax 
implications and permit the operating units underneath it to function independently, without 
strategic direction from the holding company management. In the mergers and acquisitions field, 
holding companies only have to own a controlling interest in a company (i.e., greater than 50% of 
the company’s equity). Although many holding companies do wholly own their subsidiaries, this is 
not a requirement. The advantages of this corporate structure include the ability to gain control of 
one or more companies through stock purchases, the ability to control or direct the strategic 
direction of many businesses, and the economies of scale that can be realized through pooling 
administrative functions. However, the disadvantages of holding companies are potentially 
numerous as well, especially if the subsidiary companies are not wholly owned by the holding 
company. As a result of not owning 100% of a subsidiary company, there can be minority 
shareholders who may not agree with the decisions made by the holding company. The more 
diversified the operating units, the more difficult it is to create one investment strategy for the 
whole, and very often the managers in the holding company have limited understanding of each of 
the businesses. These were the types of problems that became apparent during the time of the 
advertising industry’s first holding company.
In 1956, Marion Harper incorporated Interpublic in Delaware. This legal entity would become 
the holding company for two agencies that Harper was running at the time. At that point, McCann-
Erickson had acquired another agency, Marschalk & Pratt, in 1954. Contrary to McCann-Erickson’s 
previous acquisitions, Harper did not merge Marschalk into McCann-Erickson. Instead, Harper kept 
the agency separate because he wanted to find a way to maintain Marschalks’ clients, rather than to 
lose them in the merger. Advertising Age, the leading newspaper for advertising industry news 
during that time (and still today), wrote in a 1954 editorial (“A New Type of Super Agency?”): “If the 
experiment works, the advertising field can look for the further development of ‘satellite’ agencies 
which would actively solicit accounts which other satellites -- or the parent agency -- can’t touch 
because of conflicts” (Johnson, Advertising Age Graphics, March 2010).
Harper renamed Marschalk & Pratt into Marschalk Co. and kept McCann-Erickson functioning 
separately. For a brief time, Marschalk Co. was known as McCann-Marschalk, but Harper pushed his 
idea of Interpublic as a holding company instead. By 1960, Interpublic became the official name of 
the group of advertising agencies, leaving its subsidiary, McCann-Erickson, to run independently of 
Marschalk.
In a later interview, Harper listed the problems he was facing at the time:
The first problem was the industry rejected the concept that you could have a holding 
company. The second thing they rejected was the idea that you could have competitive 
products in the same house. And the third thing they rejected was that you could bring in 
top people and suddenly make them part of the team, so to speak. (Cummings, 1984)
As Harper correctly diagnosed, one significant problem that the holding company faced in its 
early years was convincing the advertising industry of the viability of the holding company structure. 
Even something as basic as the name of the company caused ripples of doubt and dissent in the 
industry. Contrary to the traditional naming convention in the industry, the name “Interpublic” 
neither honored a founder nor indicated what the agencies were attempting to do. This caused 
confusion in the industry because the Interpublic name had no independent brand or goodwill. 
However, the naming of the company was a strategic move on Harper’s part; he reasoned that the 
Veronica Millan_2.indd   75 2/13/14   7:12 PM
76
holding company name would not remove the respected and well-established brands that McCann-
Erickson and Marschalk had created. 
Harper remained steadfast in his belief that the holding company was the only way that McCann-
Erickson and his other companies could grow. Harper explains that the idea was to:
1. that to attract good people, we had to have a larger business; 2. that it became very 
clear to me that the very best clients made the best agencies; 3. that these clients would 
have product development concepts and products, new products coming and those new 
products should not routinely be given to some other agency, because of some idiosyncrasy 
of the management or because of possible product conflicts. (Cummings, 1984)
Harper defined his structure in a very specific way so that both his management team and the 
clients would understand the role of Interpublic. In doing so, he created nine tenets that he wanted 
Interpublic to follow:
1. a purposeful decentralization, which allows each operating unit under Interpublic to 
run independently of each other and where the holding company would not 
intervene in their direction;
2. diversification of the services offered to attract more clients, which means that if a client 
needs a particular service, but the agency they were using did not have that service, 
the agency would send the client to one of the sister agencies for that service;
3. separate entities for each of the agencies and groups under Interpublic, which would 
allow them to operate independently;
4. effective use of the size of Interpublic, which implied that global clients would 
negotiate global level contracts with the holding company, rather than negotiating 
individual contracts locally;
5. central management of back office services, to take advantage of the holding 
company management;
6. the development of talent through the central group;
7. centralized training and recruitment;
8. continuous growth by acquiring more agencies; and
9. continuing the pursuit of marketing communications as the main focus for the 
organization 
(Wright, 1967).
Initially, Interpublic embraced the traditional holding company model and did not provide any 
services or goods to its subsidiary agencies. The relationship was structured in this manner because 
Harper wanted the holding company to remain separate and not interject into the agencies’ 
business. This decentralization of power was the motivation for each of the agencies to compete 
independently, even with each other, with the goal of creating the best possible work.













The creation of the advertising agency holding company was unheard of in the industry and 
many other advertising agencies refused to follow suit.
When Marion Harper decided to create Interpublic, he had been influenced by the solid modern 
manufacturing companies that were growing and expanding around him. He wanted to embrace 
larger portions of the industry and grow his overall company. Harper took a hold of those solid 
modern characteristics and tried to apply them to a liquid advertising agency, in a liquid industry. 
Because of his background in market research—one of the most “solid” areas of advertising—Harper 
believed that advertising could be approached in the same manner that all other manufacturing 
companies approached their production processes—through technological and scientific strategies. 
Harper believed that the scientific method could be applied to advertising and even founded the 
Copy Research Council to make research a scientific advertising tool (Alfonso, 1989).
Harper was successful in attracting and keeping accounts, such as Coca-Cola and Buick (GMC 
brands). However, managing the ever-growing agencies and holding company proved to be much 
more difficult than he had originally planned.
The Advertising Holding Company Phenomenon
Under Harper’s leadership, Interpublic continued through the 1960s. Harper was determined to 
prove that the holding company model was correct and needed to show that Interpublic could be 
larger than J. Walter Thompson, the largest agency at the time. By the mid-1960s, only six years after 
the official incorporation with McCann and Marschalk, Interpublic had over 8,000 employees, billed 
over $700 million in client fees, and owned firms all over the world. 
This exponential expansion placed Interpublic in the enviable position of being the largest 
advertising “agency” in the world; however, the acquisitions had strapped Interpublic financially. 
The growth of the holding company had led to an increased size in the holding company-level 
corporate organization that had to manage all of the acquisitions. While this growth did make 
Interpublic the largest advertising agency in the world, with the largest billings, the result was an 
unprofitable company. The lean holding company that Harper wanted to create never materialized—
there were too many expenses and the overhead of the holding company was eating up the profits 
of the agencies. 




McCann Erickson Inc. 1930
Marschalk & Pratt 1923
McCann Marschalk 1956
Interpublic Inc. 1961
Interpublic Group of Companies 1965
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With the gift of hindsight, Harper admitted in a 1982 interview that he made a mistake by trying 
to grow in three different directions during the early years of Interpublic:
Well, I only point that out to say that we had three expansions running simultaneously, 
and all of these on what I regard as limited resources for the job. The first expansion I just 
outlined; [expanding into different countries…] all of those took money. The second 
expansion, of course, was we were acquiring other agencies. And the third expansion was, 
we were attempting to go into the marketing services business, that is, be a separate 
research company, a separate sales promotion/merchandising company, etc. (Cummings, 
1984).
As Interpublic grew, the holding company concept and Harper’s tenets were no longer being 
followed because the company was becoming unwieldy. Harper no longer had any control of the 
organization, leading Interpublic to near receivership. Finally, in 1967, the board of directors 
replaced Harper with Robert Healy, an executive who had joined McCann-Erickson as director and 
treasurer. 
This drastic change in leadership was Interpublic’s last bet for remaining the industry’s first and 
only holding company. Healy was tasked with turning the company’s financials around. First he sold 
off several of the company’s subsidiaries and restructured the organization’s financials. He then took 
the step of making Interpublic the first publicly traded advertising holding company, putting it on 
the New York Stock Exchange in 1971. Healy left the company two years later, after naming Peter 
Foley, former copywriter and then-Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of McCann as the new CEO of 
Interpublic. Under new leadership, Interpublic started to grow again, both in billings and in 
acquisitions. It continued to attract large clients and welcomed the 1980s with $2 billion in billings 
and with another president and CEO—Philip Geier. Geier stayed as president of the company until 
the year 2000. (Further details surrounding Interpublic’s turnaround will be covered in Chapter Six.)
However, by this time Interpublic was no longer the only holding company in the advertising 
world, as it had been in throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Advertising agencies had continued to 
acquire and merge with each other, and as clients grew and became more global, the need to have 
large, global-scale operations dominated the market. This frenzy of acquisitions created the feeling 
that the only way to survive in the industry was to merge and create a holding company-like 
structure in order to meet client needs. 
The Holding Company Greats: Omnicom Group, WPP plc, and Publicis Groupe
Interpublic’s eventual success as a holding company in the 1980s ushered in a boom of mergers 
and acquisitions in the advertising industry. The Interpublic model of using a holding company as 
a way of keeping clients and growing agencies led to dramatic changes throughout the landscape 
of the industry. The holding company structure was also used as a defensive weapon to protect 
advertising agencies from being acquired by other holding companies—the advertising agencies 
could choose to consolidate so they became too large to be targeted.
During this mid-‘80s boom, two prominent holding companies were created—Omnicom Group 
and WPP plc. The Omnicom Group was born out of the merger of three agencies that had neither 
grown enough to be top tier advertising companies nor were specialized enough to work in the 













boutique sector. Needham Harper, BBDO (Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn), and DDB (Doyle, Dane 
and Bernbach) were all respected agencies in the advertising industry. However, individually, each 
agency only ranked in the top 20 of the industry (by revenue), not the top 10. The industry was 
rapidly consolidating in the mid-1980s, and the belief was that only a few top tier agencies would 
manage the majority of the market. These agencies saw an opportunity to direct their own future by 
merging together, and in 1986, the Omnicom Group was created—a move that was intended to 
protect the individuality of the three original agencies.
The corporate structure of the Omnicom Group was closer to the textbook definition of a holding 
company; it owned stock from the agencies under it such that each subsidiary agency had a vote 
and shared equally in the profits. However, because Needham Harper only had strong operations in 
the United States’ Midwest region and DDB had a strong presence in New York and Europe, the two 
agencies merged together to better serve their clients. At the end, it was two major agencies made 
up the new holding company—BBDO and DDB Needham. Omnicom’s management style has been 
to let the agencies lead, allowing creativity to be the dominant factor in their strategy and maintain 
the original culture of the agencies. This was a response to the corporate greed that the agencies 
saw unfolding during the 1980s with the other mergers and holding companies (Tungate, 2007). 
WPP plc, on the other hand, was created by Sir Martin Sorrell, who was considered an “outsider” 
to the advertising industry. His work experience prior to entering the industry had been in financial 
services. Sorrell had found his way into the industry by becoming the Finance Director for Saatchi & 
Saatchi, a well-renowned ad agency in the United Kingdom. During his tenure at Saatchi & Saatchi, 
Sorrell purchased 30% of the shares of a U.K.-based company called Wire and Plastic Products, a wire 
shopping basket manufacturer. Sorrell’s share of ownership was just enough for him to be able to 
manage and control the company, and so he named himself the CEO and renamed the company 
simply WPP. He had acquired WPP because he wanted a company that was already listed on the 
London Stock Exchange and that was available to act as a holding company for other operations he 
wanted to acquire. During his tenure at Saatchi & Saatchi, Sorrell had noticed that “below the line” 
(BTL) marketing agencies were undervalued but very profitable. In industry speak, “below the line” 
refers to the retail marketing aspects of the business. These agencies help retail outlets manage 
promotions or improve brand recognition through channels outside mass media. These agencies 
were not highly valued in the industry, since there was less creativity involved in the business. In 
1986, Sorrell used WPP to acquire some of these agencies. Then in 1987, Sorrell acquired his first 
“above the line” (ATL) agency, J. Walter Thompson (JWT), in a hostile takeover. This led to subsequent 
buying, and one of such purchases included the acquisition of Ogilvy & Mather, a prominent agency. 
Sorrell used his background in finance and contacts in the banking industry to acquire many of the 
larger agencies in the same hostile takeover method that he used with JWT (Tungate, 2007).
Lastly, out of the largest advertising holding companies in the world today, Publicis Groupe has 
a unique history as a holding company. A French company, Publicis dominated the French market 
for many decades, with its founder, Marcel Bluestein-Blanchet, introducing many of the American 
advertising techniques and styles into the French advertising market. The agency was founded in 
Paris in 1926 and had grown organically and successfully throughout the middle of the 20th century. 
In the 1970s, it began to acquire small European agencies, but did not grow into other international 
markets. By the 1990s, it had signed an agreement to cooperate with Foote, Cone & Belding (FCB), 
an American agency that had a strong presence in the United States and had expanded into Asia 
and Latin America. This permitted Publicis to serve its clients internationally. However, soon after, 
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FCB decided to create its own holding company called TrueNorth, which resulted in Publicis backing 
away from the original agreement. Publicis’s first outright acquisition purchase was that of an 
agency network in France called FCA-BMZ. The success of this acquisition led to the further 
purchasing of agencies around the world—an effort to improve their global presence. They acquired 
Saatchi & Saatchi in 2000, and later Leo Burnett, another well-known and famous American agency. 
With these two purchases, Publicis became the fourth largest holding company in the world 
(Tungate, 2007). 
By the turn of the 21st century, these major holding companies, along with Interpublic, held 
85% of the total advertising industry revenue worldwide (AdAge, 2003).
Beyond the top four holding companies, there are a number of other advertising holding 
companies that exist, but the billings they manage are much smaller. Over the years, Havas, another 
French holding company, along with Dentsu, a Japanese holding company, have managed to hold 
their own. Dentsu also collaborates with Publicis Groupe internationally, as it owns a portion of the 
group. Recently, another smaller holding company called Aegis merged with Dentsu. As of this 
writing, the merger is still in process. Should it go through, it would make Dentsu-Aegis the fifth 
largest holding company in the world, trailing Interpublic with an approximate $6.3 billion dollars in 
revenue.
Although their rankings have varied throughout their existence, these top four have maintained 
their status as the largest adverting holding companies. Inevitably, this consolidation has changed 
the very landscape of the advertising industry.
Liquid Holding Companies
If the advertising industry helped usher in liquid modernity by shaping consumer culture, 
having fewer hierarchical structures, and by taking on the role of counselor to the solid modern 
manufacturing companies by advising them on their selling strategies, then what happens vis-à-vis 
liquid modernity when holding companies take over the advertising industry?
As described above, the advertising industry is clearly marked as a liquid industry that creates 
liquid organizations. Bauman describes liquid modernity to be “the continuation of disembedding 
coupled with dis-continuation of re-embedding” (Bauman, 2000, p. 7). Literally, and possibly 
figuratively as well, the advertising conglomerates were consolidating and destroying, then 
recreating and re-embedding their pieces of agencies together to create something new. The 
holding companies created a constantly changing environment, expecting that its agencies would 
to continue to profit and its employees would work together efficiently despite this ever-changing, 
liquid environment.
Figure 3 - 2011 Ranking of Top Four Advertising Holding Companies
Ranking Holding Company Headquarters Revenue (US$ billion)
1 WPP plc London 16.05
2 Omnicom Group New York City 13.87
3 Publicis Paris 7.53
4 Interpublic Group of Companies New York City 7.01













In further accordance with Bauman’s theory, the holding companies in the industry did not 
bring about any more solidity to the structure. Rather, these conglomerates brought about 
additional liquidity to their organizations and to the industry itself. To understand how this occurred, 
the environment in which these holding companies were created must be examined—in particular, 
the intersection of the advertising industry and the increasing influence of Wall Street.
As previously described, advertising agencies developed from the Industrial Revolution’s need 
to sell the products of manufacturing. The advertising industry created a market of “just-in-time 
consumption,” whereby the advertising firm became the nodal point for connecting manufacturers 
(producers of goods) with the consumer demand (Leslie, 1995). However, the creation of the 
consumer market also pushed producers to become more responsive to the needs and whims of 
that consumer. This drive resulted in local market saturation, driving both the agency and the 
manufacturer to look for new consumers. By the 1980s, “the greatest proportion of U.S. agency 
growth came from outside the United States” (Leslie, 1995), which aligned with the similar growth 
patterns of manufacturing companies. As opposed to these solid modernity companies, however, 
the advertising agency did not centralize its operations, but rather looked to foreign markets for 
help in setting up their own international shops. The search for this type of expansion meant that 
the largest advertising agencies were looking to acquire and merge with local shops that could 
meet their global clients’ needs. It was estimated that in 1976, 12% of the top 12 advertising agencies 
in the United States had international billings. By 1986, that percentage had grown to 20%, from 
only eight large agencies. In 1991, it was assumed that only a major advertising agency could service 
international manufacturing clients like Procter & Gamble, General Foods, R.J. Reynolds/Nabisco, 
and the like (Leslie, 1995).
This increased demand for global agencies led the industry to fall into a pattern of acquisitions. 
While Interpublic remained the only holding company in the industry until 1986, the other 
advertising agencies had already begun a pattern of increased consolidation and mergers. There 
were only eight mergers and acquisitions of agencies during the course of the 1960s, which explains 
why many in the industry did not understand Harper’s desire to create Interpublic. During the 1970s, 
that number only increased to 10. However, during the 1980s, the rate of mergers and acquisitions 
jumped to 18. This included the creation of the Omnicom Group and WPP (Leslie, 1995). 
Fed by the pressure of demands for growth and profits from financial analysts and agency 
shareholders, occasionally ad agencies and their holding companies were led to panicked or 
inadvisable acquisitions. Bauman explains that in a liquid modernity, capitalism created 
“the managerial equivalent of liposuction [that] has become the paramount stratagem of managerial 
art: slimming, downsizing, phasing out, closing down or selling out some units because they are not 
effective enough and others because it is cheaper to let them fight for survival on their own than to 
undertake the burdensome, time-taxing managerial supervision, are this new art’s principal 
applications” (Bauman, 2000, p. 122). In describing liquid modernity in this manner, Bauman 
identifies yet another key characteristic of liquidity, a pattern seen again through this period in the 
advertising industry. The market forces exerted on these advertising agencies that were publicly 
traded, plus the conglomeration of these large agencies, led the industry of the 1980s to resemble 
the financial and technology sectors, as opposed to the purely creative advertising industry of the 
mid-20th century. The intricate, financially structured corporate deals that earmarked ad company 
maneuverings seemed more like “Wall Street” than the advertising industry’s origins of “salesmanship 
on paper” (O’Reilly and Tennant, 2009). 
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The financial environment of the 1980s affected the advertising industry perhaps more so than 
other sectors of the economy because the agencies’ clients were undergoing their own corporate 
realignments and cost-cutting processes. This led client procurement and financial teams to become 
more involved in agency-client relationships and contracts. In turn, this forced agencies to change 
their fee structures and required them to justify their costs to their clients. The inevitable result of 
these cost pressures lowered the profitability of most ad agencies during this period. In the past, 
a 15% commission had been a standard rate for agencies, but now that was being eaten away by 
clients exerting cost-cutting pressures. Additionally, the media companies had also started forming 
their own conglomerations. The advent and expansion of the cable television networks further 
fragmented the media buying landscape. Advertising agencies were now at the mercy of these 
market forces. Recalling a previously discussed example, in the 1980s, the Omnicom Group was 
created by three agencies out of their fear that they would be acquired and merged into a large 
holding company. These three companies did not have the financial stability or the cash flow to 
continue to grow through acquisitions on their own; their decision to merge and create the 
Omnicom Group was their method for handling the uncertainty of the market. 
These liquid agency organizations continued to remove any sense of job or career permanence 
in the minds of their employees. To prove this point, an executive at Oglivy & Mather, part of the WPP 
holding company, admitted in an interview with the magazine Businessweek, “The fact is, what you 
don’t read about in the blogs, is that we let 391 people go. But we also hired 270 new people. We 
transferred another 300 people between different parts of the company. All of that was designed to 
meet the changing requirements of our business” (Gillette, 2010).
The holding companies did not provide more stability or solidity to the industry. Conversely, 
they brought additional uncertainty into the advertising business. The benefits of the conglomeration 
of these agencies into holding companies are still being questioned today. Prior to this phenomenon, 
advertising agencies were already liquid in their forms of business and organization. By adding the 
component of the public holding company, the agencies are now beholden not only to their clients’ 
wishes and demands, but also to the demands and wishes of the Wall Street analysts and shareholders 
who focus on financial performance. Much of the criticism that stems today in the industry is based 
on the question of who does the holding company work for: the clients or the shareholders and Wall 
Street?
Criticism: General Holding Company Issues
More than 50 years after it was founded, Interpublic has retained the same basic structure and 
mission that Marion Harper first envisioned for the company in the 1950s. Yet while Interpublic and 
the other major advertising holding companies are all profitable and growing, many in the industry 
still question whether the holding company model is the best manner in which to run an advertising 
agency. Questions remain as to whether the holding company operates to increase the profits of the 
subsidiary agencies or whether the agencies are merely there to create profits for the holding 
company. Similarly, there is lack of clarity as to how the holding companies should, and do, conduct 
themselves vis-à-vis the agencies under them. When Interpublic suffered an embarrassing financial 
scandal in the early 2000s it again raised the question of whether the holding company works for 
the operating companies or vice versa.













Many independent agencies in the industry, especially those that have left the holding company 
fold, have decried the need to have holding companies at all. These voices assert that holding 
companies serve to stifle the creativity of the agency and prevent the agency from being more 
flexible with the client’s needs. However, holding companies also hold certain advantages over 
independent agencies. 
The primary advantage that the agencies have seen under holding companies is the ability to 
weather a financial downturn or the loss of a client without creating chaos within the agency. 
The  holding company can help the agency reallocate employees to other accounts across the 
network and can help offset or defray agency costs while new clients are acquired. The holding 
company can also provide smaller agencies with the capital they need to work on a proposal or 
“pitch” for a potential client, which often requires upfront costs that may be repaid once the account 
has been won (Creamer, 2008). 
Advertising Age ran a series of articles in 2005 questioning the role of the holding company and 
whether the model had merits for the industry. A poll of Advertising Age readers resulted in various 
replies from people within the industry and from the outside. Some respondents still supported the 
holding companies virtues that Marion Harper had envisioned: economies of scale, a “one stop-
shop” for all client needs, increased shareholder value, etc., but other responses decried the lack of 
imagination and creativity that is perceived to be a byproduct of the holding company model. One 
such letter read, “It’s not about being too big – size can provide strength and momentum – rather it’s 
about whose stock price is more important: the holding company’s or the client’s” (Hartnett, 2005). 
Mitchell Kurz, in another Advertising Age piece from 2001, criticizes the holding companies for 
having strategies that are based on growth and size, rather than on strategic plans to acquire clients 
and produce effective advertising. Kurz writes, “Agencies prosper when their strategic initiatives are 
client-focused, and agencies fail when their tactical actions are internally or shareholder motivated.” 
Indeed, holding companies grew in the advertising industry not only to meet client demands, but 
also to satisfy shareholders and Wall Street with their financial performance. Kurz implies that there 
is a risk in holding companies focusing on internal financial returns and shareholder profits rather 
than client growth. This risk was evidenced less than a year later when a financial scandal, to be 
discussed in detail in later chapters, erupted at Interpublic in 2002. 
Kurz continues to criticize the resulting holding companies for not adding value to the industry, 
but rather creating redundancies with other agencies that hold similar functions and operating 
under the assumption that acquisitions would somehow lead to the ability to service competing 
clients. Supporting Kurz’s theory, there is scant empirical evidence that holding companies can 
really retain competing companies under the same umbrella. If one were to look at most of the 
major competitors in a variety of industries—Coke and Pepsi in soft drinks, Ford and General Motors 
in automobiles, Apple and Microsoft in computers—none of them share advertising agencies. 
Secondly, Kurz points out that the initial concept of the holding company as a financial umbrella 
for separately operating companies never actually achieved its goal. Interpublic, for example, along 
with the other major holding companies, formed holding-company level organizations that provide 
services to clients; this despite the assertion that the holding company would not be involved in 
client development. By increasing their functions with clients, the holding company is no longer the 
independent, overarching financial structure that Marion Harper once envisioned. 
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Finally, the rapidly increasing size of the holding companies was based on the assumption that 
bigger was better and that both the vertical and horizontal expansion of services could keep a client 
within the four walls of one of the holding companies. However, Kurz argues that there is 
a fundamental difference between a manufacturing company that can increase the scale of their 
operations to meet demand and advertising agencies in which the creative talent of the employees 
is the real work product: “Intellectual capital, by and large, is not scalable.” Leslie (1995) addresses 
this criticism in her research as well, highlighting interviews with advertising executives who 
complain that they are “producing work that we didn’t originate and we don’t necessarily love” 
because of the globalization of accounts and the application of the same global campaign across 
many regions. Some agencies and conglomerates are addressing this issue by focusing on local 
campaigns developed through local offices for global clients.
The Advertising Age survey underscores how the holding company remains a controversial 
organizational structure in the industry. Yet despite the criticism that has emerged about holding 
companies, the structure continues to be used by new, smaller conglomerates. Smaller holding 
companies continue to emerge from the remaining 15% of the industry that has not yet consolidated. 
Questions regarding the benefits of the holding company still remain. George Parker and others 
who worked in the industry during the 1960s and early 1970s remember a time when the advertising 
industry was more creative and interesting; they critique the lack of creativity and added value for 
the client they see as inherent in modern, large firms (Parker, 2011). However, part of the problem 
also lies in how clients attempt (or even the advertising agencies themselves) to apply scientific 
methodology to advertising work that simply cannot (or not easily) be quantified. Some argue that 
because advertising has lost the mystique of the 1960s, during which time the agencies’ campaigns 
were deemed by clients to be infallible, agencies today have to prove their results, and thus both 
clients and agencies have created policies that make for poor advertising. An  example of this 
concept is the “pre-testing” of an ad campaign, which basically entails market research for a product. 
However, because market research cannot guarantee a reliable result (despite the tools and efforts 
to make it more scientific), much of the advertising resulting from such research can easily fail once 
it is made public (Jones, 2000).
Examples of these failures are plenty, most notably with the introduction of “New Coke.” Rolled 
out to the consumer market by Coca-Cola in 1985, New Coke was a reformulated version of the 
venerated soft drink. The new product had ranked favorably in focus groups and blind taste tests, so 
the Coca-Cola Company was certain that the new product would be received well by the public. 
Instead, the result was a consumer disaster for the company and the product had to be eliminated; 
the company brought back “Classic Coke” less than three months after New Coke had been 
introduced.
As of this writing, and despite the criticisms levied by those inside and outside of the advertising 
industry, the four major advertising holding companies still exist and continue to grow through 
acquisitions and organic growth. The advertising industry, however, is undergoing a much larger 
change with the introduction of the Internet and the new micro-niche markets that the digital world 
has created. Social media, mobile advertising, gaming advertising and the jaded consumer are 
forcing the industry to reflect back onto itself and question if it can still sell goods to the masses.













The Future of the Advertising Holding Company
While the holding companies are still going strong, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 did not 
leave the advertising industry unscathed. The uncertainty of the financial markets combined with 
the Great Recession that followed created a period of contraction at all levels of the industry. 
Additionally, new competitors in the form of Internet search engines like Google are increasing 
their market share in the digital ad market, a sector that has grown exponentially throughout the 
world. While the holding companies were focusing on their acquisitions and mergers and general 
overall global growth, small agencies were heeding the changing winds brought about by the 
advent of digital. As a result, in recent years, many holding companies have been scrambling to 
acquire these shops that specialize in the digital and social media realms. These agencies have 
revolutionized the industry not only because they have embraced new forms of technology and 
communication, but also because they provide a metrics-based form of showing whether 
advertising is effective or not (Gillette, 2010). 
This change in consumer behavior is forcing the industry to rethink how it will approach 
advertising in the future. If television and radio are no longer the most effective media for reaching 
a consumer, then the traditional agency model must adapt to this new reality. New media is now 
requiring agencies to think in more niche spaces and look at micro-segments of their markets. 
Market research is becoming more important for understanding where these niches are formed and 
how to approach the consumer within them. Many of these smaller, strategic agencies are now 
focusing more on brand development and digital content creation, thereby giving the consumer an 
experience rather than over-the-head direct sales pitch. 
The traditional advertising agencies have already taken note of these changes and have begun 
trying to compete with these new digital startups. Agencies that long held venerable names in the 
industry like J. Walter Thompson and Young & Rubicam are now changing their names to “JWT” and 
“Y&R” to suit the new images they want to build. This is a result of the startup digital agencies that 
are choosing shorter, more energized names such as HUGE Inc., Razorfish, and 360i—names that 
may indicate the ad agency’s product but do not reflect traditional founders’ names and history. 
The fragmentation of the media industry, however, is not a problem only for the advertising 
agencies that have to navigate it, but also for the clients who need to find a way around it. 
Media  agencies, which buy and sell media for traditional creative advertising agencies, have 
expanded their offerings to resemble not only the traditional buys and sells in newspapers, 
magazines, television, and social media spaces, but have also begun providing consulting services 
for clients who need help in determining how to approach those spaces. These media consultancies 
promote themselves as experts in each different area and can offer a holistic understanding of the 
best way to promote a campaign strategically throughout the different channels. However, because 
this market is so fragmented, what remains to be seen is whether these smaller companies that sell 
micro-media spaces on websites, mobile platforms, and other digital spaces will begin to consolidate 
among themselves or if the holding companies will continue their acquisitions into this space as 
well. 
These new media outlets are also forcing traditional advertising agencies and the holding 
companies, along with their clients, to come up with new strategies to compete in the advertising 
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marketplace—an extension of the liquidity in the ad industry. Bauman warns that the effects of this 
are that “[a]ny chance not taken here and now is a chance missed; not taking it is thus unforgivable 
and cannot be easily excused, let alone vindicated” (Bauman, 2000, p. 163) This is evidenced in the 
way traditional agencies are trying to embrace this new technology, attempting to acquire agencies 
that have the expertise to navigate these areas, and working to up-end their internal media agencies 
to understand the shifting paradigm.
The perception among traditional agencies is that clients will not wait for the industry to catch 
up. Already, the industry is seeing many clients shift parts of their business to smaller boutique 
agencies that have an expertise in digital media or that are attempting to address the digital ad 
market in-house. The shifting away from traditional agencies is, then, part of the same liquidity that 
created the industry, in which “bonds and partners tend to be viewed and treated as things meant 
to be consumed, not produced; they are subject to the same criteria of evaluation as all other objects 
of consumption” (Bauman, 2000, p. 163). Shifting modernity to a consumption-driven and liquid 
environment has led the ad industry to undersell their expertise and to create a space in which the 
clients consume the advertising in the same manner that the public consumes the products that the 
clients are manufacturing. As a result, we are now seeing significant changes in the client-agency 
relationship. 
In the last few years, many long-term partnerships between the oldest agencies and their clients 
have been broken. In 2010 and 2011, Harley Davidson ended its 31-year relationship with Carmichael 
Lynch (Interpublic); Dr. Pepper/Snapple Group ended a 40-year relationship with Y&R (WPP), along 
with Metropolitan Life Insurance (MetLife), who also left Y&R after 83 years together. Also occurring 
during that period, Exxon Mobil, whose founding company (Standard Oil of New Jersey) was the 
very first client of McCann-Erickson, ended its epochal 100-year relationship with the agency. These 
changes are indicative of the loss of partnership and value that the clients have historically had with 
their advertising agencies, heralding the commodification of advertising. Bauman cautions that in 
liquid modernity, “co-operation is not only unnecessary, but downright superfluous” (Bauman 2000, 
p. 165). In an article in Advertising Age, Bill Duggan of the Association of National Advertisers, 
summarizes the situation for the agencies in the industry:
Once upon a time, the advertising agency was the center of the universe for the 
marketer. It was the key partner [...] they used to be the keepers of institutional knowledge 
on an account. There are always peaks and valleys in relationships. Before, clients were 
more willing to ride out the valleys because they knew that the peak was around the 
corner. Unfortunately, brands don’t value agencies as much as they once did. (Parekh, 
2011)
The ad industry is currently struggling to find a way to demonstrate to clients the need to 
reestablish the traditional relationship between the parties. Combined with the tectonic changes in 
the industry being ushered in by the digital age, both agencies and holding companies are 
attempting to find their traction in an increasingly slippery business environment. 














The framework of “modernity” that Bauman posits fits nicely around the development of the 
modern advertising industry from the Industrial Revolution until today. This same framework also 
dovetails with the movement of the economy from the pre-industrial agrarian world through to 
today’s modern corporations. The shift into modern times led the way to a change in the economic 
model of society and fanned the flames of industrialization across many markets and industries. 
Simultaneously, the result of the increased production of goods and commodities led to the need to 
sell all of these new goods to people. As selling methods developed and adapted to changes in the 
economy and society, the advertising industry rose in prominence and in conjunction with these 
industrial factories. 
These two areas—advertising and the manufacturing of goods—can then be classified as being 
part of “solid” or “liquid” modernity in Bauman’s theory. The Fordist factories that sprung up after the 
Industrial Revolution and at the turn of the 20th century contained solid modern structures like the 
factory floor, where the production line was routinized and simplified, and at its end, created 
a product to be sold. The factories were overseen by managers who controlled the workers’ time, 
duties, and pay in very structured way, i.e., through standardized pay scales, titles, career paths, and 
schedules.
Though borne of the need for these solid modern manufacturing companies to sell their goods, 
advertising companies had more liquid modern characteristics as exemplified by their lack of 
structure. The agency hierarchy was relatively flat, with no set career path. Work in ad agencies was 
dependent on talent, ideas, and creativity, and they positioned themselves as an advisor to their 
clients. Despite their differences, the market for advertising—which is steeped in liquid modernity—
grew and prospered hand-in-hand with the solid modern manufacturers. As industrial giants 
increased the number of consumer goods available, these companies also needed to create 
a consumer market for the goods.
The activity of advertising is based on selling a product and understanding what type of people 
need it and how it must to be sold. As they grew, manufacturing companies continued to need 
advertising, but began to require these services beyond the geographic regions initially covered by 
advertising agencies. In order to solve the problem, many advertising agencies increased the 
number and breadth of their locations. This was done either through expansion or, more likely, by 
acquiring other agencies that were already in these locales. This permitted the newly acquired 
agency to then provide advertising services to the client in their particular city, state, or country. The 
trend of growth by acquisition in the advertising industry turned out to be another liquid modern 
characteristic, because these advertising companies became fluid in their growth or contraction 
based on their clients’ particular needs. However, there naturally arose limits to this growth, because 
as agencies became prominent in their own right and through the names and identities of their 
founders or partners, the equity in those names and identities became as important (and valuable) 
to the agency as the clients’ work. Any separation of the partners (or death of the founders) could 
throw the agencies for tailspin in terms of client losses. 
Thus, larger agencies grew by acquiring other agencies while maintaining their company names. 
But while this spate of growth could help an agency maintain an important client, acquiring another 
existing agency could also give rise to new problems for the agency—how to handle conflicts 
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among old and new clients. At some point, whether it was the client or the agency, an internal 
conflict would appear and so the continuation of the various relationships would have to be 
reevaluated. It was not until McCann-Erickson found itself in this exact position—it wanted to 
acquire Marschalk, but that acquisition would ultimately lead to client conflict—that a solution to 
this conundrum appeared.
The solution to the problem was to create a solid modern structure above the agencies to 
manage the liquidity of the industry and the agencies in the hopes of being able to retain clients 
and increase profitably. Marion Harper of McCann-Erickson was inspired by the manner in which 
General Motors managed its potentially competing vehicle lines to design a holding company for 
his agencies; and so Interpublic was born. The Interpublic holding company allowed McCann-
Erickson and Marschalk to maintain separation financially, creatively, and in account management. 
This solid modern structure was difficult to implement, however, in an industry that did not believe 
it would be possible to separate the critical areas of the agencies while still having the best ideas and 
talent for each. Additionally, the anticipated benefits of the solid structure (e.g., economies of scale 
for common functions) did not manifest itself at all and Interpublic was on the brink of bankruptcy 
before it was able to turn things around. Harper’s decision to imitate the structure and expansion of 
a solid modern company onto a liquid modern company operating in a liquid modern industry was, 
initially, a failure. 
Liquidity, in the financial sense, is what Interpublic needed, then, to manage the liquidity it 
faced. Through a series of financial tactics, the conglomerate was able to avoid bankruptcy. The 
details behind this turn-around are addressed in Chapter Six, but, ultimately, Interpublic had to 
embrace a different type of liquidity—financialization—in order to survive. The financialization of 
the industry, as Chapter Six will show, drastically changed the industry. A series of mergers and 
acquisitions, as well as the formation of other holding companies, further increased the liquid 
modern characteristics of the industry. 
In the end, Harper’s dream did come true—the advertising agency holding company became 
a structured vehicle through which order and efficiencies could be realized in the advertising 
agencies; but at what cost? These structures are solid, requiring bureaucracies and hierarchies in 
order to run smoothly. Making the advertising industry more solid in this manner changed the 
shifted the focus from advertising to increasing the stock price of the holding company. 
But even with this superimposed solid structure, the holding companies still retain the liquidity 
of their industry. As much as Harper would have liked to see a General Motors-like holding company 
structure and process for Interpublic, the industry itself is too liquid to replicate the structure that 
a manufacturing company can have. The end result is competing holding companies that are trying 
to stay ahead of the curve. Despite the structure that holding companies can give their agencies, 
these same companies are still struggling with the changing industry. This is especially true as 
outside competitors like Google, Apple, and Facebook are encroaching on the advertising industry 
and fragmenting the tools and services necessary for these ads as they move more into the digital 
space. The traditional advertising agency is no longer competing with other traditional advertising 
agencies, but rather with bigger companies with better access and knowledge of the digital space. 
To further acknowledge the liquidity of the industry, the past few years have seen radical 
changes for the holding companies. Some of these changes are indicative of the larger problem 













facing the holding companies, namely, when their advertising agency networks are losing major, 
long-standing clients. The constant ebb and flow of these preeminent clients is a symptom of of the 
liquidity of the industry.
Yet as these holding companies have sought to adapt to the changing industry, it has brought 
even greater liquidity into companies that are already wrestling with the juxtaposition of 
a traditionally solid modern structure and a highly liquid modern industry and business environment. 
This interplay between the solid modern business structure of the holding company and the liquid 
modern market (and industry) takes place at all levels of the organization. 
Bauman has developed a framework and a language that fits the rise and importance of 
advertising in the modern economy and society. This framework can help the reader understand the 
advertising industry and how it is so “liquid.” The descriptions of liquidity in the advertising industry 
are useful for understand how these forces are affecting the experience of working within such an 
organization. 
The next chapter will use autoethnographic sketches to provide insight into the organizational 
effect of liquidity on the holding company’s structure, activities, and employees. Thereafter, Chapter 
Six will examine the financialization of the advertising industry and specifically the effects it’s had on 
several of the holding companies in the industry.
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Introduction
Accepting Bauman’s argument that a “business organization is increasingly seen as a never-
conclusive, ongoing attempt ‘to form an island of superior adaptability’ in a world perceived as 
‘multiple, complex, and fast moving and therefore as “ambiguous”’, “fuzzy” or “plastic”’, militates 
against durable structures, and notably against structures with a built-in life-expectation 
commensurable with the customary length of a working life” (Bauman, 2000, p. 117), then the liquid 
nature of the advertising industry becomes immediately apparent. After all, it’s the ad agencies that 
must adapt in a faster way to both the needs of the clients and the changing demographics of 
society and the marketplace. 
Continuing with my autoethnographic analysis of my company, I will now examine how the 
liquidity of the advertising industry affects the people in the holding company organization. The 
holding company departments were caught in a middle space between the business (the advertising 
agencies) and the corporate demands of shareholders and financial statements. Very often, we had 
to reconcile the different demands daily. We were asked to remember that our business was 
advertising, not technology or finding ways to get everyone under one enterprise contract. This 
clash between the two (very important) demands in the company was an area where the liquidity of 
the advertising industry became increasingly apparent. 
The liquidity that permeates the advertising industry and, in particular, the holding companies 
therein, creates an environment in which the company must adapt to the liquidity of the industry. 
Working in the holding company, I could almost forget that we were in advertising, because we 
were so removed from the actual advertising product. But, there were always reminders around the 
corner that this was, in fact, an advertising company, regardless of how removed we were from the 
final outcome. These reminders came in from the agencies themselves, when we (in the corporate 
departments) tried to implement a project or try to change a process in some way that went against 
the very nature of the agency. But the reminders were not always clashes in our projects or goals – 
they also appeared in the expectations that we would treat one another (within the holding 
company departments) as we interacted with our “clients” (the agency staff). One of the sketches 
that follows shows that we entertained our “clients” in a similar manner that the agencies entertained 
our clients. The relationships were important internally as much as they were with the clients. 
Bauman has created the space and the language to describe this environment under the “liquid” 
theme; the sketches in the following pages will demonstrate the liquidity of the advertising industry 
at varying levels. The four sketches will show how we grappled with the two sides of the industry, 
the advertising agency and the corporate shareholder demands. 
























Autoethnographic Sketch - Relationships Matter
Greg’s been with the company for 18 years. Scott started working here when 
he was 17; he was now a 50-year-old man. Paula’s been working in the industry for over 
20 years. Brian told me it was almost 20 for him. I had been here for only 7 years, almost. 
I was one of the youngest. 
We stood around the hotel bar one night, drinks in hand, after a dinner 
during one of our conferences. Socializing like this is not even an option. An absence is 
noted, not in a negative way in the sense that you would lose your job for not being 
present, but rather in a sad, “knowing” way—socializing was part of networking. Not 
only that, it was a way of getting insider knowledge on people, strategies, and opinions.
Essentially, socializing in this manner is an imitation of what our industry 
does on the client-facing side of the business. Our account managers and executives 
socialize and network with existing and potential clients, reading into the small 
chitchat and asking for thoughts and opinions “off the record.” After a drink or two, 
tongues would loosen up and information could be gleaned to make a presentation 
better, focus an idea in a different direction, or to get a sense of where you stood within 
the organization and with your peers. 
Internally, we did the same. The conversation described above attempted to 
map out the links between everyone who was there. Longevity signaled not only the 
seniority in the group, but also the political skills to stay relevant. I asked if anyone had 
considered leaving the industry to go elsewhere. Everyone replied that they were tied to 
the industry for the long haul. I found this solidity incongruous to the liquid world in 
which we worked.
Scott said that the work was always different; no day was ever the same. Greg 
chimed in and said he stayed because it was interesting and challenging. (Greg had 
also privately told me that he had recently been looking for positions outside the 
company, and was even offered a much higher position with a higher salary; but that 
job would have taken him out of the industry. He turned the offer down.)
With its lack of structure and process, the laid back management style of the company, and the 
precariousness that seemed to exist for our jobs and careers in the organization—a situation where 
anyone could have simply left, fed up of the uncertainty or in an attempt to seek a more secure 
future—I repeatedly asked myself, how did we end up with teams of employees who had not only 
weathered these storms, but could count 10, 15, or even 20 or more years of working for the same 
company or, at a minimum, for the same industry? The instability and uncertainty that existed in this 
environment would seem to the casual observer—and even the seasoned veteran—that there 
would be more turnover in the industry and, as a consequence, in this company, specifically in this 
department. 
In trying to understand the industry further, it was clear that the high turnover—a historic 
characteristic of the industry—was part of the culture and was almost expected. As previously 
mentioned in Chapter Four, Andrew Bennett explained that the industry as a whole lacked the 
ability to treat employees better and keep them happier and in the agency longer. However, this 
statistic and analysis of the industry seemed to be incoherent with the day-to-day reality that I was 
facing at the holding company. I started to search for the answer as to why we had such long-term 
employees in this specific department.
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Because I was thrust into the organization without much of an orientation, I had no other 
recourse but to follow what everyone else was doing to survive. One of the many things I noticed 
was that our department placed a lot of value in socializing with one another. In fact, after observing 
the behavior of senior and mid-level management at the big executive meetings and in my business 
travels to New York and other cities throughout Latin America, I quickly learned that socializing 
within the group and with the agency’s technology management and staff was incredibly valuable 
on a professional level.
We imitated our business-side counterparts by entertaining our “clients” with the old relics of the 
actual “business” side of advertising, where account managers and other management would take 
clients to restaurants and bars or out for other forms of entertainment. Our vendors wooed us with 
socialization, but we also wooed our agency management, and ourselves whenever we traveled, in 
much the same fashion. Yet what became clear early on in my tenure was that not participating in 
these corporate rituals was equivalent to ostracizing yourself. Whether it was a get-together with 
management or with the agencies, attending these events was a de facto requirement. To reject the 
occasion to socialize was to miss out on that valuable networking opportunity that might allow you 
to explain a decision you made to the agencies’ executives, gather from them their thoughts and 
perspectives on a new project that was being proposed, or assess the impact of any technology we 
were implementing on their business or their clients. 
Bauman argues “that in our liquid modern times we need and desire firm and reliable bonds 
more than any other time only exacerbates the anxiety” (Bauman, 2006, p. 70) because of the 
uncertainty that we have around us. Given the liquidity of the advertising industry, it is no wonder 
that we, as employees in this situation, need to grasp socially onto others in order to have some 
semblance of stability. During these events and social outings the bonds between us grew, between 
the holding company’s corporate teams and the advertising agency technology staff. These social 
events were the canvas on which we could figure out or predict what could possibly happen next, 
even if every conversation on that subject ended with the phrase, “… but you know how it is, it could 
all be different next year… month… week.”
 
But beyond the networking and information gathering opportunities, the socializing—most 
especially when it was internal to the holding company department—was a “team building” event 
for all of us, at least those of us who worked in the technology division. Many of us were located in 
different cities around the United States or in different countries around the world, and when we 
met, it was an opportunity to come to know your coworkers better. These intense socializing 
opportunities also developed friendships that extended beyond the confines of the company. 
I remember the peculiar feeling of incredulousness upon learning that one of the agency CIOs 
had not only invited his agency coworkers and staff to his wedding, but had also invited coworkers 
from other agencies. The relationships between many of the holding company heads of Technology 
existed not only because they worked in the same field or in the same company, but because they 
had also developed friendships that extended into the personal realms of their lives. But this was 
not the only time it happened; a different coworker had also invited many of us to his nuptials.
All of this socialization was surprising for me, because my otherwise solid modern background 
had prepped me to be social and friendly to my coworkers, but to not cross the “real life” line. 
However, in this company, the personal and professional mixed.
























It was in trying to understand these personal connections that I discovered that many of my 
coworkers had been in this holding company (or in one of the agencies that was absorbed by the 
holding company) for many years. The length of tenure ranged from 10 years to over 30 years (an 
entire career lifespan). In comparison to other companies for which I had previously worked, where 
the median length of tenure was four to six years, the median tenure in this holding company 
seemed to be two or three times longer. Even those who had come from outside the industry 
seemed to stay for a long time (despite having no prior experience within the industry). 
We all thought it was rather unique that the head of one of the agency’s technology departments 
had only been with the organization a mere two years. This was considered such a minor amount of 
time in comparison to the other heads of technology within the company. In fact, up until the day 
he left (I believe he was laid off or fired, but I was never able to confirm), this technology department 
head had been seen as an outsider because he did not come into the job with these industry 
relationships. 
Moreover, in contemplating the relationships between my teammates and coworkers, I observed 
an interesting paradox: On one level, true friendships seemed to develop, but other friendships 
seemed to be more superficial. When I heard that some of my coworkers were attending each 
other’s weddings (I had also been invited to one, but was unable to attend), I asked myself whether 
such an invitation was a true extension of friendship or whether it was merely another networking 
opportunity and obligation. 
Through my years of interactions at the holding company, I have come to understand that the 
definition of what is considered a “true” friendship rests on whether that person not only could 
remain a friend past the termination of the working relationship (i.e., if one party moved on to 
another company), but also whether that person would watch out for your interests in the 
organization as well. The demarcation of that line, however, remains blurry because there are 
instances in which “friends” may help you out of a variety of motivations, from the most cynical 
(helping you to help themselves) to the most charitable (helping you out of the kindness of their 
heart). While some motivations could be genuinely altruistic, Bauman argues that liquid modernity 
does not allow true altruistic actions because: 
while [we are] unable to put our suspicions to rest and stop sniffing out treachery and 
fearing frustration, we seek – compulsively and passionately – wider ‘networks’ of friends 
and friendship; indeed as wide a ‘network’ as we can manage to squeeze into the mobile 
phone directory that, obligingly, grows more capacious with every new generation of 
mobiles. And as we try to hedge our bets against treachery and reduce our risks in this way, 
we incur more risks and set the stage for more betrayals. (Bauman, 2006, p. 70)
Thus, some of the altruistic actions of sharing information, for example, are also ways of 
guaranteeing that the other person will share information with you, too. This extension and 
reinforcement of your network of information exists only because of the uncertainty that this 
liquidity creates in an organization. In terms of friendships and relationships with others at work, we 
extend our networks in order to reduce the risk of that “treachery” and “betrayal.” The networks 
become a type of solid structure that we create in order to have something hold onto, because 
without these relationships, we would be even less likely to function due to the constant changes in 
the liquid organization. 
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It was not surprising, then, that when I probed further into understanding why people stayed in 
the ad industry for so long, the general consensus was that the very nature of the individuals who 
worked in the industry militated for longer, more stable careers. There were beliefs expressed by my 
colleagues that the people in the ad industry are smarter and better adapted to work in this type of 
environment. Some even expressed disdain for workers in more “solid” industries, such as 
manufacturing or even banking (perceived to be more solid than advertising despite recent events 
to the contrary) who could not conceivably handle the constantly changing set of objectives, goals, 
people, teams, and companies. 
Nonetheless, the uncertainty and liquidity of the organization did have some benefits for the 
staff and employees of both the holding company and the agencies. The liquidity of the advertising 
industry had already paved the way for perceiving “a career” in a very different way than before. 
Bauman argues that the notion of a career in liquid modernity is not possible in the hierarchical 
model that solid modernity proposed, whereby you progress from one rung on the corporate ladder 
to the next until you cannot go any further or you retire. Careers in liquid modernity are “mainly 
aesthetic significance. It is expected to be gratifying by and in itself…” (Bauman, 2000, p. 139). It 
allows those coworkers who did not want to continue climbing the corporate ladder—and those 
who did not want to be judged by how high or low they were on that ladder—to enjoy their careers. 
Throughout my time at this holding company, the sheer flatness of the organization allowed many 
talented and creative technologists to remain well paid and in their roles without pushing them into 
management positions. A usual career in information technology eventually pushes very talented 
technology “geeks” into positions of management, but managing a department requires a very 
different set of skills than playing with technology or designing the architecture of an application. 
This liquid organization allows many to stay in their positions without being encumbered by the 
next rung on the ladder.
The liquid organization also brings about a different set of traits. Because the advertising agency 
and, consequently, the holding company are not bound by space, technology has driven time and 
space to become instantaneous. “[I]n the software universe of light-speed travel, space may be 
traversed, literally, in ‘no time’; the difference between ‘far away’ and ‘down here’ is cancelled” 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 117). The cancelling of space in this manner means that a work site or location is 
not as important under liquid modernity as it was during solid modernity. The liquid organization 
does not require any of us to be located at a specific holding company work site. It is commonplace 
for many of us, myself included, to work from home some days, from a hotel room other days (when 
we’re traveling), and eventually end up at an agency in a more traditional office environment for the 
remainder of the trip. It is not a requirement to be in the same building as your manager. This lack of 
“space” requirement in liquid modernity benefits employees insofar as their ability to pick and 
choose their work location. If all they need is a laptop and mobile phone, then any space can be 
a workspace. While this arrangement blurs the lines between home and work, which can thus create 
a constant push to work all hours, every day of the week, the ability to work from home also has its 
benefits—allowing us to tend to children or pets, make personal appointments, or run necessary 
errands, all without the watchful eye of management. 
Greg’s offer to move into a new position with higher pay outside of the ad industry was not 
sufficiently superior to his desire to stay in the company due to the relationships he had formed (his 
tenure in the industry was close to 20 years). When asked the reasons for turning down the offer, 
Greg also cited the flexibility that the industry and holding company offered him in terms of his 
























work location. He saves money by not driving into the city for work, which gives him more time to 
spend with his children. Overall, the liquidity of the organization gives him the luxury of flexibility. 
Personally, over the time arc of my relatively lengthy career in this company, I also find myself 
emotionally and intellectually attached to the advertising industry and its particular work 
environment in ways that I cannot adequately explain. I enjoy the socializing and lack of structure 
around the hierarchy of the organization. I, too, have also even invited coworkers to personal events 
in an effort to test the bounds of the friendships I’ve created. Here I can speak to anyone at any level 
of the organization, whereas in my prior work experiences in more solid organizations, my  title 
would have determined my limitations in terms of socialization and advancement. The flatness of 
the hierarchy in this organization, combined with my manager’s encouragement to build 
relationships across the organization, grants me access to many levels of the holding company and 
the agencies. My title, which does not denote any particular level, has never been an issue, and 
rarely does anyone even ask for it. The flexibility of being involved at different levels, usually by 
choice, allows me to create the environment in which I want to work. With the changing objectives 
and day-to-day activities, I find tremendous professional and personal pleasure in the range of 
choice that is given to me. 
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Autoethnographic Sketch – Adaptation
My “promotion” was both a practical solution and a way to “reward” the 
work that I had performed in the region. The agency would receive the focus and 
attention that their regional technology director could give them (for a quarter of the 
price) and the holding company would keep me in the same position, still overseeing 
the agencies and making sure they were not heading off in the wrong direction. 
But I knew that the agencies did not simply head off in the “wrong” direction.
The agencies went in the direction of their business. If clients were not hiring the agency, 
then the agency had no direction. The agencies had to deliver—revenue, clients, 
projects, timesheets, plans, invoices, financial statements, artwork, metrics, briefs, 
presentations, databases, websites, and events. The agency needed to perform.
The holding company claimed they knew best. Sitting high, aloft in the tower 
of the corporation, the holding company had no idea about what happened on the 
ground. They had a vague notion of what it meant to acquire clients, create the media 
buying plans, woo the client, shake hands over dinner, and have to finish a presentation 
before the next morning’s meeting. But the holding company employees had little 
notion of what it took to get the artwork out, to struggle with the slow Internet, to curse 
at the machine that didn’t respond to your requests, etc. 
One morning I officially sat on one side of the fence; the next morning I sat on 
both sides. I explained to my colleagues that I wasn’t giving up my old position; I was 
still part of the holding company. I was just now going to add the responsibilities of 
regional technical director for one of the creative agencies to my resume. Other agency 
friends patted me on the shoulder and thanked me for coming to the other side. 
“I like that she has the role in the agency, now,” Fred explained to his new 
manager. “She’s the only one in the holding company that understands how we work. 
And she works for the smallest agency too, so she’s not going to sell us expensive 
projects she can’t pay for in her own agency.”
“You’re one of us, now,” said Bernadette on a call. “You now know what it’s like 
to be on this side.”
As the news became official, the golden doors of the agency opened in front 
of me. I turned to look back at the holding company, John still the in archway, asking 
me what I saw on the agency side.
Holding
Company Agency
In an insecure and unpredictable world, clever wanderers would do their best to imitate the 
happy globals who travel light; and they would not shed too many tears when getting rid of 
anything that cramped the moves.
 Zygmunt Bauman, 2000, p. 163
























“I can’t believe what I’ve been given,” I responded. “I had no idea any of this 
existed.”
I went back to John and told him, “Everyone on your department needs to do 
this. They need to see this in order to understand, you know.”
John laughed, “That would be a great idea.”
Every day I spend weighing the good of the agency versus the good of the 
holding company.
One of the coping mechanisms that I learned early on in the holding company was to “go with 
the flow” rather than attempt to fight a quixotic battle. I saw Frank’s struggle with the creation of one 
unified technology department in Latin America. And while I, too, thought that many of these 
projects were worthwhile, I also knew that fighting for attention went against the fluid and liquid 
nature of the organization. 
Instead, I focused on the agencies and learned more about the business of advertising in this 
region, including how technology was specifically affecting their overall performance. Rather than 
fighting an internal battle within my own department—an effort that I recognized would bring very 
few results—I began to develop stronger relationships and alliances with the local technology 
management. Working closely with the agencies and their local projects (as well as any regional 
ones that came up) allowed me to develop a strong working relationship with the local technology 
directors as well as their global counterparts. 
This strengthening of relationships not only gave me insight into the people running these 
departments, but also on the business of advertising. I took the time to sit down with them and 
understand how the impact of a holding company project would affect their local balance sheet 
and technology strategy. I started to understand how bits and pieces of the business were 
interwoven with the decisions we, in technology, made. To follow the directive of the holding 
company meant the agency could be unprofitable. As I understood the advertising business better, 
I was able to put into words the needs and limitations that the agencies had in the region. I was then 
also able to put into “agency language” what the holding company was trying to accomplish. 
The other alliances that I was able to form were with the global technology directors. These 
global directors were more sympathetic to focusing on the region because they understood their 
own business in the local country, plus their own balance sheets and the impact this region had on 
their overall revenue goals; they also understood how technology and investments in that 
technology could affect that bottom line.
Yet more than this, walking into the agencies and coming to better understand their business 
processes brought forth the reality of the liquidity of the advertising industry. I had dealt with the 
liquidity of the holding company organization and had managed to float along (somewhat with the 
help of others). But now, as I immersed myself in the agencies, I was seeing an all-new, higher level 
of liquidity than in the holding company. Perhaps it was because of their size, or their hands-on work 
with the client base, or the varied, often-unique environment (both physical and economic) in which 
they operated, but these agencies were steeped in a level of liquidity that was daunting yet 
invigorating to experience. My major hurdle in addressing the liquidity of the agencies was that I was 
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still an outsider. As much as I was working with the agency technology directors, I was only seeing 
what they shared with me. I wasn’t actually in the agency, and I knew there were still parts of agency 
“life” that I was missing.
My experience of working closely with the agency management nevertheless proved to be the 
foundation for the change in my career trajectory within the company. A prior candidate had only 
lasted one year in the position of regional technology director, unable to fit into the culture of the 
agency or make the right friends therein. While the prior technology director was very qualified in 
terms of his experience, at the agencies it is interplay of the personalities and the chemistry among 
the staff that is the real predictor of professional success. In this case, the chemistry between the 
newcomer and management was all wrong. Because I had worked closely with all of the regional 
technology directors, including this one, I had an idea of what his job entailed. It was no surprise, 
then, when asked if I was interested in the position I immediately said yes, of course. 
It is interesting to note, however, that despite the offer of a new role and a “promotion” of sorts, 
the caveat to accepting this role was that I would still continue in my old position for the holding 
company. I was asked to remain in my current role of managing the region; in addition to that, 
I would simply allocate a portion of my time to the agency as well. The reluctantly drawn 
organizational chart now had “dotted” lines showing the intermingling reporting structure.
Bauman touches upon the duality of roles like mine. While on one hand I was still managing the 
region on behalf of the holding company, I was also given the keys to managing an agency in the 
region. This duality is possible because in an organization such as this, “liquid modernity is ‘liquid’ in 
as far as it is also post-hierarchical. The genuine or postulated order of superiority/inferiority, once 
presumed to have been structured in an unambiguous fashion by the unassailable logic of progress, 
are eroded and melted…” (Bauman, 2005, p. 31). In other words, the holding company’s position as 
“higher” (because it held the agencies together) was not a limiting factor in the decision to offer me 
the role (and possibly an advantage). The hierarchy of the agencies relative to the holding company 
can vary over time. At times, the holding company can have the upper hand in determining 
a direction (this usually happens when the holding company pulls out the argument that they exist 
on a stock exchange somewhere and therefore the agencies must work together) or, more often 
than not, the agency can pull rank and argue that their business is what keeps the holding company 
afloat; without it, the holding company would not exist. As Bauman indicates, the hierarchy is 
eroded and melted and recreated and melted again. A solid modern holding company would have 
kept the structure firm, without any doubt of who was leading the strategic direction (in any 
discipline), and certainly without dual roles in almost opposing camps.
Upon entering the role inside the agency, doors were immediately opened that, up until this 
point, I did not even know existed. I had thought that my close relationships with my agency 
directors had given me insight into the inner workings of the agencies, but I immediately realized 
my own arrogance in thinking that even though I had good relationships with the agencies, that the 
access would be the same as actually working for an agency. Immediately I had to adapt to the new 
information that was being thrown at me, plus the global management expectations I already had 
in terms of the agency world. 
Successfully navigating a liquid environment requires certain skills, including the ability to learn 
quickly in new situations. However, Bauman also argues that “what is less visible however, though 
























no less crucial than the skill of learning quickly is the ability to instantly forget what was learned 
before” (Bauman, 2005, p. 117). As I faced new information in regards to the business and strategies 
of a creative agency, an internal conflict between what the agency was planning on doing versus 
what the holding company wanted to do started to churn inside my head. 
For the first time I finally understood how the other technology directors felt on the other side 
of the table when I was trying to convince them that the holding company’s strategy was best for 
their agency. 
Invariably, not only did I have to quickly learn and adapt to the new information I was being 
given, but I also had to forget what I had learned before about what was the “right” action to take 
within the context of the holding company. The agency strategy was focused on netting profitable 
clients, among other strategies that ultimately ended with the same end goal of client retention or 
acquisition. Whether for the love of the industry, egos, fame, or climbing the career ladder, everyone 
at the agency had that one end goal in mind. I had no similar singularity of focus with the holding 
company against which I could compare the agencies’ positions. At the holding company, we rarely 
had any understanding of who our clients were; we could not point out a client’s work on television 
or in a magazine. We were blind to the business, not because we wanted to be, but rather because 
our focus was internal. Being in the agency suddenly removed what I had learned to be true at the 
holding company. Liquid organizations essentially force the liquid modern human to forget what 
they’ve learned from past experiences; “learning from experience in order to rely on strategies and 
tactical moves deployed successfully in the past is for that reason ill advised: past tests cannot take 
into account of the rapid and mostly unpredicted (perhaps unpredictable) changes in circumstances” 
(Bauman, 2005, p. 1). In my capacity as an agency technology director, I  could not push for (nor 
would have I been allowed to continue) the same holding company strategy that I had advocated in 
my role as a holding company employee. I had to create, adapt, and follow an entirely new strategy 
that fit my new agency and my new responsibilities.
By adding a new position to my existing one, I was not merely adding more work responsibilities 
that aligned perfectly with my previous role. Essentially, I was going to have to create and recreate 
the identity of holding company technology director and agency technology director on a daily 
basis, possibly on an hour-by-hour basis, depending on the day. Invariably, I found myself discussing 
the role in terms of “hats”—today I wore the holding company hat, tomorrow I might be wearing the 
agency hat. Each hat had a separate set of expectations that I had to follow based on the differing 
strategies of each role. Bauman explains, “Life in a liquid modern society [organization] cannot stand 
still. It must modernize (read: go on stripping itself daily of attributes that are past their sell-by dates 
and go on dismantling/shedding the identities currently assembled/put on) – or perish” (Bauman, 
2005, p. 3). The stripping and shedding of the holding company identity and then the agency 
identity was jarring at first. My agency coworkers saw me as a full agency employee, forgetting that 
I still held the holding company role. When they remembered that I was part of the holding company, 
I would suddenly be thrust back into that pigeonhole, even though I had been focused on agency 
strategy. I took my new agency role very seriously and I did not want to be accused of being just 
another holding company stand-in until the real agency director could be found. Thus, I would insist 
on always keeping my agency “hat” on, unless it was necessary to really switch out.
The opposite was also true. I was annoyed at holding company coworkers who began to send 
me emails using my agency address, rather than my holding company address. I wanted to keep the 
Veronica Millan_2.indd   101 2/13/14   7:12 PM
102
two worlds separate, only intersecting them when it was absolutely necessary. But even that was 
not possible, because I was finding myself switching “hats” in the middle of the same conversation 
or meeting. I flipped back and forth between the two perspectives. 
This ability sheds light on the power dynamic found in liquid organizations where “the greatest 
chances of winning belong to the people who circulate close to the top of the global power pyramid, 
to whom space matters little and distance is not a bother; people at home in many places but in no 
one place in particular” (Bauman, 2005, p. 3). While I had not won the power lottery with my regional 
roles (either in the holding company or the agency), I had stepped a little closer to being part of the 
decision-makers in the organization by keeping the agency “hat” on my head. By showing my 
versatility in being able to change to the right hat at the right time, I was starting to display those 
characteristics of being at home in many places.
By also wearing the agency “hat” in addition to my role at the holding company, my perception 
of my holding company role began to change. In the holding company, management had enforced 
the idea that we were there to serve our “customer,” which was the agency that needed our 
technology services. During my second year in the company, I had received a book (all management 
had received a copy) entitled “IT At Your Service.” It was a book that posed the paradigm that 
technology departments should be service-centric. Last published in 1993, it seemed outdated, but 
my managers firmly believed that the role of technology was to cater to the business, rather than to 
drive it. At the holding company we were rewarded for good customer service skills. The change 
into the agency role gave me insight into the other side. I could now more readily perceive and 
understand the failures and gaps in holding company technology services that I could not see 
before I assumed my new role with the agency. 
This dual perspective began to positively affect how I looked at my role inside the holding 
company. Not only was I the only one analyzing our issues based on what I knew the agency wanted 
and was not getting from the holding company, but I also now had agency coworkers who could 
give me the feedback, in the hopes that I would take it back to the holding company to be fixed. This 
insight was also welcomed by the holding company, which seemed to thirst for knowledge on the 
inner workings of the agency. Admittedly, I was surprised that both sides were not more forthcoming 
with information about their internal workings; after all, free exchange of such information could 
only benefit each player, right? Then I remembered the internal political wars, failed initiatives (such 
as Frank’s “virtual departments”), and the casualties that resulted from them, and so I understood 
the reluctance of both parties to share information freely. This is still a relationship I must build on 
a daily basis with the agencies.
Not only had the doors to new information been opened when I was given the role, but the 
other agency directors—both regional and global—welcomed me into “the club.” As such, 
I developed a new personal identity of sorts with each of them. Liquid modernity has the 
characteristic of making identities liquid as well; “[A]s a result, ‘identity’ has become something that 
is mostly self-paced and self-ascribed, the outcome of efforts left to the individuals to worry about: 
an outcome that is admittedly temporary with an undefined, yet probably short, life expectancy” 
(Bauman, 2005, p. 31). My own identity in the holding company and in the agency continues to shift 
as more (or less) responsibilities fall on my shoulders and as the months and years progress. 
























It was especially interesting to me that this characteristic of the liquid organization only became 
acutely apparent when I had to shift drastically in my dual roles. During my time within the holding 
company, the different roles and job responsibilities affected the identity I held within the 
organization. At times I had to take on the appearance and character of an auditor who was imposing 
controls and order in the agencies that refused to comply with the rules set at the highest levels of 
the organization. At other times I was powerless to affect a small change because I had no authority 
over that situation. Each of these situations affected the identity that I took on that day or week or 
month. I subtly changed how I reacted to people based on whether I thought they could handle 
information or requests in a particular way. I adapted to a person’s schedule, ability to communicate 
in written or spoken form, their native languages, and whether or not the topic at hand required 
a technical or high-level conversation. In an organization with no formal structure, my title had no 
sway over anyone, so my adaptive abilities had to suffice if I wanted to accomplish anything, acquire 
more information, or influence a decision.
What I thought was adaption—a successful characteristic in a liquid modern environment—was 
only a precursor to finding true power through a different source. Adaptation is not the successful 
strategy in liquidity, because adaptation simply enables you to accept the situation and find coping 
mechanisms to handle it. The true source of power in a liquid organization is what Bauman calls 
“hybridization,” in which global elites (power) can be nowhere and yet can be home anywhere—
unbound by roles, rules, and boundaries. In Bauman’s optic, the successful liquid modern holds 
power because she is not dependent on a location or structure to give her that power.
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Autoethnographic Sketch - The Damming of the Agency
Because I was brought into the company to bring order, procedures, and 
policies into the organization, while I immediately perceived the “chaos” around me, it 
took me a while to discern whether or not it was really chaotic at all.
In the beginning, it was easy to dismiss the decisions that my agency 
coworkers were making as chaotic, without reason, against the greater good, against 
all better judgment, and other similar clichés. With my holding company coworkers, 
I would sometimes complain about the latest “incident” in which an agency was 
making a decision that seemed, on its face, to be completely irrational. In return, I would 
get agreement from those listening that it was irrational, and inevitably we would 
bemoan the effect of this seeming irrationality on the stock price for the company 
overall. It was never long into a conversation before someone would comment, “We’re 
all the same company anyway. There’s only one stock symbol.” Of course, that was true. 
The company was listed on the stock exchange and all that really mattered was its 
share price, right? Or perhaps what mattered was the “bottom line,” or the profit margin, 
or the operating margin; whatever “it” was, we knew that it was only the holding 
company that mattered.
If it was the holding company and its position vis-à-vis the stock market that 
mattered, and not the agencies, then we as holding company employees had the best 
interests of the constituent agencies in mind. With that perspective, we all “walked the 
walk” and “talked the talk” of the centralization “line”: We needed the agencies to 
centralize their technology services with us. Centralization was equivalent to having 
economies of scale and cost savings and other benefits. With the holding company, we 
were bigger, better, and we were doing the right thing for the company and all of its 
parts. 
But the agencies resisted. As a group we collectively created hundreds of 
presentations and held thousands of meetings with the agencies in order to explain 
how sensible and correct we were for wanting to centralize services. Our favorite words 
were “rationalize,” “economies of scale,” “cost-savings,” and “cost avoidances.” We 
lavished promises of lowering overall costs, transparency, and better communication 
and service. All of these were the right reasons to do any project, right? 
I evangelized the holding company centralization message across my own 
region. It made sense. But having disparate application systems in every agency 
location was not the answer. 
Frank was the first to see the writing on the wall. As a former agency employee, 
he had realized that the future did not lie in the agency environment (not unless he was 
going to find a way to cross over into the “front office” of the business, where the 
account managers and Creatives were working), but rather in the holding company. 
When he saw that the centralization efforts were steamrolling over the holding 
company’s regional operations, he planned his escape out of the regional level to the 
global level. 
In the meantime, I was spending my time trying to understand why the 
agencies did not see these centralization projects as necessary or, at a minimum, better 
Standing on the edge of the Hoover Dam; I’m on the centerline; Right between two states of 
mind; And if the wind from the traffic should blow me away…”
 Sugar, Copper Blue, Hoover Dam
























than whatever they currently had in place. Many agencies understood the project and 
even agreed with the lofty goals it was setting, but there was an immediate issue— 
cost. While the holding company was professing all of these wonderful benefits of 
joining the central projects, the issue was that the agencies in my region had to pay to 
get onboard. So the finance and technology directors looked at their existing systems 
and wondered how much longer they could do without the better central system 
because there was a cost associated with such a move. But even as I helped them get 
over the financials by bringing in the agency’s global departments to finance the cost of 
the move, the next hurdle appeared: the ongoing cost of the centralized system. 
I didn’t understand this perceived hurdle, but I wanted to so I could fix it. 
I listened; 
I spoke to the technology directors and the finance directors; I heard their 
reasoning; but I did not have answers for them. I  learned that the agencies had their 
own profit and loss balance sheets. The individual agency finances were subject to 
specific metrics and goals; they had to meet certain operating margins, profit margins, 
and a number of different ratios. They had to report back monthly and quarterly. They 
had budgets they submitted six months in advance—budgets that were based on 
those specific financial goals. If a project was not contemplated early enough in the 
cycle, the finance directors would rant and rave at the technology departments for the 
lack of foresight. The agencies that did well could handle the new projects and costs, 
since their client revenues would offset this cost in their balance sheets. The agencies 
that were doing poorly, however, could not handle it at all. These agencies could not 
explain why their technology manager insisted on a global project implementation 
when the global finance department had not taken it into account the cost of the 
project. 
Understanding the financial terms of the agencies and the holding company 
suddenly brought to light why we had all of these obstacles. The agencies were not 
being obstinate. Yes, it’s possible that many of the technology executives could’ve been 
playing corporate politics, but at my level, very few of them were invested to such 
a degree. Rather, these agency technology directors and finance executives were simply 
trying to perform to the holding company’s requirements. They  were trying to run 
a business. They were trying to cater to their clients’ desires, whims, and projects. As 
opposed to focusing on the holding company’s technology projects, the agencies were 
more concerned with the demands of their clients. If our technology projects did not 
help them achieve their immediate client goals, then our projects would never roll out 
without force. 
At the global level, technology could improve costs, but finance wanted to 
see the results before committing. Yet without the commitment, it was difficult for the 
technology projects to roll out. It took years before this perfect balance of finance 
commitment and technology delivery of savings would finally come about. 
These bits and pieces, these explanations that had nothing to do with 
technology, were fascinating. I now understood the behavior of the people within the 
agencies much better than I ever had before. Our strategy of purporting the centralized 
technology’s superiority over the agency’s existing technology was useless information. 
No one really disagreed on those levels. The true issue was a business issue. 
Now, it was easy to limit this to financial issues. After all, it’s the finance 
directors who handle the agency’s purse strings, and it was that money—the agency’s 
money—that the technology group needed in order to incorporate the projects. But the 
financial issues were really the result of larger business problems within the agencies. 
The advertising industry was changing and the margins that had existed in the past 
were no longer applicable because clients were pushing for lower costs, a trend that 
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had escalated throughout the early 2000s. In addition to that pressure, the digital arena 
into which the advertising business had entered—and its traditional business model—
was now competing among new upstarts in the newly minted digital market. New 
regulations and other governmental pressures also added to the rapidly changing 
environment and the agencies’ needs to keep pace with it. 
What seemed like pure chaos and irrationality before, suddenly made sense 
within the context of the agencies and the industry. Why had my department not 
caught onto this earlier? 
With every bit of this newfound knowledge freshly engrained in my mind, 
I explained to several work friends what I had heard and seen in my conversations. 
Some of them understood immediately what the agencies were saying. Others did not 
“get it” and would simply push the same tired message that we just needed to get 
everyone on board. When I spoke to my agency technology directors, they knew that 
I had listened to them, and each of them understood that they faced the same pressure 
in their sister agency; they felt that I was finally understanding the real issues they faced 
in their daily operations. 
This issue, however, was a problem I could not fix. I continued to read about 
the advertising industry and talk to the agencies about their businesses. The agencies’ 
technology directors warmed up to my presence and eventually opened up more about 
their issues. They were even open to understanding what the holding company was 
trying to do. 
My other coworkers—those who interacted less with the agencies—did not 
have the benefit of this education. In their minds, the agencies’ actions still didn’t make 
sense. I tried to explain it to them, and even offered to let them be more involved with 
the agencies, but they did not take me up on this opportunity. 
The message learned by those of us in the holding company who work with 
the agencies is this: The business environment of the agencies is going to change, and 
while it is not going to make a lot of sense initially, there is no handbook or set process 
that can be followed. But the agencies usually know their advertising business and are 
simply trying to perform to the metrics set by the holding company and sometimes the 
projects we want to do in the agency seem to go against the agency’s way of getting 
those metrics. 
It’s up to us to help create that partnership between the agency and the 
holding company in order to navigate those waters. 
Liquid modernity can often be seen as chaotic and irrational because the bonds between people 
or objects are different in a “liquid” environment. Bauman describes the characteristics of liquidity to 
be “fluid,” and that they undergo continuous changes and move and flow around obstacles in their 
path (Bauman, 2000, pp. 1-2). Bauman uses this metaphor because liquids provide for many of the 
characteristics he observes in modern society. Fluidity is defined by an element of time, because 
liquids can change as time elapses. Thus, Bauman argues that modernity is a process of liquefaction, 
which took the old solid regimes (prior to our present modern day era) and created new solids, 
“better” solids (Bauman, 2000, p. 3). Changing these old solids was a process of liquefaction that 
began at the start of modernity, and the speed in which this happens has simply increased as time 
and space is conquered through technology (Bauman, 2000, p. 118). 
























The Technology group at the holding company was comprised of old timers and newcomers. 
The newcomers had all traditionally come from more “solid” companies, companies that had 
factories or that had implemented processes and other more solid structures into an organization, 
such as a project management office. In part, the hiring of this type of staff was done on purpose—
the holding company wanted to incorporate more of these types of workers and managers in order 
to apply those structures and processes onto the agencies and into the holding company itself. 
But the holding company found itself faced with the liquidity of its constituent advertising 
agencies. Due to the inherent nature of the industry—which had been born alongside the creation 
of the solid modern factories—this liquidity remained despite the holding companies’ solid modern 
theories and intentions. Regardless of how often the holding company added more solid processes 
and structures to their interactions with the agencies, the agencies still became more liquid—at 
least that’s how we perceived the agencies’ reactions toward the holding company’s projects and 
their attempts to solidify such projects. 
We (in the holding company) had to understand that liquidity would always be present because 
of the nature of the business: Advertising companies had to be flexible, adaptable, and willing to 
change at a moment’s notice. The requirements of this liquidity stemmed from the service-oriented 
ad industry. Clients demanded flexibility and adaptability from the agency, and the agency wanted 
please the client. And because the nature of the service was sales, there was a third party who also 
had to be considered as well: the consumer. 
Compounding those demands upon the agencies were the demands of the holding company, 
which wanted the agencies to meet certain financial requirements. Apart from the agencies’ clients 
and their clients’ clients, the holding company also had to appease their shareholders and their 
financial analysts, who demanded specific growth and balance sheet numbers in order to retain 
faith in the executive management. Managing all of those expectations, especially for those of us 
who were focused in only one area (such as technology), could seem chaotic and unstable to an 
outsider (or even an insider without the bigger picture of the business in mind). Thus, finding agency 
allies who were able explain to me the business and the unique demands placed on them enabled 
me to understand that what we perceived as reluctance and unwillingness to commit to one course 
of action could be easily understood through the lens of the business. However, understanding the 
agency’s reluctance to commit to a project or investment, did not make the liquidity of the agency 
into a solid structure that the holding company could manage.
As we insisted on implementing processes and structures throughout the agencies, the liquidity 
flowed through and around our processes and structures, as the agencies found ways to avoid or 
circumspect them, all justified by their business needs. Harnessing the liquidity from my level was 
impossible—how could I question their business needs? I also suspected that the technology 
projects could not harness that liquidity, even from the highest ranked technology executive in the 
organization. I often asked this of my manager, wondering out loud “if only so-and-so could mandate 
this idea down to the agencies…” These comments would generally be met with a wry laugh 
because the answer was always that nothing in the holding company could be mandated down. We 
needed to show the value in what we did and convince the agencies to participate. Forcing the 
liquid to stay solid was impossible. Conversely, we had to learn to make our solid policies more 
liquid. 
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One of the battles I decided to take on was to request that our standard policies on equipment 
be loosened to include less expensive equipment. The technology department had taken a firm 
stance on standards; they wanted to limit the equipment options that the agencies had to select 
from because it was easier for the holding company to only manage one top brand-name hardware 
vendor, and within that brand, a limited number of models. My argument against that policy was 
that if the agency needed to meet certain financial objectives—and in my region the agencies were 
limited by the amount of business generated—then it was impossible to expect these same 
agencies to invest the money in this top brand-name hardware. So, how could we get them the 
equipment they needed while still meeting our standards? The answer I received back from our 
engineers was that it was possible, but not preferable. It was as I had suspected; the standard could 
be adjusted. I justified the relaxation of the holding company standards because the goal was to get 
the agencies to agree to let the holding company manage this equipment. If that was the goal, but 
cost was an obstacle, then it seemed logical and practical to remove the obstacle. In this example, 
agency liquidity eroded the solid holding company standard; however, ultimately, both the agency 
and the holding company reached the ultimate objective of the technology department—for the 
agency to use equipment or applications based on a new standard, which facilitated future 
centralization of technology.
The project to centralize the technology was very solid modern in concept. Rather than allowing 
the agencies to continue with their disparate and overlapping systems, the holding company CIO 
was determined to centralize as much as possible into his department. The struggle between these 
solid modern processes and the liquidity that the agencies needed for their business played out 
over and over again through the implementation (or attempted implementation) of these 
centralization projects. I was stuck between the two worlds.
In some cases, a project like centralizing the email system was supremely successful because 
email has become both ubiquitous and critical. A system like this could not be “liquid,” and 
centralizing it with the holding company was easy to justify. So rather than loosening the solid 
modern standard of email (such as allowing multiple email platforms, for example), the liquidity of 
the agency was transformed in much the same way that a dam can transform a river. The only 
arguments against the centralization of the email system were based on the cost of the overall 
project and the on-going fees that the holding company wanted to charge the agencies for using 
the system. This sticking point was the liquidity of the agency butting up against the solid modern 
standard of the holding company. 
To continue the analogy of the dam: The email system was centralized (the damming of the 
disparate agency systems), but the real issue was the cost, not the technology. Thus, much like 
a dam still lets the water run under its control (simply not in the quantities that the river had before), 
the cost was continuously reduced until the agencies could no longer argue that they could do it for 
less while keeping the same quality of service. 
This back and forth between the central projects versus the local agencies’ own technology 
resulted in a compromise of sorts. Many of the aspirations and goals to centralize everything under 
the holding company umbrella were truncated to just the projects that were considered “back of the 
office,” and thus not critical to the client or strategic operations. 
























The department staff who have lasted throughout the “transformation” of the organization have 
recognized that some of the more solid processes and structures that they wanted to implement 
were simply not possible or had to be altered into something else that better fit the industry and the 
agencies’ needs. But equally so, the agencies have learned to send their liquidity through a more 
solid structure, like a river changing after a new dam has been built. 
The liquidity of the industry and the agency was not irrational or chaotic. It simply appeared that 
way because we had not yet discovered how to be flexible enough to harness some of the power of 
that liquidity. The holding company will have to continuously learn this process as the agencies 
change and adapt to suit their clients and their clients’ clients. 
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Autoethnographic Sketch - Why Do You Stay?
How do you do it?” my friend asked. The true question was, why was I still with 
the same company?
Why did I stay in a company that was completely disorganized and had no 
direction? Friends and family who knew finance asked why I stayed in a company 
whose stock price wasn’t going up, or a whether or not my 401(k) retirement account or 
pension plan was in the company’s stock. The ghost of Enron (and other companies) 
always loomed over that conversation. Other friends were indignant over my titles—
they were meaningless. Others insisted that I should start looking for a new position in 
a company where I “had a future.”
I understood their concerns and fears. I had them myself. But I felt tied here—
to the holding company, the advertising agency, and the industry.
It wasn’t about the money. Sadly, my salary had not increased significantly 
despite the steady increase in job load and responsibilities. The financial scare that 
shook the entire country made me happy to have a stable position with a steady 
income. I truly did not need any more than that.
At first I stayed because I had “potential,” as my superiors would say. They 
always said they were looking for that great position that would highlight my skills. 
Someday, I suppose, that position would come. My manager apologized to me every 
year for not having another higher position available in his department.
I stayed because I liked it. It was exciting. It was different. It changed every 
day. Every year had the potential of something new or different: a new obstacle, a new 
direction, a new problem, a new solution…
It was only a couple of years after I joined the company that it found itself facing the effects of 
the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Clients had cut back on spending, they themselves wondering 
what the economic situation would be like in the next few months. Consequently, our entire industry 
was forced to ask the same question. Our business depended on clients’ spending money on 
advertising, and clients only spent money when they thought their customers would actually buy 
products. As long as global consumers were afraid of losing their jobs and, in the United States and 
elsewhere, losing their wealth with the concurrent crash in real estate values, our clients were 
reluctant to spend on advertising. And we felt those effects. 
In my department, the question that hung over our heads was whether or not we would be laid 
off. We wondered how our company would steer us through these difficult times. Sadly, these 
feelings were not new; they were simply more acute during this recessionary period. In our 
“No one may reasonably assume to be insured against the next round of ‘downsizing’, 
‘streamlining’ or ‘rationalizing’, against erratic shifts of market demand and whimsical yet 
irresistible, indomitable pressures of ‘competitiveness’, ‘productivity’ and effectiveness’. 
‘Flexibility’ is the catchword of the day.”
 Zygmunt Bauman, 2000, p. 161
























technology department we often joked—but really felt it deeply—that our jobs could easily be 
eliminated. The sense that our roles in the holding company were temporary permeated throughout 
the department, despite the fact that we were full-time employees and not just contractors. 
Bauman argues that one of the highlights of liquid modernity is the perpetual sense of precarité 
in this environment. As such, “secure jobs in secure companies seem to be the yarn of grandfathers’ 
nostalgia,” and even more so in an environment as liquid as the advertising industry (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 161). Bauman then asserts that this precariousness in the environment creates “consumable” 
relationships because those “bonds and partnerships tend to be viewed and treated as things meant 
to be consumed, not produced” and consequently these relationships are temporary, because they 
are consumed for their immediate value and worth. Once the consumption of the relationship is 
finished, there is no more need for that relationship. 
This was very apparent during the years of the economic crisis and the financial restrictions 
imposed by the holding company onto our activities. The uncertainness of our own personal futures 
in the company left many of us to whisper to each other the latest tidbits of news, trying to 
extrapolate meaning out of nothingness. I reached out to more and more of my coworkers in the 
hopes that I could sense in which direction the wind was blowing. If my position was going to be 
eliminated, I wanted to know with some advance warning. 
But despite this uncertainty—and even as the economy began to improve—many of my 
coworkers still felt the sense that a firing could come down at any moment. Having been trained by 
our experiences that there was no such thing as predictable career progression within the 
organization, we focused instead on the new projects and new relationships we built. Bauman 
clarifies that rather than “the once cumulative and long-term nature of progress” we, as employees 
laboring under this company, had to be focused on “the merit of each episode” because our work 
was a series of short-term events, thus forcing us to “consum[e] in full before [the episode] is finished 
and the next episode starts” (Bauman, 2000, p. 137). Our strategies had to be short term-focused in 
order to succeed, because any attempt to conceive and execute a long-term plan would invariably 
fail from the outside, given the high likelihood of either the economy or a client throwing a wrench 
in our plans. Thus, the liquidity of our company demonstrates that we as employees had to treat our 
jobs and careers differently. Essentially, our “work has drifted from the universe of order-building 
and future-control to the realm of a game; acts of work become more like the strategy of a player 
who sets himself modestly short-term objectives…” (Bauman, 2000, p. 138). 
Bauman goes on to argue that because work is a series of short-term objectives, the relationships 
between the employer and the labor become tenuous. However, this worker-employer relationship 
no longer has the same responsibilities or obligations as it once did in the past. Instead, flexibility—
both in the tasks performed by the workers and in the employment contract—is the dominating 
goal of a liquid modern environment. Bauman uses the example of a camping site to describe that 
lack of obligation between both the worker and the employer; “the place of employment feels like 
a camping site which one visits for just a few days, and may leave at any moment if the comforts on 
offer are not delivered” (Bauman, 2000, p.149). Bauman’s descriptions are melancholy and he uses 
other areas (such as the effects of liquidity in marriage) to indicate that the loosening of these bonds 
create instability and volatility beyond the work environment.
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But the transformation of the worker-employer relationship from a more solid and inflexible 
bond into one that is more fragile and tenuous is not necessarily an undesirable development for 
the worker, at least not at the level of my coworkers in the technology department. The solid 
structures of the past provided structure and predictability, but equally so, that solidity can create 
a “‘routine [that] can demean’” (Bauman, 2000, p. 147). Solid modernity (and the subsequent 
structures such as unions that arose through it) provided a structure that eliminated the notion and 
role of the craftsman in society. This solid modernity stability and routine was not necessarily a preferred 
environment by workers prior to the creation of the Fordist type of factory. The imposition of unions 
in order to give workers some rights created a détente with capital, but at what creative and 
individual cost?
By staying in the holding company, and in this department, we recognized that we were 
sacrificing possibly more stable jobs with more solid modern companies. In exchange, however, we 
were being given the opportunity to work in a constantly changing environment where thinking 
quickly, creatively, and collaboratively was highly valued. This freedom to create our own solutions 
translated into working beyond normal standard hours—yes, we worked during “off” hours—but 
we were given the flexibility to work from home or remotely from other sites. The challenges we 
faced required us to be creative, even as our resources were limited, so creativity often was stretched 
beyond routine, complacent solutions. As a result, we worked together on the projects and goals, 
strengthening the relationships we had built.
The precariousness of my position in the holding company was clear. But at the same time, even 
in the harshest light of this precariousness, not only did I stay, but many of my coworkers did, too. 
Some of them stayed for financial reasons—at least they had a position that brought in a paycheck 
that week or that month—but the reality was that many also stayed despite the job market 
improving. The answer lies again with Bauman, because while there was a loosening of bonds 
between employers and employees, the fact that many of us stayed (and the company did not let us 
go) was also indicative of value we found in the work we were performing. At many levels, I was 
happy with the work that I did, the challenges I faced, and the people I worked with. I—all of us, 
really—could have escaped to another company because we had the experience, education, and 
skill-set to find work elsewhere, but I knew that the cost of the stability I may find elsewhere would 
be too high to pay. 
Having considered and pondered these reasons—as I explained  to friends and family — 
I understood why others stayed in the advertising industry. It was not only in my company, as many 
workers in the industry stayed even if they found themselves without a job, either because a client 
changed agencies or because the latest round of shareholder meetings forced the company reduce 
their overhead costs. Although the industry and the organization were liquid and uncertain, the 
value that we were getting from our experiences, at an emotional, intellectual, and career level, was 
sufficient enough to stay within this environment. Thus, even in surveys that asked whether or not 
the industry was attracting more people to it, such as the one presented by Andrew Bennett for the 
4As, they indicated that despite the lack of career development and other strategies to promote 
loyalty and stability in the workforce (advertising does have a high turnover rate), people wanted to 
stay in the industry.

























The metaphor of “liquidity” can be used to understand the advertising industry and the 
experience of the worker within. The experiences of both my coworkers and I have shown that our 
relationships within the organization and with each other have helped us navigate the liquidity 
found in our day-to-day work. Our attraction to the ever-changing environment of the industry is 
based on the challenges it presents, satisfying the need to be both completely engaged but at the 
same time entertained—the two of which are aspects of liquid modernity. 
In the sketch, Relationships Matter, I recounted my discovery that both the industry and 
organizational relationships that you made were crucial for success. But many of these relationships 
were more than just political alliances to help you through the corporate battleground; there were 
genuine friendships that were developed. However, the maintenance of those good relationships 
was critical to your success. This emphasis on good relations was very similar to how the industry 
itself worked, with its practices of wooing clients and catering to their needs. Instinctively, we did 
the same inside the company because it helped us accomplish our goals and objectives with our 
projects. Not only did these relationships help us task-wise, but they also helped us survive the 
instability and uncertainty that we faced daily in the organization. The liquidity of the organization 
perpetuated the need to find stability somewhere, and that place was in our relationships and 
friendships with one another. By “surviving” the constant and persistent change in the company 
(whether it was brought about by client wins, losses, or other financial or economic factors), we held 
onto each other as a means of proving some kind of stability. The fact that many of my coworkers 
had stayed for decades or longer in the organization and in the industry was indicative of the strong 
ties they had formed, as well as their talents and capabilities. 
Forming close ties—and thus being able to learn from the people around you—was a skill that 
I picked up on my own. After watching Frank struggle in our group, I felt I had to take a different 
approach when I was left alone in the region. The sketch, Adaptation, describes the experience of 
learning more about the agencies and becoming sympathetic to their perspectives. For the first 
time in my tenure at the holding company, I saw the importance of clients and the logical (if liquid) 
reasons for the agencies’ decisions and strategic directions. I had already begun to suspect that my 
department was stuck in the ivory tower of the holding company, simply overseeing the agencies, 
but not actually grasping their reality. And once I was given the keys to unlock another piece of the 
agency, I realized that my suspicions were correct. By learning more about the business and the 
industry, I found myself with an offer to join one of the agencies.
This “promotion” in and of itself was also another aspect of the liquidity in the company. As my 
coworkers and I had discussed in the Relationships Matter sketch, the reality of our situation was the 
flat hierarchy of our organization. This dual role that was given to me was both an honor and a test 
of my skills in terms of my adapting to having both viewpoints. 
In The Damming of the Agency, the solid structure of the holding company met the liquid nature 
of the advertising agency. As we saw in Chapter Four, the holding company structure was created 
precisely to add more structure to the industry, and to permit for the expansion of the advertising 
agency so it could meet the growing demands of its manufacturing clients. In the holding company 
I worked for, these solid modern structures were seen as the projects that centralized the technology 
services into the holding company. The agencies, on the other hand, were used for more liquid 
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systems and services—these services could vary from location to location, be provided by different 
vendors or departments, and be of different levels of quality. The centralization efforts of the holding 
company worked in some instances, but in other cases the holding company needed to give right 
of way to the agency. Ultimately, this was the fine line that I had to walk between the holding 
company’s desires to put more structure on the agency and the agency’s desires to stay as liquid as 
possible. 
These experiences encompassed the stories I would tell whenever I was asked to describe the 
company I worked for, which almost invariably begged the response, “Why do you stay?” The sketch, 
Damming of the Agency, addresses why so many of us did stay in this seemingly chaotic environment. 
The answer was surprisingly both related to the work we were doing—it was interesting, challenging, 
and constantly changing—and the people we worked with. My coworkers believed that this type of 
challenging environment attracted genuinely talented people, and so they stayed because there 
was pleasure in working with those individuals. This circle perpetuated itself through the friendships 
and the small community the industry created. Rather than aiming for higher-level positions in 
other industries, many of my coworkers preferred the challenges of the advertising industry and 
waited for their next opportunity therein.
My experiences interacting with others in the advertising industry, both in the holding company 
and in the different agencies, show that Bauman’s liquid modern descriptions fit both the industry 
and this company. There is, however, a difference in the area of relationships. Bauman focuses on the 
tenuous and fragile bonds that are created in a liquid modern environment, but it’s the opposite 
that actually holds true in this industry and company. Here, relationships are critical not only for job 
success, but also in terms of coping with the constantly changing environment. This reflects the 
strength of the human quality needed in the industry—which is based on human creativity and 
ideas—rather than on the machinery and technology that other industries are based on.
But the liquidity of the industry is not limited only to Bauman’s paradigm of solid and liquid 
modernity. Rather, there is an alternative form of liquidity that influences the chaotic and unstable 
environment of the advertising industry. As previously mentioned in Chapter Four, the advertising 
industry has been affected by the drastic turn that the holding companies took in the 1980s through 
their entrance into the stock markets and the subsequent marriage of advertising and finance. The 
primary driver for growth for the holding companies was the financing provided by banks. This 
decision to finance was based on a general turn in the importance of financing and debt in society, 
which has, consequently, affected the decision making of the advertising holding companies. 
Equally important, the effects of these decisions has had an impact on even the non-financial 
departments of these agencies, as these holding companies are now subject to meeting analysts’ 
expectations and shareholders’ demands of returns.
Chapter Six will focus on the importance of this “financialization” of the industry and the impact 
it’s had on the actions of the holding companies. Chapter Seven will then take into account the 
liquidity that the financialization brought into the industry through more autoethnographic 
sketches of my experiences within the holding company.
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“It’s not creative unless it sells.”
Al Hampel
Creative Head of Benton & Bowles during the 1970s
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Introduction – Liquidity Metaphor
In this “liquid” modern era, in which capital is free to move around unnoticed, the effects of this 
fluidity appear in various forms that affect the agreement previously created between labor and the 
owners of capital. Bauman suggests that “in ‘liquid’ modernity, it is the most elusive, those free to 
move without, who rule” (Bauman, 2000, p. 120). In other words, it is the characteristics of being 
flexible and unencumbered by solid structures that permit global elites and capital to flit from one 
plate to the next without being bogged down by the structures of the past. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, the liquidity of the advertising industry was not bogged down by the holding company 
structure that was created in order to provide more order. Rather, the holding companies, as 
a consequence of the liquidity in the industry, became more liquid structures themselves. 
The liquid modern era created the “weightlessness of capital.” This weightlessness was seen in 
the breakdown of the relationship between the owners and managers of capital and the labor, 
where the mergers and downsizing—which are typical in the liquid modern world—broke the 
obligations capital had with labor. Bauman is clear that these two corporate trends—mergers and 
downsizing—are interrelated and reinforce each other, despite their initial appearances to the 
contrary. After all, a merger should create a larger organization than before, while a downsized 
entity should create a smaller company. However, according to Bauman, these two acts actually 
reinforce one another and offer “capital and financial power the space to move and move quickly, 
making the scope of its travel ever more global while at the same time depriving labour of its 
bargaining and nuisance-making power, immobilizing its hands every more firmly” (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 122). The mergers and acquisitions that are common in liquid modernity prevent labor (employees) 
from being able to create solid structures that protect them in relation to the light and liquid global 
elite, who do not need to create these benefits nor believe that they need to provide them to their 
employees. Employment in a liquid modern environment is temporary; it lasts for a specific period 
and is not a life-long agreement between capital and labor. Thus,
 the managerial equivalent of liposuction has become the paramount stratagem of 
managerial art: slimming, downsizing, phasing out, closing down or selling out some units 
because they are not effective enough and some others because it is cheaper to let them 
fight for survival on their own that to undertake the burdensome, time-taxing managerial 
supervision, are this new art’s principal applications (Bauman, 2000, p. 122). 
This creates uncertainty on the part of the employee due to the fact that their job is now in 
jeopardy, as their company is broken apart, merged with another, or restructured in some other way. 
Capital, however, benefits from this uncertainty because it no longer has to maintain the solid 
structures that factories used to occupy, and because no obligations (whether management, 
responsibilities or economic stability) are necessary to the role of the contractor (as the “permanent” 
employee numbers are reduced). This liquidity affects not only the relationship of the employee and 
the owner, but also the financial markets and capital. In the latter scenario, these effects are visible 
through the financial deals and agreements that both WPP and Interpublic made during the rise of 
the finance-focused economy.
The era of mergers and acquisitions (and the subsequent restructurings and downsizings of the 
agencies that were acquired) first emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. The effects of these activities 
gave rise to the “mega-holding company phenomenon” and led to the further financialization of the 
industry, indirectly affecting the identities of the agency and holding company structures. The 


















future of the industry currently depends on whether the holding company is a viable structure not 
only for the financial markets, but also for the clients that hire the subsidiary agencies for their 
campaigns. The leaders in the industry are currently grappling with these same issues: What are the 
effects of financialization on an already liquid industry? Does this financialization bring additional 
benefits to any of the stakeholders of the advertising company; e.g., clients, shareholders, employees, 
or management?
Foundations of Financialization
The modern corporation in America gained strength and grew from the time of the Industrial 
Revolution through to the turn of the 19th - 20th century. Charted companies, guilds, and other 
organizations had existed prior to this period, but the corporation had several unique characteristics 
that set it apart from these other business forms: It was a solid modern structure that existed as 
a legal entity, with rights separate from those who owned its underlying shares.
In the United States, corporations were initially managed by bankers, who acquired and merged 
local and regional companies into larger conglomerates of similar companies. It was in this manner 
that the earliest American manufacturing giants such as United States Steel, General Electric, and 
Standard Oil were formed. These corporations went on to create oligarchies and monopolies in 
several markets, but primarily in the industrial sector. The result of the creation of these conglomerates 
often was seen in the notable groups of companies, such as the Rockefeller group, the Gould group, 
the Vanderbilt group, and the Morgan group (Davis, 2009).
It was precisely this structure of early U.S. corporations that enabled them to grow so successfully. 
With bankers helping to manage the corporations, thereby giving them access to the financial 
markets, the future growth of these giants seemed limitless. However, the size of these companies 
began to concern the public at large. People feared the control that these conglomerates had on the 
economy. They also had a hard time understanding this new economic system that was hallmarked 
by the faceless behemoths. Beginning in the 1920s, corporate managers began a public relations 
campaign to address these concerns through the concept of “welfare capitalism,” under which a set 
of corporate practices was instilled to provide employees perquisites such as pensions, vacations, 
health insurance, and other benefits (Davis, 2009). Through this process, employees would be 
bound to the corporation that was providing these benefits and, in return, provide a personality and 
a “face” to the public.
Not coincidentally, the rise of welfare capitalism and the desire of corporations to improve their 
public personas gave rise to a brand new industry: public relations. The first public relations firm, 
called Publicity Bureau, was established in 1900. It quickly rose to prominence through a publicity 
campaign that was designed to help the railroads appear ‘friendlier’ the public during a period when 
anti-corporation sentiment was strong in the United States. Around the same time, AT&T created its 
own institutional public relations campaign both to hold at bay the sentiment that telephone lines 
should be a government-owned system and to put a friendlier face on the company for the customer 
(Davis, 2009). By 1920, the public relations and advertising industries evolved to meet the demands 
of corporations. But these agencies were not immune to the same waves of mergers, acquisitions, 
and divestitures that were common throughout American enterprises of this era. 
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The 1920s also brought about the expansion of stock ownership, which led to a significant rise 
of public shareholding; i.e., larger percentages of companies being owned by larger numbers of 
people, including small investors. As a result, these larger corporations were no longer exclusively 
owned by single large families or by groups of individuals, but rather by hundreds of thousands of 
individual shareholders, none of who held majority ownership. Furthermore, as ownership became 
more diversified, so did management. While it was altogether common in the oligarchies of the late 
1800s and very early 1900s to see an individual man or family running the daily operations of 
a massive company, as their ownership shares dwindled, so did their managerial involvement. The 
end result was that “professional managers” controlled these corporations and their assets, rather 
than any one individual owner. As such, these professional managers did not necessarily have 
ownership interest in the corporations they were running or accountability to the companies’ 
shareholders (Davis, 2009).
During this period in the early 20th century, the “benevolent” corporation that provided 
employees benefits (in exchange for reduced unionization and fewer strikes) and, subsequently, 
became part of the fabric of American society had transformed into large, mass production factories 
that were now run by professional managers with no tangible “ownership” ties to the company itself. 
The impact of this type of corporation was significant, leaving marks not only on the economic 
aspects that the corporation touched, but also on other areas of society, including scientific and 
medical research. “[S]ociety had been reorganized along the lines of the automotive assembly line” 
(Davis, 2009, p. 73).
The corporation was now part of daily life and often determined each member of society’s 
perspective on his or her own status in that society through their connection to the benefits (or lack 
thereof ) that the corporation gave them. The industrial revolution had completely changed the face 
of the elite from land-owning aristocrats to bankers, capitalists, and merchants. Modernity was the 
process of “shedding the ‘irrelevant’ obligations standing in the way of rational calculation of effects,” 
as Bauman describes, leaving “the whole complex of network of social relations unstuck – bare, 
unprotected, unarmed, and exposed, impotent to resist the business-inspired rules of action and 
business-shaped criteria of rationality.” Bauman describes a society effectively unable to compete 
against the corporation’s strategy of building a self-encompassing system to manage and control 
the employee within it. As a result, “that order came to dominate the totality of human life because 
whatever else might have happened in that life has been rendered irrelevant and ineffective as far 
as the relentless and continuous reproduction of that order was concerned” (Bauman, 2000, p. 4).
At the turn of the early 20th century, the corporation changed to resemble the type of 
corporation that we recognize today, with professional managers at their helms. Industrial 
manufacturing companies had grown and, in turn, had begun to dominate their markets. Oligopolies 
and monopolies were common during this period. Many feared the concentration of power amongst 
these banks, railroads, and industrial corporations, as people thought that this concentration of 
power and wealth would lead to economic and political control. The result of this fear was an 
immediate backlash against the “corporations” and the bankers who managed them. In order to 
combat the negative publicity that questioned the bankers’ roles and intentions, the corporations 
followed two paths. The first was “welfare capitalism,” which Davis defines as “a set of corporate 
practices … to provide an array of employee benefits on and off the job: pensions, paid vacations, 
health insurance, and housing assistance, among other things” (Davis, 2009, p. 69). The intention of 
these benefits was to ensure that their employees would stay tied to the corporation, but also to 


















avoid the increase of unions and other trade group organizations. The second path taken by these 
corporations was to give the company a “personality.” Davis presents various examples of the 
advertising and public relations strategies that these corporations took to affect the opinion of the 
general public. The  result of this increase of corporate “benevolence” and the immersion of the 
corporation into the day-to-day life of the employee led to the strength of the professional manager 
over the shareholder. In turn, this led to “lifetime” employment practices, creating “memberships” to 
the corporation and allowing it to become the most prevalent force shaping society (Davis, 2009).
Additionally, the end of World War II saw a huge influx of skilled workers and capital into the 
economy. This led to a burgeoning middle class in the United States. As the corporations became 
stronger and the middle class became larger, most manufacturing companies were seen as 
providing a “career path” for their employees, along with growth opportunities for skill acquisition 
and increased salaries as workers advanced on the hierarchical ladder of the ever-growing 
corporation. As these monoliths grew, the belief was that the larger the company, the more stable 
and successful it would be. Furthermore, massive size was also perceived as a bulwark against being 
acquired by a competitor. Consequently, management worked primarily to ensure that the 
companies under their control would grow, and grow continuously, both in size and in profits.
Again, because of the continued growth of the corporation, fears over the overabundance of 
power in concentrated individuals and corporations resurfaced. However, this backlash was no 
longer focused on the bankers who had been the targets in the early 20th century, but rather on the 
corporate managers who held so much power in the conglomerates that arose out of the post-war 
period. These fears led to a series of laws and regulations that prevented these corporations from 
creating monopolies or oligopolies, but it did not prevent expansion into different industries. While 
these regulations did not stop merger and acquisition activity during this period, it focused 
companies on growth through diversification across industries, instead of on conglomeration 
within a single market. By the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, these conglomerates had 
consolidated power through expansion into different industries. Corporations extended the 
benefits that they offered employees, tying them to a lifetime within a conglomerate. The sheer size 
and breadth of these giant corporations facilitated the shaping of society around them. Entire towns 
and careers could be centered on one of these companies. 
Advertising agencies were slightly different than other corporations, in that they had been 
limited by industry trade association rules from being owned by any person outside the company. 
This restriction was imposed under the belief that in order to maintain high levels of standards and 
avoid conflicts of interest, the principals in the firms had to be the majority owners (Nordenflycht, 
2010). 
However, these standards were very limiting for the firms. Advertising agencies held ownership 
stakes exclusively through their partners; it was considered private ownership, not available to the 
public. The value of the ownership interests in these private firms was determined mostly by the 
book value of those interests. Moreover, these private ownership interests were illiquid, meaning 
they could not be easily sold. Founders of these smaller, private advertising firms had to find buyers 
either through mergers (in which the buying company would buy out the owners of the firm, 
allowing the former owners to walk away with cash) or through internal purchases, in which the 
existing employees of a firm (higher level executives, usually) would buy out the retiring partner. 
Again, because these private ownership interests were limited in their ability to be easily bought 
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and sold, they seldom changed hands.
Initially, to solve this problem of “illiquidity” in ownership, ad agencies wanted to become 
corporations and set themselves up to be publicly traded on the New York or London stock 
exchanges. For example, in 1962, PKL (Papert Koening Lois) became the first advertising agency in 
the United States to “go public”; i.e., sell shares on a stock exchange (Tungate, 2007). Foote, Cone & 
Belding followed suit, along with DDB (Doyle Dane Bernbach), in 1963 and 1964 respectively 
(Advertising Age Graphic, Johnson). Ogilvy & Mather was the first agency to go public on both the 
New York and London stock exchanges in 1966 (Lui, 2008). These agencies initially went against the 
norm and industry rules, but the trade associations quickly changed their regulations as other 
agencies expressed their desire to also go public.
Despite the small forays that large agencies like Ogilvy & Mather, Foote, Cone & Belding, and 
several other firms had taken into the stock market, very few agencies had ventured into the 
financial markets to sell their shares. This was because of the widely held belief that the inherent 
value of an advertising company was tied to the people employed by that firm; i.e., partners, creative 
talents, or account managers. In contrast to a manufacturing company, the value of which is 
measured by the assets it owns, the value of these advertising agencies was denominated in human 
capital. And because any of these valuable people could walk away and start their own advertising 
firm at any moment—the barriers to entry in the advertising industry are very low—the value of the 
advertising company was not seen as being tied to the firm. Therefore, the financial markets (and 
those who bought shares in the advertising company) had concluded that the value of these shares 
was lower than their book value due to the ever-present risk that an agency could fall apart at any 
moment if any one of the critical principals in the firm were to leave and take with them their creative 
talents or significant clients. However, once other advertising agencies in the market finally went 
public, many found that that the public did not rush out buy their stock (Fox, 1984).
The original structure of the average ad agency was loose and undefined. The advertising agent 
in the 1800s worked independently, without a corporate structure. Later, in the 1860s, Francis 
Wayland Ayer started the advertising firm of N.W. Ayer & Son. This firm structured the relationship 
between the advertising agent, client, and publisher in a manner that became the model for the 
advertising industry in the United States during the mid-to-late 19th century. As the advertising 
industry in the country grew, these agents had to increase their operations by hiring other agents to 
either handle clients or to help write copy. The increase in organizational size also meant that these 
agents now had to retain bookkeepers and assistants to cope with the administrative tasks of 
running the agency. As a result, larger firms were created, and it was only a matter of time before 
these larger firms would integrate corporate structures. 
Much like their manufacturing counterparts, the creation of Interpublic as a holding company 
for McCann-Erickson and Marschalk & Pratt was an extension of the belief that even advertising 
agencies needed to take on the structure of the corporation and the conglomerates in order to grow 
as large as possible. The notion that the corporation could encompass more than just one area in an 
industry led Marion Harper, Interpublic’s founder and first president, to purchase lines of business 
both within the advertising industry and outside of it. 
However, Interpublic had grown unwieldy during Marion Harper’s tenure. Growth through 
acquisitions during the 1960s rendered the organization unmanageable. Rather than creating an 


















efficient organization that provided the operating companies with a structure and flexibility to 
grow, the holding company had created an overhead structure that could not be managed and that 
was making the company unprofitable. Harper had taken the concept of a conglomerate to its 
fullest extent, acquiring companies outside of the advertising industry, such as publishing houses. 
In a questionable practice, Harper denied rumors the company had acquired John Felix Associates4, 
a data processing company that was providing services to competitors like Ogilvy & Mather, Grey, 
and others (Fox, 1984). However, a secret agreement did indeed exist, and Interpublic was providing 
these data processing services to other major advertising agencies outside of Interpublic. Although 
the Interpublic acquisitions during the 1960s diversified the company and added different streams 
of income into company coffers, these acquisitions did not venture too far from the services or 
advertising industry. While other corporations of the time, such as General Motors, were acquiring 
manufacturing plants and companies outside of the auto industry and expanding their reach 
through additional physical space and material, Harper recognized the “liquid” nature of the 
advertising industry and focused his company’s growth on the service sectors that could be used to 
attract clients.
This constraint of liquidity upon Harper and the growth strategy of Interpublic are important 
points to understand. Bauman describes the solid modern era as the “era of hardware, or heavy 
modernity – the bulk-obsessed modernity, ‘the larger the better’ kind of modernity” (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 113) because it focused on acquiring space. The “supreme goal” of a company was to acquire as 
much property as possible and then to guard it with gates and other boundaries. This “heavy” 
modernity was “the era of territorial conquest.” However, liquid modernity, or light modernity, was 
focused instead on the conquest of time and space; its ultimate goal was to be instantaneous. Liquid 
modernity recognizes human labor as separate from solid modern structures; it focuses on the 
closest point to uncertainty or unpredictability, especially because technology reduces the physical 
geography and thus the need to have territorial conquests (Bauman, 2000, p. 114). Harper could not 
take advantage of all the technology that would later benefit the advertising industry that would 
reduce the turnaround times for products or campaigns, or even in the instantaneous forms of 
modern communication and other advances. However, he perceived the need to focus on other 
areas that brought additional liquid modern flows of income, such as services and (in the case of 
John Felix Associates) income from competitors as clients. Harper failed, however, to loosen 
completely the solid modern characteristics that he wanted to have in the company, thereby putting 
Interpublic in debt by accruing not only acquisition costs of so many non-advertising specific 
companies, but also such excesses as private planes and buildings around the world.
Harper’s purchase of these assets put Interpublic into crippling debt. Like most American 
corporations during the middle of the 20th century, he could rely on Interpublic’s earnings and 
profits to self-finance purchases or acquisitions. The involvement of commercial banks in this 
process was limited by Depression-era regulations and the lending practices that grew out of these 
laws. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 sought to address one of the underlying causes of the Great 
Depression by prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in investment banking activities. 
Furthermore, law and industry practices limited the size and scope of most banks; after the 
Depression, large national banks were unheard of, and smaller regional or local banks were the 
norm. The result was the restriction of large-scale investment capital from banks. Consequently, 
corporations did not turn to banks for financialization or securitization, choosing instead to perform 
4 John Felix Associates had been such controversial purchase that Marion Harper created a new type of stock for 
the purchase. [Computerworld. (1968, January 31). NY Service Bureau Secret Bared. Computerworld , 2 (5), p. 2.]
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those acts themselves during the subsequent decades (Davis, 2009). 
The limits of the banking industry had an enormous effect on corporations. The late 1960s saw 
significant anti-corporatist and anti-government movements around the world that compelled 
governments to take action against private corporate interests (Harvey, 2005). Banks were in even 
more dire straits as the regulations that limited their ability to function across state lines or regions 
meant that they were losing the control they once had on corporations, consumers, and 
governments. Because the banking industry remained local or regional, banks were focused on 
their local communities and local businesses. The smaller banks held close ties with the corporations 
that were local to them (Davis, 2009). The interrelated nature of banks and business also helped 
corporations find financing for their projects, inform each other of upcoming events that might 
affect their business, and provide general macroeconomic advice. As corporations expanded and 
grew, and the corporations’ demands for loans or other financing grew accordingly, local banks 
were limited in their ability to meet the needs of these clients due to government regulation. 
Investment banks, on the other hand, had the freedom to work with these corporations across state, 
regional, and even national lines. Therefore, corporations increasingly turned to investment banks 
for assistance in funding company projects and expansion. 
By the 1970s, with bank lending at a nadir, these large corporations were finding that they could 
borrow through “commercial paper” at low interest rates. Commercial paper is a promissory note 
that only highly rated (or “blue chip”) corporations issue to investors as a form of short-term loan. 
Because commercial paper is not backed by assets or any other type of collateral, the ability of 
corporations to issue such notes successfully depends completely on the reputation of the company. 
Additionally, the interest rates for these notes are related to their term: the longer the term of the 
debt (in days and years), the higher the interest rate. Corporations typically issue commercial paper 
only for short-term debt obligations, knowing that the company will repay the notes quickly. This 
type of debt often is preferable to a line of credit at a bank, because the financing is readily available 
and the interest rates tend to be lower, thus costing the company less to repay.
The welfare capitalism and public relations drive of the early 20th century worked. Before the 
1970s, the banking industry had been held in high esteem in the marketplace. Banks maintained 
strong relationships with companies and helped them manage their growth through loans and 
financing. Banks maintained complete information records about companies, and the regard of the 
banking industry toward a particular corporation was used as the barometer of that company’s 
credit-worthiness in the market. This information was valuable, and banks had managed this 
information to their advantage. However, by the 1970s, expanding information technology had 
facilitated the flow of such corporate and financial information beyond the banking industry into 
the marketplace at large. Moreover, the use of commercial paper and other types of financing in the 
market became more popular. While banks still held the monopoly on conventional bank loans and 
financing, the role as the catalyst of financialization—particularly for large corporations—was 
passing from the banking industry to the financial markets. This shift fundamentally changed many 
corporations, including Interpublic.


















Financialization Comes to Interpublic 
As described previously, Interpublic grew rapidly during the 1960s through mergers and 
acquisitions. By 1966, the company included 24 divisions, 8,300 employees, a fleet of five airplanes, 
and billings of $711 million. Yet this spate of corporate acquisitions cost the company money. 
Interpublic spent its earnings on these purchases and then depended on short-term loans to cover 
immediate costs. In 1967, the company posted losses of $3 million and defaulted on short-term loan 
obligations with several banks. Interpublic found itself in a situation in which it had to turn to the 
financial markets to get out of the debt it had accumulated.
The first step in the recovery of the holding company was to split with its founder. In late 1967, 
Harper was ousted by the board of directors because his vision of growth did not include details on 
how to pay for that growth; Harper’s business plan was devoid of ways for cutting costs or finding 
effective methods to finance the deals that had already been made plus the company’s expenses. 
He had been a visionary in terms of creating the concept of the holding company, but he had not 
focused on how this could work further in practice (Gordon, 2009). What worked in manufacturing 
to improve profit margins and efficiencies did not work in the service sector, especially not in 
advertising. In advertising, economies of scale were not possible, as a campaign for soap could not 
be used for two different clients. Additionally, the creators of the product could walk out, increasing 
the cost of running a firm. Advertising was not manufacturing; therefore, the growth and margins 
enjoyed by companies like General Motors were nonexistent at Interpublic. 
Robert Healy was brought in as the new president of Interpublic in late 1967 in an effort to turn 
the company around. His past business experience included working as the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) and running the European division of McCann Erickson. He had entered semi-retirement in 
Switzerland until the board of directors of Interpublic asked him to come back to the United States 
to take over Marion Harper’s role. Banks in New York had already signaled to the board that if Marion 
Harper were to be replaced, the banks would be willing to negotiate a deal to help Interpublic out 
of its financial mess. Chase Manhattan Bank, for example, promised the company a $10.5 million 
loan under such conditions (Fox, 1984). Once Harper left and Healy came in, Chase Manhattan 
began openly discussing the terms of the loan for Interpublic.
Yet the removal of Marion Harper was not the only demand placed on Interpublic by the banking 
industry. Agreements with the board of directors and Chase Manhattan called for Healy to implement 
strong cost-cutting measures, sell parts of the business, and lay off staff. Additionally, the agencies 
were to be divided by regions, giving each entity the autonomy over its own business. In this regard, 
the reformation plan demanded by the banks mirrored the original intent of Interpublic—a holding 
company that allowed the agencies to run their own businesses (Fox, 1984). Rather than having 
Interpublic manage each region or each operating company from the center, part of the turnaround 
plan was to give more power to the local agencies to manage their own financial statements and 
lines of business. This independence echoed the theme of the conglomerates of other industries 
that had rapidly expanded to other regions of the world and resembled the banks’ own strategies of 
expanding abroad; Chase Manhattan itself had 75% of its profits coming from overseas in the 1970s 
(Davis, 2009, p. 113). 
As part of the Chase Manhattan loan, Healy also had to sell the “Debenture Plan” to the 
management executives in the agencies (Gordon, 2009). As part of the restructuring demanded 
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under the terms of the loan, management had to raise $6 million by themselves. Much of these 
internal funds were to come from the sale of these convertible debentures—unsecured bonds that 
can be converted into company stock—to Interpublic employees. These convertible debentures 
would be due in 1988. With some convincing, Healy was able to raise $3.5 million dollars from 
Interpublic employees. These funds, along with the loan from Chase Manhattan and other monies, 
gave Healy $16 million to start paying off debt. From the $16 million raised, almost $6 million of the 
total went to pay off domestic debt, and just over $1 million went toward buying out Marion Harper 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1968). 
However, the raising of capital through these loans and notes was not enough to completely 
correct the financial course that Interpublic was on. It needed a more permanent solution to 
maintain and guarantee itself a future. In February 1971, Interpublic offered 750,000 shares of 
common stock to the public with the maximum price of the stock at $18/share. In the required 
disclosures for this stock offering, Interpublic noted that Smith, Barney and Co., Inc., a New York 
brokerage house, would be helping with the offer. Additionally, the disclosures noted that the 
outstanding class B shares of Interpublic were already available to purchase, along with the 
important disclosure that 23% of the ownership of the company rested with its executives, as 
a result of the Debenture Plan. Under the heading of the reason(s) for the stock offering, the 
disclosures listed “general corporate purposes, including working capital requirements and the 
repayment of bank indebtedness (to the extent of $2,000,000 of overseas bank indebtedness and 
prepayment of about $3,000,000 of borrowings from foreign branches of domestic banks)” 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971).
With this public offer, Interpublic was now considered completely financialized. This 
financialization was indicative of the power that banks would now have over the industry, 
determining the business and financial strategy that the executives would have to take in order to 
continue to exist and grow. Though most likely unintended in the public offering, the company 
would now become part of a larger financialization in the advertising industry and part of a larger 
push toward neoliberal policies during that era through their need to raise money in the stock 
market.
Essentially, through the convertible debentures, lower level executives at Interpublic now owned 
a portion of the first publicly traded advertising holding company, a type of ownership that had 
never existed in the industry until now. Interpublic’s foray into the public stock exchange market 
meant that the holding company structure in the industry was more “solid” than ever before.
It is important to note that even in the 1960s and 1970s, it was not as common for the average 
person to own stock as it is today. In fact, in the 1970s, only 5% of Americans owned stock in any 
company. Gallup reported that stock ownership in the United States was at a “low” of 54% of all 
Americans in 2011 (Saad, 2013), a number that was considered “low” due to the recent financial crisis 
of 2008. Prior years had seen percentages at 64% or higher. While the stock market was a place to 
facilitate the selling and exchange of shares, it was not yet a predominate force in a given industry, 
corporate America, or society in general (Ho, 2009). Further contributing to this low percentage of 
stock ownership was the fact that the mid-1970s also saw an economic recession in the United 
States that eroded disposable income for investments and suppressed returns on the stock market 
in general.


















There was even less incentive for an ad agency to go public company at this time. Because the 
advertising industry was service oriented, and thus “labor intensive … advertising did not benefit 
greatly from the financial advantages of public ownership” (Fox, 1984). In fact, publicly owned 
agencies did not see much benefit to being publicly owned and traded on stock exchanges; some 
even bought back their shares. The retreat back to private ownership occurred because the agencies 
realized that their companies were worth more privately than on the openly traded market.
However, the situation began to change as the United States emerged from recession in the late 
1970s. Prior to this period, the stock market “allowed owner-entrepreneurs of successful private 
enterprises in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to cash out while maintaining the 
management and organizational structure of the enterprise that had helped to make the business 
a success” (Ho, 2009, p. 191). The difference between the 1960s and the 1980s in terms of the nature 
of corporate acquisitions was that those corporations that acquired entities in the 1960s typically 
allowed the acquired company to run its own operations. Conversely, in the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions in the 1980s, the target company typically was subsumed completely into the acquiring 
company.
In bygone days, the stock ownership of a company was perceived as a structure separate and 
distinct from the operational being of a company. This difference allowed corporations to make 
decisions on their day-to-day operations with lesser concern for the ramifications of those decisions 
on the stock price. The stock exchange was a place where the stockholder could buy and sell their 
stock, and where the stockholder would be told the price and valuation of those stocks. Typically, 
prior to the 1980s, stockholders were not perceived as actively participating in the management or 
direction of a corporation and did not feel day-to-day ownership over the corporation. The corporate 
managers focused on running their corporations without fear or concern of outsiders (stockholders) 
getting involved in their decision-making (Ho, 2009). 
Consequently, prior to the 1980s, corporations were built with the belief that they would be 
long-lasting organizations. Marion Harper’s goal for Interpublic was to make it into the advertising 
industry’s version of General Motors—a long-standing institution that would outlast competitors 
and continue to grow into the future; “the corporation was understood to be an illiquid institution” 
(Ho, 2009, p. 195) because of this fixed and solid structure. Financially, however, this structure 
needed a way to raise capital and make the assets of the corporation more liquid, which it found in 
the stock market (Ho, 2009). The issuing of stock allowed the corporation to acquire the capital it 
needed in order to expand its business, where the financial markets would assess the value of the 
assets and the strategic decisions the corporation was making. In return, the corporation would 
then pay shareholders a return on their investment by issuing dividends (profit-sharing) or by 
pursuing activities that would increase the price of the stock. 
This relationship between the corporation and the financial markets became stronger in the 
1970s as a number of different changes occurred in the financial and political climates. One of the 
biggest changes of that decade was the turn to neoliberalism after various countries fell into an 
economic recession. There was a belief that the Keynesian policies of the 1950s and 1960s led to 
stagnation and inflation in the 1970s (Harvey, 2005, p. 24). Economic growth had stopped both in 
the United States and Europe, causing interest rates to stagnate and economies to slow down 
significantly. Various fiscal and economic policies were being adopted in an attempt to jump-start 
their economies.
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One of the many types of policies being considered was based on neoliberal principles, which, 
on the surface, seemed to focus on giving corporations and markets the freedom to pursue their 
business, independent of government regulation. It was “a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In this context, the role of the state or its 
government is to ensure that this framework is being followed, to print money (and secure the value 
of that money), to implement only those legal controls or functions that allow private property 
rights to be upheld, and to ensure that the markets are functioning as “freely” as possible (Harvey, 
2005).
This “liberalization” of the corporation led to some significant political changes. Large 
corporations began to see themselves as a specific class of “citizen” that sought to exert and control 
legislative action as a group. In 1976, a Supreme Court decision in the United States allowed for 
corporations to make unlimited donations to political campaigns and political parties. This was the 
first step toward the definition of a corporation as a separate entity with the same rights as an 
individual (Harvey, 2005, p. 49), which eventually became a reality in the United States Supreme 
Court in 2010 with the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission decision that corporations have 
“personhood” and can thus donate to political campaigns because they have the right to free 
speech.
During the recession of 1970s, households in the United States saw their savings eroded by high 
inflation. In order to keep some of their savings intact, these households started looking for different 
financial vehicles into which they could invest. Normal American consumers began looking outside 
traditional savings accounts and started putting money into “money market mutual funds.” These 
money market funds began investing in commercial paper, which was perceived as a relatively low-
risk, high-return investment. As households became comfortable dealing with the financial markets 
in this manner, they started to look at other financial products, such as equity mutual funds. Because 
these nascent financial markets were providing a steady return, more and more households 
continued to invest in these products, lowering the traditional savings rate at banks to unprecedented 
levels (Davis, 2009, p. 114). Additionally, government direction over and intervention in these 
financial markets was remarkably low, as neoliberal policies were being adopted in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s not only in the United States, but around the world.
Harvey cannot say definitively that this early success of financial markets (and the propaganda 
in financial circles that this success engendered) mobilized the heads of corporations or other 
institutions to promote neoliberal values. However, he does present increasing membership in 
neoliberal organizations, increasing private funding of neoliberal causes, and the consequential 
changes to the law that this neoliberal groundswell created as indicators that there was 
a transformation in U.S. economic-political policies during the 1970s and early 1980s to promote the 
neoliberal agenda.
New York City of the 1970s is a prime example of new neoliberal policies being applied to public 
sector governance. In 1975, New York City, which was wallowing in a sea of debt, was allowed to 
enter into bankruptcy and the bail-out that was structured for the city included the appointment of 
new institutions to help balance the city’s budget. Through the bailout plans promoted by these 
institutions, tax revenues are used to pay off financial institution bondholders first. The primacy of 


















bondholders over city employee salaries, unions benefit payments, or social services contracts 
became an indicator as to the focus of neoliberal policies: financial institutions. As New York 
rebounded from its near-financial collapse, Harvey continues to argue that the success of this 
program in New York City was a signal that the same priorities would be assigned in any public 
sector in the United States. Now, with the effects of the New York City crisis as an example of what 
could and would be done with these neoliberal policies, financial institutions became more 
powerful. They could designate the direction of not only private corporations, but governments and 
public institutions as well.
By allowing the financial institutions to take on this role of savior, the government was signaling 
that this was an acceptable solution to these problems. This power was given to financial institutions 
because, as Harvey indicated, “the neoliberal state cannot tolerate any massive financial defaults 
even when it is the financial institutions that have made the bad decisions” (Harvey, 2005, p. 73). 
Thus, not only can a neoliberal government afford to have massive bankruptcies in the cities it 
governs, but also it will not allow the financial institutions to fail. This meant that financial institutions 
could bail out cities and other corporations without any concern that they themselves would be at 
risk. 
Returning to the example of the New York City financial crisis and bailout, Harvey points out, 
“[the crisis and bailout] established the principle that in the event of a conflict between the integrity 
of financial institutions and bondholders’ returns, on the one hand and the well-being of the citizens 
on the other, the former was to be privileged” (Harvey, 2005, p. 48). The bailout forced the government 
of New York City, and eventually municipal governments everywhere, to accept the new reality that 
governments must first cater to the needs and demands of creditors and other bondholders before 
addressing the needs of its citizenry. With the wave of deregulation in the United States and abroad 
in 1980s in terms of financial institutions, these institutions became “instruments of coordination, 
[and] they also provided the means to procure and concentrate wealth” (Harvey, 2005, p. 73).
Bauman also warns that neoliberalism is the switch from the solid modern managerialism to 
what he calls “mark II,” which changed how management enacted control. Rather than focusing on 
the panoptical “all-surveilling and all-monitoring model of power[,]” management focused on 
“domination through casting the dominated into a state of diffuse uncertainty, percarite, and 
a continuous though haphazard disruption of routine” (Bauman, 2000, p. 203). In other words, the 
turn to neoliberalism in the 1970s was the use of “liquid” modern strategies applied to public and 
private organizations and institutions as a means of purposefully creating the uncertain state: to 
remove the heavy, solid, structure of domination and control through the Panopticon style of 
control and instill a more liquid and fluid form of control, uncertainty, and constant disruption and 
overhaul. 
Harvey also describes that increasing financialization in the United States was indicative of the 
accumulation of wealth in specific financial institutions. These institutions worked to create a system 
that was comprised of four main characteristics: the privatization and commoditization of public 
assets, the financialization of corporations and, in general, financial transactions (because of the 
deregulation of the system), the management of crises, and (consequently) the state redistribution 
of wealth. Specifically for the advertising industry, we can focus on the financialization of 
corporations.
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Effects of Financialization on Corporate America
A radical change occurred in the 1980s when improvement in corporate stock prices became 
synonymous with corporate success. Karen Ho argues that the “takeover” movement of the 1980s 
became the “most important set of events to stimulate the liquidation of corporate America” (Ho, 
2009, p. 129). This movement resulted in the corporation itself becoming a financialized commodity. 
Rather than seeing the stock of the corporation as separate from the company, the trend in 
financialization turned the stock and the corporation into one financialized commodity. As 
a consequence, the overarching belief of the 1980s became that “corporations exist for the sole 
benefit of shareholders, and any attempt to separate shareholder interests from those of the 
corporation was selfish and nonsensical” (Ho, 2009, p. 140). This worldview was drastically different 
from prior decades, in which the stock market, banks, and corporations were perceived as 
independent forces in society. 
These neoliberal policies, combined with the increasing dependence on the stock market and 
investment banks for financing corporate expansion and consumer’s savings accounts, created 
a strong shareholder-focused business environment. The focus on shareholder returns then tied the 
corporation to the value of the stock (as previously described). Consequently, business decisions 
within corporations were made primarily with an eye toward the effect on share price and secondarily 
on the effects such decisions would have on stakeholders within the corporation or the community 
at-large. 
As increases in share price began to be the primary indicator of corporate success, these stock-
price decisions became the focus of corporate policy. Any operating costs seen as superfluous were 
eliminated or controlled as a means of proving the “value” of the company to shareholders. 
As neoliberal policies took hold in the 1980s, further deregulation of the financial industry under the 
Reagan administration allowed banks to expand their offerings to corporations and function more 
like the investment banks. Many of the additional services that were provided by banks centered on 
stock management and share price improvement. The deregulation of these financial markets 
permitted speculative and predatory activity to increase as the turnover rate of financial transactions 
increased. As a sign of this booming market for financial transactions, Harvey points to an amazing 
increase of over 5,000%—5,554% to be exact—in the dollar value of transactions from 1980 to 2001, 
going from only $2.3 billion in 1980 to over $130 billion in 2001. The stripping off and sale of 
corporate assets through mergers and acquisitions was common in the 1980s and 1990s, among 
other activities, and “since brokers get a commission for each transaction, they can maximize their 
incomes by frequent trading on their accounts (a practice known as ‘churning’) no matter whether 
the trades add value to the account or not” (Harvey, 2005, p. 161). Harvey further posits that this 
increase in churning eventually led to the nefarious manipulation of stock prices. 
Additionally, as share price increases became synonymous with corporate success, corporations 
with a new, sole purpose emerged into the marketplace. These corporations were created solely as 
vehicles to acquire stock in other companies or to act as holding companies while newly acquired 
entities were dismantled and their assets were sold off in pieces. Armed with huge amounts of 
investment capital to fund their acquisitions, no publicly traded corporation was safe from becoming 
a take-over target.


















The “takeover” era of the 1980s was the spawn for these corporate “raiders,” who would analyze 
corporations to find potential targets. The companies most at risk were those with undervalued 
stock, excessive assets on their books, or those with management that was not focused on 
shareholder value. In each of these cases, the raiders would acquire a controlling stake in the target 
corporation. The raiders would offer the target’s shareholders a price for their stock that was often 
20% or 30% more than the traded value. These target shareholders, seeing the possibility for quick 
returns on their stock ownership, were usually eager to sell. Upon reaching a controlling ownership 
of the target company, these corporate raiders would put new management in control of the target 
and impose a new company strategy. Most often, this new strategy would consist of pulling as much 
of the value out of the target as possible through asset sales, break-ups of divisions and business 
units, severe cost cutting, severance of employees, and other similar activities.
In order to protect themselves from potential takeovers, corporations in the late 1980s and 
1990s now had to focus more on maintaining the value of their stock price than on simply running 
the business. Companies looked for ways to avoid becoming take-over targets; this included 
expansions of their own businesses through this predatory practice and expansions into unrelated 
areas of business in order to keep excess cash from accumulating on the balance sheet. This advice 
was promoted as a means of not only expanding their businesses, but of allowing corporations to 
diversify, grow, and create “one-stop” shopping companies for their clients (Ho, 2009). Fueled by the 
deregulation of financial markets during the 1980s, companies also used investment capital to 
increase market share in their own industries.
Under the guise of improving efficiencies and better utilizing company assets, Wall Street now 
had the power to determine the fate of corporations and mold the environment of corporate 
America. Wall Street investors and their investment banks not only affected the decisions that were 
made by the corporations in the context of their financial statements and strategy, but they also 
infused the same norms and beliefs that are held inside Wall Street into the ethos of the American 
corporation. Karen Ho’s ethnography finds that investment bankers’ experience as employees 
shaped their beliefs, which are then, in turn, applied to corporate America, beliefs that “instill 
a specific disciplinary model of employee liquidity, insecurity, and workplace relations” and believe 
it is superior model of existence (Ho, 2009, p. 224). As such, Ho finds that these investment bankers 
believe “their key imagined social roles … is to create liquidity, to speedily unlock and allocate 
money (as in the takeover movement) to its ‘best’ use.” Consequently, they are themselves are 
“anxious, difficult experiences of constant downsizing and reinvention, their skills and lives” which 
makes them “more liquid” (Ho, 2009, p. 254). This translates to the belief that “Wall Street’s larger 
social – and market – purpose is also the necessary evil of forcing the average worker to become 
more liquid.” Bauman indicates that the implications of liquid modernity on these corporations and 
financial institutions turn into a cycle that is 
self-propelling and self-accelerating, and (like Max Weber’s perfectionist businessmen 
who longer needed Calvin’s exhortations to repent in order to keep going) the original 
motive – increase efficiency – becomes increasing irrelevant; the fear of losing in the 
competition game, of being overtaken, left behind or put out of business altogether are 
quite sufficient to keep the merging/downsizing game going. 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 123)
Effectively, Ho’s research and analysis of the Wall Street bankers show that they have created a 
“liquid” environment for themselves. While Bauman himself acknowledges the facets of liquid 
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modernity appearing in the financial sector of society, the liquidity that Ho demonstrates is slightly 
different. These two types of “liquidity,” then, clearly demonstrate that there is another level of 
financial market liquidity being applied to corporations in addition to the liquidity of modernity that 
Bauman argues. 
As Harvey explains, “the increasing geographical mobility of capital” forces countries to 
reconsider their “business” climates; this pressure to present a more flexible environment led to their 
adoption of neoliberal policies, which enabled companies like Interpublic, WPP, and others to 
expand their reach across national lines, acquire new agencies, and continue their mergers and 
acquisitions activities within the industry. This perspective is also captured by Bauman, who 
recognizes that one of the greatest indicators of modern liquidity is the fact that “nowadays capital 
travels light” (Bauman, 2000, p. 150). During solid modernity, corporations were focused on “bulk 
and size, and for that reasons, also with boundaries” (Bauman, 2000, p. 58). However, liquid modernity 
allows for money and financial institutions to move freely across borders, especially through 
countries that adopted or are adopting neoliberal policies in order to make their business 
environment more hospitable to those institutions. 
The stock market and Wall Street added another layer of “liquidity” onto the advertising 
industry—a layer above and beyond the inherent liquidity of the advertising industry itself. By 
going public, the agencies and holding companies now had to respond to, and manage, this 
additional paradigm of financial liquidity.
WPP plc: Born into Financialization
Looking beyond Interpublic for the moment, this overall financialization of the advertising 
industry is best exemplified by the rise of WPP plc. This holding company’s growth was approached 
very differently than the other holding companies, mostly because of Sir Martin Sorrell’s comfort 
with investment banking and finance. 
Contrary to the Interpublic story, from its inception WPP had the goal of becoming the largest 
advertising and communications company in the world. WPP’s founder, Martin Sorrell, was born in 
London to a middle-class family right before the end of World War II. Sorrell had the opportunity to 
attend some of the finest schools in the United Kingdom, attending Haberdashers’ Aske’s Boys 
School and later Cambridge University, where he studied Economics. Sorrell’s father was a great 
influence on him, and through his father’s contacts, he sought out a Masters of Business 
Administration from Harvard Business School. With his business and finance background, Sorrell 
entered the workforce as a marketing analyst for Glendinning Associates, a Connecticut-based 
advertising agency. This experience later took Sorrell to James Gulliver Associates, a company that 
was part of the Britain’s Argyll group (Basham, 1996). James Gulliver Associates was focused on 
acquisitions for Argyll, and it was here that Sorrell learned how to acquire companies for himself 
(Martin Sorrell, Executive Profile, 2012). The firm was located in the same building as Saatchi & Saatchi, 
and through the relationship that Gulliver built with Saatchi & Saatchi, Sorrell soon found himself 
hired as the Finance Director for the preeminent advertising agency. 
Charles and Maurice Saatchi entered the advertising industry in 1970. Charles Saatchi had 
worked as a copy editor in another firm, Benton & Bowles, earlier in the 1960s, but had left to create 


















his own firm in 1967. Maurice Saatchi joined him in 1970, creating Saatchi & Saatchi, a full-service 
advertising agency. The agency’s early successes in the British advertising industry led them to 
acquire additional agencies to fuel their growth. The Saatchi brothers had accepted the fact that in 
order to continue to build their advertising empire, they needed someone who could give their 
plans some structure, and so they looked to Sorrell. The only caveat that the Saatchi brothers placed 
on Sorrell’s employment arrangement (as Sorrell described in a Harvard Business School interview 
many years later) is that he was not allowed to get any more public attention than the Saatchi 
brothers were receiving. Operating in the shadows, Sorrell managed to increase exponentially the 
size of Saatchi & Saatchi by purchasing a much larger agency, Compton, which was almost 20-times 
the size of Saatchi & Saatchi at the time (Nordenflycht, 2010). With the 1976 acquisition of Compton, 
a publicly traded company, Saatchi & Saatchi itself began trading on the London exchange. Sorrell 
led the Saatchi brothers into the financialization of their own advertising firm through this 
acquisition.
Saatchi & Saatchi continued to grow under Sorrell’s guidance. During the remainder of the 
1970s, Sorrell began a series of acquisitions for the Saatchi brothers that would make Saatchi & 
Saatchi one of the largest advertising companies in the world. Through his experience of analyzing 
other advertising firms as potential acquisition targets, Sorrell gained valuable industry experience 
that helped to cement Saatchi & Saatchi’s reputation as the expert in the advertising industry in the 
realm of acquisitions. 
Through data-driven analyses of the entire industry, Sorrell came two conclusions: The first was 
that mergers and acquisitions were now part and parcel of the business of advertising. The second 
was that so-called “below-the-line” (BTL) agencies were the most profitable in the industry. BTL 
agencies are associated with direct mail and supermarket product advertising. These agencies can 
be highly profitable because the campaigns they run are short in duration, focused, and target 
a specific audience. BTL agencies covered the “unglamorous” side of the advertising industry. 
Conversely, Above The Line (ATL) agencies are known informally as the agencies that create the 
advertising and branding for clients through mass media such as television, magazines, and 
newspapers. BTL agencies are focused in niche areas, in which they can be more rigidly measured in 
terms of their success or failure. ATL agencies, on the other hand, have a harder time quantifying the 
reach and type of audience a campaign attracts and whether or not that translates to sales.
In 1985, Sorrell and his friend Preston Rabl purchased 30% of the shares of Wired, Plastic Products 
(WPP)—just enough to hold a controlling interest. Sorrell’s experience with Saatchi & Saatchi 
demonstrated that the Saatchi brothers were not interested in BTL agencies, companies in which 
Sorrell saw limitless potential for growth and profits. Therefore, Sorrell would use WPP as a holding 
company to purchase these BTL agencies instead. Sorrell left Saatchi & Saatchi soon thereafter to 
work exclusively for WPP. The existing directors at WPP accepted Sorrell’s strategic plan for the 
company and less than a year later Sorrell was named as the company’s CEO. Soon thereafter, Sorrell 
formally renamed Wired Plastics Products to WPP, plc. 
As previously mentioned, the 1980s had created a new type of “takeover” corporation that would 
be used to acquire other corporations in hostile buyouts. WPP was one of those companies. Sorrell’s 
decision to attain a controlling ownership of WPP was purely to get hold of a vehicle that could be 
used to acquire other agencies. The fact that WPP produced wire baskets and other similar products 
was irrelevant to Sorrell. He only needed a company that was listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
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Sorrell’s initial acquisitions in the BTL sector did not cause a stir in the advertising industry. The 
BTL agencies were the least appreciated companies in advertising, and thus other industry leaders 
were unconcerned that WPP was acquiring a number of these agencies at a rapid rate. Sorrell, 
however, was focused on the financial conditions of these agencies and recognized that they were 
very profitable and had very low expenses. These agencies would eventually become the funding 
centers for Sorrell’s later acquisitions of larger advertising agencies.
Led by Sorrell’s vision, Saatchi & Saatchi and WPP were able to take advantage of the global 
economic climate and, specifically, the climate in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The stagnation of Britain during this time led to the quick adoption of neoliberal policies that 
benefited corporations and banks and the dismantling of the many governmental obligations that 
had been set up after World War II. Portfolio investment became critical in Britain as well as in the 
United States and around the world, pushing financial markets (stock exchanges, in particular) to be 
more dominant. 
One of Sorrell’s favorite acquisition strategies was an “earn out” purchase. In this type of 
transaction, the full purchase price for the stock of the agency was not paid immediately upon the 
closing of the sale. Rather, some percentage of the price (often 50% or more) would be payable over 
a period of years (usually five or more) and was made contingent upon the agency meeting certain 
performance targets set by the buyer. This type of earn-out transaction is often used in the purchase 
of on-going businesses. Additionally, rather than acquiring large amounts of debt in order to finance 
the transaction, Sorrell would issue new equity (or ownership) in the target agency—usually to the 
employees and existing equity owners —as part of the purchase price. The net result of this strategy 
was that the equity ownership of the target agency expanded, but the acquiring company did not 
have to saddle itself with massive debt. This type of transaction “financing” was more common in the 
U.K. than in the United States (Nordenflycht, 2010).
The combination of transaction financing strategies employed by Sorrell while at Saatchi & 
Saatchi and later at WPP was a game-changer for the advertising industry. The extended earn-out 
periods helped guarantee that the employees and owners who were the lifeline of the agency 
stayed put and created ties to the agency. After the acquisition was complete, the “rights issues,” or 
shares that were issued to employees and equity owners, kept employees and owners vested in the 
company and helped prevent turnover of key personnel, thereby mitigating one of the greatest 
risks in any agency acquisition, the risk of talent leaving the agency. This same combination of 
acquisition techniques would help Sorrell, through WPP, to purchase one of the largest American 
advertising companies in a transaction that set records for its value.
Prior to the widespread use of this strategy, the concern in any merger or acquisition centered 
on keeping the talent that made up the firm. Since the “assets” of the agency were not the building 
or the equipment inside, but rather the account managers, planners, and Creatives, there had to be 
a strategy for keeping them post-acquisition. Sorrell used this strategy continuously to ensure that 
the talent he needed in the companies he was acquiring would remain and continue to produce for 
him. Sorrell tested this methodology with the acquisition of his first full-service agency, JWT.
J. Walter Thompson (JWT) was a venerable advertising agency in the United States. It was one of 
the older agencies still around in the1980s. (It had been founded in the 1860s.) The agency had 
grown throughout its first 50 years and had expanded into many foreign markets in the 1920s and 


















1930s. By 1969, JWT joined the few advertising agencies that went public during the 1960s. JWT 
continued to grow throughout the 1970s, acquiring additional agencies and branching off into 
other sectors of the industry, including public relations. By 1980, the company was reorganized to 
create the JWT Group, Inc., with J. Walter Thompson (the advertising agency) as a subsidiary of the 
newly formed holding company (Interview With Martin Sorrell, 2012). By 1987, JWT was a giant in the 
industry; however, this behemoth was about to be acquired by a smaller upstart from the U.K.
By the end of his second year at WPP, Sorrell had already proven his financial acumen. In Sorrell’s 
first two years, WPP had acquired 15 agencies in total, prior to its attempt to acquire JWT. Moreover, 
the share price of WPP had risen from $0.50 to $18 per share. This increase in share price was critical 
for Sorrell, as he needed WPP’s “value” to be higher. If Sorrell was going to attempt to purchase JWT, 
first he needed to maximize the value of WPP in order to secure financing for the purchase. Second, 
WPP needed to present a strong financial front so that it would not become a takeover target itself 
after the JWT transaction was over. Third, Sorrell needed WPP’s share price to rise because he would 
need not only the cash from his existing agencies to fund this JWT purchase, but he would also need 
to borrow from the financial markets, and the investment banks liked to see high share prices.
JWT had become a target for Sorrell when management at the agency made some mistakes that 
drastically lowered share prices. There was an initial buyout proposal that did not get approved by 
shareholders, and then several top executives were sacked. A short time later, the agency started to 
lose clients, the most significant being Burger King (Tungate, 2007). Other clients started to give 
parts of their business to other agencies, cautiously aware that JWT was in trouble but uncertain of 
what that meant for the company. In 1986, the JWT Group had only a 4% profit margin when, in the 
rest of the industry, the average profit margin was more than double that amount. Additionally, the 
other agency under the group, Hill & Knowlton, a public relations firm, posted no profits at all. As 
a result of this performance and the miscues, JWT’s stock price fell from $40 down to $27 per share 
(Harper, 1987). Don Johnston, Chairman of the Board and CEO at JWT, tried to calm investor fears 
that the company was headed into a nose-dive, but the reality of JWT’s financial straits was 
irrefutable: JWT’s profits had fallen from a record year of $19.4 million in posted earnings in 1985 to 
$5.9 million in 1986. 
These financial indicators signaled to WPP and others that JWT was in a vulnerable position and 
was a likely candidate to be taken over. The financial markets were aware of this and the industry 
was prepared to see how JWT would weather 1987. Already, some were whispering about financial 
improprieties in the company and the successor apparent to Don Johnston had resigned after he 
presented a bid to take the company private. The only remaining question was, what company 
would attempt the takeover and at what price?
Sorrell’s previous experience in London’s financial center (the City) had given him access to 
investment bankers and a ready pool of financing. While at Saatchi & Saatchi, Sorrell had maintained 
a good reputation with the City through the profitable acquisitions. So when he struck out on his 
own, Sorrell took advantage of the relationships he had created. 
With the long history, positive reputation, and valuable goodwill that JWT had in the United 
States, Sorrell was convinced that the agency could be profitable if he could only rectify its financial 
troubles. But first Sorrell had to acquire the company.
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Sorrell anonymously set up a company called Tiptree that he used to acquire stock of JWT Group, 
the holding company of JWT. At the same time, WPP also started to acquire JWT Group stock. With 
the financial backing of a London merchant bank named Samuel Montagu, Tiptree took on more 
debt in order acquire more shares of JWT Group. Citicorp also participated, with both banks pledging 
loans of up to $260 million to finance the purchase of JWT. By the time Sorrell was ready to tender 
his offer for JWT Group, and before any other purchasers could strike, Tiptree and WPP had acquired 
4.8% of JWT’s stock. Sorrell’s strategy of quietly acquiring additional stock of JWT in order to gain 
some control over the company is aligned with Bauman’s characterization of liquid modernity and 
of those who gain, manage, and control: “[P]eople who move and act faster, who come nearest to 
the momentariness of movement, are now the people who rule” (Bauman, 2000, p. 119).
On June 10, 1987, WPP made an unsolicited offer (a so-called “hostile takeover”) of $45 per share 
for JWT. This was $3.50 per share more than the highest price at which the stock had ever traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Because the offer was unsolicited—JWT had not agreed with WPP 
beforehand as to the price per share—the offer was also public. JWT immediately declined. Not only 
was the offer unsolicited, but JWT Group did not know WPP, nor could it surmise what type autonomy 
or changes the purchase by WPP would entail. Don Johnston, CEO of JWT, went seeking a “white 
knight”; i.e., a known and trusted company that would purchase JWT Group for a similar price to 
protect JWT against the hostile takeover by WPP. At the same time, JWT’s executives considered an 
internal management buyout, whereby the management department would raise capital (through 
bank loans, personal loans, or other financing) to purchase back the stock and “privatize” the 
company. The executives would then own the agency, rather than shareholders. However, JWT 
could not arrange for such a buyout.
WPP offered a higher tender price for the stock of JWT Group because, through his careful study 
of the company, Sorrell had come to the conclusion that the stock price was underperforming; that 
is, the stock market was not valuing the company based on its real assets in the financial statements 
or the brand’s potential. Sorrell also believed that the management at JWT was not maximizing the 
value of the company. Additionally, for WPP, the acquisition of JWT would be a coup, as the purchase 
would solidify WPP as a significant player in the advertising industry in the U.K. and in the United 
States.
With its initial offer of $45 per share declined, WPP returned with a second offer at $50.50 per 
share. However, by now the stock of JWT Group was “in play.” Arbitrageurs who were anticipating the 
acquisition began to buy up shares of JWT in the hopes of cashing out during the transaction and 
making a fast profit. As more of these shareholders purchased JWT shares, the stock price rose. 
Because of the stock price increase, WPP now had to offer an even higher price per share for the 
takeover to keep the premium to JWT shareholders intact, thus making the WPP offer the only 
available choice. WPP was obligated to offer this new higher price because the belief was that 
shareholder value was the supreme governing philosophy in the purchase: Since shareholders had 
to benefit financially, the higher price was necessary. Without agreement from the shareholders to 
sell, WPP could not have acquired the company. The JWT Group board of directors, focusing on their 
fiduciary duty to maximize “shareholder value,” had no other choice but to accept the offer, because 
it was now in the best interests of the shareholders to sell their shares to WPP.
On June 17th, one week after the initial bid for the company, JWT’s board of directors accepted 
the WPP offer of $55.50 per share, finally closing the chapter on the first hostile takeover of an 


















advertising agency. Until the 1987 acquisition of JWT Group by WPP, there was a widely held belief 
that hostile takeovers, which were occurring in virtually every other sector of the market, would not 
occur in the services industry, including advertising. It was presumed that a hostile takeover of a 
service company would lead to a mass exodus of the talent (i.e., creative and management 
employees), which effectively was the value of the target company. However, WPP’s takeover of J. 
Walter Thompson proved that this was not the case (Leslie, 1995). The staff at JWT remained after 
the WPP transaction, despite the negative atmosphere engendered in the acquisition. 
It can be argued that WPP paid too much for JWT because the stock price had surged during the 
weeklong period during which JWT’s board contemplated WPP’s offer. However, because WPP came 
back with ever-higher offers as arbitrageurs took advantage of the delay, it seemed as though WPP 
did not want to lose the opportunity to acquire JWT Group, regardless of the cost. Relying on two 
strategies, WPP maintained the façade that it was the right purchase at the right price: First, the 
earn-out structure of the deal was advantageous for WPP; and second, Sorrell immediately set out 
to gain control over JWT’s financials by installing his own financial directors at the agencies that 
comprised the group. As the price of the JWT stock climbed pre-purchase, it seemed that Sorrell 
could not walk away from the deal; he had to make it happen, regardless of the cost to WPP. This 
purchase would give WPP a seat at the table among the world’s largest advertising agencies. 
The total cost for WPP’s acquisition of JWT Group turned out to be $556 million. Luckily, as Sorrell 
and his new finance directors reviewed the financial health of JWT, they discovered a very valuable 
but expendable piece of property that JWT owned in Tokyo, Japan, which WPP was able to sell 
quickly for $100 million. With this cash, WPP paid off some of the investment bank debt it had 
incurred in financing the acquisition. Finding a building that could immediately offset 18% of the 
total acquisition cost demonstrated that Sorrell was correct in his fundamental assessment of JWT 
Group: The stock price (and, therefore, the company) had been undervalued, and WPP could now 
recoup that value by implementing new strategies to maximize corporate efficiencies to bring 
about a rise in shareholder value.
In subsequent years, Sorrell repeated this strategy of identifying financially weaker agencies and 
acquiring them through hostile takeovers. Karen Ho argues that the 1980s were “revolutionary” not 
only because of the new focus on “shareholder value” in publicly held corporations, but also because 
of the “hostility” in the transactions. Bauman stresses that this is characteristic of the liquid modern 
society, as those who hold money or capital:
travels hopefully, counting on brief profitable adventures and confident that there will 
be no shortage of them or of partners to share them with. Capital can travel fast and travel 
light and its lightness and motility have turned into the paramount source of uncertainty 
for all the rest... and how this creates the foundation for the domination of society. (Bauman, 
2000, p. 122)
WPP’s experience in the 1980s proves what Bauman and Ho postulate: If you have the capital 
and the financial liquidity to grow and create more wealth, then you can dominate over your 
competitors and your industry, regardless of their acquiescence.
As stated previously, the acquisition of JWT Group was not the end of Sorrell’s dramatic 
acquisition plans for WPP. As the end of the decade neared, WPP was betting that Sorrell’s 
connections with investment bankers, plus the strength and success of the JWT acquisition, would 
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now give WPP even greater access to capital markets to fund other, larger purchases. The company 
was not mistaken in its belief.
In 1988, the Ogilvy Group, a holding company for the Ogilvy advertising agency and other 
marketing and public relations companies, was in a similar situation as JWT: It had lower profit 
margins than its peers (Rothenberg, March 30, 1989). Some Ogilvy clients had started to put major 
lines of business (i.e., client work) up for review, and rumors of a takeover by another agency began 
to circulate in the fall of 1988. However, there was no clear indicator as to who would step up to the 
plate to make an offer. In January 1989, the Ogilvy Group decided to put certain corporate 
governance provisions into place in an effort to fend off a hostile takeover. In the world of corporate 
finance, these provisions are referred to as “poison pills.”
The Ogilvy Group’s poison pill was a provision that if any sole investor not approved by the 
board of directors were to acquire 20% or more of the company’s issued and outstanding stock, 
then the remaining shareholders could acquire more shares of the company stock at 50% of the 
current trading price. This tactic would dilute the overall stock price and the new investor’s 
percentage of ownership in the company (Rothenberg, January 13, 1989). On the news of this 
poison pill, Ogilvy’s share price dropped, as expected. 
However, rumors of a possible takeover continued to swirl through the spring of 1989. Finally, 
on May 1st, Ogilvy chairman Kenneth Roman indicated that he had received a bid for the 
company—$45 per share from WPP. Roman assured the public that the bid was simply the beginning 
of a conversation. On that date, the price of Ogilvy Group stock was $32 per share, so the WPP offer 
was a 40% premium on the original price (Arndt, 1989). Roman also assured the public that WPP did 
not have adequate financing for the purchase.
Despite Roman’s commentary, the stock price rose to $49.13, with the expectation that either 
WPP would repeat their JWT strategy or that another agency would put an offer on the table. Similar 
to what JWT Group had considered, the Ogilvy management team considered an internal 
management buyout but could not arrange for it. Also, just as in the JWT transaction, the Ogilvy 
executives waited to see if a “white knight” would appear. They were hoping that Dentsu, the 
Japanese advertising holding company, would make an offer, but that didn’t happen. WPP raised 
the offer to $50 a share, but the board of directors still wouldn’t accept. Finally, when WPP raised its 
offer to $54, the board could not refuse the price, again bound by the ideals of shareholder value 
(never mind whether or not it was good policy for the advertising industry or the internal 
management teams). The same banks, Montagu and Citicorp, helped Sorrell finance this deal, along 
with a third bank, Midland Bank Plc.5
It was another coup for WPP to acquire Ogilvy and so soon after the JWT purchase. WPP promised 
the Ogilvy Group that its management team could continue in place and had even convinced David 
Ogilvy, the founder of the agency, to join the board through the transition (Tungate, 2007). This was 
another major success for WPP, because David Ogilvy had very publicly expressed contempt for 
Martin Sorrell, seeing him as a financier rather than an “ad man.” Ironically, in 1980, JWT had offered 
the Ogilvy Group the opportunity to merge, but David Ogilvy turned down the offer because he 
wanted to keep the agency independent and wanted to preserve his executive management. Had 
5 It is worthy to note that the banks themselves made $8.3 million off this deal with Ogilvy.


















JWT and the Ogilvy Group merged in 1980, WPP most likely would not have been able to purchase 
what would have been a company valued at $6 billion post-merger (Lazarus, 1989).
By acquiring these two large agencies, Sorrell made WPP one of the largest advertising holding 
companies in the world in just a few short years. However, now having leveraged WPP to the hilt 
with debt in order to make these acquisitions, Sorrell was now beholden to his new creditors and 
shareholders to make WPP as profitable as possible as quickly as possible while maintaining the 
roster of clients it had acquired through these purchases. 
Sorrell’s style of purchasing targeted agencies through leveraged buyouts forced a form of 
financial discipline onto the holding company. Karen Ho points out in her ethnography that one of 
her informants answered why these leveraged buyouts were beneficial for the corporations—
because management “have to pay the interest expense, they trim out all of the fat [excessive costs]” 
(Ho, 2009, p. 157). WPP’s buyouts and guarantees to keep the existing management on board were 
predicated on the assumption that the newly acquired company could be held to a higher level of 
financial discipline than before. Keep in mind, the reason Sorrell had identified JWT and Ogilvy as 
attractive targets for takeover was because of his perception that the companies did not have 
financial discipline and that he could force it on them post-acquisition, exacting efficiencies and 
even reductions in staff if necessary. 
This style of management and acquisition handling was the epitome of the financialization of 
the advertising industry. The hostile takeovers of the JWT Group and the Ogilvy Group showed the 
industry that it was not necessary to have a gentleman’s agreement in order to quietly merge 
agencies together. WPP demonstrated that these advertising holding companies were not just 
vehicles for growth (as Interpublic had been), but rather strategic, financially centric organizations 
focused on dominating the advertising market. WPP now was showing that strategic financial 
transactions could secure a position in the rapidly consolidating world of advertising. 
But while Interpublic chafed at the environment created by financialization—the constant 
struggle between creative advancement and increasing shareholder value—WPP seemed to thrive 
on it. Sorrell believed that the best strategy for the advertising industry was to have this dichotomy 
in the organization: It was necessary to have financial managers and advertising business managers 
at odds with each other because the agency had to be good at creating and managing the 
campaigns and clients—not in finance (Rothenberg, May 16, 1989). Sorrell’s proposition was that 
through WPP he could create a structure in which agencies could do what they are best at doing—
the creative advertising part of the business—and he and his WPP staff would be responsible for the 
financial aspects of the company. 
The Role of the Holding Company in the Environment of Financialization
The financialization and consolidation of the advertising industry during the 1980s and 1990s 
mirrored the same consolidation and financialization of their corporate clients (Nordenflycht, 2010). 
As a corporation grew in size, it would seek advertising agencies that were similar in size to handle 
their advertising needs. This held true whether the advertising agency was part of a holding 
company or not. So, then, what role did the holding company have if it was not attracting more or 
bigger clients?
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The answer to this question seems to be in the role of the advertising holding company as a 
“financial intermediation opportunity” that holding companies perform on behalf of their agencies. 
It’s the holding company’s access to equity markets that allows it to exist; without it, agency 
management would have to perform this function, carry the additional burden of knowing how to 
speak to the financial markets, and handle the expectations that these markets engendered. By 
shifting these responsibilities to the holding company, it allows the agency management to focus 
solely on the business of advertising.
Furthermore, for agency partners and other owners who are interested in divesting their 
ownership, the holding company performs this critical function: It provides a way to make ownership 
liquid. Thus, the true value of the holding company is less on the creative or client side of the 
equation, but significantly more on the side of financial expertise and access to capital markets 
(Nordenflycht, 2010). Sorrell clearly confirmed this theory through his successes at both Saatchi & 
Saatchi and WPP. He demonstrated the value of the mega-holding company and created a “financial” 
brand that signals to the markets a given type and level of leadership and financial discipline. This 
financial brand, therefore, promises the markets that the company will be profitable and will 
maximize the return on investment in their assets. This is the standard definition of the source of 
stock value for a holding company. 
But in addition to creating this financial brand, the advertising holding company also has to be 
successful in functioning as a “financial intermediary” for the advertising agencies it holds. Interpublic 
initially could not provide this function with Marion Harper at the helm; the company grew unwieldy 
and the board of directors lost confidence in Harper’s ability to manage the holding company. Even 
WPP struggled with this role in the aftermath of some of its larger acquisitions. 
WPP’s Crisis in Financialization
While the small recession in the early 1980s had not affected the advertising industry (which 
continued to grow at 10% and 12% per annum for 1982 and 1981 (What Happened To Advertising, 
2012) Sorrell could not predict the recession that started at the end of 1990. By then, a year and a 
half after the purchase of the Ogilvy Group, WPP announced it would not pay a dividend owed to 
shareholders in January 1991. With the slowing economy and lagging advertising sales, WPP could 
barely pay the debt obligations it acquired in order to purchase JWT and Ogilvy. The bankers that 
had helped Sorrell purchase Ogilvy were putting pressure on WPP. Sorrell refused any suggestion to 
sell pieces of his empire, conceding only the possibility of the sale of Scali, McCabe, Sloves, an 
agency that had lost a number of clients after an ad they create d for Volvo resulted in fines for false 
and misleading advertising from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (Foltz, December 24, 1990).
While Sorrell’s weapon of choice was the hostile takeover, he was not a corporate raider in the 
standard sense of the term. Unlike most raiders, he did not sell off the agencies he acquired in 
pieces. As such, he failed to incur the benefits that corporate takeovers generally provide other 
corporate raiders, such as the reutilization of underappreciated assets or the selling of an agency in 
piecemeal (Ho, 2009). The closest he came to benefiting in this manner was the sale of the JWT 
Group’s Tokyo building, which offset some of the debt that WPP incurred in the JWT transaction. Yet 
because many of his purchases had been more expensive than he had anticipated, Sorrell (through 
WPP) was left with the debt burden brought on by these the higher purchase prices. 


















By the spring of 1991, Sorrell was being pressured to add a new member to WPP’s board of 
directors to represent the banks (Foltz, 1991). The banks were concerned about Sorrell’s power over 
WPP and some of his proposed debt-restructuring offers. Additionally, rumors were still swirling 
that Ogilvy’s management was attempting to get help from investment bankers to pursue their own 
buyout from WPP. The banks pressured Sorrell into taking more financial control over the agencies 
and pushing more cost cutting measures. The situation at WPP was dire, and the share price fell to 
less than a $1 per share.
By the end of July 1991, WPP’s shareholders and its investment bank creditors seemed to have 
come to an agreement over a debt restructuring that approached $1 billion in value, with most of 
the debt stemming from the purchase of the Ogilvy Group. The debt the banks held would be 
converted to stock, making the banks majority shareholders, which would give them decision-
making power in the company. Ironically, in this heavily financialized company, the existing 
shareholders were complaining about the preference that Sorrell and WPP were now showing for 
the banks by converting their debt into stock. Institutional shareholders, like Fidelity, initially 
opposed this proposal, arguing that the deal favored the banks over the shareholders. The 
structuring of the debt created two types of stockholders, which the company felt was the only way 
it could move forward without altering the shape of WPP (Reuters, 1992). In 1992, Sorrell hired Paul 
Richardson to be the holding company’s finance director. Pushed by the expectations set by the 
banks that now had equity control over WPP, Sorrell and Richardson pushed to restructure 
compensation plans across all its agencies, imposing stricter margin targets and implementing 
more flexible hiring practices. Under this new régime, agencies would hire staff through consultants 
or contractors, which would allow for more flexibility in terms of increasing or decreasing personnel 
levels based on demand for their services and the variability of their costs. 
In an interview marking the 20th anniversary of the formation of WPP, Sorrell admits that the 
way in which he purchased Ogilvy was his biggest mistake. Sorrell stated that he should have 
purchased Ogilvy in a split debt-equity ratio of 50/50 in order to give WPP breathing room when the 
recession started shortly thereafter (Tungate, 2007). However, in the midst of the offer, Sorrell 
became caught up in the pricing wars that were taking place in the markets, which led the stock 
price to climb much higher than he had anticipated. Sorrell recognized that the purchase of Ogilvy 
was more than just the expansion of WPP. Effectively, WPP was falling into the liquidity not only of 
the advertising industry, but also of the financial industry as described by Bauman:
The tendency becomes self-propelling and self-accelerating and … The original motive 
– increased efficiency – becomes increasingly irrelevant; the fear of losing in the 
competition game, of being overtaken, left behind or put out of business altogether are 
quiet sufficient to keep the merging/downsizing game going. The game becomes, 
increasingly, its own purpose and its own reward; or, rather, the game no longer needs 
a purpose if staying in the game is its only reward. (Bauman, 2000, p. 123)
After the setbacks of 1991, WPP did not acquire any more companies for the remainder of the 
1990s; rather, Sorrell focused inward on WPP’s structure and began creating a more streamlined 
organization. In 1993, Sorrell rolled out his Leadership Equity Acquisition Plan (“LEAP”), a program 
that would tie the bonus and performance pay of agency executives to their stock ownership over 
a longer period of time than was normal for the industry. He locked his executives into a minimum 
four-year agreement, with salary and incentives based on the future performance of the company. 
Sorrell allowed his agency executives to focus on acquiring new clients to replace the ones they had 
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lost during the acquisitions period and during the recession. Simultaneously, Sorrell focused on 
creating a range of products that all WPP agencies could offer their clients through the holding 
company, from the traditional creative agency to digital development and media buying. In 1997, 
Mindshare, the first centralized media-focused agency in the industry at the holding company level, 
was created. 
Sorrell remained internally focused on organizing and expanding WPP into the markets of 
digital development and media buying. It was during this “introspective” phase in WPP’s corporate 
development that Interpublic leapfrogged over WPP and grew to be the largest advertising holding 
company. At the same time, during the mid-to-late 1990s, the rest of the industry continued on with 
their mergers and acquisitions, creating other holding companies in the process, such as Omnicom, 
Publicis, Havas, and other smaller agency networks. 
As WPP improved its financial position throughout the 1990s, it was finally considered stable 
enough to attempt another large acquisition. By 2000, Sorrell focused again on another venerable 
brand in the United States, Young & Rubicam, which had become a global icon for independent and 
clever advertising. The purchase cost $4.7 billion in stock. This made WPP the largest holding 
company once again, ahead of Interpublic. By taking most of the 1990s to focus on the structure of 
the agencies, the different offerings of the holding company, and the streamlining of operations, 
WPP now had a balance sheet that was strong enough to withstand any new acquisition. On the 
other side of the Atlantic Ocean, however, the ground under the feet of Interpublic was starting to 
shake, leading to a decade of crisis, restructuring, and further liquidity.
Interpublic Crisis of Financialization
While WPP found itself in crisis because of its desire to grow and expand quickly and through 
leveraged purchases of JWT and Ogilvy, whose debt brought the company to its knees at a rapid 
pace, Interpublic faced a different type of financialization crisis. Interpublic found itself facing 
a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation in the post-Enron world of the 2000s. Due to 
issues it faced with proper accounting of revenue, Interpublic found itself facing the consequences 
of unbridled growth and its push for higher profit margins to match Wall Street expectations. 
In the late 1980s, Interpublic found itself comprised of two major networks and a smaller number 
of agencies. It also found itself behind the times. The other major advertising holding companies—
WPP and Saatchi & Saatchi—had already purchased all of the significant and major advertising 
companies that mattered (Lazarus, May 22, 1989). Interpublic had tried to make a bid for the Ogilvy 
Group, but was not able to reach agreement with the agency. Philip Geier, president of Interpublic, 
needed to acquire agencies to maintain the growth that Wall Street expected to see during the 
recession of the early 1990s. 
Interpublic had ridden the wave of the industry growth in the 1980s and saw the creation of 
other advertising holding companies in its shadow. At the start of the decade, Interpublic was seen 
as a visionary for having consolidated its corporate functions at the holding company level early on. 
However, because the trend in the 1980s was to acquire as many agencies as possible, Interpublic 
had to grow, both to show that it was not a target for another holding company and also to maintain 
the implicit promises to shareholders that management was maximizing shareholder value through 


















their acquisitions and mergers. The 1990 recession had a deep impact on Interpublic’s organic 
growth and profit margins. Europe, which was the source of approximately 65% of revenues for the 
whole company, was especially hard hit by the economic downturn (Histories, 1998). But despite 
these setbacks, Geier presented the health of Interpublic as stable and equivalent to General Electric: 
“Our annual compound growth of revenue is approximately 14% over the last 20 years, and our 
compounded growth share increases 24% over the last 20 years” (Rothenberg, December 15, 2000).
When it came to acquisition strategy, while WPP went for size, Interpublic seemed to go for 
quantity. Geier delivered new agencies into the Interpublic fold; approximately 400 new firms were 
purchased during the 1990s. But critics were not kind to the advertising holding companies of that 
era, as many commentators pointed out the negative impact that Wall Street had on the publicly 
traded advertising holding companies:
Motivating the relentless consolidation was a need to show top-line growth, which 
elevated stock prices, through acquisitions, particularly as organic growth slowed. Too 
many of the deals had little to do with client needs or protection from business cycles, and 
almost everything to do with Wall Street. (Donaton, 2003)
Geier’s focus was to show growth for Interpublic’s shareholders, and he did, but at what cost? 
Bauman brings up the effects of “liquidity” when it begins to affect “rational choices.” As  he 
worries, “the advent of instantaneity ushers human culture and ethics into unmapped and 
unexplored territory, where most of the learned habits of coping with the business of life have lost 
their utility and sense … and present day men and women differ from their fathers and mother by 
living in a present ‘which wants to forget the past and no longer seems to believe in the future’” 
(Bauman, 2000, p. 128). Some 30 years after the first financial scandal that Interpublic barely escaped, 
the company was once again thrown into severe financial turbulence. 
After the True North Communications acquisition in 1998, Interpublic had a series of post-
merger client defections, as True North clients that had a conflict or were uncomfortable with the 
merger left the roster. Geier and his CFO, Eugene Beard, retired at the end of 2000, prior to the “dot.
com” crash of 2001 that brought about new regulations from the SEC. Additionally, merger activity 
had created very high restructuring and severance costs that now had to be expensed. Circa May-
June 2001, Interpublic’s new CFO, Sean Orr, had requested that his staff collect these costs so they 
could be stated on the books (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Salvatore LaGreca and Brian 
Watson, 2008). The McCann-Erickson CFO for the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region took 
this opportunity and requested his country CFOs clear up some accounting imbalances that had 
been identified during the prior four years. This cleanup of accounts dating back to 1996 was to be 
classified as part of the restructuring expenses and costs. Interpublic received the request from 
McCann-Erickson for approval to do this, but the holding company Finance department indicated 
that such balance sheet entries would violate generally accepted accounting procedures (“GAAP”), 
so the agency was not allowed to expense the losses as part of the restructuring costs.
These losses were part of a larger system of expenses that the McCann-Erickson agencies 
incurred regularly. McCann-Erickson had hundreds of agencies around the world and, due to 
a variety of operational scenarios, these agencies often had to charge each other for expenses that 
were incurred for services or loans. These “charge-backs” were then supposed to be paid through 
intra-company invoices so the amounts due could be reconciled. From 1996 on, these credits and 
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debits had remained un-reconciled, in part due to the pressures at both the global McCann level 
and at the Interpublic level to meet financial goals that were to be presented to the financial 
analysts—and the rest of Wall Street. 
Because each charge-back transaction was small, the totality of the discrepancies was not 
immediately known. By 2000, the new McCann-Erickson CFO of EMEA decided to reconcile these 
accounts in an attempt to understand the overall cost to his balances sheets. He  found it nearly 
impossible to get all of the information he needed because of the lack of response from the local 
agencies and due to lack of documentation for the transactions. Once this information was escalated 
to the CFO at Interpublic, McCann-Erickson EMEA was asking for estimated relief of approximately 
$40 million. Additionally, the McCann-Erickson CFOs were requesting release from meeting any 
financial goals that had been set for that year and to forgive any penalties against executive 
management bonuses for bringing these costs to light, since the problems had been incurred prior 
to the tenures of these CFOs. 
Interpublic refused this request, and the accounting discrepancies lay buried for a few more 
years. Finally, in 2002, Interpublic and its outside accountant/auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) took a deeper look at the accounting situation in EMEA and the rest of the geographic regions 
in order to understand the complete financial impact of these un-reconciled intra-company 
accounts. Before PwC even began its investigation, the company had been aware of the problem; a 
local PwC team had already alerted its global bosses of Interpublic’s issues in prior years. When the 
auditors were able to complete their review, the total amount of the accounting discrepancies was 
so large that Interpublic had to restate its 2001 financial statement.
Initially, Interpublic only restated approximately $60 million in earnings, but as the detailed 
inspection of its financial records dove deeper, that amount kept growing. Most of the accounting 
discrepancies were attributed to McCann-Erickson accounting imbalances on intra-company 
chargebacks from EMEA. Interpublic’s first disclosure in August 2002 of $60 million in restatements 
was quickly followed by an amendment in October 2002 in which the discrepancies were valued at 
$120 million. Within a month, November 2002, the amount of Interpublic’s restatement had reached 
$181.3 million (Ives, 2002). Additionally, Interpublic fired McCann-Erickson’s global CFO, as well as its 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) in the wake of the investigation that showed these officers had been 
informed by the current and prior CFOs for the EMEA region that the intra-company accounts were 
not being paid and that the amounts were not being properly accrued. What was at first an “informal” 
probe by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had now turned into a formal 
investigation by the start of January 2003 (Elliott, 2003).
This disaster at Interpublic was a classic consequence of pursuing the type of “rational choice” 
that Bauman describes as the fallacy in the liquid modern world: the world chasing instantaneity. 
He argues that this era forces people to “to pursue gratification while avoiding the consequences, 
and particularly the responsibilities which such consequences may imply” (Bauman, 2000, p. 128). 
The McCann-Erickson CFOs had been pushed to create the illusion that the agency was doing better 
financially than it actually was because Interpublic wanted to present those numbers to shareholders 
and financial analysts.
The importance of shareholders and financial analysts in the strategic decisions and presentation 
of financial statements was the driving force behind the hidden accounting at McCann-Erickson. 


















Consequently, Interpublic and the McCann agency were both saddled with these accounting 
imbalances due to the pressures of showing profit and growth. Additionally, the spate of 
acquisitions—all 400 of them—had left Interpublic vulnerable to unforeseen financial problems, 
aside from the costs of acquiring all those agencies. 
Because the financial markets became the predominate force for corporations to acquire the 
capital needed to expand their business, investment banks grew in prominence. These firms 
benefited from all the merger and acquisitions activity that Interpublic partook, earning fees 
through each transaction. Consequently, conflicts of interest began to arise. Investment bank 
analysts would give positive reviews on companies in order to guarantee credit-worthiness to these 
companies’ stocks or loans. At the same time, these analysts were working for the same investment 
banks that were financing the mergers, acquisitions, and initial public offerings (IPOs) of these 
companies. The strong analyst reports increased the confidence of shareholders and lenders who 
would then embark on a transaction with financing provided by the same investment back (Davis, 
2009).
This inherently conflicted role of the investment banks had been made possible through the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, a Depression-era law that prohibited banks from having both 
commercial and consumer banking operations in the same company. After the Glass-Steagall Act 
was repealed in 1999, banks had become the largest corporations in the world and contributed 
through their new investment instruments and products to the stock market bubble that crashed in 
2001. Merger and acquisition levels in all sectors of the economy increased, and the advertising 
industry was following in step with the environment at the time. The banks benefited from this 
generation of merger and acquisition fees and the corporate executives benefited personally from 
the increase stock prices. Since corporate compensation was tied to stock price performance, the 
prevailing logic among executives at companies was to do whatever Wall Street required in order to 
obtain favorable analyst ratings and increases in stock price. Through this spiral cycle of 
financialization, shareholder “value” was maintained or increased as the stock increased in price. The 
system was set up to feed into itself and maintain the illusion of growth and prosperity (Harvey, 
2005). The financialization of any product became easier because of new technology that could 
gather information and the ease at which trading these securities and assets could be done in the 
markets. Commercial paper (bonds) and stocks were just some of the larger group of options 
available to investors. During this heyday of financialization, savvy investors could also snap up 
insurance contracts for the terminally ill, bundled home mortgages, and even the future royalties for 
rock and roll musicians. Companies that had not yet even developed a product were able to declare 
their IPOs with investors eagerly awaiting their stocks.
The financial climate changed with the corporate financial scandals at Enron and WorldCom, 
along with mutual fund industry scandals that affected many of the investment banks. The result of 
this explosive and unregulated market was seen in the crash of 2001. Corporate IPOs began to 
dramatically lose value when the product was never launched or when the financial statements did 
not reflect the accurate financial situation of the company. The disastrous crashes of the Enron, 
WorldCom, Pets.com, and other corporate “giants” made investors question whether the stock analysts 
at the investment banks had any rational basis for their valuations. In 2002, the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
was passed to impose a new regimen of transparency and completeness in corporate financial 
reporting. Against this sobering backdrop, many companies started to clean up their financial houses. 
Interpublic was among those that took this opportunity to rectify their past mistakes.
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At Interpublic, a new board of directors had been elected to comply with the (more transparent 
and independent) governance policies that were being applied to many corporations in the post-
Enron and post-Sarbanes Oxley Act environment. Formerly, the board had been comprised of the 
heads of the operating companies under Interpublic and included well-known executives such as 
David Bell (True North) and Frank Lowe (Lowe Worldwide). By 2002, new CEO (and former McCann 
CEO) John Dooner made the announcement that a new independent board would be elected6 
(Interpublic Group of Companies, 2002) and Interpublic became the first company in the industry to 
have a board comprised of outside directors, except for the CEO and CFO.
John Dooner did not last long in his position as CEO of Interpublic due to the increasing size of 
the financial irregularities. The new Interpublic board of directors asked David Bell, former president 
of True North Communications, to lead Interpublic. Bell had been part of the Bozell group since 1975 
and had held both the positions of President or CEO during his tenure there. Because of his successes 
at Bozell and True North, the board of directors at Interpublic felt that Bell was the right person to 
steer the holding company through the financial scandal that was unfolding.
As a signal of the company’s newfound transparency, David Bell used his “cover letter” for the 
2002 Annual Report to explain to shareholders what happened during the first restatement:
Some of the challenges we faced reflected the harsh business environment. Some, 
notably the company’s unfortunate foray into venue ownership, were the vestige of 
acquisitions made in the exuberance of the nineties boom. Others were self-inflicted, such 
as the erosion of cost disciplines at a number of our companies, and the internal accounting 
errors at McCann in Europe, which we at Interpublic discovered and forcefully addressed. 
(Interpublic Group of Companies, 2002)
Bell’s comment regarding an “unfortunate foray into venue ownership” was a thinly veiled 
acknowledgement of the mistakes that former CEO Philip Geier made during his tenure as CEO of 
Interpublic. The tone of Bell’s letter, however, was unmistakable. He blamed Geier’s unbridled desire 
for acquisition at any cost. In addition to the racetrack, Bell also highlighted other acquisitions made 
by Geier in the late 1990s that had not delivered the results that were promised7. Yet in the letter to 
shareholders, Bell avoided blaming Dooner —who still held a seat on the board—for the troubles 
now befalling Interpublic, since the initial restatements were made to rectify problems that had 
arisen during the 1990s, when Geier was CEO. While shareholders may have applauded the 
transparency found in Bell’s letter, the stock market did not. By the end of 2002, the price of an 
Interpublic share had crashed to $11.25, down from a high of over $37.00 per share in the first 
quarter.
In hindsight, Geier was eager to spread the blame for Interpublic’s problems during the late 
1990s. In an interview for a book he authored that was published in 2010, Geier was quoted as 
saying:
It’s ironic that Price Waterhouse was the firm responsible for auditing the accounts 
both before and after the investigation began. Having failed to alert Interpublic’s 
management to unresolved accounting issues in 1998 and 1999, Price Waterhouse profited 
6 Despite the assertions that it would be an independent board of directors, John Dooner retained his seat on the 
Boardboard, although he did step down as CEO of Interpublic.
7 Prior to Dooner’s demotion, the Chicago Tribune quoted Dooner as saying, “The ‘90s buying binge led compa-
nies to focus on growth rather than focus on core competencies. It led us astray” (Kirk, 2002).


















handsomely over several ensuing years as the firm ‘solved’ the problems they themselves 
helped create. (Crain, 2010)
This statement was the closest acknowledgment Geier ever made that it was his own business 
and financial decisions that might have been responsible for the unbridled pursuit of growth and 
the financial goals he had set for the company. 
Bell’s selection as CEO and Chairman during this crisis had been approved by shareholders. 
Interpublic wanted to demonstrate to its clients and Wall Street that the company was now focusing 
on the core businesses of Interpublic—advertising and clients. Bell focused on his strengths, calming 
client fears and trying to rally the operating companies together to perform better, rather than 
focusing on the management changes and the investigations. It was critical that Interpublic keep its 
clients from leaving its roster for other holding companies, like WPP or Omnicom. However, keeping 
Bell in this position as CEO was also part of a tradition at Interpublic. In contrast to WPP, for example, 
Interpublic had always been run and led by someone from the “business”—that is, someone from 
the advertising side of the house, such as an account manager (O’Leary, 2003).
With the stock analysts, Bell promoted the fact that Interpublic was following strong corporate 
governance processes, even stating in one earnings call:
Last week, the Company issued new corporate governance guidelines and a new 
charter for our corporate governance committee; both are available on our website and 
both have contributed to new ratings from institutional shareholders services, which 
indicate that Interpublic performed 97.7% of the companies in the S&P 500 and a 100% of 
our peers in the media sector when it comes to our governance practices. (CCBN 
StreetEvents Conference Call Transcript, 2003)
Bell’s strategy for turning Interpublic around was shared by his other senior executives. In 2003, 
COO Chris Coughlin had been selected to bring order and structure to the holding company. In his 
first earnings call with analysts, Coughlin described his strategy: to focus on financial accountability 
and reliability (CCBN StreetEvents Conference Call Transcript, 2003).
In the same call Coughlin also recommended that Interpublic simplify the number of legal and 
financial entities it managed as a means to better measure and control the complexity of the 
financial environment at the company. Coughlin also explained that he would be changing the 
reporting structures at Interpublic; CFOs would now report to him along with the CEOs of the 
agencies. Also, all group CFOs were now to include compliance and the accuracy of their financial 
reporting as part of their performance metrics and reviews. He then proceeded to outline the cost 
cutting measures Interpublic would take, which included managing real estate holdings, 
procurement efficiencies, and the rationalization of Technology department (which Bell had already 
initiated prior to Coughlin’s hire) (CCBN StreetEvents Conference Call Transcript, 2003).
Interpublic’s CFO, Sean Orr, was asked to step down in July 2003 because Coughlin wanted to 
bring his own staff. Coughlin then added the CFO position to his own title, effectively making 
himself both the COO and CFO of the entire holding company. In October 2003, Coughlin hired 
Robert Thompson, a former colleague from his days at Pharmacia, to be his senior vice president of 
Finance. In the midst of all of these sweeping changes, however, Coughlin unexpectedly resigned 
from his positions as COO and CFO in June 2004. The board used his departure to shake up the 
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senior management ranks, electing Michael Roth to be the chairman of the board and Robert 
Thompson to replace Coughlin as CFO. David Bell remained as president and CEO. Michael Roth 
gladly stepped into the Chairman role to help manage Interpublic with David Bell.
All of this executive maneuvering in the highest levels of Interpublic only served to highlight the 
deeper liquid modernity that the holding company was entering. The financial scandal at Interpublic 
had cost three CFOs their positions as well as three of their CEOs in the same number of years. While 
Interpublic had benefited from the stable management provided by Philip Geier and Eugene Bread 
(CFO) in the 1980s and 1990s, this same period brought about the further liquefaction of the 
company. By playing into the changing financial environment of the period, Geier had effectively 
brought more liquidity into the organization. Once the “structure” that he had provided fell 
through—combined with the timing of the dot.com bubble crash—Interpublic was thrown into 
even further liquidity. The revolving door of CEOs and CFOs was proof of that. As Bauman explains, 
the concept of progress is based on the trust that there is control over the decisions that are being 
made today and that history is simply a series of steps that have to be taken to bring about a better 
tomorrow. Liquid modernity is the erosion of that trust that there will be a better world tomorrow:
The deepest, perhaps the sole meaning of progress is made up of two closely 
interrelated beliefs – that ‘time is on our side’, and that we are the ones who ‘make things 
happen’. The two beliefs live together and die together – and they go on living as long as 
the power to make things happen finds its daily corroboration in the deeds of the people 
who hold them. (Bauman, 2000, p. 132)
In solid modernity, events were expected to progress in an orderly fashion and with purpose; 
but, this is not possible in liquid modernity. Philip Geier and Interpublic had, theoretically, created 
a foundation and a “future” for the holding company as the foremost advertising holding company 
in the world with outwardly appearances showing the characteristics of solid modernity; however, 
this future and foundation was built on the quicksand of short-term financial goals and acquisitions 
for growth. Interpublic had lost ground with clients, it was losing the financial market’s trust, and 
now upper management was in a constant state of churn.
Rather than blaming a few bad apples for its difficulties (as Interpublic had done originally at 
McCann), the SEC investigation was now indicating that the culture of a push for profits at all costs 
was to blame for the extensive fraud that appeared on Interpublic’s financial statements. Interpublic 
and McCann Erickson were both accused of failures to comply with reasonable financial controls; 
this was an extension of the original scope of the investigation that had only included specific 
people in the McCann organization.
In a lawsuit filed by the SEC, Interpublic was accused of “improperly recognizing revenue related 
to Agency Volume Bonifications (AVBs) and other vendor discounts and credits that IPG took in 
violation of contracts with certain of its clients” (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interpublic 
Group of Companies Inc. and McCann Erickson Worldwide Inc., 2008). These revenue issues were not 
minor. The SEC pointed out that, in one filing, Interpublic filed an overstatement of revenues of 
496%.
The AVB for an agency was the difference between the cost of purchasing space in media outlet 
such as television stations that the agency would estimate for its clients versus the amount that it 
was actually charged by the media outlets. AVBs were not commonly used in the United States and 


















often went against client contract agreements. However, AVBs were common internationally. 
The agencies would collect commitments from their clients and then turn to the media outlets and 
request discounts for the volume they would be presenting. In many cases, the discount that the 
agencies received for the large volumes of media they purchased arguably could have, or normatively 
should have, been given back to the clients. However, many agencies kept this amount and were 
claiming it as revenue. While the AVBs were not strictly illegal, the matter rested on whether the 
client and the agency had agreed in their contract that any discounts would be given back to the 
client or whether it could be kept by the agency. The discounts should have been reflected in 
cheaper operating expenses, rather than recognized as revenue on the financial statements.
In the past, advertising agencies had made money through this system. But throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, fee-based agreements between agencies and clients began to emerge. Clients 
used the fee-based proposals to limit their advertising costs and forced agencies to comply with this 
new method of billing. Part of the problem for Interpublic, however, was that the international 
markets were following their standard processes for keeping and booking AVBs as revenue. These 
agencies did so without the knowledge of whether an international client had accepted in the 
global agreement with Interpublic to return the AVBs. Additionally many of the agreements made 
at the local level were verbal contracts, with no written documentation delineating the terms. 
In April of 2008, Interpublic had agreed to settle the charges with the SEC and pay a $12 million 
fine for its fraudulent accounting practices. Civil suits from shareholders for the misrepresentation 
of financial information had also been filed against the former CFOs at McCann. By then, Interpublic 
had declared publicly that the majority of the issues unearthed in the SEC investigation were being 
addressed across the organization, and that the investigation itself was closed. These accounting 
issues, however, were only just one part of the holding company’s problem. Interpublic was also still 
grappling with losing clients, restructuring operating companies to be better aligned in terms of 
business strategy, and other centralization efforts. 
As seen with Interpublic, the actions of corporate executives seeking to maintain their bonuses 
and compensation led to the doctoring of financial statements in order to hit the incentive targets. 
Rather than the stock market or the stock price determining the best value for shareholders and 
other stakeholders in the organization, manipulation of financial statements became the 
predominant strategy at Interpublic for maintaining and meeting the expectations that the market 
had set for the corporation. Instead of “guiding” the company in the best direction for the 
shareholders, this philosophy created an atmosphere of outright fraud.
Stock Price Conundrum
According to Bauman, “[I]n a liquid modern society, individual achievements cannot be solidified 
into lasting possessions because, in no time, assets turn into liabilities and abilities into disabilities” 
(Bauman, 2005). This mirrors the situation that Interpublic’s Geier and Beard faced during the height 
of the mergers and acquisitions era in the 1990s that did not apply or work for the decade of the 
2000s. The liquidity of the company as well as the financial and regulatory environment changed 
significantly to permit old strategies to continue working. This is equally relevant to WPP, as Sorrell 
had great success in the acquisition of JWT, but when repeating the same strategy to purchase 
Ogilvy & Mather, he crippled WPP with debt. In both of these instances, WPP and Interpublic now 
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had to directly account for their financial strategies and decisions to the investment bankers and 
shareholders that owned their stock. 
The financial crisis at Interpublic in the 2000s was more significant than the crisis that WPP faced 
in the early 1990s because of the executive management changes. Interpublic’s liquidity during 
their financial crisis had deep liquid modern characteristics. The uncertainty of the financial 
statements combined with the uncertainty of the leadership, and the industry, was the pure 
liquefaction of the corporation. The situation at Interpublic was probably more liquid and uncertain 
during this period than at any other point in the company’s history. Thus, trying to make any 
predictions based on past history or to even make an accurate diagnosis of the issue at stake was 
even harder. The new executive managers at Interpublic, however, needed to try to solidify some of 
this liquidity.
The difficulty of the financial crisis did not prevent Interpublic from attempting to solidify the 
increasing liquidity. After the departure of many of its executives, including David Bell, who only 
lasted just over a year as a CEO, some kind of structure had to come back in order for Interpublic to 
survive. The alternative, of course, would be to sell the company in pieces, each advertising agency 
in the company going to the highest bidder.
In an attempt to solve the issue, the board asked Michael Roth, Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, to take the role of CEO. He accepted and took over the helm of Interpublic in 2005. Both 
Roth and the board in general wanted to create an environment of structure, centralization, and 
control over the agencies. 
Michael Roth was a good selection as CEO to assuage the financial markets. His solid modern 
background provided the image that he would bring together the structure and stability that the 
financial markets seemed to be asking for from Interpublic. He was a certified public accountant and 
held both a law degree and a Masters of Law. More importantly for the financial markets, for years 
he had worked at financial services companies like MONY, Primerica, and Coopers & Lybrand. Even 
if, in the strictest sense, he was not being selected for his ability to navigate the liquidity that 
Interpublic was facing—the board of directors undoubtedly did not know that this was a qualification 
they needed to fill in their search for a new CEO—on the surface, Roth had the right background 
and experience, as well as the ability to speak to shareholders, creditors, and financial analysts in 
a language that these powerful stakeholders could understand. 
The choice of Roth was a clear indicator that Interpublic would be focused on the financial 
metrics of the company, not on the advertising work or client relationships. Interpublic had never 
had a holding company CEO who had not grown within the advertising industry. However, it 
seemed that Interpublc was desperate enough to attempt to try something different. After all, if 
WPP had been successful with its financially oriented CEO at the helm, then Interpublic might be 
successful with a similar type of CEO. This theory, however, disregarded the fact that Roth had no 
advertising experience at all, while Sorrell had previously worked in the industry for many years 
before heading up WPP.
To confirm that the choice to put Roth at the helm of Interpublic was made in order to stabilize 
and assuage the financial markets, Roth hired a new CFO, Frank Mergenthaler, in September 2005. 
Mergenthaler’s first task was to announce yet another restatement of Interpublic’s financial 


















statements, which included the 2004 financials and the statements for the first half of 2005. He also 
announced that the company would be restating the last five years of financial statements. All told, 
the final adjustment amount was $550 million (Interpublic Group of Companies, 2005). The impact 
of the restatement was not just financial, however; it also included an admission of problems in 
revenue recognition, acquisition account, internal investigations, and compensation agreements. 
Additionally, the restatement indicated that “adjustments” also had to be made for vendor credits 
for volume and cash discounts. 
As a result of the restatements, Interpublic ended up showing no profit over the five years 
covered by the restatements, and continued to show no profitability until the first half of 2005. 
Set against the backdrop of these cataclysmic results, the goal of executive management 
beginning in 2006 and for the foreseeable future was to calm investor fears and to produce a long-
term plan of growth and stability for Interpublic. Liquid modernity encompasses the concepts of 
capital (money) traveling light, of flitting across borders, and as such the “volatility” that capital now 
has is depicted through the lack of stability and engagement between capital owners and everyone 
else. Thus, “stock exchanges and board of management around the world are prompt to reward all 
steps ‘in the right direction’ of disengagement … while punishing just as promptly any news of staff 
expansion, increased employment and the company being ‘bogged down’ in costly long-term 
projects” (Bauman, 2000, p. 151). If modernity brought about the “rationalization” of the economy 
and society, “business-inspired rules of action and business-shaped criteria of rationality” (Bauman, 
2000, p. 4) became the ruling paradigm. Financially savvy executives who could speak and 
understand this rationality were necessary in order to grasp the liquidity of the markets.
Under Roth’s new leadership, all indications to Wall Street and the shareholders pointed to 
a more controlled and structured organization. Roth and Merganthaler had been hired to provide 
the solid modern tools and techniques to calm investors and ensure that Interpublic would finally 
turnaround. Unspoken, but plainly obvious, was the direction that Interpublic was taking. The focus 
was on operations, cost cutting, and compliance.
So, was the effort to lower costs, improve margins, and reduce risk within the organization worth 
it?
Interpublic’s stock price kept dropping despite the change of leadership. The liquidity of the 
industry and of the financial markets was clearly visible in the drop of the stock price. Despite the 
attempts to improve the financial controls, cut costs, and reduce any risk of misrepresenting the 
financial health of the company, Interpublic had not significantly increased its stock price. Six years 
later, affected by both the macroeconomic climate of the United States and Europe after the Great 
Recession and the European Debt Crisis, Interpublic’s stock price remained flat in 2012. The highest 
price the stock had reached was $58.61 per share in December of 1999, a price that was arguably the 
result of the stock market bubble in the American market at the time.
In comparison, WPP plc was only trading at $83.12 per share in December of 1999. However, in 
contrast to Interpublic, WPP’s stock value continued to rise into the year 2000, reaching a peak of 
$102 per share by March of that year. However, that comparison in stock prices doesn’t tell the 
whole story, because in March 2000 WPP was in the process of acquiring Young & Rubicam because 
the stock may have been artificially high because of the impending acquisition, and as previously 
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discussed, mergers and acquisitions tend to temporarily artifically increase the price of both the 
company that is being purchased and the acquiring company.
If we compare the stock prices of Interpublic and WPP prior to the financial crisis of September 
2008, Interpublic’s stock had reached $8.81 per share. This was lower than the stock price after the 
restatement in September 2005. The lowest point for the stock after the financial crisis came in 
February 2009, when it fell to $3.32 per share. The stock at that point had lost 64% of its original 
value from September 2008. 
In contrast, in September 2009 WPP plc saw its stock trading at $49.82 per share, a rebound from 
its lowest point in October 2008, when it had been trading at $24.18 per share. This means that, 
looking at their highs and low between September 2008 and September 2009, WPP’s stock had lost 
a maximum of 48% of its value, a marked improvement over Interpublic, which posted a 64% loss. 
Figure 4 - Holding Company Stock Price Comparisons
Even Omnicom, the second largest advertising holding company, was down only 31% from 
a September 2008 value of $40.61 per share to a nadir in October 2008 of $22.53 per share. Clearly, 
Interpublic’s stock price had crashed more than the other holding companies.
But even if we argue that the Great Recession and the financial results of those quarters were 
extraordinary to the financial markets, and that 2009 was too soon to benchmark the turnaround 
that Interpublic was proposing, we can compare the cost of the stock of the holding companies over 
a five-year span. The comparison presented in Figure 1 above shows that, while WPP and Omnicom 
appreciated considerably through August 2012, Interpublic still trailed far behind in accumulating 
shareholder value. Looking at high and low values during the period of September 2008 through 
August 2012, Interpublic’s stock price had increased only 21%, while the stock prices of the other 
holding companies increased between 30% and approximately 50%.
During Interpublic’s Investor Day in 2011, journalists pointed out the fact that, during the five 
years since the turnaround for Interpublic began, the stock price had risen 20% to just over $12 per 
share. These favorable results were short-lived, however, as shareholders sought to extract their 
value from the shares. A massive sell-off of Interpublic stock sent the price tumbling down to $9.56 
per share only two days later. 
Holding Company 12-Sep-08 24-Oct-08 Lowest In Crisis 30-Aug-12 ∆ Sept/Oct ∆ Sept/Lowest Price
∆ Sept 09/Aug 12 
Price
Interpublic $ 8.81 $ 4.22 $ 3.32 $ 10.63 -52% -62% 21%
WPP $ 49.82 $ 25.67 $ 24.18 $ 64.66 -48% -51% 30%
Omnicom $ 40.61 $ 27.87 $ 22.53 $ 50.80 -31% -45% 25%


















The table above shows the Interpublic stock price over a span of six years starting in 2006 at the 
end of the first quarter (prior to the reporting of results for the previous year’s financial statements), 
culminating with the stock price at the end of September, prior to the reporting of the third quarter 
results. The first quarter stock price variation shows a decline year after year, until 2011, when it 
started to rise again. But significantly, even in 2012, the increased stock price is still the same 20% 
increase from 2006 that had been lauded during Investor Day 2011. The actual change in value from 
2011 to 2012 was a decline of 5%. At least for the third-quarter stock price numbers, the results seem 
to show a small incremental increase from 2011 to 2012. 
Interpublic had invested in centralizing some of the holding company functions rather than 
duplicating efforts or outsourcing these services. Mergers and acquisitions in the digital space were 
supposed to have given Interpublic a leg up in this new arena. So, the question remains, why was all 
of that work not reflected in the stock price? Put differently, why didn’t shareholder value increase 
more dramatically? Liquid modernity explains the lack of stock price success:
Past successes do not necessarily increase the probability of future victories, let alone 
guarantee them; while means successfully tested in the past need to be constantly 
inspected and revised since they may prove useless or downright counterproductive once 
circumstances change. (Bauman, 2007, p. 2)
Roth may have applied every correct step and direction for Interpublic that would show the 
financial markets that the company’s stock was worth more than what was arguably the worst price 
the stock had seen (the day after the last restatement). However, this was not the case, as the stock 
continued to decline and only partially rise again. While Roth may have had the background to 
speak in financial terms to Wall Street and the shareholders, it is possible that management did not 
have the ability to instill that same language throughout the organization. Rather than adopting the 
same strict financial and top-down hierarchical control that Sorrell is famous for, Roth and Interpublic 
have taken a softer approach to the turnaround, but at what cost?
Figure 5 - Interpublic Stock Price at the end of Q1 and Q3 Over a Span of 6 Years (2006-2012)
Date 1Q End Stock Price Change
31-Mar-06 $               9.56 Baseline
30-Mar-07 $             12.31 29%
28-Mar-08 $               8.40 -12%
27-Mar-09 $               4.26 -55%
26-Mar-10 $               8.33 -13%
30-Mar-11 $             12.10 27%
30-Mar-12 $             11.41 19%
Date 3Q End Stock Price Change
30-Sep-06 $               9.90 Baseline
28-Sep-07 $             10.38 5%
26-Sep-08 $               8.14 -18%
25-Sep-09 $               7.02 -29%
26-Sep-10 $             10.07 2%
30-Sep-11 $               7.20 -27%
30-Sep-12 $             11.12 12%
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If the company’s hard work and dedication toward the “turnaround” is not reflected in the stock 
price, then why has the company spent the last 10 years trying to put it into order? When Interpublic 
sent out the restatement balance sheet for 2004 and the first two quarters of 2005 (and there were 
still significant losses for 2005), the stock price only came down to $11.64 per share. Moreover, for 
the rest of 2005, the stock price did not drop below $9.34 per share. These meager increases in stock 
price that appeared in later years from 2006 through 2011 did not equate well to the fact that 
Interpublic had not only shown organic growth, but had also increased its revenue in the first nine 
months of 2011 and improved the quarter’s margin to 10% or more, which was aligned with other 
holding company’s growth numbers. In other words, the stock market was not “rewarding” 
Interpublic for its efforts.
Part of the issue facing Interpublic is that while it may be true that there was a plan to improve 
their financial controls and do what the financial markets requested, there are other factors that 
need to be considered. In recent years, Interpublic has suffered significant losses both in terms of 
revenue and clients. 
More importantly, the above-described stock price results, which would seem to be incongruous 
with standard, solid modern, stock price financial theory, are actually completely in line with the 
liquid modernity in which Interpublic is so deeply steeped. In contrast to solid modernity, liquidity 
does not preordain a response to any given stimuli. Therefore, companies can encounter this 
imprecision in the correlation between company action and stock price—between increasing 
intrinsic value and middling shareholder value. This is the conundrum of liquidity, and it highlights 
the inherent risks associated with performing in such a world:
The risks involved in every choice may be produced by forces which transcend the 
comprehension and capacity to act of the individual, but it is the individual’s lot and duty 
to pay their price, because there are no authoritatively endorsed recipes which would 
allow errors to be avoided if they were properly learned and dutifully followed, or which 
could be blamed in the case of failure. (Bauman, 2007, p. 4)
In the meantime, WPP has maintained brand name recognition for being a financial powerhouse 
for the agencies it houses. With Sorrell’s reputation as a financial expert intact, the financial markets 
do not seem to mind the ruthless reputation Sorrell has regarding strict control over the agencies. It 
would seem that applying the same type of CEO at Interpublic would give the financial markets the 
same level of trust. But this branding of financial discipline is something that Interpublic has not 
been able to achieve despite having Roth at the helm, who hails from the financial services industry. 
Conclusion: Where is Financialization Taking the Industry?
Aside from the already “liquid” nature of the advertising business, in which the product is an 
executed idea, rather than a factory-made widget, the rise of financialization in the industry added 
another component of uncertainty and liquidity. Thus, these advertising agencies, which were 
already liquid by nature, now entered into a different type of liquidity as they became part of the 
publically traded holding company. 
Although Interpublic was the first holding company in the industry, many others were created 
during the late 1970s and the 1980s. As the industry’s first holding company, Interpublic was created 


















to mirror the holding company structure of the manufacturing companies of that time. Because of 
this, Interpublic had to struggle to define a way of working with those tenets but still be profitable 
in the advertising industry. Later holding companies would use the lessons learned from Interpublic 
to better structure themselves. 
The other major transformation that Interpublic brought into the industry was the financialization 
of the advertising holding company. When it was converted from a privately held company to 
a listed company in the stock market, Interpublic opened itself up to be subjected to outsiders’ 
opinions on the company’s strategy. By entering the public market in this manner, Interpublic found 
itself embarking on a journey in which many aspects of the economy and the marketplace were 
changing, and specifically in which the rise of Wall Street banks (and, subsequently, shareholders) 
was taking hold. While, historically, shareholders had been relatively silent in the internal 
management of a company, this soon changed. The recession in the 1970s highlighted some of the 
weakness of the prior decades’ controls and regulations over the banking industry. The neoliberal 
turn that many western economies took, including the United States, changed how corporations 
were perceived by the financial industry. As banks were still regulated, corporations took on the 
financial markets for increased financial liquidity, which facilitated mergers and acquisitions. This 
environment steered the boom of the 1980s and the rise of the hostile takeovers and corporate 
raiders. 
The creation of the advertising holding company WPP plc epitomizes the era of the 1980s and 
how the industry was changing drastically during that time. WPP was purposefully created by 
Martin Sorrell to be a vehicle for acquisitions, his intention being to grow WPP into a main player in 
the advertising industry through his acquisitions. The cost of creating this holding company, 
however, was the obligation it now had to the investment banks that Sorrell used to finance this 
growth.
Apart from trying to please their clients, the holding companies now had an additional 
stakeholder to please as well—the financial markets. Thus, the advertising agencies within these 
holding companies now not only were dealing with the liquidity of their industry, but also facing the 
additional liquidity of the stock markets and shareholders. 
The financialization of the advertising industry brought about a second surge of “liquidity,” 
which the industry did not expect. Already facing liquid modern tendencies because of the nature 
of the service industry, the advertising agencies consciously or unconsciously chose to add a second, 
financial level of liquidity to their organizations and the agencies they acquired. As if it were not 
enough that the industry itself had to be flexible and adaptable to meet their clients’ needs, the 
financialization that was brought about through public trading added another layer of uncertainty. 
The benefits of the holding company for the advertising industry had to be centered on the idea 
that the holding company will be the financial intermediary for the agencies in the group. The 
financialization of the industry made this role completely mandatory and necessary in order to 
navigate the outside demands from shareholders, investment bank analysts, and other financial 
industry influences. The holding company had to be able to provide financial stability for the 
agencies as they expanded into new business or for when the holding company itself acquired new 
agencies. Thus, the holding company is a solid structure that has to be able to manage both types 
of liquidity—that of the advertising industry and of the financial markets. 
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At Interpublic, advertising agency men, such as John Dooner and David Bell, were not well 
equipped to handle the demands of Wall Street, investment bankers, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the regulatory requirements necessitated by financialization. It took the influx of 
outsiders like Michael Roth to bring about stability and control over the organization. Even Philip 
Geier, who had, for 20 years, managed to successfully navigate through the takeover and acquisition 
booms of the 1980s and 1990s, ultimately had not truly learned to navigate the system of 
financialization. Interpublic’s implosion during its financial scandals in the early 2000s showed that 
the mistakes and problems that lay behind the scandals were not sown after Geier retired, but rather 
during his tenure and during the period when Interpublic stock was reaching new heights. 
So, while Michael Roth has been able to steer Interpublic in a more positive direction, the end 
result—the focus on investment banks’ opinion and stock price—has resulted in a flat effect on the 
stock value. While the share prices of competitors like WPP and Omnicom continue to rise (and, 
subsequently, not fall as much as Interpublic’s during periods of crisis), Interpublic continues to fail 
to add “shareholder value” within the context of the neoclassical definition that Karen Ho provides. 
If that is a failure, then what benefits are there in following the edicts that Wall Street imposes on 
publicly traded companies? Why do organizations struggle to defend their expense and revenue 
numbers if the effect of stock price and the perceived health of a company are not linked? Has 
Interpublic moved beyond the standard linkage of stock price and financial performance?
Sorrell transformed WPP plc from a small wire basket maker into the world’s largest advertising 
agency. His rise in the advertising world came from being able to put deals together, his meticulous 
understanding of the industry, and his relationships with financier friends. WPP became 
a powerhouse in the late 1980s through the acquisition of JWT and the Ogilvy Group, but at what 
expense? Sorrell’s tactics have left enemies in his wake and many criticize that the major brands 
under WPP—JWT, Ogilvy, Y&R—are simply shells of their former glory. His push for growth and 
profit through his heavy-handed approach leaves questions not only about whether or not these 
former agencies can legitimately create work that shows value and increased sales for the client, but 
also about what will happen if he retires or is otherwise no longer running the company? Publicis, 
another mega-holding company, faces this issue as well with the possible retirement of its CEO, 
Maurice Levy. Upon any discussion of Levy’s possible retirement, Publicis’s stock has declined in 
price, indicating that the financial markets do not support Levy’s current transition plan. Many have 
suggested that Publicis and Interpublic need to merge in order to continue to compete with WPP 
and Omnicom in the industry8.
Bauman argues that liquid modernity is ephemeral in comparison to solid modernity. “Not much 
can be gained from the ‘long-term’ considerations. If ‘solid’ modernity posited eternal duration as 
the main motive and principle of action, ‘fluid’ modernity has no function for the eternal duration to 
play” (Bauman, 2000, p. 125). If these holding companies are in a liquid modern industry and 
financially regulated by another liquid industry, then what is the hope that they will last indefinitely? 
Or are the mergers and acquisitions the rebirth of the holding company as these smaller firms are 
absorbed? 
Even now, continued acquisitions and mergers in the advertising industry have created an 
environment that produces anxiety and uncertainty even at the highest levels of the agencies. 
8 Significant changes have unfolded in 2013 regarding the future of Publicis and Omnicom, more of which will be 
explored in the Conclusion chapter and the Epilogue.


















Whether a publicly traded agency is worried about a takeover or an agency within a holding 
company is struggling to perform, the anxieties are the same due to the liquid modernity from the 
financialization and the industry perspective. Bauman explains the thoughts of a liquid modern 
person living through this:
No rational person would expect to spend her or his whole working life, or at least 
a large chunk of it, in one company. Most rational people would prefer to entrust their life 
savings to the notoriously risk-ridden, stock-exchange-playing investment funds and 
insurance companies than to count on the pensions that companies for which they work 
at present could provide. As Nigel Thrift summed it up recently, ‘It is very difficult to build 
trust in organizations which are, at the same time, being “delayered”, “downsized” and “re-
engineered”’ (Bauman, 2000, p. 166).
In an interview with agency employees by D.A. Leslie (1995), she finds that one of her subjects 
described the uncertainty of the mergers as “almost a burlesque acquisition. The ownership of this 
company has changed hands four times in the past four years.” In another interview conducted by 
Leslie, an Interpublic employee describes, “We’ve had three layoffs in the three years I’ve been 
here… The people who get laid off aren’t the ones who get punished so much as us, because we 
have to pick up their work” (Leslie, 1995, p. 409). 
The future of the industry seems to lie overseas, away from North America and Europe. Both the 
Great Recession and the European Debt Crisis have made many larger clients nervous about 
spending for large advertising campaigns. The American economy has not improved fast enough, 
but industry reports indicate that, despite this, advertising budgets are growing.
These larger issues and uncertainties affect the departments, teams, and individual employees 
inside the holding companies. Internal departments that have been instrumental in bringing the 
holding companies back from the brink of financial scandal still grapple with their identities and 
missions in the liquid modern organization within the holding company. Teams within these 
departments and individual employees on these teams face similar difficulties and uncertainty. 
Especially important, these departments represent, in microcosm, the balance (or lack thereof ) 
between solid and liquid modernity in a modern corporation. In the next chapter, I will delve deeper 
into these areas to explore and understand the extent to which financialization adds more liquidity 
to an already liquid organization. 
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Introduction
In Chapter Five, a series of autoethnographic vignettes were presented that captured the 
liquidity of working within the advertising agency and specifically within a holding company. The 
advertising holding company was created in the middle of the 20th century in an attempt to solidify 
what was an already liquid industry. When Marion Harper created Interpublic in the mold of General 
Motors Company, his vision was to create a super-structure (a solid structure) that could hold 
a variety of agencies together. The drive to create this structure was based on the belief that the 
advertising agency did not have to suffer unnecessarily through two main problems that the 
liquidity in the industry presented: the loss of clients and limited growth.
Taking an already liquid industry like advertising and placing it in an extremely volatile 
environment like the stock market adds another layer of “liquidity” to the equation—financial 
liquidity. The holding company structure, which was built under the assumption that it would 
provide a solid foundation for the activities within the agency, was now facing additional pressure 
from the financial markets and shareholders. For the individual who is living in the era of the 
portfolio society, “in which the investment idiom becomes a dominant way of understanding the 
individual’s place in society” (Davis, 2009, p. 6), this perspective becomes the predominant lens 
through which to view social relationships and corporate politics. 
And just as assuredly as the liquidity of the advertising industry seeps through to the average 
employee, so too does the added liquidity of financialization affect all levels of an organization, from 
the leadership level, which has to deal with both the industry and the financial markets, down to the 
managers and employees who implement the strategies developed at the top. The prior 
autoethnographic sketches touched upon previously in Chapter Five demonstrated how we were 
confronted with the reality of the liquidity of the advertising industry and how we could not forget 
that our business was advertising, despite being removed from the product. The other side of that 
coin was the demands and requirements that we faced from the corporation, the shareholders, and 
the governmental regulations that we had to comply with in order to remain in business. Even as we 
were also confronted with the fact that our business was advertising (and not economies of scale or 
corporate-wide contracts) we also could not forget that our roles in the holding company were to 
support and promote the structure and value of the holding company. We were supporting the 
agencies and giving them the benefits of being part of this larger network and structure that could 
handle many activities centrally and (hopefully) for a lower cost. But we were also supporting the 
belief of shareholder value and that our ultimate owners were the financial services companies that 
held our stock on behalf of thousands of people and institutions who owned mutual funds. This part 
of our job was not something we would ever be allowed to forget. Oftentimes, this would produce 
a narrow-point of view and perspective on the overall business. More often than not, this was 
caused by the fact that many of us (especially those in senior management) did not come from the 
advertising companies themselves. They came from other industries and had peculiar notions about 
what should be done. 
The following sketches and analysis of this dual-natured experience with liquidity will reference 
the duality in the company. Today’s corporation is “concerned with looser forms of organization 
which could be put together, dismantled and reassembled at a short notice or without notice: [a] 
fluid form of assembly which fits [the] view of the surrounding world as ‘multiple, complex, and fast-
moving, and therefore “ambiguous”, “fuzzy” and “plastic”’, ‘uncertain, paradoxical, and even chaotic” 




























(Bauman, 2000, p. 154). Bauman further argues, “Today’s business organization has an element of 
disorganization deliberately built into it: the less solid and more fluid it is, the better” (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 154). These vignettes capture that which may seem to be disorganized and inefficient; however, 
there is no inefficiency, there is only liquidity.
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Autoethnographic Sketch - Working with the “Other”
I felt that John was on my side. But over the phone I could tell that I had lost 
my audience. I tried to clarify again, because I knew I wasn’t being understood.
I was giving a presentation over the telephone to my upper management. My 
manager, John, had given me this opportunity because I had been explaining to him 
that the Latin America region was growing: The countries had lower unemployment 
rates than in the United States and their gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 
higher than in the U.S. and Europe. If we wanted to ride this wave, I reasoned that it was 
crucial for the company to start investing in Latin America.
“As you can see, the agencies have been investing, but we haven’t had 
a chance to do our investing in the region,” I continued.
I was interrupted by the CFO, “I remember investing $100,000 in Mexico and 
then having to fight to get those invoices paid.”
“If I recall correctly,” started the Director of Applications, “the agency guys 
didn’t want us there. They told us they didn’t want to move into our financial system 
because it was too expensive.”
The CFO had the floor now. “This is what I don’t get: You’re telling us the 
region has all this money, but then they won’t pay for the services. They can’t have it 
both ways.”
John stayed silent. I start to speak, but the CIO interrupted me.
“Veronica, are you saying that the agencies in the region are now ready to 
make some investments of their own?”
“Well, yes, actually, they have been and this is one of the reasons why 
I thought we may want to do it ourselves.”
The CFO interrupted again. “They made it clear they didn’t want us in there. 
We tried to make the investment, but instead, they wanted us to clean up their mess. 
They only wanted us in there to clean up their balance sheets. They’re unwilling to make 
their own investments and now they want us to do it for them.”
He was angry. I felt he was angry with me.
At that point John wasn’t participating in the conversation and I didn’t know 
why. If they weren’t clear about what I was asking, why didn’t John jump in to explain? 
He knew exactly what my intention was with this presentation, and now everything 
was going awry.
Based on the CFO’s and the Directory of Application’s past experiences with 
Latin America from many years ago, I realized that I needed to smooth some feathers; 
Efforts to keep the ‘other’, the different, the strange and foreign at a distance, 
the decision to preclude the need for communication, negotiation and mutual commitment,  
 is not the only conceivable, but the expectable response to the existential uncertainty rooted in 
the new fragility or fluidity of social bonds.
 Zygmunt Bauman, 2000, p. 108




























however, my attempts to do so only angered the CFO more. The CIO listened in until the 
conversation became even more heated. Then he interjected and summarized the 
whole presentation in a few words:
“So, what you’re saying is that the region is different now? And the agencies 
need and want to invest. Okay, we can think about that option, but we need to see 
agency commitment to this and especially within each of the countries.”
With that comment, I was dismissed. I hung up the phone and felt the 
adrenaline course out of my body again. 
I wasn’t sure what had gone wrong and I wouldn’t know for a few more 
months. The initial feedback that John had given me was that they were taken by 
surprise from the tone of the presentation. But John had known exactly what I was 
going to present and I had even given him a preview of the presentation flow and words 
prior to this meeting. I had also given the same presentation to the Technology heads of 
the agencies, who, after the presentation ended, pledged to give more money to the 
region to offset some of the lack of investment from earlier years. 
I knew the CFO had a dislike for the region, but I had always associated his 
dislike with Frank. The two could be often heard fighting on the phone or, if they were 
together in New York, squaring off face-to-face. Frank always made every statement 
with the bravado of one who “knew” that he was always right. The CFO countered with 
the abject certainty of knowing Frank was always wrong. Neither man would budge on 
an issue. For the most part, the CFO seemed to harp on Frank’s excessive budgets, which 
were filled with hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of travel expenses and promises 
to the region and headquarters that were never put in writing.
But I wasn’t Frank. In the five years since Frank’s departure, I had carefully 
pared down the travel budget to less than $10,000 a year, a tiny fraction of what it was 
during Frank’s time. Plus, all of my promises included a written agreement with 
signatures. So, why, then, was the CFO still so angry at the region? 
Sometime later I had another chance to present the same information to the 
CFO, but in a different form and forum. When we had our large department meeting, 
the CFO reached out to me after a few drinks and indicated that it was my aggressiveness 
that had thrown him off. I suddenly realized he was upset that a woman had been so 
forceful on an issue. Obviously there was an issue here, but it clearly didn’t involve me or 
the region. 
Despite his protestations to the contrary, I continued to hear through other 
channels that the CFO rarely spoke well of the region. He was afraid of Latin America, 
I was told. He would read articles in newspapers or periodicals regarding political 
uncertainty, drug violence, or social upheaval in Latin America. And even though each 
of these factors may have been present in the United States and the other regions, too, 
his negative perceptions, coupled with his brief experiences with Frank and the other 
agency CFOs, led him to distrust everyone associated with Latin America. I myself was 
lucky enough to escape unscathed from his xenophobia because I spoke perfect English, 
seemed more American than not, and could “translate” the Latin American way of 
doing business into comfortable words familiar to American businessmen. 
My second presentation went better than the first. At the end, however, I was 
given a different task to complete before upper management would even consider 
making any investment in the region. I realized this was nothing more than a delaying 
tactic. I suggested to the CFO, CIO, and others that they should travel to the region—to 
Mexico or Brazil, or any other country—to see firsthand what I perceived by working 
with the region on a daily basis: The economy was doing well, our  company was 
Veronica Millan_2.indd   161 2/13/14   7:13 PM
162
growing, we had new clients, and we were profitable. But they remained afraid. Images 
from the evening news of Mexican drug violence or Brazilian kidnappings held more 
sway in their minds than the pictures I would draw for them of this vibrant, profitable 
region. I even offered to go on the trip as their guide, in case they feared being unable to 
speak the languages. No one took me up on my offer. 
I stopped fighting against the system, or rather, against their ignorance (as 
I saw it). I focused instead on the Latin America region agencies and working with them 
to invest what they needed in order to get their operations up and ready for new clients 
and new business. When agencies asked me why this was not an investment being 
done by the holding company, I reminded them that my management was not ready 
yet. If the local agencies wanted to push the issue with headquarters, they were 
welcome to take it above my head; however, I had done everything I could personally 
do to make the investment a possibility. 
The agencies tried to escalate the need for capital investment. My impression 
is that their initiative received the same cold response as my own, and we simply fell 
back into what had become our normal routine— finding inventive ways to make 
projects happen with the budget we were given. We also focused on sharing resources 
between the agencies because we realized that no single agency could make the 
investment on its own.
Through our symbiotic work we continue to see record profits in Latin 
America in comparison to every other region. Moreover, struggling against the cultural 
ignorance of the panopticon of senior management, I felt closer to the agencies than 
I did to my own department and company. 
By working in the Latin America region I predominately interacted with employees living outside 
the United States. This had been true for a good portion of my adult life, whether it was working with 
Latin Americans, Europeans, or even Americans (as the foreigner, when I worked outside of the 
United States). Working with the “other” was considered normal. At the holding company, working 
with a global perspective was seen as an asset, but I did not know that there were limitations to this 
perspective. Because most of the organization’s revenue came from the United States and Europe, 
little attention was given to the Asian or Latin American markets. This started to change slightly as 
the economies in North America and Europe started to stagnate after the financial crisis of 2008. 
Yet despite the growth that Latin America was exhibiting in terms of increases in GDP, steady 
workforce, rising incomes, and stable economies, the technology leaders at the agency and at the 
holding company remained far away from these regions. A more cynical coworker told me that the 
reason I still existed was to be a panacea to the demands that the region was making toward the 
holding company’s investments. I accepted the truth without rancor, as I could see that I had turned 
down the noise coming from Latin America for the management in New York; it was an unspoken 
portion of my job description. Seeing the recent growth in the region, however, and reading the 
forecasts that predicted continued growth for the next five years or more, it made me certain that 
we were making a mistake in not addressing the investments we needed to make in the region. 
I had seen some last-minute projects done in Europe and Asia and the resulting feedback from 
those investments from the agencies was negative. The global agency technology leaders—most of 
whom I had developed close relationships with during my tenure at the company—complained 
about the lack of foresight and follow through. Whether it was a warning for my own projects or 
simply a venting session, I did take the complaints to heart and planned with my manager, John, 




























better ways to prepare for the inevitable onslaught of questions surrounding technology 
investments and additional services that were currently lacking in the region. 
Until that point, the region had completed a number of projects remarkably well without the 
capital investment that it needed. Frank had failed to procure these investments centrally, so he had 
turned to the agencies to fund his projects. I had seen his failure at attracting the funding from New 
York, so I knew that I could not turn to the holding company for it. Instead, I worked with the 
agencies locally to advance our plans. I encouraged and helped facilitate the local agencies to invest 
what they could in the region in order to reach the same standards that the North America or the 
European region had reached with their technology levels. Some of the agencies resisted, hoping 
there would be a mandate that would reach down to them, accompanied by some funds to spend, 
but that did not happen. As time passed, we were quickly reaching the point at which, without 
additionally funding, we were not going to reach the same standards of service as North America or 
Europe. 
I spent a few months setting up the argument for the investment into the region. I knew what 
New York wanted to hear—no staff in the region. I also knew that the CFO had a difficult time in the 
region’s recent past (with Frank) and his perception was that the region was incapable of handling 
an investment. 
When I gave my presentation, it fell on deaf ears. But I recognized that the harsh reactions from 
the management department in response to my presentation were based on fear. “The resulting 
defensive or aggressive reactions aimed at mitigating the fear may be therefore targeted away from 
the dangers truly responsible for the presumption of insecurity” (Bauman, 2006, p. 4), which means 
that the fear of the region was being expressed through the belief (or the position) that the holding 
company was unwanted in the region. Pride, of course, was a portion of it—as North Americans, this 
management had presumed that any attention or project that was offered up in the region would 
be gladly accepted as though the region were receiving priceless gifts. But it turned out that the 
region had functioned on its own for so long that these “gifts” were not viewed as so.
The Director of Applications had been shocked to find out that the reason for declining the offer 
of a new financial system went beyond the cost. As it turns out, the agencies in the region that had 
been offered this “gift” had done a business case analysis and realized that they would be paying 
much more to receive a system that had less functionality. Because the company was run through 
individual balance sheets that rolled up to the global agency level and then into the holding 
company, the agencies had a choice as to what costs to incur or not. And the choice to not incur 
a more expensive financial system (that had less functionality) had come as a shock, especially in 
a case where upper management throughout the region would’ve be grateful for it! 
Also, for these Americans, there was an inherent fear of the foreign and unknown. While 
management’s travel to Europe had been eagerly anticipated and filled with five-star treatment and 
generous expense accounts, prospective travel to Latin America, at least to them, was tinged with 
fear of kidnappings, violence, and poverty. 
Bauman argues that these fears are part of the liquid modern life. Because identity and values 
are variable and ever changing, they become “fragile, temporary, and ‘until further notice, and 
devoid of all defences” (Bauman, 2000, p. 178). Consequently, liquid moderns have a desire for 
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“community” because they no longer have the traditional community as an option. Quoting Richard 
Sennett, Bauman writes “the desire for community is defensive … to be sure it is almost a universal 
law that that ‘we’ can be used as a defense against confusion and dislocation” (Bauman, 2000, p. 179). 
This management, having themselves been affected by the liquidity of the organization, cannot 
help but to close ranks and fear the unknown. Their community, their defense against the liquidity, 
is to remain in the known, focused on the same projects, people, and countries. They feared looking 
outside their internal corporate community because the company and industry did not offer solidity 
or security, as any action they took could lead to their dismissal, Bauman argues that the combination 
of “uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety” that is presented in liquid modernity then leads
 to the perpetual thirst for more safety, a thirst which no practical measures can quell 
since they are bound to leave the primary and perpetually prolific sources of uncertainty 
and insecurity, those main suppliers of anxiety, untouched and intact. (Bauman, 2000, p. 
179).
Thus, because management is afraid of the Latin America region (the Unknown), in this case, 
that fear cannot simply be overcome by the information that I supply regularly on the safety of a city 
or interesting tourist spots in the region. 
The basis for some their fears came from seeing that the solid structures to which they were so 
accustomed were not available in the region. By nature, the holding company attempts to put 
structure around the advertising agencies, because they are working under one name, one symbol 
on the stock exchange. In the region, the holding company had very little input, with no holding 
company entities physically located in any of the major cities. Consequently, the agencies in the 
region flourished alone with very little oversight from the holding company. The liquidity in the 
region—a region historically, economically, and politically dominated by solid modern structures—
was overwhelming. Rather than acquiescing to the holding company’s decision-making, or 
accepting the decisions at that level, the region was prone to reinvent the wheel if it meant receiving 
the wheel to use today rather than three years from now when it would be exported from North 
America. 
But ultimately, regardless of the reason why this fear existed, I was left to handle their 
management objectives with regards to the region—as much as I could with the financial support I 
was given. The resulting effect was to create both a bubble of “safety” for our Latin American band 
of technology directors and managers to work out our own goals and projects (in our own way and 
through our own methods). I just had to make sure that whatever we did in the region was not too 
far off from what the holding company expected.




























Autoethnographic Sketch - Working With Elizabeth
I sat stunned on the other side of the phone line.
I instant messaged Greg. Start recording this. She’s lost it.
He wrote back: OMG
She continued, but I wasn’t listening anymore. Greg instant messaged me 
back saying that Rob, who sat on the same floor as she did, was hearing the screaming. 
I tried to interrupt her to tell her that she was misunderstanding why we were 
having the call in the first place. In fact, just the mere fact that I was giving her this 
information was clearly my attempt at keeping her informed and participating in the 
decisions that the agencies were making in the region. 
But she didn’t want to hear it. After I finished my explanation, there was 
a deafening silence on her side of the call. Elizabeth finally spoke and said that she was 
going to hang up now before the call deteriorated further. I could not imagine how 
much worse it could have become, unless she was going to actually call me names. 
We all hung up.
I immediately searched my instant messenger list to see if my manager was 
free. The green indicator light next to his name showed that he was not in a meeting. 
I opened up a new chat window with him and asked if he was free. He replied almost 
immediately that he was. 
It did not occur to me then that if Rob had heard the yelling, it would have 
been no surprise that my manager would have had heard it, too. He sat between Rob 
and Elizabeth, down the long hallway in New York. John called me immediately and 
I explained what had happened. He assured me that he would speak to her. I told him 
her actions were unwarranted and that I had not even been given a chance to explain 
what had actually happened. 
Elizabeth’s loss of control was inevitable. She had been slowly losing her 
professionalism throughout the last six months. I did not understand how she could 
have lost it completely, though. As she was fond of telling me, she had worked at this 
company for a long time and she knew how the agencies were. But then I wondered, 
why did she think that I was responsible for her frustrations?
Two years ago, the Procurement department, where Elizabeth worked, 
wanted to get more involved in the Latin America region. This decree was probably 
You are the worst person I have ever had to work with! 
I have tried to work with the region and I have been blocked at every opportunity!
 Elizabeth, November 2012
Insecure people tend to be irritable; they are also intolerant of anything that stands in the way 
of their desires; and since quite a few of the desires are bound to be frustrated, there is seldom 
a shortage of things and people to be intolerant of.
 Zygmunt Bauman, 2000, p. 164
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handed down by the head of Procurement, who had, in turn, probably received his 
orders from the highest executives at the holding company. Each of the corporate 
departments in the company had been tasked with finding ways to improve the 
company’s overall profit margin. The holding company had to justify their existence, 
after all. But the real issues that the company faced were lower profit margins and the 
loss of clients after the financial crisis of 2008. 
Eventually, they found their way into the Latin America region, but as it often 
happens when the tide of change reaches the small region in the company, resources 
were tired, funds were limited, and deadlines to exact certain profit margins were fast 
approaching. Making the same assumptions that most Americans make when looking 
at Latin America, the department head did a whirlwind tour of the region, shook hands, 
and assumed that everything would work like it did in the United States. However, I had 
heard through the grapevine from the agencies that the “tour” had left a sour taste in 
the mouths of the local managers because all of the “cost savings” the Procurement 
department had promised were not really savings at all. These managers believed that 
the proposed changes would be more expensive than their current costs. They did not 
understand why the holding company’s strategy included making them spend more 
money.
I realized then that there was a huge miscommunication between the 
agencies and the Procurement department. I also realized that the miscommunication 
stemmed from a lack of attention to detail and follow up on the existing agreements 
and contracts. As it often happened, the region had been ignored, and very little time 
and attention had been given to speaking the decision-makers in the region in order to 
understand their true needs.
This fragmented understanding of the company was not entirely the fault of 
the holding company’s corporate departments. Latin Americans had a way of 
conducting business that required not only a cultural understanding of proper etiquette 
when interacting with each other, but also a business understanding that rarely would 
requirements and needs be directly stated. For the most part, most of the managers in 
the region who could have given Procurement a list of items they needed would not 
have actually made that list without the help of someone sitting there, interacting, 
face-to-face, to develop such a list. 
I had faced this same problem in the technology arena, but my ability to 
speak the local languages had helped to break through that initial barrier. But I still had 
groundwork to do in the region, developing relationships with the local managers and 
understanding how the idiosyncrasies of the business culture in each country affected 
the relationship. I also needed the time to learn the personality of each agency and to 
assess the willingness of specific people to cooperate with the holding company. 
As Elizabeth and I started working together, I realized she had no idea how to 
handle these complex relationships. But I was willing to give her a chance and teach her 
what I had learned. What I hadn’t expected, however, was her unwillingness to take 
advice. Whether it was because I was younger than she, or because she felt she had 
more experience in the region, regardless of my advice on how to handle each situation, 
she would do the opposite. 
I gave up. 
She was not part of my department. I did not have any loyalty to her or the 
Procurement department. This is probably when things went from bad to worse.
As long as I was cleaning up her messes when she insulted my Technology 
departments, and as long as I was working behind the scenes to collect information for 




























her to help her with her job, things worked smoothly and I was praised for my help. 
When I decided to step away, however, the relationship turned sour. 
Elizabeth wanted more access to the agencies and wanted to work with them 
directly on various contracts that were coming up for renewal. Rather than filtering the 
“chaos” of the region, which was partly the result of the Latin culture, and partly due to 
limited resources (which resulted in everything being treated like an emergency), I left 
Elizabeth to handle everything on her own.
And then she saw the reality of having to deal with the agencies locally. 
Elizabeth now had a first-row view of the demands and expectations that the 
agencies had for the holding company. They not only questioned our strategic direction, 
but they insisted on participating in the development of that strategic direction and 
once created, to criticize it as though they had never participated in its development in 
the first place. This drove Elizabeth mad; she did not understand what they wanted. 
I found myself “translating” for her once again. 
I worked with the agencies to filter (and smooth out) their responses to her. 
I had grown accustomed to their type of interaction. Their ability to be predictable in 
their uncertainty was very normal to me. Or rather, I had come to expect that the 
agencies would rarely perform in the manner I expected. Sometimes when I was 
anticipating the worst, they would surprise me by accepting my suggestions with no 
questions asked. Other times when I had covered all the points and arguments they 
could possibly bring up, someone would find a hole in the plan I hadn’t seen. 
I was used to this state of uncertainty. I found the key skill was listening more 
than ordering. I understood that when dealing with Latin America, it was less about 
getting the work done—certainly it would always get done—and more about feeling 
connected. The agencies in the region wanted to believe that the holding company was 
listening to them. The fact that my role existed as a listener gave them hope that they 
mattered in the grand scheme of things. 
I carefully hid from their view the possibility that many holding company 
executives in various departments might not care about the Latin America region. 
I cared about them, and the holding company cared enough to keep me in this position; 
thus, I was often seen as much more than the regional Technology coordinator. To them 
I was the face of the holding company.
Procurement’s foray into the region was a positive development because that 
meant I could point to yet another holding company department that seemingly 
wanted to listen to the region. Belying this positive perception was the fact that 
Elizabeth did not listen very well and had her own ideas of how the region should react 
to her presence. I tried to tell her (and her manager) that respect from the region had to 
be earned; it would not be given freely. I sounded like a cheesy Hollywood movie, but 
I had heard the comments about Elizabeth and Procurement from the technology staff 
that had to deal with her. I knew what the local agencies were thinking. 
When I’m feeling generous and emotionally detached, I can hypothesize that 
Elizabeth herself is struggling under her own misguided performance objectives. I do 
not have the full story, but as a way of explaining her sudden outbursts that peppered 
the last year, her manager told me that she was supposed to be performing under 
a metric that required her to “touch from start to finish” every piece of Procurement 
activity in the region. Despite the small size of Latin America in the context of the 
company, it is still a huge region with a lot of money to “spend.” It is virtually impossible 
for her to touch every transaction and be responsible for each one when there are often 
20 or more separate contracts under review at any one time. But if she did not “touch” 
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these transactions from start to finish (including the contract review), she would not get 
“credit” for participating and, thus, would be penalized during her annual performance 
review and bonus evaluation. 
When I learned about her performance metric (and understanding that 
people can be incredibly motivated by money), it did explain her final screaming 
outburst at me. I thought it unfair, however, that not only was she effectively penalized 
by her performance metric, but that everyone who worked with her was ostensibly 
penalized, too. 
The sizeable effect of liquidity—both the liquidity inherent in the industry and holding company, 
and the liquidity created through financialization—spreads like a shadow throughout this vignette; 
Elizabeth’s reaction to the region, the way the agencies reacted to her, and the way both of these 
entities react to me (the messenger) are all a function of liquidity. Elizabeth had come in with 
a different set of expectations for structure and responses, but because there were no such structures 
(and no plans to put those into place), combined with the fact that she now had to be responsible 
for creating cost savings in the region, grated on her patience and sense of progress. And because 
the financialization of the industry required that a department like Procurement make an impact on 
the profit margins of the company, her own performance assessment and bonus structure was 
negatively affected by her lack of progress in this area. Invariably, her perspective on the situation 
was still very much rooted in the solid characteristics of progress, central control, and hierarchy. 
I had spent the majority of that year working with Elizabeth, trying to explain that neither the 
region, nor the holding company effectively, operated in the solid modern manner to which she was 
accustomed. The Technology department had little control or authority in the region; my own 
efforts to start and finish projects were based on the ability to adapt and change at a moment’s 
notice when the needs and requirements of the agencies changed. I had approached my own 
department’s objectives with the understanding that the goals had to be set at a very high level so 
that if anything did change, the overall objective would not be compromised. 
Theoretically, the technology department’s had similar “solid” goals and objectives as the other 
corporate departments. The department’s pay raises, promotions and bonuses are supposed to 
follow this structured method of evaluation and performance goal setting, and of course, entered 
into the system so everyone could track it. All holding company employees had to follow this 
process – the entering of goals and objectives at the start of the year and then, at the end of the year, 
enter whether or not you met your objectives and goals. In practice, however, my performance 
metrics (as well as those of my coworkers) were often decided in an ad hoc method; therefore, the 
metrics did not result in a coherent process for promotions or bonuses. Understanding this liquidity, 
we did not try to understand the performance management system because we knew it was not 
structured in a logical manner: a wide array of aspects influenced how performance reviews were 
performed and how rewards (bonuses and promotions) were meted out.
The technology department was a relatively flat organization, similar to that of all the other 
departments in the advertising agencies or the holding company. There were different levels of 
management, but the levels were not very deep. As a result, the “career” path that one could take 
was limited in the levels that were available to go up (or down). However, this flat hierarchy also 
opened up different opportunities to try different areas. What I found in my organization were many 




























people who were happy with the breadth and depth of the work they were allowed to do if they 
took their own initiative, but were disappointed with the lack of pecuniary recognition that resulted 
from that work. Even in the Procurement department I saw similar trends. When someone in 
Procurement did get promoted, his or her job description changed very little, even if the title now 
included “manager” or “director.” The flat organization, as mentioned earlier, was a hallmark of liquid 
modernity’s effect on organizations. 
Yet while the Technology and the Procurement departments shared some similarities, there 
were also some significant differences. One particular difference was the focus on cost savings. In 
the Technology department, we attempted to achieve cost savings through efficiencies. We had 
centralized many of the technology services that the agencies used. These services had created not 
only more stable systems, they had also allowed the agencies to use them, rather than to create 
their own independent application environment. Additionally, the standardization of technology 
across the company also reduced the overall investment in ad hoc infrastructure or additional 
headcount to manage all the different systems, that the costs to use such technology were lowered 
significantly. All in all it probably added a 2% to the overall profitability of the holding company after 
the dust cleared from the projects and reduction in staff was completed. Additional cost savings 
were realized through lower technology (hardware and software) costs, better strategic capital 
investments, and through a series of changes to employment practices; i.e., a significant reduction 
of their headcount, combined with an increased number of temporary and consulting staff (another 
hallmark of liquid modernity—to have flexible employment, which was subject to change at a 
moment’s notice). This streamlined employment effort was also a hallmark of the financialization 
and neoliberal policies that had been enacted by corporations. Neoliberalism sought to “strip away 
the protective covering” and essentially “the individualized and relatively powerless worker then 
confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered” (Harvey, 2005, p. 168). 
Procurement, on the other hand, did not have the same focus on centralization. While the 
department had existed in the same time span as the technology department, the Procurement 
department had only focused on global services and contracts. I eventually realized through my 
interactions with Elizabeth and the rest of the Procurement department that they had not been 
aware of the efforts we, in Technology, had undertaken and that they were trying to reinvent the 
wheel on their own. Elizabeth’s frustration would only grow during that period of transition—where 
Procurement would attempt to become more agency focused—in which she would have to deal 
directly with the agencies and have to cater to their needs. 
Despite Elizabeth’s long tenure in the Procurement department, this particular quirk (of not 
having to focus on the agencies’ needs) was possible because, in the United States, Procurement 
had worked toward acquiring holding company-level contracts. These contracts would be signed by 
the holding company and then the agency would have its choice in whether or not it wanted to 
participate. Generally speaking, the pricing for these contracts had been so well negotiated that the 
agencies were happy to use them to save money. However, this positive reception at the agency 
level was possible only in the United States, because of the large size of the country and the cultural 
similarities. The Latin America region (as well as the other regions) things were slightly different. 
While we treated the region as a “whole” for planning purposes, the region is, in fact, comprised of 
many countries, languages, and cultures. This effectively prevented any possibility of having one 
contract for the whole region. No single provider could give us the pricing, flexibility, and contractual 
terms that were possible in a single country like the United States. Additionally, the scale of the 
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countries in terms of advertising agency size compared to the United States did not compare. 
Therefore, the Procurement department did not dedicate resources to the region exclusively the 
way it had done with the other regions. 
These differences resulted in Elizabeth’s situation: She was frustrated that the region did not act 
together as a whole (like the United States). When dealing with the U.S., rarely did she have to 
interact with Technology line manager. Conversely, Elizabeth’s interactions in the North American 
region were normally at the CIO level, where generally the CIO would be concerned about strategy 
rather than the financial impact on the region.
I had worked with the other regional Technology directors to move past the “lowest cost is the 
best” perspective on the technology strategy for their agencies. However, for these directors, the 
impact of financial performance was much stronger than at the holding company level. In fact, 
many times, the conversation was directly with the CFO of the agency, who would question the 
strategy and the costs of any technology we wanted to implement. Thus, Technology’s budget and 
its impact were usually filtered through the lens of the operating expense account, rather than 
a more strategic or even a profit-centered account. Some agencies had Technology directors that 
understood the strategic impact that technology could have on their bottom line, so in those 
agencies, technology investments were easier to handle. But generally, the agency CFOs saw 
technology as a necessary expense, best dealt with as cheaply as possible. The “consumerization” of 
technology did not help our efforts, as many non-technology people saw technology as easily 
expendable and with little long-term strategic purpose. 
This perspective also affected the Procurement department, which was involved in long-term 
deals to purchase technology equipment, services, and licensing. But with the increasing speed that 
technology changed, some of these contracts—even ones that were just as short as a year—were 
considered obsolete before the year’s end. Part of the frustration I faced with Elizabeth was her lack 
of urgency and her North American perspective on the region. The agency technology managers 
understood how quickly technology changed in their own agencies and how the demands of their 
employees changed depending on whether a new Apple or Microsoft tech toy was released. These 
line managers understood that the investments and long-term contracts into which the holding 
company wanted them to enter were radically inconceivable because prices changed quickly as 
new technology was introduced in the countries. 
Yet while I understood these differences in perspective between the holding company and the 
Latin America region, these concepts remained foreign to Elizabeth. Moreover, when I would try to 
educate her about the differences, she would have minor explosions of annoyance and 
misunderstanding because she refused to believe that the agency business was so different in the 
region. I also recognized immediately that she had not really worked directly with the agencies and 
their CFOs—not even the agencies and CFOs in North America. All our CFOs had to deal with short-
term, quarterly objectives to meet the holding company’s financial goals. These financial goals were 
determined by the shareholders and the financial analysts who set the grade of the holding 
company stock, and, of course, these were the same shareholders and analysts that determined 
whether or not the share price would rise based on the information presented by the company. 
CFOs had to meet these objectives because not only were their own personal bonuses at stake, but 
fundamentally, their jobs were also on the line. 




























This demand to meet the quarterly results meant that the local technology managers had to be 
cognizant of this fact and able to react accordingly. Reacting to these pressures oftentimes went 
contrary to the same demands that the Procurement department had in respects to the region; 
Procurement wanted to see cost savings from the contracts they negotiated, but the region did not 
want to even participate in the contracts (or have to incur a cost). How could any “savings” be found 
in that for the Procurement department when the agencies in the region did not even want to 
spend it in the first place? 
Thus both the technology and procurement areas were functioning under the pressures of the 
holding company’s financial situation. However, while the pressure was the same, Elizabeth reacted 
to her pressures in the opposite manner, insisting the agencies should purchase through her so she 
could show how she “saved” them money.
All of us in the holding company were acutely aware of the impact of being listed on the stock 
exchange. We were made aware of it through the pressures of our objectives or goals (as was the 
case with Procurement) but also through other ways, such as limits to our spending. Because it was 
drilled into us that we were accountable for the stock price’s rise or fall (and in fact we were, to the 
shareholders), it was up to each department to take into consideration the overall goal of the 
company—financial strength and security for our shareholders—and put that into action through 
budgets and spending plans.
The entire Procurement department was tasked with increasing the profitability and efficiency 
of the corporation through cost saving measures, implementing global agreements using the 
economies of scale, and protecting the company by ensuring all of the former was completed within 
the context of the contracts that were signed. However, the actual details and practical application 
of those efforts was largely left to the individuals within the department—similar to the style I faced 
in my own technology department. However, their “motivation” was slightly different than ours. 
Elizabeth and the Procurement department had a financial incentive plan applied to their goals and 
objectives that they had to meet stringently through direct cost-savings to the company. In light of 
the finacialization of the advertising holding companies, certain members of the corporate 
departments were also “motivated” not only by stock performance (which all of us at the corporate 
level were through our retirement plans) but also by monetary compensation for the work that we 
performed. In the case of the Procurement department, as I found out, Elizabeth’s compensation 
was tied not only to how much cost savings could be associated with the region, but to the actions 
she took to bring about those cost savings. 
Perversely, because it was difficult to control every aspect of the projects and programs we 
imposed or offered the region in such a liquid environment, Elizabeth was being paid for controlling 
every aspect of the procurement process. This financial control over Elizabeth’s bonus led to her 
reactions in a similar way to the way that of the bankers’ actions that Karen Ho described the 
transition from managerialism to shareholder value centric view of the corporation. As financialization 
took over the corporations in the United States, the fundamental belief was that managers were 
sacrificing the “real” owners.
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I sat in on the earnings call for my company. I heard my company CFO give 
the news that we had missed our earning expectation by only 1 cent. I heard that Latin 
America had more or less delivered their portion of the revenue and profits that the 
company needed. The news wasn’t too bad, I thought.
That same day, an email from John indicated that the company was getting 
clobbered in the market. An analyst’s report from Citigroup indicated that the company 
possibly had a good future, but they were cautious. 
A month later I was canceling my travel to the region. The edict had come 
out: No one was to travel in this fiscal quarter until the next earnings call. And depending 
on the results from the next fiscal quarter, the moratorium on travel could be extended.
As I read the email from John I saw a penny sitting on my desk. An entire 
company grounded for one cent. 
Working for the holding company in the technology department means that we are internally 
focused. Our customers are the other agencies in the group. So when we were affected by external 
decisions, the impact was usually direct, and seldom was it ever good news. The  head of the 
technology department had begun to send his direct reports emails from the various advertising 
trade publications and financial analysts’ reports concerning the health of the holding company’s 
stock. 
The reports we received on the advertising industry often made for interesting or entertaining 
reading; however, what we really focused on was what the “financial markets” were saying about us. 
Whether it was the financial press or actual movements in share price, the impact on our company 
was huge. And almost always, we had to acquiesce to the market’s perception of our efforts.
The influence of the decisions of the financial markets on the management of a company, even 
to the level of middle or lower management, showed the level of importance that senior 
management believed the market had on its actions. Liquid modernity implies that the game of 
management has fundamentally changed and managers, within the context of the financial 
markets, have to respond by “[downsizing] their managerial offices in order to earn the recognition 
of the stock-exchange, gain shareholders’ votes and secure the right to the golden handshake when 
the current round of hatchet jobs has been completed” (Bauman, 2000, p. 123). Bauman 
acknowledges that the result of this focus is that capital, and thus power, has to the option to fly 
where it wants to go, while the less powerful (more solid) labor force is left to deal with the 
consequences of these decisions. Bauman himself comments that in a study done by the American 
Management Association found that morale and motivation by workers had declined due to the 
fleeting of capital and as “capital acquires more room for maneuver – more shelters to hide in, 
For that reason they are exposed, armless, to the inscrutable whims of mysterious ‘investors’ 
and ‘shareholders’, and event more bewildering ‘market forces’, ‘terms of trade’ and ‘demands 
of competition’
 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, p 166
Autoethnographic Sketch - Travel




























a larger matrix of possible permutations, a wider assortment of available avatars” (Bauman, 2000, p. 
123), in a direct association of the effects of mergers and downsizing have in the organizations 
affected by catering to the financial markets. 
This held true even in the holding company. While in my own situation I never had to face 
a financial analyst or come face-to-face with a shareholder to explain why the share price had 
declined or why I was not able to improve the profit margins of the largest agencies in the group, 
I had to face decisions like not being able to travel for work because the holding company (and the 
agencies as well) were in lockdown until the finance departments could sort out what the next 
quarter’s numbers would look like. The holding company was chasing these numbers (and had 
been in a futile chase) for many years. Despite efforts to acquire or sell agencies, hire new or let go 
management who were perceived by the financial markets to be inept, or to restructure or reinvent 
ourselves, the efforts to affect the share price remained relatively the same to where it had settled in 
close to a decade ago. The financial crisis of 2008 was seemingly the only event to have affected the 
share price. Internally, however, the belief was strong that the share price should be higher. 
Gerald Davis argues that the problem with conglomerates (such as holding companies of our 
size) is that they trade their stocks at a discounted price because shareholders believe the individual 
units of the company would be a better return on investment than the group as whole (Davis, 2009, 
p. 81). The upper management of my holding company had, through actions and communications, 
sent the clear message to the financial markets that we could trade at a higher price; it was just 
a matter of giving the financial markets the information and action plan they needed. We would 
take draconian measures, even foreswearing non-emergency travel for three months, in order to 
reduce our operating costs to the levels expected by the analysts.
However, in an apparent paradox, the holding company (and its management) also pushed the 
idea that the holding company was a benefit to our clients, because they could use all the diverse 
agencies that were under one roof —a “one-stop shop” for any and all advertising related business. 
The holding company could offer a prospective client not only the creative advertising agency, but 
also digital advertising agencies for their mobile phone and Internet ads, event marketing firms, 
public relations agencies, media-buying groups, branding firms, and even specialized consulting 
areas for anything related to the clients’ business. However, and all holding companies faced this 
problem in the advertising industry, very few clients took the opportunity to use all of the holding 
company’s offerings. Clients liked to spread around their business, never putting too many eggs into 
one holding company’s basket. 
This “conglomerate paradox” was seen across the advertising industry. Davis argues that the rise 
of backlash against “managerialism,” where the managers could not possibly have the best interests 
of the shareholders in mind because the managers did not “own” the company, led to the mergers 
and acquisitions frenzy of the 1980s, when “shareholder value” was seen as the fundamental goal for 
any corporation that was publicly traded. Davis explains that this wave led to the creation of the 
corporation as a nexus of contracts, rather than a conglomerate of companies. The result was that 
those corporations became more focused on one aspect of the business, usually a service, rather 
than owning companies in various areas of an industry or across industries. It was better to outsource 
that work to other third parties and own the most lucrative part of the process. Ultimately, the drive 
for shareholder value led many of these corporations to spin off business units that were perceived 
to lessen the value of the share price.
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In the advertising industry, however, this process was rarely completed. Whether the holding 
company was Interpublic, WPP, Omnicom, or Publicis (to name the mega-holding companies of the 
industry), very rarely did any of them spin off their units in order to increase shareholder value. 
Independent advertising firms rarely bought themselves out (or were sold by the holding company 
that acquired them). These independent firms usually arose because, at some point, a prior conflict 
with upper management, a holding company, or some other event would precipitate creative and 
account managers leaving the firm to create a new one. Interestingly enough, many of these new 
agencies would be eventually be purchased by one holding company or another.
The share price conundrum seen at Interpublic (and possibly in all holding companies) is also 
a result of the relative valuation of the advertising industry as a whole. Part of the definition of how 
the agencies and the holding company are valued is clear and direct: the assumption that if the 
economy is stable or growing, advertising agencies will have increasing revenue as their clients will 
be focusing on selling or branding their product to the consumer. This means greater ad revenues 
and higher profits for the ad agencies and holding companies. In the event of a general economic 
downturn, clients are likely to scale back their advertising budgets in expectation that consumers 
will be less likely to purchase their products. 
However, the remaining pieces of the valuation model for the advertising agency/holding 
company are less certain and usually rise or fall at the whim of the market since they are not based 
on fixed assets such as factories or equipment. Davis argues that the valuation of a corporation is 
inherently liquid (in the context of Bauman) rather than based on any solid foundation to explain 
this valuation. Davis claims that as corporations became more like nexus of contracts, “advertising 
tag lines are more valuable than production lines” (Davis, 2009, p. 94). But where does that leave the 
advertising agencies that create those tag lines? Valuation should be very high, since the agency 
holds no production lines and the product is essentially created out of thin air. Because a corporation 
is a nexus of contracts, “the corporation is also a network of affiliations” (Davis, 2009, p. 94) leading 
them to manage corporate board membership to maximize the influence that board members can 
give the company to stave off financial market analysts and outside shareholders—“Well-connect 
directors have no discernible impact on profitability … but they do significantly increase the esteem 
in which the company is held by outside analysts and executives,” which seem to have a positive 
impact in terms of the pressure from the investment community (Davis, 2009, p. 96).
In my own holding company, the cost of a weeklong trip into the region would have not 
surpassed USD $7,000.00. Taken in the aggregate, the cost savings from the quarterly embargo on 
travel would have little to no effect on a multi-billion company. Moreover, failing to travel to the 
region could have endangered critical technology projects that would have resulted in significant 
cost savings for the agencies and the holding company. In my case, I knew that by not traveling to 
Chile for a particular project, we were going to lose an opportunity to cement a shared technology 
operation that we had established a few years earlier. The manager of this operation seemed 
incredulous that I would not make the trip, but I had to explain that my own manager had vetoed 
the decision, despite my own arguments as to the benefits of the travel. 
In the context of liquid organization, I was also aware that this opportunity to cement the 
technology operations in the country would come again. As previously stated, in a liquid 
organization, these opportunities come and go and whether or not they are taken.





























The “liquidity” resulting from the financialization of the advertising industry added more 
pressure to the daily struggles of those working inside an advertising holding company. The liquidity 
that financialization brought inside the company created unexpected results as more solid financial 
metrics were imposed across the board on an equally solid quarterly basis. The demands of 
financialization forced the holding company departments to work together to reach these goals 
and consequently, brought additional liquidity. 
Originally I had become aware of the liquidity of the organization at my level and from my own 
perspective. This liquidity described by Bauman seemed to permeate my world. However, it was 
during a presentation in which I was faced with resistance from my upper management that 
I realized that we in middle and lower management were not the only ones grappling with liquidity 
in the organization. These senior executives faced the same liquidity we did, and I was now seeing 
the effect of that liquidity in the form of their anxieties about the Latin American region. 
In Working With the Other I describe how my managers are fearful of investing in a region that 
they do not know well. Their experience has been with the English-speaking world and the European 
region, areas that are similar to each other. In my presentation to them I was asking them to go 
beyond what is safe and known and to take a risk (in the Latin America region) with no clear reward 
at the end. Rather than seeing my region as an exponential growth market in which we had to be 
prepared to manage, this group of executives was dissuaded from investing in the region for the 
simple reason that they knew very little about it. Compounding that fear and ignorance, the 
agencies in my region were also very reluctant to open their arms to a holding company management 
that had ignored them for many years. I found myself in the middle, attempting to bridge the 
increasing gap between the two sides. This fear of the “other”—the unknown and unknowable—is 
common in liquid environments. The instability and uncertainty of a liquid organization makes 
retreating into the “known” the safest option to take. In seeking that safety, my management was 
reacting exactly as Bauman expected us to react in similar circumstances. 
The sketch, Working with Elizabeth, is a detour into another corporate department and its 
attempts to deal with the liquidity of the company and industry, in which liquidity has been 
compounded by the financialization of both the industry and the company. Elizabeth, despite 
having worked in the holding company for some years, had never worked in advertising before and 
had not developed the skills to handle the liquidity well. In her department, the financial goals of 
the company and her group were clear—it was to focus on cost savings. The resulting effect of that 
requirement was her attempt to find ways to centralize purchasing and management of pricing and 
contracts so she could declare cost savings. By trying to handle the very liquid agencies in this very 
liquid region using very solid structures, she lost her footing and had begun to psychologically and 
professionally break down. 
This frustration and anxiety that the region produced in Elizabeth were a combination of the 
inherent liquidity found in the agencies and the industry and were compounded by the demand for 
“shareholder value” placed on the organization. Despite the lofty idea that the Procurement 
department should (could?) centralize their activities, the reality crashed against the theory when 
faced with real agencies that were trying to meet the financial objectives set by the financial 
departments at the corporate level. The problem with the department as a whole was with the type 
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of metrics and results the staff was required to produce. Rather than seeing the larger picture—the 
agencies locally were spending less, thus increasing their operating margins—Elizabeth (and, 
consequently, the department) was focused on the lack of “cost savings” because they were not 
using the central agreements or negotiating through her.
Finally, in Travel, I convey my own personal experience in facing the analysts’ demands on the 
performance of our company. Because the holding company is beholden to shareholders and the 
financial analysts through its financialization, we have little choice but to pay close attention to what 
those shareholders and analysts want. So despite several quarters of amazing growth and 
improvement, all that mattered to these stakeholders was missing a financial metric by a penny. 
Consequently, all of us were forced to limit our travel, even at the expense of a project that could 
have ultimately saved the company money in the long term. Again, Bauman’s theory is reflected in 
these decisions, in which the company is focused on short-term goals because, in liquidity, you 
cannot guarantee any long-term plans. Equally so, Davis and Harvey would argue that the 
financialization of the industry and society has led to the mismanagement of corporations, which, 
effectively, are run for the shareholders and analysts, rather than for the complete set of stakeholders 
affected by it. Davis and Harvey would most likely nod in agreement at the frustration I felt in Travel.
In a coda to the story of Travel, in the following quarter the holding company showed spectacular 
profitability. The hope (and belief?) is that the travel that was denied across the organization actually 
helped the company perform better than expected and will lead to a higher stock price. Otherwise, 
the failure of the project in Chile would have been in vain.
Two of the sketches also show a cultural clash between employees in the holding company that 
have to work with different regions, and in particular, the Latin America region. This is also an 
indication of the increased liquidity through the financialization of the organization. Financialization 
forces companies to expand and grow to meet their client demands, oftentimes putting people 
who had never worked internationally before face-to-face with the “Other.” The two sketches 
Working With the “Other” and Working with Elizabeth highlight what is at first (superficially) seen as 
a cultural issue. But an alternative perspective to that culture issue is that these employees were not 
prepared to work internationally. Liquidity, as Bauman has indicated, forces the reduction space and 
thus reduces the barriers and borders of the foreigner into the corporate departments. My coworkers 
are no longer the employees housed in my floor or even my building, but rather my coworkers are 
spread around the world. There are still many coworkers that fail to grasp that their boundaries have 
expanded and they are no longer “safe” in their corporate building in their own city.
These three autoethnographic chapters have shown three different areas of the holding 
company experience through my perspective. The sketches in Chapter Three highlight that the 
characteristics of liquidity, such that they can be seen in an actual organization. The Chapter Five 
sketches highlight the tension that exists in being a holding company employee and the advertising 
industry. Lastly, this chapter shows that financialization has a tremendous impact on the experience 
of the holding company employee and that the added level of liquidity to the organization can 
cause breakdowns and policies that seem irrational. 
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“At first, it was thought that Tlön was a mere chaos, an 
irresponsible act of imaginative license; today we 
know that it is a cosmos, and that the innermost laws 
that govern it have been formulated, however 
provisionally so.”
Jorge Luis Borges,
Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius
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The Organizational Chart
Eventually, many organizational charts crossed my path—a lot of which I had actually created 
myself in order to visually plot a new structure of working together. But by that point I had stopped 
seeking out the “org chart” as a means of defining my career path or understanding who was in 
charge and who was not. In fact, I found it better to forget that the organizational chart even existed 
and ignore whatever perceived powers it granted the person above or below the lines and boxes. 
Invariably, the amount of power that any one person in my organization had was less defined by the 
organizational chart and would eventually change anyway. While the changes within my department 
have not stopped—even something as major as a job promotion or transfer into or out of our 
department is barely announced anymore—I am more accepting of the ambivalence in all of our 
positions.
One afternoon I received an issue of Fast Company magazine in the mail with the headline, “The 
Secrets of Generation Flux.” In this February 2012 issue, Robert Safian explores what he calls 
“generation flux”: people of a certain type (not a certain age) who have a “mind-set that embraces 
instability, that tolerates – and even enjoys – recalibrating careers, business models, and 
assumptions.” Safian argues that in “the next decade or two [we] will be defined more by fluidity 
than by any new, settled paradigm; if there is a pattern to all of this is that there is no pattern.” The 
remainder of the article goes on to explain how companies are changing and adapting to this new 
“generation” and how this chaos and uncertainty has become the new normal. There are, evidently, 
individuals in this new demographic who actually enjoy the ambiguity and turbulence. The end 
result is that this generation is future-focused and not “sentimental about the past.” Safian explores 
whether this return to nostalgia is a “survival mechanism that pushes people to avoid risk by 
applying what we learned … we instinctively become more conservative … to times that seem 
simpler” which is the opposite of what Generation Flux is trying to do. 
Safian’s article summarizes a major theme that is not only relevant to today’s world, but also to 
this research -- the fluid and fluctuating state in which so many parts of our society seem to be in; 
the interconnection between our financial and economic state and our daily lives. Included in 
Safian’s article is the story of R/GA, a digital advertising agency owned by Interpublic, which is now 
undergoing its fifth reorganization—“into a new business model.” However, according to Safian, 
there isn’t actually any new model. Rather, “you may well need to build one from scratch.” All of these 
sentiments echo the liquid modern world captured in the theories of Zygmunt Bauman.
Proponents of the purest forms of Bauman’s sociological theories would have you believe that 
modernity in all its forms—both solid and liquid—and the evolution of society and the economy 
into modernity and its subsequent forms, are inevitable given the technological, political, and social 
advances that arose at the end of the agrarian epoch. The metamorphosis of society into solid 
modernity was presumed to be the result of modernity’s attempt to rationalize all of the activities it 
oversaw and to create a society that had very structured roles and relationships (Bauman, 1989, p. 
57). However, just as the water in a rushing river can reshape mountains into canyons, the liquidity 
present in the human condition prevents solid modernity from remaining in place; solid structures 
are constantly being reformed into more liquid structures, which are underpatterned rather than 
patterned and disorganized rather than ordered (Blackshaw, 2005, p. 33). The theory posits that the 
evolution from solidity to liquidity is an inevitable process. The ideas behind “liquidity” and “liquid 
modernity” offer us a language with a vocabulary that is actually very solid in its definitions. This 















creates a paradox within the definition of liquidity, as decidedly solid terms are being used to define 
a continuously changing liquid modern reality. While the theory of liquidity seems to apply generally 
both to our current world and to the advertising industry, there are specific facets of this liquidity 
that need to be highlighted and closely examined.
Zygmunt Bauman’s metaphors and descriptors of solid and liquid modernity are, I believe, useful 
to contextualize the advertising industry and especially the financialization of the industry and 
where it stands today. These descriptions helped me to name what I was feeling and experiencing 
in my own organization, as I knew that what I saw unfolding in front of me was not anarchy or chaos, 
but something else. I simply did not have the context or the language to understand it at first.
Liquid modernity has a twinge of nostalgia built into the theory. For Bauman, the past seems 
safer because it was more structured. His neo-Marxist background permeates the theory, suggesting 
that there was a period of time when the structured solid modern past created a stable (and 
therefore “knowable”) relationship between capital and labor, when unions protected their workers, 
and managers needed these workers be a part of their factories. However, in both the factory 
setting, as well as the rest of the economic environment, it is well known that the “mutuality of their 
dependence” was rarely a friendly situation. Henry Ford, who himself is considered the father of the 
modern factory, would have continued to pay his workers lower wages had there been not been so 
much competition for their labor. This is not to say that Bauman was nostalgic for the unrestrained 
capitalism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries; rather, he was nostalgic for the structures in 
society and the long-term relationships that solid modernity created. Solid modernity made it clear 
who or what needed to be fought, but now “the spectre of Big Brother ceased to hover in the world’s 
attics and dungeons … in their new, liquid modern, drastically shrunken versions … it is there that 
the threads and the chances of individual autonomy … must be sought and located” (Bauman, 
2000, p. 52). In other words, the despot of solid modernity has disappeared in liquid modernity and 
the responsibility for control over one’s destiny has been thrown back to the individual. 
This recasting of the past also recasts the fundamental basis for liquid modernity: If the solid 
modern past was not as comforting, clear, and stable as Bauman presented it to be; then, conversely, 
the liquid modern present cannot be as fearful, unstable, or precarious as he has made it out to be. 
Indeed, for Bauman, the question of whether we have reached a post-modern state is still up for 
debate, and the basis of that (post-modern) state still remains undefined. Bauman’s decision to walk 
away from the debate of what was postmodern, and instead to create “liquid modernity” and its 
incumbent language, is his solution to the fragility of the definition of post-modernity but it does 
not address the nostalgia found in his work. The nostalgia found in Bauman’s book series on liquidity 
is reminiscent of the current cultural popularity for themes of the past; the nostalgia is “an antidote 
to the current speed of change in contemporary culture” (Lazarus, 2013).
As demonstrated in the evidence presented in this book, and particularly in my autoethnographic 
sketches, I have seen solid structures form and flourish in the midst of this liquid world, just as often 
as I have seen liquidity win out over solidity. The social and economic effects of liquidity predicted 
by Bauman’s theory have not been seen in my empirical practice; for example, the value and strength 
of human relationships is stronger in my liquid world than in the more solid organizations and 
industries in which I worked before. Yet, at the same time, the appearance and effect of liquidity in 
and on my environment cannot be doubted. The facets of liquidity described by Bauman appear to 
me daily and are reflected in my autoethnographic snapshots: rapidly changing organizational 
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structures, the absence (or frequent replacement) of work processes, and the relative certainty that 
we (as in my coworkers and I) are each working in a thoroughly uncertain world. 
A key weakness in Bauman’s theory seems to arise from the lack of original ethnographic 
research. While many other theorists and sociologists are quoted throughout his “Liquid Modernity” 
book series, Bauman’s own specific research of his theories has not been evidenced. In my own 
research, I have found a paradox in the solid definition of liquidity (liquid modernity) as well as some 
clear differences in how relationships unfold in in relationship to Bauman’s definition of liquid 
modernity. The liquid actuality of my corporate environment is not as “Bauman-ian” as I initially 
thought it would be. The all-encompassing umbrella of “liquid modernity” or “liquidity” need to be 
tailored to include the fact that liquidity can change and vary within itself. And, while Bauman’s 
theories of liquidity may apply perfectly in one area—e.g., the relationship between the financial 
markets and a corporation and its managers—the same theories may not apply to other areas, such 
as the relationships between individuals or between employers and employees. Therefore, it seems 
apt to say that each aspect of liquid modernity, as outlined by Bauman—emancipation, the 
individual, time and space, work, and community—needs to be tested, through additional research. 
New patterns as to how liquidity can affect different aspects of society are critical to making the very 
definition of liquid modernity more liquid, in order to accurately encompass (or expand the 
definition of ) the reality we are experiencing. Bauman’s epistemic will to know liquid modernity is 
itself not liquid. 
Bauman is clear in his desire for all of us (laymen and academics) to continue to pursue sociology 
and research, because “we also need to know what it is we need to talk about and what the 
resolutions we pass ought to be concerned with” (Bauman, 2000, p. 211). For Bauman, sociology 
should restore “the lost link between objective affliction and subjective experience” (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 211). However, he does not leave his theory open enough to interpretation. He fights for a 
sociology that will enable individuals to understand the choices they have, and that promotes the 
role of the sociologist fighting for freedom from the forces (capital, tyranny, etc.) that attempt to 
subjugate and control the individual. Again, this position refuses to acknowledge the full extent and 
implication of what liquid modernity can mean when the definition of the theory itself is allowed to 
be liquid. The oppression of the individual is changing and the forces that are to be fought against, 
can change as well.
The language of liquid modernity is useful in the context of understanding the experiences of 
my coworkers and I throughout the period of my employment covered in this book. The distance 
created by the researcher position in this study also allowed me the privilege of observing a situation 
while it unfolded rather than frenetically attempting to affect its outcome. An effect of this position 
was that I fell into a pattern that Bauman argues liquid moderns have to take— becoming less 
invested and less interested in the immediate outcomes. This separation and distance as researcher 
then led me to realizations about the ability of an employee to navigate him or herself in a liquid 
modern company. Some of these realizations include: an understanding that things will invariably 
change, the importance of adapting to change, and finding ways (through relationships, primarily) 
to navigate the constant change. Conversely, had I not learned to take that more distant approach, 
I might have found myself looking for a new position in a more structured environment such as a 
financial services or a technology services company. Instead, the research gave me the distance that 
was needed to navigate the liquid environment of the advertising holding company. In my study of 
liquidity, the research and theory furnished me a sort of professional solidity.















This realization brought about an understanding that in labeling and using the metaphor of 
“liquidity,” it could be possible to survive this environment and possibly even enjoy the experience. 
And it was through this process that I became curious to understand my coworkers’ experiences in 
the same environment. Through their understanding of the company and our business, and through 
their day-to-day professional lives, it became clear to me that what I was labeling as “liquidity,” as 
defined by Bauman, was something that they understood existed with or without the contextual 
language to define it. Moreover, they accepted this liquidity with the same “third-party observer” 
attitude that I had assumed in my research. The fascination with pursuing this research further 
increased as the coworkers began to explain their long-term experiences in the liquid environment 
to me. 
And so a paradox was born between Bauman’s descriptions of the liquid environment and the 
experiences that were unfolding and being told to me by others in the “real life” liquidity of the 
advertising industry. It is clear that part of the difference between Bauman’s argument and my (our) 
experiences is that my research was solely focused on a specific group of professionals in a specific 
advertising holding company. Therefore, it can be argued that a similar study in another company 
or industry would produce different results. But the findings of my autoethnographic research are 
important to document and analyze in order to show the boundaries of Bauman’s theory and where 
it could (and perhaps could not) be taken. Thus, analysis of how others experience liquidity, in 
conjunction with my own experiences and coping mechanisms, became the crux to the 
autoethnographic stories that are presented in this book. 
Bauman created the language of liquidity to describe different aspects of modernity that are 
apropos to our current environment and our recent history. In addition, Bauman’s narrative is similar 
to that of Jorge Luis Borges’ work, whereby it encompasses a specific world, which is defined by the 
author; however, perhaps only in that specific world do the theories apply. Much of Borges’ fictional 
work is centered on the creation of characters and environments where special rules apply, such as 
in the short story Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, in which Borges created an encyclopedia with a 
mysterious entry into a world called Tlön. In the story, the fictional entry in the encyclopedia 
essentially creates a real, physical world of the same name with artifacts from it. In a similar manner, 
it seems that Bauman recasts the past in order to affect present-day understandings of modernity 
and also to affect the future in a specific way. It was no surprise, then, as mentioned in Chapter Two, 
that, presented with the choice, Bauman says he would have taken one of Borges’ short fiction 
books with him to an isolated island—Borges created specific worlds with specific rules determining 
cause and effect, and Bauman has done the same with his take on liquid modernity.
The ultimate benefit, for me, of the language and descriptions that Bauman has created has 
been the ability to contextualize the industry and the organization in which I have been working. 
Bauman’s theories do not enable me to predict the future or to understand necessarily the 
management decisions that are being made above me. However, the conceptualization of liquidity 
does allow a certain acceptance of the situation. Once you change the assumption that things 
should flow in a solid way, but actually unfold a more liquid way, the anxiety about it all seems to 
dissipate or, at the very least, becomes buffered. But I realize that Bauman might be horrified to 
know that his books led to “acceptance” on my part.
In the subsequent year since the body of this book was written, a number of events have affected 
the advertising industry. Not only has the drive for acquisitions continued to increase, but the first 
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merger of two major holding companies, Dentsu and Aegis, is currently underway. This will make 
the resulting holding company, Dentsu Aegis, the fifth-largest advertising holding company in the 
world, and increase the roster of the so-called “mega-holding companies” from four to five. 
Interpublic, being the smallest of the mega-holding companies, will then be at risk of seeing its 
ranking fall to number five if it does not continue to grow. WPP plc. and the Omnicom Group 
continue to perform acquisitions, but not exclusively within the advertising sector. Both holding 
companies have expanded their reach into non-traditional agencies and even beyond the field of 
digital advertising. Competitors like Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Apple are now encroaching on 
what used to be the traditional advertising agency’s domain; the fallout of such shifting territoriality 
is almost guaranteed to unfold in the coming years. This expansion by WPP and Omnicom has also 
made their revenues and employee counts increase significantly. In the same vein, both Omnicom 
and WPP are trading at approximately $50 per share, while Publicis and Interpublic continue to 
trade at a quarter of that price. This makes it possible to envision a scenario whereby the behemoth 
holding companies outpace the rest, restructuring the industry into two major holding companies, 
as opposed to four or five. 
However, at the end of the day, the advertising industry, I believe, is clearly defined by its “liquid 
modern” characteristics. Bauman’s descriptors are apt and useful in understanding the industry. The 
liquidity of the advertising industry, as defined by Bauman, is clear throughout its inception. Bauman 
always defined liquidity as part of the modernization process that we entered into at the end of the 
agrarian phase of our history. With the creation of new solid structures, came the processes of 
tearing them down, which was the inception of “liquidity” as it unfolds today. As the economy 
changed from agrarian to industrial, advertising was born: As new solid structures were being 
created by the new society and economy, the old ones were shattered and rebuilt. Thus, the 
liquefying process of old solids leading to new ones; advertising was just the by-product of the 
process. Without industry, advertising (sales) would have never existed and vice versa. The two 
needed each other in order to exist. Mass industry had to create mass demand to survive and this is 
what advertising provided. 
As mirror images of each other— with both solid and liquid modernity off-setting each other in 
society—it is no surprise that attempts to transform advertising into a more solid endeavor were 
met with resistance. The holding company phenomenon was an attempt to create a more structured 
environment and to take advantage of the economies of scale and finance that it offered, but the 
reality of the situation—as Marion Harper saw through the creation of Interpublic—was not that 
simple. 
“In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. 
In practice there is.”
 Yogi Berra
The success of the advertising holding company throughout the last thirty years shows that 
most agencies find value in belonging to a network that offers one structure for multiple concerns. 
For example, the McCann Erickson advertising agency originally expanded internationally because 
their largest client, Standard Oil, needed services around the world. It is no surprise, then, that with 
so many global companies facing the same needs as Standard Oil, many advertising agencies have 
had to join a larger network in order to provide global services. A holding company—because of its 















size and access to capital markets—can offer the financial capital and logistical structure to create 
that global ability to meet clients’ needs. Thus, entire agencies in a country or region can exist solely 
to service a single global client, with no other influx of income from local or other international 
clients. 
The holding company also offers a financial structure that enables agencies to handle the 
uncertainty of client arrivals and departures and the incumbent economic difficulties. Agency 
owners understand that being purchased by a holding company also means that agencies receive 
(whether they want it to or not) injections of cash, and the intervention and guidance of senior 
executives who know how to work within a holding company environment, as well as a strategy to 
ensure further growth, and returns on initial investment. The pay-off to the founders of an agency 
can be large, both literally and figuratively, in terms of both money and seeing their agency grow 
into something larger or greater than it could have ever become on its own. 
Industrialization of Advertising
Given that advertising agencies expanded their reach because of their clients’ needs for global 
services, will these agencies take on other characteristics of their manufacturing counterparts? The 
work performed inside an advertising agency has not yet become a full-fledged “factory of ads,” in 
the way that manufacturing has transformed the creation of goods from artisanal artifacts to 
machine processed goods. There are several reasons why this is true. Firstly, the Creatives in the 
industry still need to have a pulse on the consumer, on the product, and on what the client is willing 
to do. The intersection of the three is where the idea for an advertisement is created, approved, and 
put into production. This portion of the agency—which remains elusive to holding company routine 
and control—is also usually the heart of the agency and what keeps it alive. The holding company’s 
management remains “hands-off” in that area, believing that it is better to keep the agencies 
producing work that clients will pay for, rather than attempting to control it. One successful example 
of this tactic has been WPP’s Martin Sorrell, who had the philosophy to intervene only at the financial 
department level and not to touch the business/client-facing side of the agencies he acquired. 
Secondly, the creation of the ads is based on the agency’s ability to manage and acquire clients, an 
activity that cannot be “industrialized.” The management of the client relationships is based on skill, 
not on a formula. Thus, two critical areas of an advertising agency remain elusively out of the reach 
from the structure and “routinization” that is common to factory manufacturing. 
Despite these two areas that seemingly refuse to enter “solidity,” there is a lot of work within the 
agency that can be structured and automated, and many agencies today are attempting to use 
technology to apply structure and automation to such processes. Workflow tools and digital asset 
management systems are increasingly being rolled out inside the agencies to capture through 
technology, the processes that the staff go through in taking the initial client “brief” (i.e., the problem 
or message that the client wants to resolve) to the end-product of a campaign based on said brief. 
Even now, many of the agencies in my holding company work on paper and depend on one person 
who knows the whole workflow for the agency (and, therefore, when and how each group should 
intervene in the process). Although Bauman indicated that technology would increase the liquidity 
of modernity, technology may also prove to be the tool that imposes solid structures into liquid 
agency processes. 
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The bureaucratization of the creative process has been a long time coming. The creative staff at 
the holding company, where I work, pushes back on the technology tools that restrain and attempt 
to build processes around their creativity. So far, they have been able to partially offset some of the 
“routinization” of their work. Administratively speaking, however, Creatives have not been able to 
escape basic processes like time-entry and job-code usage because the agency ultimately has to 
understand their costs against client billing, especially as profit margins become more difficult to 
acquire and holding company metrics and goals are set higher and higher. 
The future of the ad agency—in particular the traditional creative agency—may yet still be 
determined by consumer society’s increasing dependence on technology, such as the Internet, thus 
shifting the audience from traditional media to digital media. While television remains the largest 
medium for advertising (with the majority of media dollars being spent there), an increasing amount 
of studies and statistics show that the typical consumer is depending less on television for their 
entertainment, or to help them make their purchasing decisions. And so, as we already have started 
to see, advertising will be called to shift away from traditional media in order to embrace new media, 
e.g., digital advertising found on the Internet and applications that are developed for advertisers for 
use on mobile phones and social media. Holding companies have started to focus on this new area, 
acquiring as many digital shops as possible in an attempt to capitalize on this market. However, as 
mentioned earlier, Silicon Valley players are also encroaching in the domain that used to be exclusive 
to advertising agencies. In June 2013, WPP’s Martin Sorrell lashed out at these “tech” companies 
during the Cannes Lions awards, arguing that companies such as Facebook and AOL, while hiding 
behind the label of “tech company,” are encroaching into and acting in the advertising space without 
regard for their responsibility over the content of such ads (Glenday, June 21, 2013).
There is still one tenet that holds true about the advertising industry (even as it constantly 
changes): the creative content has to be there in order to convince the consumer to buy a product 
or brand. As long as consumers are still swayed by feelings and the market is still overwhelmed by 
product options, the creative output of advertising agencies will remain critical in determining what 
products are purchased by consumers. Technology may have changed the medium, but it has yet to 
bridge the gap between delivering the content and actually creating it. While Google and other 
companies may depend on advertising as their main source of revenue (Singel, July 19, 2011), they 
have yet to start creating the content of those ads—that is still being done by the advertiser (directly 
or through the help of an advertising agency). 
The mid-2000s saw the growth of “consumer-created advertising,” in which advertisers promoted 
competitions for consumer-created ads. The idea was premised on asking the consumers of a 
product to create a funny and interesting ad in exchange for prizes or money. Some advertising 
agencies promoted these contests, and after sifting through the entries, picked a select few that 
would move into a final competition round. In one such contest in 2012 and 2013, Doritos presented 
consumer-created ads during Super Bowl XLVII and offered a prize of working with a movie director, 
plus a $1 million cash award. While these ads have been good public relations gimmicks for PepsiCo 
(owner of the Doritos brand), this type of work is no different than working with an advertising 
agency or with PepsiCo’s own marketing staff. The human element of advertising still exists (whether 
it’s a paid Creative or a consumer-as-creative), even as the industry rapidly changes to keep pace 
with technological advances, consumer cynicism, and clients’ financial pressures. 















These changes are indicative of the continuing liquidity in the industry as the holding companies 
and agencies (as well as their clients and the consumer) adapt and shift within a changing market 
space. This highlights the importance of liquid coping strategies in order to succeed effectively over 
the long term. Admittedly, there is a paradox here between liquidity and the will to survive “over the 
long term.” In my research, the underlying coping strategy for the majority of the issues that result 
from this liquid environment has been the strength and nurturing of personal relationships. 
Learning to navigate the creation and maintenance of relationships has been the only way to stay 
successful within the organization. This is another paradox – relationships are a stabilizing force 
within liquidity; relationships become the “informal organizational chart” that can lead you to 
survival and “success.”
A Coda to the Story of Bruce
Bruce, who had worked within the Compliance organization for five years, 
was unhappy. All of us outside the group knew that he was unhappy, but he never told 
anyone whether or not he had an escape route. 
I knew Bruce was anxious about making a move to leave his role or the 
company. Whenever I pressed him, he would say that he did not see any positions open 
in the agency or even in his old department. He felt trapped in his role. While he never 
told me he worried, I knew his wife had a string of recent jobs, none of which had lasted 
longer than a few months. I didn’t know her well enough to figure out if she wasn’t 
seriously looking or whether the job market was really that difficult for them in their 
city. But I could tell that Bruce felt he needed to have a steady income to offset his wife’s 
less-than-consistent work schedule. 
A few months into the New Year, during a meeting with multiple departments 
and agencies, I heard Addy speak harshly to Bruce—in public. This was unheard of, 
especially in our company, where relationships mattered so much. I wasn’t the only one 
who noticed—another work friend later commented on it during a private call. We 
both agreed that it was not a good sign. This friend warned me that Bruce was at risk of 
losing his job; she had heard it through her own grapevine that Bruce’s management 
was unhappy with his performance. This explained why Addy seemed so comfortable 
publically castigating him. My alarm bells went off and so I spoke to Bruce, but again, 
he was anxious and nervous about making any moves or pushing for a new position 
elsewhere. I asked him if he felt his position was in danger and told him that Addy’s tone 
of voice and comments were not a good sign for him. Bruce then proceeded to tell me 
that it was normal for her to do this. He had seen it in some other meetings recently, and 
while he didn’t like it, he felt he couldn’t say anything about it since she was his manager. 
This set off even more alarms in my mind, which I voiced to Bruce, but again he shrugged 
them off.
I hoped he was right, that there was nothing to worry about. But I didn’t like 
Addy’s tone in that meeting and I didn’t want to see Bruce’s job eliminated. I knew Addy 
well enough to know that she often spoke in inappropriate tones; however, I could not 
confront her directly over Bruce, especially given our own history. I started asking some 
of my close confidantes at work if they had heard anything else about Bruce’s “Plan B” 
or if there was any news of his pending layoff. No one had heard a thing. 
A month later we gathered together for a global meeting. During one of the 
sessions, Bruce’s area of expertise was brought up in discussion. He wasn’t at the 
meeting, of course, because Addy didn’t let him travel as much anymore; nor was she 
present to represent her area. To my ears, the comments and problems that were being 
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discussed sounded like they could be addressed by someone like Bruce, and so I began 
to wonder if it was even a possibility to have him join our department. I knew my 
manager had budget restrictions and personnel limits, to the point that he was not 
hiring new individuals when employees left the department. But it couldn’t hurt to try. 
A month after that, I asked one of the directors in my department if there was 
a chance that we could create a position for someone like Bruce. I reminded her of the 
global meeting we had the month before and how Bruce could help address some of 
the issues that had been raised. To get her thinking in the right direction, I even 
suggested the names of managers to whom Bruce could report. The response was 
a positive “yes,” but because Bruce had been so careful about not speaking negatively 
about his department, he had led many to believe he was happy in his current role. 
I knew better and told the director that if we could create a position, Bruce would 
happily take it on. She asked me to confirm that.
I diligently went back to Bruce to report the news. He was excited and 
promised to follow up. I was happy to see a sliver of a chance to save him from his 
impending fate. When I spoke to him again, he told me he had already set up a second 
interview with the director, after the first one had gone well. We hashed over what he 
had said to her in the first call and I told him that he needed to be more direct about his 
interest in moving over. Bruce still worried about Addy or others on his department 
learning of his potential departure. But I told him frankly that he needed to look out for 
himself and that moving into a new position was not the same as burning a bridge 
behind him.
A few weeks later, through the grapevine, I received confirmation that all the 
background work had been done. Bruce had finally spoken up and was being transferred 
back to my department. Addy seemed fine with the decision, and Bruce did not seem to 
alienate anyone from his old department in the process. 
In this whole situation, what amazed me the most was that I was not the only 
one who came to Bruce’s rescue! While I had managed to put all of the pieces together 
to create something for Bruce, others from inside the agencies and in other departments 
were pushing to get Bruce into a new department as well. 
The fascinating part of the whole story is that, because Bruce had been at the 
company for so many years and had developed such strong relationships across 
various departments and agencies, these people came to his aid when he needed it 
most. I knew Bruce well and I couldn’t justify letting him languish; many others felt the 
same way. May we all receive that kind of support should we ever find ourselves in 
a similar situation! 
Bruce’s eventual “salvation” from the Compliance department is merely one anecdote of the 
many situations I have witnessed throughout my years in the organization, in which the bonds that 
coworkers have created amongst themselves has benefited them. Even Addy, who is not well-liked 
by many, still manages to have others come to her rescue time and time again.
Thus, in terms of human relationships, a paradox is created between the theory of liquid 
modernity and its application. Yes, the industry is liquid, but this fails to match Bauman’s definition 
when it comes to the precariousness of human bonds. As opposed to Bauman’s predictions, in this 
industry, human bonds are not frail (at least not within my group of professionals), because without 
the human bonds that are created, the industry, and with clients, value would be gone. So, while 
liquidity is an apt descriptor of the organization, this gap between theory and practice also leaves 















open the possibility that liquidity does not automatically create frail human relationships, as 
Bauman would have us believe. Instead, the liquidity of the environment may be the single greatest 
factor reinforcing human bonds. Despite Bauman’s warnings that a liquid environment would create 
fragile bonds that could be lost at a moment’s notice, what I have found with my coworkers is that 
the uncertainty of our environment has brought us closer together. Much like a life-changing 
experience can bring a group of people together, I suspect that the liquidity of our environment has 
created a stronger bond amongst my immediate group of coworkers because we need each other 
in order to proverbially survive. If it were not for the grapevine, the network that keeps us informed 
of and interlocked with the fates of one another, none of us would have ever been able to navigate 
the industry or the organization like we have done so far. Bauman may be right that certain 
relationships are less stable and easily ripped apart, but equally so, it has to be recognized that 
liquid events and situations can also create strong bonds.
Maybe these are the lessons for any scholar examining our current world. While liquidity does 
not capture everything in the advertising environment, it does describe certain aspects of it quite 
well. Indeed, advertising is an environment not only riddled with uncertainty and precarite, but also 
with some certainties and bonds. Moreover, it is certainty that things will be different tomorrow, so 
if the situation is unpleasant today, it can change. In other words, by recognizing that there are 
factors that can be described as liquid, inherent in much of our world, we can learn to identify and 
thus adapt to negative consequences of such liquidity as envisioned in Bauman’s theories in our 
stride. We can then use liquidity as a base to better design and implement human relationships and 
organizational strengths. Does then liquidity become a new structure or some kind of solid liquidity?
Turning to my analysis of the financialization of the advertising industry, the empirical evidence 
presented in my analysis and in my autoethnographic sketches supports a similar conclusion: the 
financialization of the industry brought about a different type of liquidity to organizations, which, in 
turn, brought about the need to understand the holding company and advertising agencies in 
terms of the financial markets. It was not enough to simply push for more revenue and growth; the 
holding company and its agencies (and, consequently, the employees within those organizations) 
had to start acting with shareholders and financial analysts in mind. 
As described in Chapter Six, Interpublic was able to survive near-bankruptcy because of the 
company’s access to banks and its ability to financialize itself by issuing stock to senior managers in 
exchange for capital, raising the rest of the capital it needed by converting itself into a public 
company. Not only was Interpublic saved in this way, but this strategy of financialization also created 
a model that other holding companies followed in order to fuel their own growth. Harper’s strategy 
of creating a holding company in the manner of General Motors becomes the de facto strategy for 
the consolidation of the advertising industry. This model became prevalent not only because of the 
benefits to clients who needed a global partner, but also because financialization permitted 
advertising companies to rapidly expand their size in terms of revenue, employees, and clients 
(through acquisitions). Conversely, WPP was created purely as a vehicle to conglomerate agencies 
under one holding company. Interpublic and WPP are examples of the new strategies that 
advertising agencies developed in order to thrive in the industry during the 1980s. The general 
consolidation of the industry was theoretically aligned with the holding companies’ gigantic clients, 
many of who had begun to demand globally available services, which led the agencies to enter into 
a second level of liquidity, that of financialization. 
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By entering into agreements, contracts, and financing with banks, the holding companies also 
entered a new environment, in which they were now beholden to the very same banks that had 
given them the ability to expand. Companies entered into the system of quarterly reporting, 
focusing on short-term goals at the behest of stock analysts, whose ever-changing edicts of what 
was good for the company’s stock price became the new paean for company officers and directors. 
Subsequent financial crises at holding companies like Interpublic caused shareholders to demand a 
different style of management; rather than letting ad-men and Creatives run the company, 
executives from the financial industry were brought in to run the organizations. 
Through the neoliberal policies that arose in the 1970s and 1980s, beliefs drastically changed. 
Short-term profit taking (from selling company shares) became the norm. This is exemplified today 
by high-frequency trading, which is only possible through the ultra-fast computer systems that are 
now available to traders and which try to capture profit over each trade, even trades than can come 
millionths of a second apart. This has resulted in approximately 50% of U.S. equity trading being 
done with such algorithms (Philips, June 6, 2013). This new trading activity has created more 
volatility in the markets and is clearly not focused on any long-term strategic planning by corporate 
managers. Thus, it is clear that these quarterly metrics and goal-settings that financial analysts 
request from companies drive the actual financial markets to become more and more liquid, as they 
drive for immediate profits. This increasing liquidity, in the financial markets, requires a specific sort 
of executive at the helm of publicly traded companies to deal with the effects of share prices, 
shareholder value, and associated risks.
With respect to Interpublic, for example, it was only upon the naming of more traditional, “solid” 
senior managers such as Michael Roth in 2005 that the company was able to right its ship financially 
and began to rebuild stock value. While responding to the liquid, short-term goals of the stock 
analysts, combined with the management style of liquid ad-men such as Philip Geier, John Dooner, 
and even David Bell, caused the company to teeter on the brink of financial ruin. More solid 
strategies, such as implementing long-term plans for growth and stability, assuaged the fears of 
investors and returned the company to (albeit meager) profitability. With similar strategies in place 
at WPP, the company has shown consistent profitability and growth during the same period. Thus 
again, liquidity produced a paradox and “solidified” some matters.
I have experienced repeated situations in which the cutting of corporate costs—the panacea to 
all stock price woes for stock analysts—has been performed through the implementation of rigid 
procurement systems and strictly hierarchical management structures. Rather than forcing solidity 
out of the organization, the added liquidity brought about through financialization seems to have 
resulted in solid structures returning to my workplace. Bauman argues that liquid modernity is 
ephemeral in comparison to solid modernity: “Not much can be gained from the ‘long-term’ 
considerations. If ‘solid’ modernity posited eternal duration as the main motive and principle of 
action, ‘fluid’ modernity has no function for the eternal duration to play” (Bauman, 2000, p. 125). 
Much in the same way that Bauman’s language and metaphors of liquidity help us to understand 
and contextualize the advertising industry; these same tools also help us to rationalize the 
financialization of holding companies. The language of liquidity gives us a lingua franca to describe 
the actions and the environment in which the holding companies find themselves. This can be seen 
in the corporate messages that holding company managers send to investors and stock analysts. In 
the WPP Annual Statement for 2012, for example, the company speaks of “increasing our flexibility 















in order to adapt our cost structure to significant market changes and by ensuring that the benefits 
of the restructuring investments taken in 2012 are realized” (WPP Annual Report 2012, p. 28). Here, 
the language is that of liquidity (“flexibility, “market changes”), but the message is one of 
financialization: reducing costs and growing through acquisitions. 
A significant particularity found in my autoethnographic research is the lack of “Creatives” in my 
analysis of the advertising industry. Historically, advertising has been synonymous with creativity, 
with the creation and juxtaposition of an image and copy (writing). But throughout this research 
and through the many holding company departments that were explored, none of the typical 
“creatives” appear. This lack of predominance, even in the areas touched by the subsidiary advertising 
agencies, is indicative of the breadth of the industry—the Creative may get the fame, glory, and 
awards, but the bulk of the companies are comprised of the remaining departments that manage 
the creative forces. The holding company phenomenon created organizational overhead to handle 
publicly traded companies. Consequently, I was able to research corporate departments where, 
ultimately, our association with the creative product was, and is, many times removed. The roles and 
groups I studied fall in the organizational overhead. This corporate overhead was created to increase 
the capacity of the agencies to service clients, but ultimately, because of the 1980s financialization 
revolution, these corporate groups ended up handling the increased liquidity brought on by 
financialization. Because advertising had no fixed assets, only intellectual and human assets, the 
liquidity in the organization therefore increases without anything to slow down the process or 
reduce the effects. But as observed, financialization counteracted this in some ways. Creatives want 
to preserve “craftsmanship” and the back office wants to make the industry more efficient. Both of 
these forces are both liquid and solid within their goals, 
Finally, observing my organization in an autoethnographic fashion, I perceive that, seemingly 
despite all the liquidity in the organization, the company is still in some ways the same company 
now as ten years ago. Whether I am looking at the company in 1996 or 2006 or predicting what it will 
look like in 2016, the state of the company seems to remain the same. This seems to indicate a given 
level of solidity despite the highly liquid environment in which we work. Perhaps the source of this 
dichotomy lies in the tenure and relative stability of the holding company organization. My 
coworkers would argue that, at the end of the day, they have survived the multiple acquisitions and 
restructurings because they know fundamentally how to adapt to the environment. Rather than 
focusing on their ability to go up or down the corporate ladder—a common indicator of “success”—
the fact that they are still in the industry and in the same holding company/agency is an indicator of 
their adaptive skills and their “success” in surviving (or thriving) in the liquidity of the organization. 
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An Autoethnographic Reflection on the Relevancy of This Research
When I first started in this company, I had very little knowledge of the industry, 
the company that employed me, and the agencies I was serving. This research allowed 
me to understand industry differently. I was able to see that my organization was part 
of a larger trend in the advertising industry and that this was an on-going process. This 
was comforting initially, because I had spent a good part of my time wondering if it was 
management failure to have “things under control,” or if this was a period of transition 
(that never ended). 
I learned that that the industry has been in a constant state of flux since its 
inception, which, by definition, is part of why it falls under the heading of a liquid 
modern industry. Chapter Four focused on the reasons why the industry came about 
and why it is liquid. The industry has been forced to evolve constantly to mirror and 
remain current with the outside evolution of three groups or forces critical to the 
advertising industry: the consumer, the financial markets, and technology. Thus, the 
changes and adaptations I saw in my corporate groups and ultimately, the entire 
organization are not going to stop – there is no “perfect state” when all of this activity 
will end and we will fall into an “operational” state (only taking care of the day to day). 
Because I was a part of one of the key areas – technology – I was seeing the effects of the 
changes up close and in some cases, directly asking the agencies to change. The 
company (and industry) is constantly changing, constantly evolving, and we, who work 
in it, have to learn to adapt to these changes. 
The harder part to internalize has been the impact of the financialization of 
the industry. Although I have worked both in private and publicly traded companies 
before, I have not worked at a level where the impact of the markets affected the 
decision making that my managers (or even I) had to take to this extent. I had to 
understand that the financialization of the industry arose from client activity, as the 
advertising agencies had to respond to their clients’ needs by not only expanding their 
reach to provide global services, but also by providing related services such as public 
relations, digital marketing, event management, and others. The holding companies’ 
goals are to keep as much of this business inside the company, as opposed to sharing it 
with others. The holding company structure creates a bubble of services under one roof. 
It has changed the “shape” of the firm, making it impossible to exist in the industry 
without a holding company structure to nurture, protect, or grow the organization. As 
such, the holding companies have changed the structure of the companies to include 
departments that, in a smaller firm, would have never been necessary or could have 
been specifically identified. Furthermore, it has required a specific set of skills in upper 
management to be able to handle the demands of the financial markets, making 
financially savvy executives a requirement, rather than a promoting client skills or 
creative skills as the main determinant of a good executive. Once I understood this 
aspect to the industry, it was easier for me to understand why certain decisions were 
short-term in nature, and why it seemed we catered more to the financial markets than 
to our clients. There may be a balance between the two, even if I am not yet clear on 
whether we are doing it well or whether my company is still trying to find some sort of 
(unrealizable?) balance or is somehow out of balance.
I also had to recognize that technological advances have significantly 
affected the business, both by easing some of the traditional overhead required to run 
a firm and by making formerly arduous, manual tasks (such as printing documents) 
much easier. But this was not just a change I had to understand – it’s a change that the 
agencies themselves are still trying to grasp. Since I worked in the technology 
department, I understood how important technology is for our business – if something 
breaks down, we scramble to fix it because the business could not function without it. 
For the agency, presentations and mock-ups for clients, which used to take weeks to 















prepare, can now be created in minutes (with the right idea). Time has been compressed, 
as Bauman predicted, giving more time back to the advertising employee, but also, 
equally, tying him down to a computer and mobile phone, rather than “liberating” him 
from his desk. Furthermore, the technology industry has changed the face of society, 
the economy, and the advertising needs of clients. It is no longer enough to think of a 
campaign in terms of a television spot on a major network during prime-time. Rather, a 
complete advertising solution must now also include social media strategy and other 
digital aspects. However, I still see my own company and the agencies within it, 
struggling with the transition of technology as a “back-office” function to putting it into 
the “front-office” with the due respect (in terms of budget and staff) it then would 
receive.
The effects of all of these changes in the industry have created liquidity that 
effectively sorts out those who can handle the constantly changing environment from 
those who cannot. I have noticed and remembered varying accounts of strange events 
depicting how the changing environment affected those around me and my own 
reactions to events, such as last minute process changes without a concern to the fact 
that it was last minute, a changing hierarchy seemingly without notice or explanation, 
projects that are top priorities dropping in the list quickly only to rise again later, and 
more. This led to the creation of the autoethnographic stories in the research. The 
autoethnographic portion of the book demonstrates the various effects liquidity has 
had on me and my coworkers, through the financialization of the holding company, 
and its increasing needs and effects of the industry. 
Throughout this research, I have had the good fortune of finding a support 
system in my holding company that offered me a certain level of stability. In-company 
friends and mentors have been invaluable in helping me to understand how to view the 
organization and understand the industry. At any point during my early years in the 
company I could have easily sought out a more stable company, similar to the ones that 
I had worked at for before. My previous – and more stable companies – gave me not 
only a structured career track to follow (titles making specific sense to the actual role 
and power), but also gave me structured work to do within the roles. I could predict how 
much my salary could increase with a new position and every year, I could calculate the 
bonus I would receive based on my performance. I knew who would work with me and 
that their titles and roles would remain the same, at least with some consistency for a 
period of time. While technology was changing in those industries too, it was not 
changing it as fast as technology seems to be changing in advertising. 
But it was the support system and the challenges we faced that made the 
advertising experience worthwhile. The long tenures of my coworkers are indicative 
that the liquidity of the organization does not necessarily translate to high turnover. 
The similarity of their experiences to mine—of finding support and stability with one 
another—demonstrates that the ability to forge relationships was in this liquidity, 
crucial. As I saw over and over again, the original job description for a position became 
obsolete as soon as a new employee entered the job or when a promotion was granted; 
and this was not limited to our department. Even specific professional skills seemed to 
be transferrable to areas where people had no experience at all. In the stories that 
reference Addy, in Compliance, an example of someone who had very little risk 
management experience, but was moved into that department and given the 
opportunity to shape her future in there. Through her ability to relate to the head of the 
department, she was given free rein to re-organize the group she was a part of and 
eventually she came out on top, as a director to the department with a significant 
number of staff reporting to her. In other situations, not elaborated in the stories here, it 
was normal to speak to a newcomer and ask how they were finding their new job. It was 
always the case they would claim that things were going well, but that they had not 
been warned that their job would also include a number of other functions – this 
happened both at the global level (one head of a technology department thought his 
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work was only limited to the North America region) and at the local level (one 
technology manager was not told that his job responsibilities included not only the 
agency he was hired at, but also two additional agencies in the holding company). 
The benefit of this type of environment is that it provides all of us with 
experiences that we knew we would not easily get elsewhere – this comment was often 
exchanged whenever we would hit a wall in a project. It reminded us that even though 
the project might be difficult at this point, the experience itself was rewarding and 
challenging and in another company we would not be facing it. Despite our long 
tenures in the company, we know from our own past (or of others who left the company 
and went into other organizations) that we have a unique experience. I often repeated 
that I knew that in another company, run differently, with more solid processes and 
structures, the same projects would work well, but it was not a place I wanted to work 
in. It was the challenges and constant changes that forced us to think faster on our feet 
to solve problems. We were pushed to do better rather than to rest on our laurels. 
I think this brings me to a larger point about the advertising industry – in the 
end, it is an industry of humans, of people who bring ideas to the table and humans 
who end up creating ideas that bring others to buy or feel positive about a product. The 
focus on the human aspect of the industry means that even though it is a liquid industry 
and has many of the liquid modern aspects that Bauman defines; at the same time, the 
human connection is critical. Feeling close to my coworkers was not only due to working 
in the same department, but rather based on an understanding of the industry wherein 
human relationships matter. Agencies hire Account Directors who are well connected, 
who have relationships with people who can bring in business or have proven to be 
able to keep clients. In the holding company, our internal clients are other people in the 
company – we are not dealing with an anonymous unknown “consumer.” The work of 
the agency is to put a face and understanding to the anonymous consumer, in order to 
focus a campaign strategy on a specific niche demographic. Our company is not 
building refrigerators to an unknown consumer; it knows exactly who is being targeted. 
Humans can be often be confusing and complex in how they perceive 
situations and others. I recognize that my role as a participant and an observer gave me 
a unique insights to my environment that my coworkers may not have been afforded. I 
also recognize that this study was undertaken in a particular period of time – liquidity 
will change things, even as they remain they seem to remain the same. 
This then is the paradox that I find myself in by understanding how liquidity 
is defined by Bauman. I am faced with an environment that is both changing and un-
changing. This is still advertising; I am still in a holding company; and at certain levels it 
has remained the same. However, it is not the same. As the industry changes, so does 
the make up of the company. My holding company, along with its competitors, for 
instance, has made significant changes to the organization by consolidating the 
media-buying agencies under one group. A change like this can have a lasting effect on 
the industry (will consolidation of media buying change the pricing model? Improve 
the precision of the media-buy? Improve financial performance? Require different level 
of technology in the agency?). But at the same time, this reinforces my day to day 
continuity – consolidation of this type means that my job security gets stronger, as we 
centralize the media agency’s back office functions. Thus, these types of consolidation 
activities means things have to be done at the holding company level, not at the agency 
level. This happens again and again with other industry-wide or holding company-
wide changes. Whether it is an agency group doing better than expected or doing a lot 
worse, the justification is found to centralize as much as possible into the holding 
company. Thus, for us in the holding company, it becomes a more stable environment 
– but the changes in the industry and the holding company are constant and invariably 
affect us in different ways. 















There is a paradox even in that paradox – as changes and liquidity are 
expressed both because of the advertising industry (as described in Chapter Four) and 
in the liquidity of the financialization of the industry (as described in Chapter Six), our 
activities in the holding company attempt to create solid structures in the back office 
functions, both to benefit the clients of the agencies, and to signal to Wall Street and 
shareholders that our company can be trusted. Those of us that are high enough in the 
organization to create and document structured processes recognize that these 
documents and processes are ever changing. They remain solid enough for a client 
audit, but once the investigation is over, the process is free to change. The same applies 
whether we are looking at business processes or back office processes – they can 
become a “solid” form temporarily, as ice can remain a solid until it melts again into 
water. 
I have felt consternation throughout this analysis caused by the fact that 
I feel comfortable in this constantly changing world, but I feel that I should be rallying 
to bring some solidity back into what I see happening before me. I like the world that I 
am working in – intellectually I am challenged. But the headaches and the frustrations 
that I see in the people around me also make me want to actively “improve” this liquid 
chaos. I think that the way that I have been handling both my relationships with my 
coworkers and my own work is an attempt to find a way to handle this paradox. 
On one hand, I actively try to give solid information, advice, and solutions to 
my internal clients and my management. But I also know – as they probably do as well 
– that what I say today will probably change tomorrow. And the way through this 
dilemma is that I admit that it will probably change, and I try to gauge how radically it 
can change, and the possibility of change. I’m not the only one that does this; everyone 
outlined in this book, as well as others in my day to day (including my manager) will 
end a decision or conclusion with the phrase “Unless things change, of course.” Thus, 
part of my success in my role has been due to the transparency that I provide my agency 
management, as well as the holding company. I will tell the agency the same 
information both in private conversation, as well as in public, and with all the caveats 
that are needed (“Unless headquarters says differently, this is what I can promise you”; 
“As far as I know, yes, that’s the solution, but I will check again”), and I will immediately 
go back to the agency or management and explain that something has shifted or a 
different process is being created and thus the outcome or the promise or the solution 
has to change (or can’t be given). I’ve learned to take my ego out of the job – and 
recognize that I have to apologize and maintain the relationship, even if I was wrong – 
in order to continue in my role. 
The additional liquidity of financialization is the liquidity that does make me 
nervous. Intellectually I understand that the financialization was a step the agencies 
had to take, at least looking back at the results of the last thirty years. Rallying against 
financialization in the late 1970s or early 1980s would have been futile. But it is clear 
that short-term financial goals, and immediate action on perceived flaws in the 
company’s strategy, are also not the way to go – it affects the ability to create a long-
term strategy and reduce the ability of people within the company to pursue the 
business they are in, and instead, cater blindly to the financial markets. Today, it seems 
inevitable that the industry and our companies will have to deal with financialization. 
If advertising and manufacturing were a process of (post)modernization and 
consequently liquidity, then the logical conclusion is that financialization and the 
speeding up of the liquefaction processes result from the initial (post)modernization of 
society. 
What I am also seeing, as we are in an industry of persuasion and 
manipulation, is how my own company manages financialization. While we are 
invariably limited – especially at the holding company level – by the constraints the 
financial markets inflict upon us, I also see, from the inside, how much our own strategy 
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to the financial markets is a public relations campaign. We know ahead of time what 
the financial markets expect from us, and the corporate departments responsible for 
communicating this information to the analysts and shareholders work to massage 
and cater to those expectations. The mantra that we get told is that we have to show 
that we are “under control” – regardless of whether we are or not. In order to show 
confidence to the “outsiders,” I see our financial departments managing information, 
doling out the right numbers and metrics, when it is expected, producing anxiety in all 
the different departments, when finance determines something has to be cut or a 
revenue stream has to be made. Even as financialization attempts to “solidify” our 
structures and processes, the solids liquefy again. Now that I have been at this company 
for a number of years, I have seen that there is a pattern and the larger picture is that 
the company has eked out a space for a more ambitious strategy than it had before. 
I also find myself in another paradox, wishing for both that larger picture, i.e. 
a smarter leader, a more competent management team, and at the same time fearing 
that the levels above me do not have a grand-master plan or a long-term strategy, at 
all. Sometimes I see moments of brilliance and a flash of complete understanding of the 
larger picture. But then, later, I can be equally disappointed in the myopic plans or 
projects that are coming down from the same “leaders.” This makes me think that it 
cannot be either, but rather both. In this liquid environment, a brilliant long-term 
strategy is not possible, both because of the industry and because of its financialization. 
It is possible to be myopic but not have it harm the overall company, department, client 
or geographic region, because invariably, things will change. So, what might have been 
myopic in the past, might turn into the right strategy a few years later. Or the myopic 
view might be forced to change. 
Bauman has given me a language and a context within which to place my 
organization and my industry. Despite seeing some of the more troubling aspects of the 
industry and our role in the financialization of society, I still want to stay here. Despite 
what others might see as an unstable environment, where it seems that I have little 
control over the outcomes of what my organization is trying to do, even as I see that 
Bauman’s liquidity is present and the outcomes seem to be negative, I still want to stay. 
I understand that in some ways there is no understanding (or predicting) of this 
organization. This is paradoxical (again) – shouldn’t a deeper understanding give rise 
to better answers? I think this is where liquidity forces us to look at this differently at 
things. Rather than to focus on the solid, the solid of liquidity is the lack of solidity. But 
when liquidity is expected, then liquidity is less unknown. 
Conclusion
Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity does not indicate the paradoxes created when looking at 
a real situation through the lens of liquidity. The advertising holding company is a perfect case to 
showcase how liquidity appears in a specific industry. However, deeper analysis into the industry, 
the financialization of the industry, and the people that work within the holding company show a 
number of paradoxes and deviations from Bauman’s definition that needs to be highlighted. 
Primarily, the definition of liquid modernity is very rigid and in itself, prevents the boundaries from 
being liquid enough to encompass the application of the theory into reality. Secondly, the posited 
consequences of liquid modernity rely heavily on the alienation of the individual and the broken 
relationships that should appear. However, in the organization studied, relationships were solid; 
many of my coworkers and I clung on to them to steady ourselves in the liquidity. I believe that it is 
because of the relationships – and the value they possess – that liquidity does not destroy the 
people that work within it. Rather, it seems as though there is an ethical way to navigate liquidity, so 
that relationships remain strong, rather than break down. 
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Summary (English)
“Large-scale efforts are being made [by advertising companies], often with impressive success, 
to channel our unthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and our thought processes.... The 
result is that many of us are being influenced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in the 
patterns of our everyday lives.”
Vance Packard, “The Hidden Persuaders” (1957)
After centuries of being bombarded in our daily lives by advertising, no one doubts the power 
of the advertising industry to affect us. But within the realm of advertising itself, it is the advertising 
holding company that has the power and dominates the management of the industry.
Within the holding company, but outside the advertising agencies that comprise it, there is 
a group of corporate departments which provide “back office” functions such as human resources, 
finance, and information technology for these agencies. Within these departments, there are 
employees who experience the effects of the advertising industry and the financial markets through 
their responsibilities, projects, and daily operations. This group functions silently, behind the scenes, 
despite the critical role they play maximizing the financial benefits from the holding company 
structure. 
A study of the complications and difficulties of working in these corporate back office 
departments is shown through autoethnographic sketches of my experience in a holding company, 
in the three departments of technology, compliance, and procurement. An outside observer or 
newcomer might label the chaos and turmoil in these departments as “mismanagement.” However, 
my analysis suggests that holding companies function in this manner due to very purposeful 
historical and financial reasons, and the employees within these organizations are expected to 
manage what seem as outwardly problematic and dysfunctional processes. 
The theory of liquid modernity as defined by Zygmunt Bauman manages to classify and 
contextualize the chaos in the advertising holding company. Bauman’s definition of modernity puts 
into place the role of the manufacturing (client) companies versus the advertising agencies in 
a dichotomy between solid and liquid structures. He categorizes certain qualities and characteristics 
in solid modern companies such as factories and other manufacturing industries and contrasts 
them to liquid modern companies such as advertising firms.
Historically, advertising firms had many of the qualities that define them as liquid organizations, 
thus creating the type of organization in which liquidity was commonplace and employees were 
expected to function and thrive in that environment. The nature of the product of advertising sets 
up the organization in this manner: the product is an idea and the most valuable asset in the firm is 
the staff, both which are resources that cannot be easily reproduced or duplicated. Attempts to 
solidify the advertising firm led to the creation – and later, proliferation – of the advertising holding 
company that comprises of multiple agency brands catering to different clients. The structure of this 
arrangement worked very well for the industry, and today this type of organization dominates the 
landscape. 
Despite the framework that holding companies seem to give the advertising industry, the 
liquidity of the industry itself did not allow it to remain very solid. With changes in the late 20th 
Veronica Millan_2.indd   203 2/13/14   7:13 PM
204
century in the financial markets, the wave of financialization affected the industry, just as it affected 
the clients of that industry. Financialization also necessitated the further development of the 
holding companies in order to manage the financial expectations for these now publically traded 
companies. Without the financialization of the advertising companies, they would not have been 
able to expand and grow. Indeed those agencies that failed to do so were acquired by those that 
took advantage of the financial markets. As a consequence, the advertising holding companies now 
had to handle a different type of ownership: the active shareholder. This turn of events and new 
focus imparted on the holding companies a second layer of liquidity.
Throughout this book, the autoethnographic sketches bring to life the experience of the holding 
company employee navigating between these two sets of liquidity. Furthermore, Bauman’s 
definition of liquidity creates paradoxes when applied to an actual set of data. This highlights the 
shortcomings of Bauman’s rigid definition of liquidity and the need for a more flexible (liquid) 
definition. Finally, the data show that one of the significant coping skills necessary to navigate the 
forces of liquidity in the company is the establishment and strength of relationships across the 
organization.
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Samenvatting (Nederlands)
“Large-scale efforts are being made [by advertising companies], often with impressive success, 
to channel our unthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and our thought processes.... The 
result is that many of us are being influenced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in the 
patterns of our everyday lives.”
Vance Packard, “The Hidden Persuaders” (1957)
Na eeuwen gebombardeerd te zijn door reclame in ons dagelijks leven, twijfelt niemand aan de 
kracht van de reclame-industrie die ons beïnvloed. Maar binnen het rijk van de reclame zelf, is het 
de reclame houdstermaatschappij die de macht heeft en het beheer van de industrie domineert.
Binnen de houdstermaatschappij, maar buiten de reclamebureaus die daar deel van uitmaken, 
is er een groep van stafafdelingen die de reclamebureaus van “back office” functies voorzien, zoals 
personeelszaken, financiën en informatietechnologie. Binnen deze afdelingen zijn er werknemers 
die de effecten ervaren van de reclame-industrie en de financiële markten door middel van hun 
verantwoordelijkheden, projecten en dagelijkse activiteiten. Deze groep werkt stil, achter de scher-
men, ondanks de kritieke rol die zij spelen bij het maximaliseren van de financiële voordelen van de 
houdstermaatschappij structuur.
Een studie naar de complicaties en problemen van het werken in deze back office afdelingen 
wordt getoond door auto-etnografische schetsen van mijn ervaring in een houdstermaatschappij, 
in de drie departementen van technologie, naleving van wet- en regelgeving en aanbestedingen. 
Een externe waarnemer of nieuwkomer zou mogelijk de chaos en onrust in deze afdelingen labelen 
als “wanbeheer”. Echter, mijn analyse suggereert dat houdstermaatschappijen die, als gevolg van 
zeer doelgerichte historische en financiële redenen en de werknemers binnen deze organisaties 
waarvan wordt verwacht dat zij deze beheren, op deze manier functioneren, dat van buitenaf lijkt 
als problematisch en disfunctionele processen. 
De theorie van de vloeibare moderniteit zoals gedefinieerd door Zygmunt Bauman managet 
het classificeren en contextualiseren van de chaos in de reclame houdstermaatschappij. Bauman’s 
definitie van moderniteit plaatst de rol van de productiebedrijven (cliënt) versus de reclamebureaus 
in een tweedeling tussen vaste en vloeibare structuren. Hij categoriseert bepaalde kwaliteiten en de 
kenmerken in solide moderne bedrijven zoals fabrieken en overige verwerkende industrieën en 
contrasteert hen aan vloeibare moderne bedrijven zoals reclamebureaus.
Historisch, reclame bedrijven hadden veel van de kwaliteiten die ze definieert als vloeibare or-
ganisaties, dus het creëren van het type organisatie waarin vloeibaarheid alledaags was en werkne-
mers werden verwacht om te functioneren en gedijen in die omgeving. De aard van het product 
van reclame plaatst de organisatie op deze manier: het product is een idee en de meest waarde-
volle activa in de onderneming is het personeel die beiden middelen zijn die niet gemakkelijk kun-
nen worden gereproduceerd of worden gedupliceerd. Pogingen om het reclamebureau te stollen 
leidde tot de oprichting- en later, proliferatie – van de reclame houdstermaatschappijen bestaande 
uit meerdere agentschappen en merken voor verschillende klanten. De structuur van deze regeling 
werkte heel goed voor de industrie, en dit soort organisatie domineert tegenwoordig het land-
schap.
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Ondanks het kader dat houdstermaatschappijen de reclame-industrie lijken te geven, de liqui-
diteit van de industrie zelf stond het niet toe zeer solide te blijven. Met veranderingen in de late 20e 
eeuw in de financiële markten, de golf van financialisering trof de industrie, zoals het de klanten van 
die industrie trof. Financialisering maakte de verdere ontwikkeling van de houdstermaatschappijen 
noodzakelijk om de financiële verwachtingen van deze houdstermaatschappijen, nu beursgeno-
teerde bedrijven, te managen. Zonder de financialisering van de reclamebedrijven hadden ze niet 
kunnen uitbreiden en groeien. Inderdaad werden de agentschappen die hierin faalden overgeno-
men door degenen die van de financiële markten profiteerde. Dientengevolge, moesten de reclame 
holdingmaatschappijen nu omgaan met een ander type van eigendom: de actieve aandeelhouder. 
Deze wending en nieuwe focus gaven de houdstermaatschappijen een tweede laag van ‘liquiditeit’. 
In dit boek brengen de auto-etnografische schetsen de ervaring tot leven van de medewerker 
van de houdstermaatschappij navigerend tussen deze twee sets van ‘liquiditeit’. Bovendien, creëert 
Bauman’s definitie van ‘liquiditeit’ paradoxen wanneer toegepast op een werkelijke verzameling van 
gegevens. Dit wijst op de tekortkomingen van de Bauman strikte definitie van ‘liquiditeit’ en de be-
hoefte aan een meer flexibele (vloeibare) definitie. Tot slot, uit de gegevens blijkt dat een van de 
belangrijke omgangsvaardigheden nodig om te krachten van de ‘liquiditeit’ te sturen in het bedrijf 
de oprichting en de kracht van relaties in de gehele organisatie.
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